bp  EoIaiUJ  (0. 

PUBLISHED   BY 

HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN  COMPANY 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE. 
PAN-GERMANISM. 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 


A  STUDY  IK 
AMEBICAtf  FOKEIGKtf  POLICY 

BY 

ROLAND   G.   USHER,  PH.D. 

x/ 

Professor  of  History  in  Washington  University,  St.  Louis 

Author  of  "Pan-Germanism"  "Pan- Americanism" 
"  The  Rise  of  the  American  People,"  etc. 


Let  us  raise  a  standard  to  which  the  wise  and  honest  can  repair 

George  Washington 


BOSTON  AND  NEW  YORK 
HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN  COMPANY 
fttoer$l>e  pK$$ 
1916 


SANTA    BARBARA.   CALIF. 


COPYRIGHT,   1916,  BY  ROLAND  G.   USHER 
ALL  RIGHTS  RESERVED 

Published  March  igib 


TO 

THREE  STURDY  FKIENDS  AND  TRUE 
MY  BROTHERS 


PREFACE 

MY  title  perhaps  requires  definition.  By  chal- 
lenge I  mean  to  call  to  account,  to  ask  an  explana- 
tion of;  by  future,  I  mean  our  own  posterity.  In- 
evitably we  must  appear  at  the  bar  of  posterity 
and  answer  the  challenge  of  the  future  by  giving 
an  account  of  our  stewardship  of  American  inter- 
ests. "  Upon  this  moment  of  time  hangs  all  eter- 
nity ";  upon  our  decisions  unquestionably  depend 
the  liberty  and  prosperity  of  our  posterity.  The 
point  of  view  is  all  essential :  do  we  act  for  our- 
selves alone  in  preparation  for  such  difficulties  as 
are  at  present  imperative  or  shall  we  envisage 
the  distant  future  as  the  true  objective  of  Amer- 
ican policy  and  ideals?  I  do  not  hesitate  to  ad- 
here to  the  latter  alternative  as  the  only  course 
of  which  the  wise  and  honest  can  approve.  Pro- 
tected ourselves  by  subtle  and  peculiar  forces 
not  within  our  own  control,  we  must  realize  that 
every  probability  points  to  their  disappearance 
in  the  near  future,  and  that  we  must  prepare  for 
later  generations  some  adequate  substitute,  pref- 
erably within  their  control.  We  may  die  unto 
ourselves,  but  we  must  live  for  posterity. 
This  book  is  not  a  forecast  of  what  American  f or- 
vii 


PREFACE 

eign  policy  will  be,  still  less  a  prophecy  of  coming 
events,  but  an  essay  in  expediency.  It  describes 
what  seems  to  me  the  policy  most  consistent  with 
itself,  that  most  expedient  in  view  of  our  econo- 
mic disabilities  and  our  comparatively  disorgan- 
ized administrative  and  industrial  fabrics,  that 
most  feasible  in  the  light  of  European  interests 
and  ambitions.  It  is,  I  hope,  impartial  and  non- 
partisan,  not  exalting  as  expedient  what  coincides 
with  our  passions  or  prejudices,  but  seeking  to 
develop  a  policy  by  a  consistent  application  to 
the  problems  before  us  of  the  fundamental  postu- 
lates and  logic  of  history,  political  science,  and 
political  economy.  The  number  of  idealistic  fore- 
casts of  the  future,  the  strength  and  variety  of 
the  prejudices  now  existent  in  all  countries,  the 
very  fact  of  this  apparently  irreconcilable  clash  of 
ideals,  interests,  and  prejudgments,  should  prove 
the  futility  of  books  that  seek  to  play  upon  the 
emotions. 

Nothing  except  a  disinterested  study  of  Amer- 
ican conditions  and  European  ambitions;  nothing 
short  of  an  unsparing  analysis  of  our  weaknesses, 
economic,  administrative,  and  military;  nothing 
less  than  a  willingness  to  accept  as  postulates  the 
psychology  of  the  European  and  the  American 
public  mind  as  we  know  them  to  exist,  can  provide 
fundamental  postulates  that  will  bear  the  test  of 
adoption.  If  we  believe  that  reason  differentiates 

viii 


PREFACE 

man  from  the  animals,  and  that  a  conscious  appli- 
cation of  his  intelligence  and  judgment  to  the 
problems  of  existence  has  produced  such  progress 
as  has  been  made  hi  civilization,  we  must  agree 
that  a  livable  solution  of  immediate  issues  and 
the  hope  of  permanent  peace  can  proceed  only 
from  a  dispassionate  analysis  of  forces  and  factors 
in  the  light  of  what  scientific  research  supposes 
to  be  reason  and  truth.  Passionate  desire  for 
good,  like  blind  prejudice,  in  refusing  to  accept 
the  results  of  reason  and  analysis,  declines  to  use 
the  only  prop  which  has  sustained  man  hi  his 
slow  evolution  out  of  barbarism.  Experience  tells 
me,  however,  that  those  who  dislike  my  conclu- 
sions will  justify  their  disagreement  by  denying 
the  accuracy  of  the  history  and  the  cogency  of  the 
logic  by  which  they  are  established.  Every  one 
has  some  postulates  of  belief  too  firmly  embedded 
hi  emotions,  interests,  or  traditions,  to  be  shaken 
by  mere  reason  or  logic. 

In  my  effort  to  simplify,  emphasize,  and  corre- 
late, I  am  aware  that  I  have  created  a  picture 
more  definite,  clear,  and  one-sided  than  the  situ- 
ation warrants.  Truth  to  tell,  our  dangers  should 
not  be  painted  black,  nor  our  hopes  white;  our 
possible  adversaries  are  not  entirely  actuated  by 
ambition  and  greed,  nor  are  we  ourselves  made  hi 
the  image  of  angels.  A  true  picture  would  be  a 
rather  confused  blur  of  different  shades  of  gray, 

ix 


PREFACE 

which  melt  into  one  another  with  here  a  shadow 
and  there  a  streak  of  white.  But  the  attempt  to 
represent  such  values,  to  qualify,  to  discuss  op- 
posing views,  and  provide  in  footnotes  some  in- 
dication of  the  extent  and  variety  of  the  critical 
investigations  on  which  the  book  is  based,  threat- 
ened to  double  its  size  without  convincingly  ac- 
complishing any  of  these  desirable  ends.  It 
seemed  better  not  to  risk  the  loss  of  clarity  and 
emphasis  for  the  sake  of  an  academic  accuracy  of 
statement  and  a  critical  apparatus  too  brief  to  be 
made  intelligible  to  the  layman  or  rendered  con- 
vincing to  the  expert. 

After  deliberation,  it  seemed  doubtful  whether 
any  critical  apparatus  could  render  the  main 
propositions  more  plausible.  If  my  readers  quar- 
rel with  my  interpretation  of  economic  history, 
with  my  idea  of  European  ambitions,  of  the  com- 
parative economic  development  of  this  country 
and  Great  Britain,  or  with  my  notions  of  logic, 
impartiality,  and  truth,  neither  footnotes,  author- 
ities, nor  qualifications  will  put  us  en  rapport. 
The  logical  structure  of  the  book  must  be  its  own 
justification. 

I  hope,  however,  that  my  attempt  to  attain 
clarity,  and  to  emphasize  certain  views  and  fac- 
tors, will  not  lead  the  reader  to  conclude  that  I 
am  claiming  any  certainty  of  knowledge  that 
the  events  described  will  happen  or  the  policies 


PREFACE 

advocated  will  be  adopted.  I  disclaim  with  what 
vehemence  there  is  in  me  any  attempt  to  prophesy 
or  predict  or  vaticinate  in  the  vulgar  sense  of  the 
words.  I  make  no  claim  to  read  the  stars,  to  com- 
municate with  spirits,  or  to  draw  upon  the  occult 
for  information.  The  forecaster  is  an  investiga- 
tor, an  analyst,  a  seeker  for  tentative  probabili- 
ties, and  utilizes  merely  the  premises  and  logic  of 
science.  Indeed,  my  real  aim  has  been  to  show 
what  the  result  is  of  a  strict  application  to  the 
present  situation  of  the  premises  established 
through  a  study  of  the  past,  by  means  of  a  criti- 
cal method  as  dispassionate  and  thorough  as  I 
should  use  hi  analyzing  foreign  policy  in  the  six- 
teenth century. 

WASHINGTON  UNIVEESITT,  ST.  Louis, 
January,  1916. 


CONTENTS 

I.  ON  BELIEVING  THE  INCREDIBLE 

What  the  American  people  believe  to  be  incredible      ...  1 

The  incredible  merely  the  unexpected,  the  unintelligible      .  3 

Its  dangers 4 

Its  cause,  our  failure  to  think  in  international  terms    ...  4 

Inadequacy  of  older  premises  of  American  thought      ...  10 
Inconsistency  of  earlier  traditions  and  policies       .      .      .      .12 

Democracy  and  foreign  policy 14 

Our  international  status  still  indefinite 15 

The  meaning  of  nationality 16 

"A  standard  to  which  the  wise  and  honest  can  repair"  .      .  17 

H.  THE  APPROACHING  PERIL 

Our  future  prosperity  in  danger 19 

Economic  status  of  undeveloped  countries     ....       ,19 

Abnormal  character  of  their  trade 22 

What  the  borrowing  of  capital  involves     ....  ,22 

Its  effect  upon  competitive  business ,23 

Abnormal  basis  of  American  trade  with  Central  America  .      .    25 

And  with  South  America ,25 

Our  probable  loss  of  trade  at  close  of  present  war       ...    27 
Probable  future  exclusion  of  our  merchants  from  markets  of 

undeveloped  countries .29 

Consequent  danger  to  our  future  prosperity SO 

III.  THE  CONTINGENT  DANGER 

The  aggressive  position  of  the  United  States  at  Panama    .      .  35 

Vulnerability  of  the  Canal's  position 37 

Prerequisites  of  its  defense 38 

Our  aggressive  position  in  the  Pacific 39 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  an  aggressive  policy 42 

South-American  view  of  Pan-Americanism 43 

xiii 


CONTENTS 

Preparedness  will  involve  danger  of  immediate  attack  on  these 

positions  and  policies 46 

An  invasion  to  secure  their  cession  possible 46 

IV.  NEUTKAL  RIGHTS  AND  NATIONAL 
PRESTIGE 

European  view  of  recent  American  policies 49 

Their  charge  of  inconsistency  and  hypocrisy 51 

Their  idea  that  key  lies  in  party  politics 54 

Character  of  immediate  problems 57 

Geographical  expansion  of  American  interests        ....  57 

American  conception  of  international  law 59 

American  notions  of  international  practice 60 

Legal  status  of  aliens 61 

Subtle  dangers  inherent  in  these  issues 63 

V.  THE  ESSENTIAL  MEASURE  OF 
PREPAREDNESS 

Value  of  American  interests,  not  their  danger,  the  significant  fact  65 
Only  formulation  of  foreign  policy  can  evaluate  them  .  .  66 
Obsolescence  of  offensive  policies;  meaning  of  defense  .  .  66 
Comparative  and  relative  character  of  preparedness  .  .  68 
Analysis  of  American  conditions  essential  to  decision  upon  ex- 
pediency and  scope  of  preparedness 70 

VI.  FUNDAMENTAL  AMERICAN  INTERESTS 

American  interests  those  implicit  in  European  policies      .       .  72 
The  right  to  define  humanity  and  justice  in  terms  of  American 

ideals 75 

The  right  to  define  American  interests  in  terms  of  American  life  76 

Analysis  of  our  economic  interests 77 

Inalienable  character  of  these  rights 78 

Imperative  necessity  for  defense 80 

Interpenetration  of  American  rights  by  European  ambitions   .  81 

Interdependence  of  modern  world 81 

Subtlety  of  modern  problems  of  defense 82 

The  defensive-offensive 84 

xiv 


CONTENTS 

VII.  IMPERATIVE  NECESSITY  OF  FORCE 

Various  types  of  force 86 

Ultimate  character  of  military  force 87 

Fundamental  reasons  for  relying  upon  it 87 

Normality  of  war 92 

Economics  and  ethics  of  war 94 

Definition  of  peace ..98 

Inadequacy  of  arbitration 97 


VEIL  IS  PROSPERITY  INDISPENSABLE? 

Meaning  of  prosperity  to  Americans 103 

It  is  indispensable  in  order  to  pay  present  extravagant  cost  of 

democratic  government 105 

It  is  imperative  to  maintain  present  level  of  personal  comforts  107 

It  is  essential  if  political  reform  is  to  succeed 109 

It  is  necessary  if  education  of  the  masses  is  to  be  more  than 

superficial 110 

The  factors  threatening  its  continuance 113 


IX.    CAN  ARMED  FORCE  PROTECT 
PROSPERITY? 

Past  generations  have  believed  it  has 116 

Present  statesmen  believe  it  can 117 

Improbability  that  we  are  wiser  than  past  and  present  Eu- 
ropeans          H' 

Force  cannot  create  economic  phenomena 119 

It  can  hasten,  retard,  or  assist  their  operation      .       .      .       .121 
True  American  problem  the  hastening  of  economic  independ- 
ence         12^ 

Force  can  seize  natural  highways  and  resources     .       .       .       .125 

Economics  of  nationalization:  its  profits 126 

Force  can  insure  continuity  of  economic  processes  .  .  .  127 
It  can  juxtapose  capital,  labor,  and  natural  resources  .  .  .  128 
It  can  create  new  social  entities  and  new  economic  wants  .  .  131 

Our  need  for  force  in  future 133 

It  can  maintain  degree  of  profit  in  business 134 

XV 


CONTENTS 

X.  FUNDAMENTAL  ECONOMIC  DISABILITIES 

Use  of  force  to  create  economic  factors  in  America      .       .      .  136 

Influence  of  sea  power  on  United  States 136 

Early  dependence  on  Europe  for  necessities  of  civilized  life  .       .  142 

Lack  of  medium  of  direct  exchange 143 

First  solution  in  triangular  trade  through  West  Indies      .      .  143 

Second  in  export  of  foodstuffs  to  France 147 

Third  in  cotton  culture 148 

Medium  of  domestic  exchange  in  California  gold  .  .  .  .149 
Development  of  country  has  ended  this  type  of  dependence  .  150 
Present  relative  economic  status  of  United  States  .  .  .  151 
Still  a  debtor  country:  owes  its  capital  investment  .  .  .153 

Amount  of  this  indebtedness 155 

Our  economic  fabric  inferior  in  efficiency  to  best  European 

countries 156 

Supplies  of  capital  insufficient  to  enter  foreign  investment  field 

on  large  scale 159 

Our  fundamental  economic  disabilities  basic  postulate  of  Ameri- 
can foreign  policy 162 


XI.  THE  PRICE  OF  ISOLATION 

Isolation  means  complete  independence  of  Europe       .      .      .164 

European  view  of  its  implications 166 

Impossibility  of  defending  isolation  by  economic  pressure  on 

Europe 167 

Or  by  an  embargo  on  exports 169 

Price  of  independence  the  effort  necessary  to  interfere  in  Eu- 
rope         171 

Independence  would  require  United  States  to  become  control- 

•  ling  factor  in  international  politics 172 

Prerequisites  of  so  extensive  an  effort 174 

Not  to  be  achieved  in  less  than  half  a  century       .      .      .      .175 
Isolation,  independence,  spell  Pan-Germanism       ....  176 

XII.  INEXPEDIENCY  OF  INDEPENDENCE 

Independence  means  destruction  of  democracy  in  effort  to  pre- 
serve it 178 

xvi 


CONTENTS 

It  means  aggression  and  is  contrary  to  our  non-military  tra- 
dition and  leanings  toward  pacifism 179 

It  involves  centralization  of  administration  and  industry  con- 
trary to  our  traditions  .  .  .  .  *  .  .  179 

It  is  inexpedient  because  its  price  is  greater  than  the  value  to 
us  of  the  interests  it  defends 181 

It  is  unnecessary  for  safety  or  prosperity 182 

It  is  also  unattainable  at  present 183 

Feasibility  doubtful  of  so  extended  an  attempt  to  hasten  eco- 
nomic independence 185 

Limitations  of  security  not  terrifying 187 

XIII.  FOREIGN  ALLIANCE  IMPERATIVE 

Present  interests  of  United  States  can  be  advanced  only  by 

foreign  alliance 191 

Significance  of  alliances  in  European  politics 193 

Inexpediency  of  isolation 193 

Key  to  international  situation  lies  in  European  policies  .  .  197 
Identity  of  American  and  European  economic  interests  .  .198 
Our  interests  most  needing  protection  are  isolated  from  us  .  .  199 
Alliance  possible  only  on  terms  of  European  nations  .  .  .  201 

European  attitude  toward  United  States 203 

We  must  adopt  European  traditions  of  diplomatic  intercourse  206 
And  accept  European  definition  of  international  law  .  .  .  207 

Perils  of  double  allegiance 208 

Expediency  of  permanence  of  tenure  in  our  diplomatic  service  209 
Advantages  of  alliance  transcendent 211 

XIV.  ALLIANCE  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN 

Great  Britain  only  power  with  whom  we  can  at  present  ally 

on  favorable  terms 213 

Fundamental  relationship  between  the  two  nations  .  .  .  214 
Alliance  will  at  once  give  us  results  of  economic  independence 

and  complete  security 216 

Alliance  will  protect  citizens  and  interests  in  Europe  .       .      .217 

No  fundamental  clash  of  interests  to  hinder 218 

Advantage  to  Great  Britain  in  certain  source  of  supplies   .      .  220 

In  safe  location  for  investment  of  capital 221 

xvii 


CONTENTS      . 

If  Germany  wins  on  Continent,  only  alliance  with  us  can  en- 
able Great  Britain  to  continue  fight 222 

Superior  advantages  for  us  in  alliance  with  Great  Britain  over 

any  other  European  nation 223 

Victory  of  Allies  also  more  advantageous  for  us  than  of  Central 
Empires 229 

Probable  result  of  defeat  of  Great  Britain  on  sea         ...  232 


XV.  RENUNCIATION  OF  MARITIME 
AMBITIONS 

Uneconomic  character  of  demand  for  merchant  marine  .  .  235 
Contact  with  world  assured  by  mutuality  of  interest  of  all 

nations  in  its  continuity 237 

Alliance  with  sea  power  assures  a  merchant  marine  better  and 

cheaper  than  we  can  organize 238 

Fundamental  economic  disabilities  in  way  of  American  marine  240 
History  of  American  conditions  in  relation  to  merchant  marine  241 

Present  attractions  of  life  on  shore  a  barrier 242 

Present  profits  not  great  enough  to  attract  American  capital  in 

competition  with  business  on  shore 245 

Disabilities  do  not  affect  lake,  river,  and  coastwise  trade  .  .  246 
Inexpedient  for  us  to  compete  with  Great  Britain  ....  247 
Merchant  marine  impotent  to  create  direct  trade  with  South 

America 248 

It  is  not  true  remedy  for  our  difficulties    .      .      .      .      .      .  249 

No  real  gain  probable  from  its  creation 251 


XVI.  ASIATIC  PROBLEMS 

Japanese  ambitions 253 

The  golden  opportunity  in  1914 258 

Japanese  policy  hi  regard  to  China 259 

Its  defensive  aspect 260 

Probable  action  in  the  immediate  future 261 

The  alternative  for  the  United  States 263 

Japanese  apprehensions  of  danger  from  us 263 

American  economic  disabilities  counsel  surrender  of  Pacific  to 

Japan 265 

xviii 


CONTENTS 

No  present  losses  of  importance  involved 267 

Loss  of  Philippines  and  Hawaii  not  significant       ....  268 
No  danger  of  attempt  to  colonize  our  Pacific  coast  ....  269 

Impossibility  of  coercing  Japan  at  present 270 

Acceptance  of  stand  of  Western  States  against  right  of  Japan- 
ese to  own  land,  etc 271 


XVII.  SOUTH  AMERICA  AND  THE  MONROE 
DOCTRINE 

Indefiniteness  and  inconsistency  of  interpretations  of  Monroe 

Doctrine  a  source  of  grave  danger 274 

Accuracy  of  European  and  Latin-American  views        .      .      .  275 

Extent  to  which  it  is  already  obsolete 275 

Its  clash  with  our  democratic  and  social  traditions  .      .      .  276 

Fallacies  of  Pan-Americanism 277 

Monroe  Doctrine  assumes  an  independence  of  Europe      .      .  279 
Inadequacy  of  proposals  to  expand  or  amend  it     ....  282 
All  extensions  of  relationship  with  Latin  America  mutually 
beneficial  not  different  from  their  and  our  relations  with 

Europe 285 

Use  of  term  "Pan- Americanism"  unfortunate       ....  285 
True  basis  of  our  relations  with  Latin  America      ....  286 


XVIII.  CENTRAL  AMERICA  AND  PANAMA 

The  policing  of  Central  America  by  adequate  armament  .  .  290 
The  defense  of  the  Panama  Canal  by  sea  and  land  ....  290 
Extension  of  American  commerce  with  Central  America  .  .  291 
Policy  justified  by: 

a.  Traditions  of  American  development      ....  292 

6.  Not  inexpedient  for  natives 293 

c.  Only  permanent  solution 294 

Army  to  be  strong  enough  to  make  resistance  impossible  .      .  296 

Coercion  accords  with  conditions 296 

Ability  of  United  States  to  perform  all  services  ....  298 
In  any  proper  sense,  a  defensive  policy  for  us  ....  299 
It  will  also  preserve  opportunity  of  abnormal  markets  in  distant 

future     301 

xix 


CONTENTS 

XIX.  SCOPE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

Actual  armament  needed  only  for  Central  America  and  Gulf      302 
Ultimate  scope  of  preparedness:  to  meet  the  incredible  .      .  303 

Details  to  be  decided  by  experts  only 304 

Adequacy  relative  and  comparative  quantity 305 

Scope  not  determined  by  circumstances  under  our  control .      .  806 

Present  status  of  army  and  navy 309 

Present  deficiencies  indicate  scope  of  present  measures    .      .310 

Correlation  of  army  and  navy  imperative 311 

Preparedness  to  be  executed  by  experts  only 312 

Time  to  prepare  probable 313 

Necessity  of  providing  for  contingency  of  defeat  of  Allies  .      .  316 
Expediency  of  preparing  for  offensive  alliance  with  Great 

Britain 317 

Cost  of  preparedness 318 

XX.  DANGERS  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

Bogies  and  bugbears 321 

Danger  we  shall  act  before  preparedness  is  completed  .      .      .  323 

Danger  people  will  cease  to  direct  movement 323 

Danger  we  shall  attempt  too  little 324 

Danger  we  shall  attempt  too  much 325 

Little  probability  it  will  impoverish  us 326 

Worst  calamity  the  failure  to  consummate  alliance  with  sea 

power 328 

Danger  preparedness  will  become  campaign  material  .      .      .  330 
Danger  it  will  become  a  new  source  of  corruption  ....  331 
Danger  that  vested  interests  will  use  it  to  advance  their  ends  332 
Danger  we  shall  attempt  to  give  it  economic  status  as  a  busi- 
ness   334 

Possibility  that  preparedness  will  be  too  ill-considered  to  be 

adequate 336 

Constitutional  obstacles          337 

Opposition  of  organized  labor  probable 338 

XXI.  THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

What  account  of  our  stewardship  shall  we  give  at  the  bar  of 

posterity       .     - 340 

XX 


CONTENTS 

The  true  majority  of  the  American  people  yet  to  be  born  .      .  341 
The  interests  and  rights  we  are  to  protect  are  not  ours,  but  be- 
long to  posterity 342 

Comparative  simplicity  of  our  immediate  problems  .      .      .  343 

Defense  easy  without  appeal  to  war 343 

Factors  on  which  we  must  now  rely  not  those  we  control      .      .  345 

They  are  also  changing  rapidly 346 

Uncertainty  of  their  future  condition  and  reaction  upon  us  .      .  347 
Preparedness  must  enable  us  to  postpone  the  decision  until  the 

reorganization  of  Europe  is  completed 347 

The  most  serious  of  our  present  disabilities  time  alone  can  solve  347 
Preparedness  must  secure  for  us  this  time  in  which  to  work  out 

our  domestic  issues 348 

The  greater  preparedness  which  is  spiritual     .....  349 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF 
THE  FUTURE 

CHAPTER  I 

ON   BELIEVING   THE   INCREDIBLE 

THE  immediate  danger  to  the  safety  and  future 
prosperity  of  this  country  lies  in  the  unwilling- 
ness of  the  American  people  to  believe  the  in- 
credible. They  feel  that  no  nation  flaunts  ag- 
gressive policies  before  us  nor  sighs  for  empires  to 
conquer  in  the  Western  Hemisphere.  Our  na- 
tional integrity  and  political  independence  are 
not  visibly  threatened;  the  persistence  of  our  in- 
stitutions is  not  a  matter  of  doubt;  the  location 
of  a  new  European  state  in  America  seems  to  be 
a  chimera;  and  the  colonization  of  the  Pacific 
coast  by  the  Japanese  is  apparently  a  figment  of 
the  imagination.  How,  then,  can  we  be  in  danger 
if  no  nations  intend  to  assail  us  and  if  we  our- 
selves cherish  no  aggressive  policies? 

Is  not  the  present  European  war,  where  nation 
is  arrayed  against  nation,  each  ardent  in  its  own 
defense,  a  product  of  delusion  and  insanity? 

1 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

Is  not  such  a  paradox  incredible  because  de- 
fense is  unthinkable  without  aggression?  It  is, 
moreover,  difficult  for  many  to  believe  that  a 
population  decimated  and  impoverished  by  the 
present  war  will  be  capable  for  generations  of 
anything  but  recuperation  and  the  binding  of  the 
wounds  of  war.  Will  not  this  fact  alone  render 
danger  to  the  United  States  incredible  for  half  a 
century?  As  for  an  inevitable  clash,  most  find  it 
impossible  to  believe  that  anything  subject  to 
human  will  can  be  inevitable.  Whence  comes  this 
prescience  that  tells  of  a  future  danger  which 
no  concessions  can  avert  and  which  no  change  of 
policy  on  the  part  of  the  aggressor  may  alter? 
There  are  no  forces  the  working  of  which  can  be 
so  definitely  predicted  as  to  be  called  inevitable. 
Thus  argue  the  multitude. 

Yet  it  will  be  necessary  to  establish  in  the 
course  of  this  argument  that  the  fundamental 
interests  of  the  United  States  are,  from  the  point 
of  view  of  foreign  policy,  neither  its  integrity  nor 
its  political  independence.  We  shall  require  for 
the  defense  of  our  interests  the  exertion  of  a  force 
of  which  we  are  not  ourselves  at  present  capable. 
Preparedness  we  must  at  once  undertake,  but 
armament  will  be  its  least  important  element. 
To  many,  such  contentions  will  seem  equivalent 
to  our  defense  from  an  invisible  danger  by  the 
might  of  an  intangible  force. 

2 


ON  BELIEVING  THE  INCREDIBLE 

To  most  individuals  the  normal  spells  merely 
the  accustomed,  the  familiar.  The  incredible  is 
the  unexpected,  the  unintelligible,  and  into  that 
category  passes  rapidly  everything  not  readily 
explained  or  justified  by  our  mental  premises. 
The  incredible  is  also  the  unwelcome,  the  unac- 
ceptable, the  unpalatable.  From  the  strength 
of  our  desire  to  compass  some  end  results  a  re- 
pulsion from  everything  contrary  or  inimical  to 
it:  the  general  popular  belief  in  all  European 
countries  of  the  incredibility  of  defeat  is  nothing 
but  the  visualization  of  their  own  fierce  desire 
for  victory.  In  the  incredible  we  see  face  to 
face,  though  often  as  through  a  veil,  darkly,  the 
limitations  of  our  own  knowledge,  the  restric- 
tions of  our  own  point  of  view.  Like  most  moral 
judgments  it  reproduces  not  the  situation,  but 
our  own  mental  condition.  Our  view  of  the  in- 
credible will  be  as  broad  as  our  mental  horizon 
is  narrow;  our  notion  of  the  impossible  will  be 
as  wide  as  our  ignorance  is  deep. 

It  is  with  the  incredible  rather  than  with  pow- 
ers and  principalities,  with  our  own  ignorance  of 
possibilities  and  realities  in  the  modern  world, 
that  we  must  contend.  The  extent  of  our  pres- 
ent incredulity  has  nourished  a  sense  of  security 
at  the  expense  of  a  proportionately  tremendous 
reaction  when  enlightenment  dawns.  Panic  has 
become  possible,  hysteria  will  enter  in  at  the 

3 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

door  a  welcome  guest,  and  those  hasty  and  im- 
politic actions,  whose  lack  of  consonance  with 
national  interests  and  national  honor  will  only 
too  likely  appear  at  some  future  day,  are  already 
imminent  possibilities.  From  such  moments  of 
panic  and  disillusionment  as  seem  to  be  dawning 
for  the  American  people  many  fruitless  and  un- 
necessary wars  have  sprung.  The  jingo  and  the 
militarist  are  bad  neighbors,  but  not  as  danger- 
ous as  their  cousin  —  the  man  who  refuses  to 
believe  danger  a  possibility,  to  believe  that  what 
seems  incredible  to  him  may  happen  after  all,  to 
see  that  his  own  information  and  intelligence 
may  be  too  limited  to  embrace  the  real  possibili- 
ties. 

The  cause  of  this  national  incredulity  is  found 
in  the  failure  of  our  previous  habits  of  national 
thought  to  elucidate  the  international  situation. 
We  have  not  been  accustomed  in  this  country, 
by  and  large,  to  thinking  in  international  terms, 
to  estimating  international  conduct  by  interna- 
tional interests,  to  judging  European  issues  from 
an  accurate  knowledge  of  European  history. 
We  have,  therefore,  as  a  nation  failed  to  com- 
prehend the  subtlety  of  modern  issues  of  eco- 
nomic aggression  and  political  relationship.  Our 
own  true  economic  disabilities  have  been  hidden 
from  us  and  their  intimate  connection  with  the 
slings  and  arrows  that  assail  us  has  not  been 

4 


ON  BELIEVING  THE  INCREDIBLE 

understood.  The  insoluble  paradox  of  the  na- 
tions at  war,  each  in  its  own  defense  against  un- 
provoked aggression,  is  the  result  of  an  attempt 
to  interpret  the  present  conflict  in  the  terms  of 
a  type  of  warfare  long  since  abandoned  as  im- 
possible and  repellent  by  all  civilized  nations. 
In  truth,  war  in  the  crude  sense  of  a  war  of  ag- 
gression and  conquest  is  obsolete  and  unthink- 
able; with  it  passed  into  oblivion  the  old  prob- 
lems of  defense  against  unprovoked  aggression. 
Such  issues  are  not  before  the  American  people 
to-day,  nor  is  this  the  type  of  danger  for  which 
preparedness  must  be  invoked.  Its  obsolescence 
does  not,  however,  demonstrate  the  unreality  of 
another  type  of  aggressive  action  nor  of  those 
modern  policies  and  ambitions  with  which  in- 
deed the  issue  of  preparedness  for  the  United 
States  is  interpenetrated. 

There  are,  too,  inevitable  forces  in  modern 
life  —  the  economic  factors  in  modern  industry 
and  commerce  —  the  normal  working  of  which 
in  peace  and  war  has  been  definitely  established 
by  observation.  Given  certain  factors  and  cer- 
tain events,  the  economic  reaction  can  be  truly 
termed  inevitable.  With  the  subtlety  and  com- 
plexity of  this  international  economic  structure 
the  American  people  must  familiarize  themselves, 
for  our  true  perils  and  deeper  needs  lie  in  our 
own  economic  disabilities  and  are  not  dangers 

5 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

which  result  primarily  from  the  hostile  inten- 
tions of  foreign  nations  nor  from  the  operation 
of  factors  which  they  control.  It  has  frequently 
been  possible  to  convince  great  bodies  of  men 
that  the  evils  from  which  they  suffer  have  per- 
manent economic  causes,  but  the  histories  of 
past  centuries  are  sorry  tales  of  man's  attempt 
to  offset  these  disabilities  by  legislation  and 
forcible  schemes  of  readjustment.  When  na- 
tions learn  that  so  many  years  must  elapse  before 
the  permanent  working  of  economic  forces  can 
readjust  the  situation  in  their  favor,  they  are 
always  inclined  to  deny  the  accuracy  of  an 
analysis  of  the  situation  which  predicts  such  con- 
tinued disaster.  If  war  grows  in  the  future  out 
of  the  economic  disabilities  of  the  United  States, 
as  it  has  in  the  past,  it  will  be  largely  because  the 
public  mind  in  America,  misunderstanding  our 
own  true  interests  and  the  fundamental  nature 
of  our  difficulties,  insists,  as  in  1812,  upon  an 
attempt  to  remedy  by  force  apparently  simple 
manifestations  of  fundamental  disabilities,  rooted 
in  economic  and  geographical  phenomena  over 
which  human  agencies  exercise  no  direct  con- 
trol. 

From  this  failure  to  think  in  international 
terms  has  come  naturally  an  inability  correctly 
to  estimate  relative  international  values.  It  has 
long  been  the  fashion  to  regard  whatever  we 

6 


ON  BELIEVING  THE  INCREDIBLE 

possessed  as  the  biggest  and  best;  our  swelling 
granaries  and  our  humming  factories  have  given 
us  a  very  real  sense  of  power;  the  area  of  the 
country  and  size  of  its  population  indicate  a  po- 
tential military  strength  as  vast  as  that  possessed 
by  the  largest  European  nation  and  greater  than 
that  of  most  of  the  strongest  powers.  No  true 
American  has  ever  doubted  the  magnitude  of  our 
national  possibilities.  Few  have  failed  to  as- 
sume that,  what  we  might  be,  we  already  were. 
Harmless  enough  in  domestic  relations,  the  in- 
direct effect  upon  American  notions  of  inter- 
national status  has  been  deplorable  and  dan- 
gerous. It  has  fostered  an  idea  of  our  equality 
with  European  powers  of  the  first  rank  which 
the  latter  have  never  admitted.1  We  have  so 
often  been  told  in  recent  months  that  the  United 
States  is  already  the  strongest  financial  power  in 
the  world  that  the  public  mind  believes  us  in- 
dispensable to  Europe  and  feels  that  economic 
pressure  alone  will  enable  us  to  extort  from  her 
bleeding  and  exhausted  nations  everything  we 
may  desire.  Repeatedly  we  have  launched  "the 

1  The  theoretical  equality  freely  accorded  to  all  nominally 
independent  states  is  not  here  alluded  to;  but  a  degree  of  im- 
portance in  the  international  scale  similar  to  that  which  France, 
Germany,  and  Great  Britain,  for  instance,  concede  to  each  other's 
organized  force.  We  are  not  one  of  the  few  who  are  necessarily 
consulted  before  action  becomes  possible;  we  are  not  yet  a  mem- 
ber of  the  Concert  of  Europe.  Our  equality  is  theoretical  and 
potential  rather  than  actual.  The  diplomatic  difficulties  of  the 
last  year  are  the  most  convincing  proof. 

7 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

largest  battleship  in  the  world,"  and  the  popular 
notion  of  the  strength  and  size  of  our  navy  is, 
therefore,  different  from  European  estimates  of 
its  efficiency  and  importance.  Nor  have  some 
failed  to  preen  themselves  in  the  belief  that  so 
powerful  and  wealthy  a  people  are  invincible  and 
may  defy  the  world  at  will. 

Both  pacifists  and  militarists  have  been  labor- 
ing to  prove  to  us  inaccurate  postulates  about 
international  affairs.  To  most  people  proof 
that  the  militarists  are  wrong  is  evidence  that 
the  pacifists  are  right.  Unfortunately,  while  the 
premises  of  most  of  these  propagandists  will  not 
bear  inspection,  their  zeal  and  unquestioned 
sincerity  have  done  great  harm  by  leading  the 
public  mind  to  accept  ideas  dangerous  because 
fallacious.  The  militarist  perils  are  largely  the 
work  of  the  imagination  and  are  so  easily  disposed 
of  that  the  very  real  dangers  of  the  country  are 
passed  over  and  neglected.  Pacifists  are  so  ar- 
dently convinced  that  the  people  need  merely 
to  be  made  aware  of  their  belief  in  peace  that 
important  factors  of  the  situation  are  either  dis- 
torted or  omitted. 

If  the  outbreak  of  the  European  war  demon- 
strated one  thing  more  completely  than  another, 
it  was  the  folly  of  expecting  a  solution  of  serious 
international  problems  by  disinterested  conduct 
on  the  part  of  European  nations.  It  is  quite  clear 

8 


ON  BELIEVING  THE  INCREDIBLE 

that  they  do  not  in  the  least  intend  to  accord  the 
interests  of  others  that  same  degree  of  considera- 
tion which  they  extend  to  their  own.  Nor  will 
we  be  wise  to  rely  upon  a  lack  of  adequate  mo- 
tive to  prevent  aggressive  action  detrimental  to 
our  interests,  nor  place  dependence  upon  the 
fact  that  aggression  against  the  United  States 
or  South  America  might  not  be  consonant  with 
the  true  interests  of  the  aggressor.  The  sufferings 
of  Belgium  are  the  only  necessary  evidence  to 
demonstrate  that  a  lack  of  provocation  is  no 
guarantee  against  disaster.  It  will  be  idle  to 
look  for  protection  to  the  assumed  inability  of 
armed  force  to  produce  results  of  significance. 
Adequate  motives,  the  futility  of  force,  are  rela- 
tive terms,  and  the  aggressor's  notion  of  truth 
and  not  our  perception  of  it  will  govern  his  con- 
duct. Our  opinion  that  his  true  interests  are  not 
threatened  by  our  policies  nor  advanced  by  his 
aggression  will  avail  nothing. 

European  policies  we  must  accept  as  Euro- 
pean nations  define  them.  What  they  believe 
to  be  their  intentions  will  be  of  great  con- 
sequence to  us;  what  their  intentions  ought 
to  be  is  of  no  importance  at  all.  We  must 
accept  as  the  premises  of  thought  toward  an 
American  policy  the  European  verdict  that  there 
are  at  stake  in  this  war  important  issues  which 
fighting  is  needed  to  settle  and  which  suffer- 

9 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

ing  is  justified  to  attain;  that  force  is  not  futile 
to  achieve  things  of  true  moment;  that  there 
are  differences  between  nations  not  susceptible 
of  easy  settlement  by  diplomacy  or  by  interna- 
tional courts.  We  must  at  least  seek  to  compre- 
hend something  of  the  scorn  and  derision  with 
which  they  reject  that  pacifist  explanation  of 
the  present  crisis  as  the  work  of  politicians  and 
armament  makers  who  have  furthered  their  own 
financial  interests  by  dragging  into  war  innocent 
but  ignorant  peoples.  No  European  believes  that 
the  European  nations  are  as  lacking  in  judg- 
ment or  as  easily  influenced  as  such  an  idea 
assumes. 

Above  all,  if  we  seek  to  solve  our  present  prob- 
lems by  applying  to  them  the  older  premises  of 
American  thought,  we  shall  merely  prove  that 
all  we  see  around  us  is  incredible  and  that  what 
we  are  told  to  fear  is  impossible.  Until  we  rid 
ourselves  of  such  preconceptions  we  shall  be  in 
the  state  of  mind  of  the  old  farmer  who  inspected 
the  camel  in  the  menagerie  with  great  care  and 
deliberation  and  then  declared  with  vigor: 
"There  ain't  no  such  animal."  The  premises 
which  many  supposedly  intelligent  people  in 
this  country  apply  to  the  international  situation 
are  as  rudimentary  as  those  of  the  farmer. 
There  is  still  a  prevailing  notion  that  our  geo- 
graphical isolation  and  the  great  size  of  our 

10 


ON  BELIEVING  THE  INCREDIBLE 

country  render  us  invulnerable.1  We  are  in  fact 
the  most  completely  vulnerable  country  to-day 
of  any  large  power  in  the  world.  Tradition  has 
inculcated  a  belief,  still  active,  that  we  may 
remain  isolated  from  the  strife  and  emulation  of 
Europe  if  we  so  wish.  It  is  no  more  within  our 
power  to  sever  ourselves  from  contact  with  Eu- 
ropean nations  than  it  is  to  sever  the  head  from 
the  body  without  destroying  life.  Preparedness 
many  believe  can  be  postponed  until  the  danger 
is  visible:  the  experience  of  the  Revolution  and 
of  the  Civil  War  convince  them  of  the  safety  of 
this  expedient.  Modern  warfare,  however,  is  of 
such  a  character  that  preparedness  cannot  be 
extemporized.  Unless  completed  on  the  neces- 
sary scale  before  the  crisis  arises,  it  cannot  be 
achieved  at  all.  Another  fallacious  but  popular 
concept  is  the  belief  that  we  can  continue  to 

1  I  have  assumed  the  truth  of  certain  negative  propositions 
which  I  have  already  discussed  at  length  in  Pan-Americanism:  that 
geography  has  not  made  us  invulnerable  against  modern  armies; 
that  European  nations  do  possess  conceivable  (not  necessarily  prob- 
able) motives  for  aggression  and  invasion  of  the  United  States; 
that  united  action  of  the  republics  of  North  and  South  America  in 
defense  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  is  improbable  and  a  closer  rela- 
tion between  them  than  either  has  with  Europe  contrary  to  the 
interests  of  both.  In  ihat  same  volume  I  also  discussed  at  length 
the  strategic  position  of  the  United  States,  the  history  of  our  re- 
lations with  Europe,  the  character  of  British  sea  power,  the  nature 
of  present  European  ambitions,  political,  economic,  and  social  con- 
ditions in  Latin  America,  and  their  relation  to  the  United  States 
and  to  Europe.  Where  necessary  I  have  restated  my  conclusions 
on  these  points,  which,  in  substance,  I  still  believe  accord  with  the 
evidence  of  history  and  with  the  events  of  the  last  year. 

11 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

increase  our  population  and  develop  our  resources 
at  the  maximum  speed  with  a  continuation  of 
the  present  rate  of  profit  and  yet  not  menace  or 
disturb  the  prosperity  of  other  countries.  Indeed 
some  suppose  that,  if  we  could  only  exclude 
European  influence  and  devote  ourselves  to  the 
development  of  the  United  States  itself,  unparal- 
leled prosperity  would  result.  It  is  incredible  to 
some  that  others  should  hold  these  fallacies. 

Nor  can  our  national  problems  be  longer 
solved  —  if  indeed  they  ever  have  been  —  by 
following  the  inconsistent  and  confused  prece- 
dents and  traditions  of  past  diplomacy.  A  con- 
sistent and  clear  foreign  policy  we  seem  never  to 
have  had;  a  certain  continuity  of  effort  is  indeed 
visible,  due  rather  to  the  insistence  of  certain 
problems  than  to  any  attempt  at  a  consistent 
solution  of  a  long-standing  evil.  First  and  fore- 
most we  believe  ourselves  to  have  been  a  non- 
military  people  and  to  have  been  as  a  nation 
definitely  pacific  in  disposition,  yet  we  cherish 
as  a  people  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  whose  popular 
interpretation  assumes  our  readiness  to  fight 
European  nations  who  propose  to  extend  their 
territory  or  influence  in  the  Western  Hemisphere. 
If  we  declare  that  we  do  not  propose  to  fight 
when  it  is  challenged,  it  will  be  a  peculiarly 
empty  policy  to  maintain.  We  have  long  cher- 
ished the  tradition  of  non-interference  in  Eu- 

12 


ON  BELIEVING  THE  INCREDIBLE 

ropean  politics,  and  yet  we  have  taken  possession 
within  the  last  generation  of  at  least  three 
strategic  points  of  value  to  European  nations. 
The  very  fact  of  possession  was  in  itself  a  radical 
departure  from  the  policy  of  isolation. 

Our  protestations  of  brotherhood  and  amity  for 
Latin  America  radically  conflict,  to  the  thought 
of  Europeans  and  Latin  Americans,  with  our  con- 
duct in  the  Mexican  War  of  1846,  in  the  forma- 
tion of  the  Panama  Republic,  and  more  recently 
in  Hayti.  Whichever  attitude  we  finally  adopt 
toward  Latin  America,  one  of  arrogant  hostility 
or  one  of  peace  and  friendship,  we  shall  find  in 
the  past  ample  precedent  for  both.  We  have 
enunciated  a  policy  of  free  trade  and  the  Open 
Door  with  Asiatic  nations  and  have  concluded 
treaties  with  them  in  terms  essentially  the  same 
as  those  which  we  have  accorded  the  great  Eu- 
ropean powers.  To  the  citizens  of  these  same 
nations  we  have  denied  equality  in  this  country, 
have  enacted  exclusion  laws,  and  denominated 
them  undesirable.  Several  States  have  now  fol- 
lowed the  example  of  California  and  have  denied 
the  Japanese  by  statute  the  privilege  of  owning 
land. 

For  each  phase  of  this  astonishing  array  of 
contradictory  policies  ample  precedent  exists. 
Any  of  them  will  somewhat  further  certain  in- 
terests of  the  United  States  or  its  citizens;  for  all 

13 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

of  them  plausible  motives  of  high  morality  can 
be  alleged.  There  seems  in  truth  to  be  in  this 
variety  of  alternatives  none  which  is  wholly  good 
or  wholly  bad,  entirely  against  our  interests  or 
entirely  in  favor  of  them.  Unfortunately  there 
seems  to  be  nothing  from  which  it  cannot  be 
plausibly  argued  that  we  have  something  to 
gain  and  nothing  from  which  it  cannot  be  rea- 
sonably alleged  that  we  have  something  to  lose. 
But  all  our  existing  national  interests  cannot  be 
furthered  at  the  same  tune,  nor  can  the  ideas  or 
proclivities  of  all  individual  citizens  be  advanced 
by  the  policy  of  our  Government. 

The  fundamental  outlines  of  policy  the  Amer- 
ican people  must  determine.  While  obviously 
one  hundred  millions  of  people  cannot  be  ex- 
pected literally  to  apply  a  foreign  policy  to  the 
actual  solution  of  dangerous  crises,  the  citizens 
of  a  great  democracy  must  at  least  comprehend 
and  ratify  those  fundamental  postulates  by 
which  in  the  long  run  all  decisions  are  governed. 
If  we  are  ourselves  to  reach  those  significant 
conclusions  about  the  country's  future  which 
the  governments  of  Europe  have  in  the  main 
formulated  for  their  people,  the  nation  must  soon 
attain  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  international 
situation  and  define,  after  careful  reflection,  the 
ends  to  be  achieved  and  the  interests  to  be  fur- 
thered. Only  thus  can  the  people  rule.  If  a  few 

14 


ON  BELIEVING  THE  INCREDIBLE 

think  for  the  many,  the  few  will  rule  in  the  na- 
tion's name.  Only  when  the  fundamental  objects 
of  a  foreign  policy  are  understood  and  approved 
by  the  nation  at  large,  acting  in  its  national 
capacity,  will  democracy  as  a  form  of  govern- 
ment cease  to  be  itself  a  source  of  grave  peril  in 
international  affairs.  Our  democracy  has  abun- 
dantly justified  itself  as  a  method  of  advancing 
and  protecting  the  interests  of  individuals, 
as  a  shield  for  the  development  of  individual 
ideals,  as  a  process  for  hurrying  the  untutored 
and  ignorant  along  the  paths  of  education  and 
citizenship;  it  has  yet  to  demonstrate  its  ability 
to  think  in  terms  of  the  community,  of  the  na- 
tion, and  of  the  world. 

If  we  can  adjust  our  policies  to  international 
forces  and  factors,  can  so  transform  our  adminis- 
trative and  industrial  fabric  as  to  render  the 
United  States  the  peer  in  fact  of  great  European 
powers,  our  national  prosperity  will  be  assured 
and  our  future  as  a  potent  member  of  the  con- 
cert of  nations  will  become  definite  beyond  dis- 
pute. We  have  yet  to  convince  the  Europeans 
that  we  are  more  than  an  international  possi- 
bility, great  perhaps  in  the  promise  of  unmatched 
strength  and  illimitable  intelligence,  but  yet  to 
live  as  a  people,  yet  to  attain  as  a  nation. 

We  shall  be  pitted  against  people  "hardened 
into  the  bone"  of  patriotism  by  sharing  each 

15 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

other's  crusts  in  moments  of  national  despair 
and  humiliation,  welded  together  by  the  flames 
of  conquest  and  destruction,  unified  by  such 
spontaneous  outbursts  as  thrilled  England  after 
the  Armada,  France  after  Austerlitz,  and  Ger- 
many after  Sedan.  Armies  and  navies  are  to-day 
merely  the  hands  and  arms  of  a  potent  national 
frame,  directed  by  the  complex  corporate  brain 
and  sustained  in  danger  by  the  patriotism  of 
the  corporate  soul.  With  such  spiritual  entities, 
armed  by  suffering  with  wisdom  and  cunning, 
inured  of  old  to  the  fierceness  of  competition, 
buoyed  up  in  despair  by  the  thought  of  past 
greatness,  restrained  in  exaltation  by  a  prudence 
born  of  experience  —  with  these,  rather  than 
with  battleships  and  armies,  must  we  contend. 
Our  own  corporate  strength  must  compare  with 
that  of  others;  the  keenness  and  capability  of 
our  corporate  intelligence  must  match  theirs; 
the  loyalty  and  self-sacrifice  of  our  national  soul 
must  equal  theirs. 

In  last  analysis,  the  future  depends  upon  the 
brain  and  heart  of  this  nation.  On  all  sides  of  us 
stand  the  raw  physical  material  ready  to  our 
hand  for  the  creation  of  a  noble  structure  of  sur- 
passing strength.  Factories  and  battleships, 
armies  and  executive  commissions  we  can  create 
in  any  necessary  number.  The  future  depends 
upon  our  ability  to  use  them,  upon  our  capacity 

16 


ON  BELIEVING  THE  INCREDIBLE 

as  a  people  to  think  adequately,  to  judge  wisely, 
to  anticipate  correctly,  to  act  calmly.  As  an 
aggregation  of  individuals  we  have  lived  ably 
and  become  prosperous;  we  have  now  to  achieve 
as  a  nation  in  the  broadest  sense,  to  become  con- 
scious of  ourselves  not  as  members  of  a  body 
politic,  but  as  indispensable  parts  of  a  great  cor- 
porate entity  in  whose  greater  interests  our  in- 
dividual desires  merge.  We  must  formulate  as  a 
nation  some  concrete  expression  of  American 
ideals  and  aspirations,  of  American  interests  and 
needs  in  their  relation  to  European  policies  and 
ambitions.  No  restatement  of  the  older  premises, 
no  fumbling  among  past  precedents,  no  patching 
of  older  policies,  will  answer  the  challenge  of  the 
future.  Only  a  rigid  reexamination  of  the  prem- 
ises of  American  life,  of  American  ideals,  and  of 
their  relation  to  international  problems  can  pro- 
duce that  policy,  at  once  adequate,  just,  mag- 
nanimous, consonant  with  our  interests,  and 
founded  upon  the  high  concepts  of  humanity 
and  international  law,  which  the  American  people 
have  at  heart. 

In  the  early  days  of  the  Revolution,  when 
the  formulation  of  policies  was  under  discussion,  j 
George  Washington  gave  utterance  to  one  of 
those  eternal  pronouncements  fit  to  become  the 
watchword  of  intelligent  men:  "Let  us  raise  a 
standard  to  which  the  wise  and  honest  can  re- 

17 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

pair."  Only  a  policy  which  shall  deserve  the  ap- 
proval of  tried  intelligence  and  of  unimpeachable 
probity  can  meet  the  necessary  requirements  of 
our  national  future.  By  these  measuring  rods  we 
shall  separate  the  wheat  from  the  chaff,  the  true 
from  the  false.  Rigorously  we  must  exclude  all 
inconsistent  with  them.  Consistency  will  be 
paramount:  if  we  decide  to  abandon  armament 
for  aggression,  we  must  renounce  the  Monroe 
Doctrine;  if  we  determine  to  exclude  the  Oriental, 
we  must  give  up  hope  of  abnormal  privileges 
in  the  Far  East.  The  equitable  must  be  our  aim 
and  what  is  consonant  with  justice,  honor,  and 
humanity.  All  must  pass  the  test  of  expediency, 
must  conform  strictly  to  conditions  as  the  best 
scholarship  of  Europe  and  America  declares 
them  to  be.  Above  all  we  must  limit  ourselves  to 
the  attainment  of  what  it  is  possible  for  us  to 
achieve  in  our  present  stage  of  economic  devel- 
opment. With  regret,  but  without  repining,  we 
must  accept  those  economic  disabilities  for  which 
others  are  not  to  blame  and  which  we  are  power- 
less to  alter.  The  limitations  which  our  strategic 
position,  our  political  fabric,  our  industrial 
development  place  upon  us  must  become  postu- 
lates of  that  new  and  greater  policy  which  the 
wise  will  approve  and  to  which  the  honest  can 
subscribe. 


18 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  APPROACHING   PERIL 

NEITHER  our  political  independence  nor  our  ter- 
ritorial integrity  is  in  danger,  yet  there  is  a  peril, 
drawing  inevitably  nearer  as  the  European  war 
passes  from  phase  to  phase,  which  does  endanger 
in  the  most  literal  sense  our  future  prosperity  and 
which  may  fairly  be  deemed  not  only  inevitable 
but  inescapable.  Against  it  armies  and  navies  are 
impotent,  because  it  is  not  itself  the  product  of 
armed  conquest.  Against  it  diplomatic  notes  will 
not  avail,  for  it  is  not  the  result  of  governmental 
policies  nor  of  broad  schemes  of  aggression  con- 
sciously adopted  and  relentlessly  pursued.  Arbi- 
tration cannot  avert  it  nor  international  tribunals 
reach  after  deliberation  an  equitable  decision 
upon  such  conflicts  of  interests  or  claims.  This 
danger  is  in  fact  the  result  of  a  series  of  economic 
developments,  for  the  creation  of  which  no  indi- 
vidual or  government  is  in  any  sense  responsible, 
the  operation  of  which  is  in  the  most  absolute 
sense  impersonal,  and  which  in  some  way  and  to 
some  degree  affect  all  nations.  The  economic 
phenomena  in  question  have  always  existed,  ap- 

19 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

parently  will  continue  to  exist,  and  are  as  little 
susceptible  of  direct  control  or  manipulation  by 
human  agencies  as  the  forces  of  nature.  They 
may  be  utilized  and  modified;  their  worst  results 
may  by  careful  study  and  effort  be  minimized; 
but,  to  destroy  them,  powers  and  principalities 
are  impotent  and  the  fabled  strength  of  giants 
and  elfrics  without  avail. 

This  approaching  peril  threatens  nothing  less 
than  our  degree  of  profit  in  business,  our  desire 
to  trade  at  will  in  the  most  favorable  markets,  our 
ability  to  expand  our  industrial  fabric  at  the 
maximum  rate.  It  is  economic,  contingent,  im- 
personal, indirect.  It  is  nothing  more  recondite 
but  nothing  less  serious  than  the  normal  working 
of  normal  economic  forces  which,  because  of  our 
economic  inferiority,  act  invariably  to  our  dis- 
advantage and  in  favor  of  European  nations. 
Positive  losses  we  shall  suffer;  entirely  tangible 
difficulties  will  rise  in  the  path  of  American 
merchants;  opportunities  to  develop  our  trade  in 
certain  quarters  we  shall  in  some  apparently  mys- 
terious manner  be  unable  to  obtain.  Not  only  is 
this  danger  inevitable  and  inescapable;  it  is  in 
the  highest  degree  serious  and  will  not  unlikely 
in  coming  years  affect  adversely  the  prosperity 
and  happiness  of  every  man,  woman,  and  child 
in  the  United  States  of  America. 

In  the  economic  problems  of  undeveloped  coun- 
20 


THE  APPROACHING  PERIL 

tries  lie  those  difficulties  which  are  likely  to  be 
most  vital  to  the  United  States.  Between  coun- 
tries of  approximately  the  same  development, 
where  the  industrial  organization  has  progressed 
to  that  advanced  stage  reached  by  most  of  the 
more  prominent  nations  in  Europe  and  by  the 
United  States,  normal  trade  takes  place  by  the 
actual  exchange  of  commodities.  Money,-  credit, 
finance,  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  words,  are 
merely  media  by  which  this  exchange  between  na- 
tions is  executed  by  individuals  and  the  amount 
bought  or  sold  apportioned  to  those  who  are  to 
receive  the  actual  goods.  In  the  long  run  all  inter- 
national trade  is  based  upon  this  exchange  of 
commodities  and  will,  of  course,  depend  for  its 
profit  not  only  upon  the  ability  of  the  countries 
concerned  to  exchange  an  equal  value  in  goods, 
but  upon  their  ability  to  utilize  themselves  the 
greater  part  of  what  they  procure  from  other  na- 
tions. Between  highly  developed  countries  the 
great  bulk  of  the  trade  is  governed  by  the  laws 
of  demand  and  supply  and  admits  of  no  inter- 
ference by  armed  force,  which  does  not  damage 
the  aggressor  almost  as  much  as  his  victim.  As 
Mr.  Angell  has  ably  shown  —  a  fact  not  dis- 
puted by  reputable  students  of  political  economy 
—  military  force  cannot  profitably  interfere  in 
normal  cases  with  the  ordinary  working  of  eco- 
nomic factors. 

21 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

Very  little  of  the  trade  of  undeveloped  coun- 
tries rests  upon  this  normal  economic  foundation 
of  mutual  exchange,  where  the  one  country  pro- 
duces what  the  other  wishes  to  buy  and  takes  in 
exchange  what  it  can  itself  utilize.  The  great  bulk 
of  the  trade  of  such  countries  rests  upon  an  ab- 
normal basis  and  is  largely  the  result  of  artificial 
stimulation,  the  chief  object  of  which  is  to  hasten 
the  normal  rate  of  growth  and  to  produce  an  ab- 
normal profit  as  well  as  an  abnormal  output. 
To  such  a  situation  the  ordinary  economic  logic, 
applicable  to  the  conditions  in  the  more  advanced 
countries,  does  not  apply.  The  secret  lies  in  the 
removal  of  the  great  bulk  of  the  trade  in  unde- 
veloped countries  from  the  sphere  of  competitive 
business  by  a  means  so  simple  and  yet  so  effec- 
tive as  to  escape  at  times  the  notice  of  expert 
observers.  The  investment  of  capital  and  the 
right  to  exact  political  and  financial  stipulations 
concerning  its  safety  has  been  at  the  root  of  the 
commercial  power  of  the  great  European  nations 
in  the  undeveloped  countries  of  the  globe.  Once 
that  right  attained,  all  other  privileges,  open  and 
avowed,  become  unnecessary  and  even  undesir- 
able. 

When  an  undeveloped  country  borrows  cap- 
ital, it  does  not  of  course  borrow  money,  for 
railroads,  factories,  and  mines  are  not  constructed 
with  money.  It  borrows  the  commodities  which 


THE  APPROACHING  PERIL 

it  does  not  possess,  the  necessary  skilled  labor 
and  the  tools  with  which  to  transform  its  own 
crude  resources.  Capital  is  normally  lent  in  the 
shape  of  exports  from  the  creditor  country,  for 
the  simple  reason  that  in  no  other  way  can  that 
amount  of  value  be  passed  from  one  nation  to 
another.  International  trade  is  an  exchange  of 
commodities.  The  borrowers,  therefore,  under- 
take to  return  to  the  investors  the  annual  interest 
and  eventually  the  capital  sum  by  the  export 
of  an  amount  of  goods  each  year  equivalent  to 
the  total  interest  charges  and  such  capital  pay- 
ments as  may  fall  due.  For  such  a  time  as  the 
debt  remains  uncanceled  this  sum  in  exports 
must  flow  each  year  to  the  creditor  country  or 
the  debt  will  be  dishonored.  For  such  a  period, 
too,  that  proportion  of  the  trade  of  the  newer 
country  is  in  the  strictest  sense  hypothecated. 
New  investments  of  capital  will  of  course  in- 
crease the  proportion  of  the  debtor  country's 
produce,  the  destination  of  which  is  annually 
agreed  upon  in  advance. 

The  merchants  of  other  nations  cannot  obtain 
a  share  of  a  trade  thus  founded  merely  by  com- 
petitive selling  based  upon  a  superior  quality  of 
goods  or  upon  price  cutting.  The  debtor  country 
has  definitely  agreed  to  send  part  of  its  goods 
to  the  creditor  country  and  has  no  right  to 
expend  that  proportion  of  its  total  output.  To  j 

23 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

insure  its  strict  and  prompt  performance  of  its 
promises,  to  foreclose  pressure  by  undue  influence 
or  military  or  naval  operations  undertaken  by 
rival  European  nations  anxious  in  their  own  in- 
terests to  interfere  with  this  hypothecation,  the 
creditor  nations  have  reserved  the  right  to  use 
their  own  political  and  military  strength  to  main- 
tain the  property  rights  of  their  citizens.  So 
long  as  such  forcible  means  sustain  the  arrange- 
ments already  made,  the  only  part  of  the  coun- 
try's trade  open  to  competitive  business  will  be 
that  portion  based  upon  the  profits  annually 
made  by  the  natives  over  and  above  what  they 
pay  to  the  creditor  country  for  the  use  of  its 
capital.  This  will  always  be  a  relatively  small 
proportion  of  the  total  trade.  On  this  basis  are 
nearly  all  non-European  markets,  and  all  are 
therefore  practically  closed  to  competitive  busi- 
ness.1 

1  The  situation  precludes  competition  between  merchants  of 
different  countries,  not  between  merchants  of  the  creditor  nation. 
So  far  as  the  latter  are  concerned,  trade  will  be  governed  by  the 
rules  of  competitive  business,  except  in  so  far  as  personal  and  politi- 
cal connections  may  give  certain  citizens  of  the  creditor  country  a 
preference  over  others.  Throughout  this  book,  I  have  tried  to 
bear  in  mind  the  fact  that  the  postulates  of  political  economy  as 
elaborated  by  theorists  are  ordinarily  based  upon  two  definite, 
though  implicit,  suppositions:  that  the  individual  is  the  unit  whose 
interests  and  actions  are  to  be  analyzed;  and  that  his  interests  are 
to  be  discussed  upon  the  supposition  that  he  is  living  in  a  highly 
developed  country  under  what  we  assume  to  be  normal  conditions 
of  peace.  All  theorists  recognize  fully  what  important  modifica- 
tions any  change  in  these  postulates  must  introduce,  and  the  earlier 
writers  attempted  to  indicate  somewhat  their  extent  and  nature. 

24 


VOLLEGE  LIBRARY 
THE  APPROACHING  PERIL 

Upon  this  basis  rests  in  the  main  our  trade 
with  the  islands  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  with 
Central  America.  Its  establishment  in  the  last 
decade  and  a  half  has  been  due  to  that  same  sort 
of  economic  penetration,  protected  and  encour- 
aged by  potential  military  interference,  which 
explains  the  commercial  privileges  of  great  Eu- 
ropean nations  in  Africa  and  Asia.  Capital  was 
invested  in  large  amounts,  concessions  were  ob- 
tained on  favorable  terms,  treaties  and  arrange- 
ments diplomatic,  financial,  and  administrative 
were  completed  with  many  of  the  republics,  and 
gave  American  citizens  an  artificial  advantage 
which  resulted  in  an  extension  of  trade  so  rapid  as 
practically  to  draw  into  the  hands  of  American 
citizens  within  a  single  decade  the  major  part 
of  the  business  of  Central  America  and  the 
Gulf. 

By  far  the  greatest  amount  of  American  trade 
with  South  America  is  based  upon  even  more 
thoroughly  artificial  and  abnormal  conditions. 

Recent  students  have  confined  their  speculations  more  and  more 
to  what  they  believe  to  be  the  most  important  manifestations  of 
economic  phenomena  in  developed  countries,  partly  because  the 
material  for  study  is  greater  in  bulk  and  more  reliable,  partly  be- 
cause they  rightly  feel  that  something  approaching  agreement 
must  be  reached  by  students  upon  the  main  propositions  con- 
cerning developed  nations  before  qualifications  and  modifica- 
tions applying  to  less  advanced  nations  can  be  safely  introduced. 
Eminently  wise  as  this  decision  is  from  a  theoretical  point  of  view, 
students  of  contemporary  history  cannot  postpone  thought  until 
that  day  shall  dawn.  We  must  do  the  best  we  can  to  make 
allowances. 

25 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

Upon  the  outbreak  of  the  present  European  war 
the  exports  of  Germany  to  Latin  America  abruptly 
terminated  and  the  normal  payments  made  to 
German  investors  by  the  South  American  mer- 
chants could  no  longer  be  remitted.  The  reduc- 
tion of  the  normal  supply  in  Great  Britain1  and 
France,  upon  which  South  Americans  usually 
drew  heavily,  also  affected  a  situation  already 
artificial.  Unable  to  obtain  anything  like  an 
adequate  supply  in  Europe,  having  on  hand  a 
great  quantity  of  goods  which  they  were  unable 
to  forward  to  the  proper  destination,  the  South 
Americans  turned  to  the  United  States  as  a  last 
resource. 

The  lack  of  direct  financial  relations  with 
American  banks,  the  lack  of  an  American  mer- 
chant marine  and  the  inability  to  obtain  British 
ships  for  this  trade,  the  commercial  stringency 
in  South  America  due  to  the  war,  all  ham- 
pered an  exchange  which  might  otherwise  have 
reached  great  dimensions.  Nevertheless  Ameri- 
can trade  with  South  America  has  increased  very 
largely  in  the  last  months  and  will  continue  to 
grow  by  leaps  and  bounds  the  longer  the  war 
continues.  All  but  an  extremely  small  share  rests 
upon  artificial  foundations,  in  part  upon  our  po- 
litical influence  in  Central  America  and  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico,  in  part  upon  the  existence  of  war 
in  Europe.  It  will  be  obvious  that  the  disappear- 

26 


THE  APPROACHING  PERIL 

ance  of  either  or  both  will  promptly  destroy  the 
greater  part  of  our  Latin  American  trade. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  whatever  that  the  ter- 
mination of  the  war  will  inevitably  produce  a 
clash  between  our  existing  interests  in  South 
America  and  those  of  European  countries.  Great 
Britain  and  Germany,  who  are  both  large  cred- 
itors, will  of  course  expect  the  remittance  of  the 
overdue  payments  of  interest  and  capital,  the 
shipment  of  which  the  outbreak  of  the  war  pre- 
vented. To  meet  this  natural  demand  South 
Americans  must  export  unusually  large  ship- 
ments to  Europe  immediately  upon  the  proclama- 
tion of  peace.  Naturally,  too,  European  mer- 
chants will  desire  to  resume  their  former  trade, 
and  will  also  attempt  to  sell  in  South  America  the 
surplus  goods  which  the  economic  crisis,  the  diffi- 
culty of  exchange,  the  cost  of  insurance,  and  high 
freights  made  it  unprofitable  to  ship  during  the 
war.  For  the  Latin  Americans  it  will  be  un- 
doubtedly advantageous  to  deal  once  more  with 
Europe,  not  only  because  of  the  fundamental 
economic  relationship  due  to  the  great  invest- 
ments of  European  capital,  but  also  because  the 
European  market  is  more  advantageous  than 
ours  for  the  disposal  of  large  amounts  of  raw 
produce,  and  because  it  is  normally  a  more  favor- 
able market  in  which  to  buy  the  manufactured 
goods  which  the  South  Americans  desire. 

27 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

An  extraordinary  demand  in  Europe  will  ap- 
pear for  all  types  of  raw  material  needed  to  re- 
build the  continent  in  its  former  splendor.  There 
will  be  the  great  market  of  the  future  in  which 
high  prices  will  reign;  therewill  be  a  demand  prac- 
tically without  limit.  For  these  great  amounts 
of  material  Europe  will  attempt  to  pay  by  ex- 
panding business  to  the  maximum.  Both  Euro- 
peans and  South  Americans  will  find  their  most 
advantageous  trade  with  the  other.  The  United 
States  will  more  nearly  hold  the  relation  of  South 
America  to  Europe  than  it  will  approximate  the 
relation  of  Europe  to  South  America.  We  too  will 
find  it  advantageous  to  sell  and  buy  in  Europe 
rather  than  in  South  America.  Thus  economic 
forces  already  in  existence,  plus  those  which  the 
termination  of  the  war  will  undoubtedly  set  in 
motion,  will  cost  American  merchants  a  great 
part  of  a  trade  which  they  now  regard  with  sat- 
isfaction and  complacency. 

I  Nor  should  it  be  forgotten  that  the  present 
war  in  Europe  is  being  confessedly  fought  to  re- 
tain or  to  obtain  control  of  rapidly  developing 
and  abnormally  profitable  markets.  Its  whole 
purpose  is  to  secure  abnormal  economic  oppor- 
tunities in  countries  outside  Europe.  The  Ger- 
mans in  particular  are  anxious  to  establish  that 
sort  of  relationship  with  some  undeveloped  coun- 
try which  the  English  have  so  long  had  with 

28 


THE  APPROACHING  PERIL 

India  and  Egypt,  the  French  with  Morocco  and 
Algiers.  Upon  it  nearly  all  sane  and  conservative 
Germans  are  agreed  the  future  prosperity  and 
safety  of  the  Empire  depends.  Nor  are  the  Brit- 
ish less  determined  to  retain  their  hold  upon  their 
present  markets,  nor  do  they  insist  less  heartily 
upon  the  vital  importance  to  Great  Britain  and 
her  colonies  of  their  ability  to  keep  what  they 
now  have. 

There  is  in  this  process  nothing  resembling 
aggression  in  the  crude  sense  of  the  word.  The 
economic  situation  itself  will  inevitably  set  the 
chain  in  motion.  Neither  Great  Britain  nor  Ger- 
many need  announce  or  adopt  any  policies  what- 
ever, or  make  in  any  shape  or  form  anything  like 
an  offensive  or  aggressive  movement.  They  will 
claim  that  they  are  resuming,  after  the  war,  a 
trade  which  is  justly  theirs  and  which  they  have 
always  had.  Indeed  no  political  action  by  either 
could  very  well  prevent  this  loss  of  American 
trade,  and  it  is  least  of  all  likely  that  we  can  our- 
selves by  any  exertion  of  force  preserve  it.  Eco- 
nomic results  follow  from  economic  causes  and 
are  not  in  the  ordinary  sense  within  the  control 
of  human  agencies. 

Undoubtedly  the  result  will  be  to  limit  Ameri- 
cans to  those  markets  where  the  competition  is 
greatest  and  the  profits  least;  to  exclude  them 
from  those  markets  in  which  competition  is  less 

29 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

keen  and  the  profits  greatest.  With  Europe  we 
may  trade  upon  the  basis  of  competitive  busi- 
ness; with  South  America,  Morocco,  Egypt, 
India,  and  the  like,  we  may  exchange  such  com- 
modities as  the  fundamental  laws  of  demand  and 
supply  permit.  They  will  buy  from  us  those 
products  of  which  we  have  a  monopoly  or  which 
we  make  better  than  any  other  nation  in  the 
world;  from  them  we  shall  buy  in  turn  such  com- 
modities or  manufactured  goods  as  they  prac- 
tically monopolize;  but  we  shall  not  sell  to  them, 
nor  will  they  normally  sell  to  us,  goods  which 
can  be  bought  elsewhere.  We  shall  trade,  there- 
fore, in  the  international  market  at  a  disadvan- 
tage, for  we  shall  have  access  only  to  the  least 
profitable  part  of  the  world's  trade.  In  time  this 
will  mean  a  diminution  of  the  rate  of  business 
profit  in  the  United  States  which  will  tend  con- 
stantly toward  the  minimum  rate  in  European 
countries.  Consequently  there  will  be  a  retarda- 
tion of  the  rate  of  national  growth  in  this  coun- 
try which  will  tend  constantly  to  become  the 
same  as  that  in  the  older  European  countries. 

This  prospect  would  be  less  serious  for  the 
United  States  if  it  had  not  been  true  that  our 
own  economic  growth  has  been  largely  abnormal. 
We  are  accustomed  to  a  degree  of  prosperity,  to 
an  amount  of  worldly  comfort  and  luxury,  an 
abundance  of  food,  greater  than  Europe  itself 

30 


THE  APPROACHING  PERIL 

has  been  able  to  secure.  The  majority  of  Ameri- 
cans regard  a  diminution  of  what  we  have  had  as 
a  calamity  of  the  worst  description,  and  yet  the 
normal  operation  of  economic  forces  will  more 
and  more  tend  to  decrease  the  rate  of  progress,  to 
lower  the  level  of  wages  and  values,  and  alter  the 
general  well-being  of  the  individual  for  the  worse. 
Our  present  prosperity  is  dependent  upon  the 
continuation  of  the  past  rate  of  development,  a 
growth  so  astounding,  so  abnormal,  so  artificial 
that  it  seems  hardly  possible  to  predicate  its 
continuance,  if  only  the  normal  forces  of  economic 
life  are  drawn  upon.  We  can  easily  house  in  the 
United  States  a  population  three  times  as  large 
as  we  have  to-day;  unquestionably  we  can  pro- 
vide these  hands  with  work  and  these  mouths 
with  food;  but  we  cannot  for  many  decades  con- 
tinue to  provide  the  people  at  present  alive  with 
their  present  wages  and  continue  to  supply  them 
at  present  prices  with  the  same  proportionate 
amount  of  commodities.  The  United  States  can 
grow  indefinitely,  but  not  at  the  past  rate  nor 
with  the  present  degree  of  prosperity. 

Will  this  sort  of  a  future  appeal  to  the  American 
merchant  when  the  victors  insist,  after  the  war, 
upon  the  undisturbed  operation  of  natural  forces, 
which  militate  against  the  United  States  and 
which  therefore  perpetuate  their  advantage  and 
our  own  disadvantage  until  that  distant  day  when 

31 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

the  slow  growth  of  our  economic  fabric  has  made 
us  more  nearly  independent?  Will  we  accept  the 
danger  as  impersonal,  contingent,  and  not  the 
result  of  intentional  aggression  on  the  part  of 
European  states,  or  shall  we  follow  their  ex- 
ample and  denominate  such  disadvantages  peril 
and  demand  political  and  military  action  to  ob- 
viate them?  The  most  dangerous  feature  of  the 
situation  —  the  only  true  peril  in  it  —  lies  in  the 
probable  unwillingness  of  the  American  people  to 
accept  it.  When  normal  economic  forces  — 
whose  operations  can  be  as  certainly  predicated 
as  the  phases  of  the  moon  —  destroy  our  swelling 
trade  with  South  America,  the  great  bulk  of  the 
community  will  hold  somebody  responsible;  and 
it  will  be  in  all  likelihood  the  nation  whose  mer- 
chants acquire  the  trade.  They  will  obtain  it  by 
reason  of  their  country's  superior  economic  posi- 
tion, but  it  will  be  difficult  to  make  Americans 
believe  it.  Logically  the  argument  will  be  con- 
clusive. We  determine  to  develop  our  trade 
with  South  America,  which  we  have  hitherto  neg- 
lected; we  succeed  exceedingly  well.  Suddenly 
our  trade  disappears;  it  is  coincident  with  the 
reentry  of  Germany  or  Great  Britain  into  the 
market.  Here  will  be  obviously  cause  and  effect: 
the  British  or  Germans  came  and  the  trade  dis- 
appeared. Therefore  they  did  it. 

Unless  American  merchants  understand  the 
32 


THE  APPROACHING  PERIL 

working  of  economic  forces  in  the  future  much 
better  than  they  have  in  the  past,  they  will  con- 
clude that  the  trade  was  snatched  from  them  by 
unfair  means.  It  is  very  difficult  for  an  individual 
who  knows  his  goods  to  be  the  same  which  the 
South  Americans  have  been  buying,  the  price  the 
same,  and  the  freight  the  same  to  believe  that 
there  is  no  wrong  dealing  when  he  suddenly  finds 
himself  unable,  even  by  economy  and  price  cut- 
ting, to  compete  at  all.  During  the  last  century 
there  have  been  many  instances  in  which  eco- 
nomic forces  have  militated  against  the  individ- 
ual, and  in  many  cases  they  have  destroyed  him. 
He  has  never  been  willing  to  recognize  that  they 
were  normal  or  unavoidable  and  has  invariably 
charged  the  persons  ostensibly  connected  with 
his  ruin  with  wickedness  and  crime.  When  ma- 
chinery was  first  introduced,  the  old  hand  work- 
ers were  convinced  that  their  work  was  taken 
from  them  for  the  lowest  and  worst  of  reasons. 
The  bitterness  of  many  sections  of  the  commu- 
nity toward  the  trusts  and  great  corporations  is 
extreme.  The  small  producer  and  distributor  be- 
lieves that  his  business  was  destroyed  by  means 
which  were  the  reverse  of  fair,  honest,  or  normal. 
The  labor  unions,  the  socialists,  the  anarchists,  all 
deny  with  vehemence  the  normality  or  justifiabil- 
ity of  existing  economic  phenomena.  Two  great 
nations  indeed,  the  Germans  and  the  Austrians, 

33 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

seem  to  believe  that  their  economic  backward- 
ness and  inferiority  are  the  result  of  the  malevo- 
lence of  Great  Britain,  executed  by  the  mali- 
cious, though  subtle  and  hypocritical,  use  of  its 
sea  power  and  political  domination. 

Here  is  the  true  peril  approaching:  that  we 
shall  attempt  to  accomplish  more  by  force  than 
arms  can  achieve. 


34 


CHAPTER  III 

THE    CONTINGENT   DANGER 

To  suppose  that  the  United  States  may  avoid  all 
cause  of  offense  by  retaining  possession  of  what 
it  now  holds,  to  assume  that  we  possess  nothing 
which  other  nations  value,  is  to  nourish  a  pecul- 
iar delusion.  If  not  during  the  war,  then  at  its 
close,  the  seizure  of  certain  properties  now  in  our 
possession  is  entirely  probable  and,  if  consum- 
mated, will  be  undertaken  by  certain  nations  as 
a  measure  of  defense,  to  secure  possession  of 
strategic  positions  which  they  conceive  to  be 
essential  for  the  protection  of  their  political  in- 
dependence, territorial  integrity,  and  future 
liberty.  Against  us  they  cherish  no  aggressive 
policies;  against  us  they  may  none  the  less  act 
hi  ways  which  we  shall  consider  aggressive.  The 
contingent  risk  lies  in  the  probability  that  we 
will  ourselves  undertake  the  defense  of  the  ag- 
gressive positions  we  now  occupy  and  utilize 
them  to  obtain  abnormal  privileges  in  unde- 
veloped countries  of  the  type  so  highly  prized 
in  Europe. 

The  value  of  the  Panama  Canal  as  a  commer- 
35 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

cial  highway  between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  is 
too  widely  appreciated  for  us  to  suppose  that 
other  nations  do  not  grasp  its  significance.  It 
offers  trade  routes  to  Australia,  to  India,  to 
Japan  shorter  than  those  at  present  in  use 
through  the  Suez  Canal.  Its  possessor,  by  a  sim- 
ple scale  of  tolls  intended  to  secure  advantages 
for  American  citizens,  can  practically  control  the 
trade  of  the  western  coast  of  South  America. 
Still,  the  true  significance  of  the  Panama  Canal 
must  include  its  value  as  a  military  and  naval 
approach  to  India  and  the  Far  East.  Through 
it  the  British  may  approach  their  own  great  pos- 
sessions without  danger  of  attack  from  German 
armies  hi  Syria  or  from  Austrian  fleets  in  the 
Mediterranean;  Saloniki  and  Constantinople 
lose  significance;  Persia  even  becomes  less  im- 
portant as  a  part  of  the  Indian  defenses  once  the 
Panama  Canal  has  been  thrown  open  to  Great 
Britain's  fleet  and  closed  against  those  of  her 
rivals.  In  the  hands  of  Germany  the  great  canal 
will  make  unnecessary  vast  measures  of  invasion 
and  conquest  aimed  at  the  overthrow  of  those 
defenses  so  assiduously  erected  around  India  by 
British  diplomacy  and  military  art.  Once  the 
British  fleet  is  beaten,  once  the  German  fleet  pre- 
dominates, even  if  not  supreme,  the  Panama 
Canal  will  open  for  Germany  all  the  doors  of  the 
Pacific  and  permit  the  exclusion  of  her  rivals  by 

36 


THE  CONTINGENT  DANGER 

forcing  them  to  depend  upon  less  rapid  and  less 
safe  methods  of  access.  The  Panama  Canal  is  an 
asset;  but  it  is  none  the  less  a  liability,  by  reason 
of  its  extraordinary  value  to  other  nations.  If 
we  do  not  seek  to  use  it  in  our  own  interests, 
other  nations  will  attempt  to  monopolize  it. 

The  Canal  is  for  the  United  States  an  aggres- 
sive position  of  a  peculiarly  vulnerable  type.  A 
defensible  position  no  one  can  claim  it  has,  for  it 
is  separated  from  the  United  States  by  long 
stretches  of  land,  by  long  reaches  of  water, 
dominated  by  mountains  on  the  one  hand,  by 
islands  on  the  other,  none  of  which  we  control. 
The  Canal  Zone  itself  is  too  small,  its  forts  not 
sufficiently  extended  to  prevent  capture  by  an 
army  landed  outside  its  radius.  On  either  side 
of  the  Zone  are  nations  not  only  small  in  size, 
but  poverty  stricken,  disorganized,  an  easy  prey 
for  any  European  power  of  the  first  rank.  The 
approaches  by  sea  have  long  been  in  the  hands 
of  Great  Britain.  The  Bahama  and  Bermuda 
Islands  afford  practically  the  only  bases  for  fleet 
action  between  the  Chesapeake  and  the  Gulf. 
All  American  trade  between  New  York,  Boston, 
and  the  Canal  must  run  that  gauntlet.  The  tradi- 
tional passage  through  the  West  Indies  to  South 
America,  and  to  the  Canal  lies  through  British 
possessions  in  the  Windward  and  Leeward  Is- 
lands. Trinidad  stands  at  the  mouth  of  the 

37 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

Amazon;  Jamaica  controls  all  the  approaches  to 
the  Canal  from  South  America,  from  Cuba, 
from  Mexico,  from  the  United  States,  and  is  a 
basis  for  fleet  action  of  the  very  first  consequence. 

Nor  does  the  fleet  of  the  United  States  control 
the  ocean  approaches.  By  reason  of  a  tacit  un- 
derstanding with  Great  Britain  the  United  States 
has  recently  enjoyed  complete  freedom  in  the  use 
of  the  waters  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the  At- 
lantic Ocean.  Our  fleet  has  moved  with  entire 
liberty  wherever  it  chose,  but  we  need  not  forget 
that  should  the  tensity  of  the  European  situation 
release  either  the  British  or  German  fleet  from 
European  waters,  the  temporary  nature  and 
permissive  character  of  our  own  naval  tenure  of 
the  Gulf  may  become  only  too  immediately  evi- 
dent. In  no  sense  will  we  hold  the  approaches  to 
the  Canal  until  we  are  ready  to  defend  them 
against  any  nation.  Upon  this  consideration  is 
based  the  recent  report  of  the  Navy  Board, 
which  recommended  for  defense  a  fleet  at  least 
as  large  as  the  present  fleet  of  Great  Britain. 

It  is  the  extent  of  the  operations  necessarily 
involved  in  the  maintenance  of  our  ownership 
which  makes  apparent  the  truly  aggressive  char- 
acter of  our  position  at  Panama.  At  least  a  pro- 
tectorate over  the  States  immediately  around 
the  Canal  we  shall  find  necessary.  Without  mili- 
tary control  of  the  land  approaches  through 

38 


THE  CONTINGENT  DANGER 

Mexico  and  the  Central  American  States  we 
cannot  expect  to  defend  it  at  all,  while  a  fleet  is 
in  preparation  of  sufficient  size  to  undertake 
to  hold  the  water  approaches  against  the  Eu- 
ropean power  supreme  upon  the  ocean.  Then  we 
cannot  long  tolerate,  if  we  are  to  control  the 
Canal  and  its  approaches  in  very  fact,  the  pos- 
session by  any  other  nation  of  the  strategic  de- 
fenses in  the  Bahamas,  the  Bermudas,  the  Wind- 
ward Islands,  and  Jamaica.  Nor  will  a  mere 
ability  to  hold  the  Canal  Zone  and  the  Gulf  it- 
self be  of  real  advantage  to  us  unless  we  can  also 
protect  in  transit  American  commerce  between 
the  northern  Atlantic  and  the  Gulf.  Defense  of 
the  Canal  means  in  fact  a  practical  annihilation 
of  the  political  sovereignty  of  Central  America, 
the  decisive  interference  with  the  complete  con- 
trol of  the  Atlantic  by  the  European  power 
supreme  upon  the  sea,  and  the  actual  seizure  of 
such  positions  as  interfere  with  the  completeness 
of  our  own  dispositions  for  defense  by  furnishing 
bases  for  enemy  fleets. 

In  the  Pacific  the  position  of  the  United  States 
is  already  decidedly  aggressive.  The  great  ocean 
between  Asia  and  America  is  strewn  with  islands 
along  the  Asiatic  coast,  but  contains  few  hi  mid- 
ocean.  The  locations  of  these  numerous  islands 
was  until  recently  of  little  significance,  because 
the  only  approaches  to  the  Pacific  from  Europe 

39 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

were  from  Africa  and  the  Mediterranean.  The 
Pacific  itself  was,  so  to  speak,  an  untrodden 
highway;  the  great  commercial  routes  went 
around  it  and  not  across  it.  But  the  projection 
of  the  Panama  Canal  promptly  revealed  the  true 
strategic  significance  of  the  Asiatic  approaches. 
The  all-important  half-way  house  for  steamers 
is  Hawaii.  Guam  is  the  most  favorably  situated 
island  for  fleets  and  steamers  in  their  further 
progress  across  that  ocean  and  has  been  declared 
by  naval  authorities  the  key  of  the  Pacific.  The 
position  of  the  Japanese  islands  is  unquestion- 
ably significant,  but  below  them  lie  the  Philip- 
pine Islands,  controlling  all  the  approaches  be- 
tween Japan,  China,  India,  and  Europe  by  the 
old  and  well-trodden  routes,  exactly  as  Guam 
and  Hawaii  control  all  the  necessary  approaches 
to  Japan  by  the  newer  highways  across  the 
Pacific. 

These  islands  are  indeed  the  strategic  defenses 
of  the  United  States  and  of  the  Panama  Canal 
against  invasion  from  Asia.  They  are  also  the 
strategic  defenses  of  Asia  against  Europe  and 
the  United  States,  the  key  of  the  door  to  Asia 
which  the  white  man  has  so  persistently  sought 
to  open.  In  our  position  the  Asiatics  read  an 
intention  to  share  in  the  exploitation  of  Asia  by 
the  white  races.  Our  policy  of  the  Open  Door 
they  see  as  the  white  man's  policy,  claiming  for 

40 


THE  CONTINGENT  DANGER 

us  in  Asia  the  same  privileges  other  white  men 
have,  but  not  claiming  similar  privileges  for  the 
Asiatics  in  the  control  of  their  own  trade  which 
all  European  nations  enjoy. 

Proof  of  the  aggressive  character  of  the  posi- 
tion of  the  United  States,  proof  of  our  aggressive 
intentions  lies  for  Asiatics  in  an  entire  lack  of 
intrinsic  value  in  these  new  possessions.  In  their 
undeveloped  condition  no  considerable  trade 
exists,  and  the  character  of  the  inhabitants,  the 
climate,  the  soil,  make  improbable  the  creation 
in  the  islands  of  a  sufficiently  varied  commerce 
within  half  a  century  to  justify  possession  and 
exploitation.  The  Philippines  are  commercially 
a  liability  and  not  an  asset.  They  have  cost  the 
United  States  infinitely  more  money  than  the 
whole  value  of  their  trade.  Were  we,  then,  fool- 
ish enough  to  pay  twenty  million  dollars  and  in- 
cur expense  and  responsibility  for  a  possession 
known  to  be  worthless?  Another  explanation  of 
our  aggressive  purposes  they  see  in  the  foreign 
situation  in  1898.  Germany  is  supposed  to  have 
intended  the  seizure  of  the  islands  as  a  basis  for 
her  aggressive  policies  in  the  Far  East.  Great 
Britain  and  France,  whose  privileges  in  Asia  were 
of  course  threatened,  found  themselves  at  the 
moment  unable  to  take  possession  themselves 
without  incurring  the  danger  of  war  in  Europe. 
Only  the  United  States  could  seize  the  islands  and 

41 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

hold  them  without  affording  the  Germans  an 
opportunity  to  precipitate  at  once  a  struggle  for 
Asiatic  commerce  and  for  the  possession  of  the 
Pacific. 

To  the  thinking  of  Europeans  and  most  Latin 
Americans,  if  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  not  an 
aggressive  policy,  it  lacks  purpose.1  Why  we 
should  constantly  reassert  its  importance,  if  it 
has  no  greater  significance  than  we  allege,  is 
incomprehensible  to  Europeans.  Very  obviously 
its  original  purpose  no  longer  exists,  and  in  that 
sense  the  policy  is  obsolete.  A  European  political 
conquest  of  South  America  is  improbable,  and, 
even  should  a  European  state  be  erected  south 
of  Panama,  the  United  States  is  too  powerful 
to-day  to  find  its  political  independence  or  terri- 
torial integrity  truly  endangered.  The  old  trade 
between  the  colonies  and  the  West  Indies,  so 
profitable  in  the  eighteenth  century  and  which 
Monroe  was  seeking  to  protect  in  1823,  dis- 
appeared in  the  following  decade  and  was  never 
revived.  If  this  was  the  purpose  of  the  Doctrine, 
the  latter  is  obsolete.  The  independence  of  South 
America  is  not  ascribed  in  that  continent  to  the 
protection  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  but  to  the 
friendship  of  Great  Britain  and  the  might  of 
her  navy.  It  is  idle  for  us  to  proclaim  our  inten- 

1  Usher,  Pan- Americanism,  Book  III,  contains  a  detailed  dis- 
cussion of  the  conclusions  in  this  and  following  paragraphs. 

42 


THE  CONTINGENT  DANGER 

tion  of  protecting  them  from  a  power  who  could 
at  any  time  have  conquered  them  during  the 
last  century,  whom  they  regard  as  their  prin- 
cipal benefactor,  and  whom  we  are  not  in  the 
least  able  to  defeat.  The  notion  that  they  need 
our  assistance,  that  they  are  themselves  unable  to 
prosecute  any  necessary  measures  of  defense, 
they  decline  to  believe.  If  any  or  all  of  these  be 
the  meaning  of  the  Doctrine,  it  is  to  their  think- 
ing not  only  obsolete,  but  impertinent. 

If  we  mean,  by  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  Pan- 
Americanism  —  America  for  Americans,  the  ex- 
clusion of  Europeans  and  European  nations  as  a 
matter  of  principle  —  such  a  policy  is  widely 
believed  by  responsible  men  in  South  America 
to  be  utterly  contrary  to  the  best  interests  of  all 
the  republics  and  to  be  based  upon  obvious  falla- 
cies regarding  conditions  in  Lathi  America  and 
in  the  United  States.  A  closer  political  relation- 
ship between  the  republics  of  the  new  world,  of 
which  Monroe  dreamed,  does  not  exist;  the  gov- 
ernmental and  administrative  relationship  be- 
tween the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  and 
France  is  infinitely  closer  than  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Latin  American  republics. 
Several  of  their  governments  we  have  denied 
were  democracies,  and  one  in  particular  we  have 
persistently  in  recent  years  declined  to  recognize 
as  an  organized  government  at  all.  No  mutuality 

43 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

of  economic  interests  exists  between  the  two 
continents  greater  than  each  possesses  with 
Europe. 

Nor  can  social  contact,  brotherhood,  equal- 
ity be  maintained  as  a  possible  bond  so  long 
as  the  objection  in  the  United  States  to  the 
Indian  and  the  negro  on  the  score  of  blood  con- 
tinues to  be  as  strong  and  as  general  as  at  pres- 
ent. Many  Latin  Americans  are  full-blooded 
Indians;  others  possess  a  mixture  of  negro  and 
Indian  blood;  few  indeed  can  claim  an  entirely 
white  lineage.  If  Pan-Americanism  means  a 
closer  connection  of  any  kind  between  the  re- 
publics of  the  new  world  than  with  Europe,  its 
basis  is  so  clearly  artificial,  so  obviously  false 
and  fallacious,  so  entirely  contrary  to  the  best 
interests  of  the  Latin  Americans,  that  they  reject 
it  with  unanimity  and  scorn. 

What  possible  motive  then  remains  to  ex- 
plain the  reiteration  of  the  importance  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  to  justify  the  belief  of  [the 
American  people  in  its  necessity?  One  only,  one 
never  mentioned  in  the  United  States,  one  vehe- 
mently denied  whenever  charged  —  an  aggres- 
sive policy  to  secure  for  the  United  States,  by 
the  extension  of  our  political  influence  in  Cen- 
tral and  South  America,  that  abnormal  share  of 
the  trade  of  undeveloped  countries  which  we  can 
obviously  obtain  in  no  other  way.  They  see  in 

44 


THE  CONTINGENT  DANGER 

it  the  intention  of  the  United  States  to  inter- 
fere with  the  destinies  of  Latin  America  in  the 
interests  of  our  own  economic  future.  This  at 
least  is  intelligible;  this  at  least  is  possible; 
this  at  least  is  neither  obsolete  nor  fallacious. 
When  every  motive  alleged  is  inadequate,  when 
the  necessity  of  the  policy  is  still  asserted, 
what  other  conclusion  is  possible? 

These  numerous  aggressive  positions  and  poli- 
cies are  at  present  completely  vulnerable.  We 
hold  them  by  virtue  of  the  tolerance  of  those 
whom  they  threaten.  Our  present  army  and 
navy  are  admittedly  incapable  of  the  simplest 
operations  of  defense,  and  are  therefore  unable 
to  prevent  other  nations  from  seizing  such  pos- 
sessions with  maximum  ease.  There  seems  to 
be  little  doubt,  that  our  aggression  has  been 
tolerated  because  it  was  not  dangerous.  So 
long  as  we  were  unable  to  utilize  the  strategic  ap- 
proaches to  Asia  against  the  Asiatic,  he  looked 
upon  our  tenure  with  indifference;  so  long  as  the 
fleet  of  Great  Britain  remained  supreme,  we  could 
be  deprived  at  any  time  of  positions  subversive 
of  her  interests.  Other  European  nations  were 
not  concerned,  because  the  necessity  for  con- 
trolling the  seas  was  the  supreme  requisite  of 
aggression  upon  them  or  of  their  aggression 
upon  us. 

Obviously,  should  the  United  States  adopt  pre- 
45 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

paredness,  the  whole  situation  will  be  altered. 
However  limited  in  scope,  however  moderate  the 
expenditure,  however  emphatic  our  protesta- 
tions of  intention  to  utilize  such  forces  purely  for 
the  defense  of  continental  United  States,  the 
very  adoption  of  such  a  policy  as  the  strengthen- 
ing of  armament  will  raise  in  the  minds  of  other 
nations  a  suspicion  of  the  honesty  of  our  purpose. 
Discretion  will  urge  them  to  defend  themselves 
by  seizing  the  posts  which  threatened  them  or 
their  interests  before  our  military  and  naval 
forces  become  able  to  utilize  them.  Prepared- 
ness will  instantly  lend  color  to  the  claim  that 
our  purpose  is  aggressive,  just  as  our  possession 
itself  has  for  years  proved  the  existence  of  ag- 
gressive positions  in  American  hands.  Nor  will 
the  loss  of  any  or  all  of  these  in  the  least  threaten 
our  political  independence,  our  territorial  in- 
tegrity, the  prosperity  of  American  business, 
or  our  access  to  the  markets  of  the  world.  To 
defend  them  is  to  undertake  aggression;  to  at- 
tempt their  retention  is  to  take  from  others  what 
they  are  determined  to  have. 

To  secure  the  final  cession  by  the  United 
States  of  such  aggressive  positions  or  policies  an 
invasion  of  continental  United  States  is  possible. 
Unquestionably  we  can  be  invaded.  At  present 
we  may  be  invaded  with  the  maximum  ease  and 
safety  to  the  invader.  Military  authorities  are 

46 


THE  CONTINGENT  DANGER 

agreed  that  several  European  nations  are  at 
present  capable  of  landing  in  the  United  States 
within  a  few  days  an  army  of  sufficient  size  to 
take  possession  temporarily  of  whatever  section 
they  desire  to  dominate.  All  authorities  are 
agreed  that  such  an  invasion  could  never  be 
extended  into  conquest  by  any  resources  of  pres- 
ent nations  in  Europe.  Unless  immediate  pre- 
paredness is  within  some  brief  period  completed 
sufficient  to  withstand  the  occupation  of  New 
York  or  Boston  by  a  hostile  army,  we  can  be  com- 
pelled to  ransom  our  shores  by  a  cession  of  the 
Panama  Canal  or  of  the  islands  in  the  Pacific  or 
by  a  specific  renunciation  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, demanded  by  the  European  powers  in  the 
interests  of  the  South  American  republics.  The 
truth  is,  the  seizure  of  our  extra-continental 
possessions  is  extraordinarily  simple,  but  pos- 
session will  be  entirely  incapable  of  extorting 
from  the  United  States  a  renunciation  of  owner- 
ship. These  positions  in  no  way  threaten  us  and 
therefore  cannot  be  used  to  secure  from  us  terms 
of  peace.  AJI  attack  upon  the  Panama  Canal 
will  be  delivered  upon  the  Atlantic  coast;  an 
attack  upon  the  Philippines  will  be  aimed  at 
Seattle  or  San  Francisco.  At  some  time  or  other 
the  conqueror  must  reckon  with  the  real  might 
of  the  United  States,  and  he  can  do  so  only  by 
invading  the  continent.  War  cannot  possibly 

47 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

result  from  the  loss  of  our  present  aggressive 
positions  and  policies  unless  we  ourselves  de- 
termine to  maintain  them.  If  this  be  the  purpose 
of  preparedness,  however,  it  is  not  defense,  but 
aggression. 


48 


CHAPTER  IV 

NEUTRAL    RIGHTS    AND    NATIONAL    PRESTIGE 

THE  last  few  months  have  shown  that  more  ex- 
tensive privileges  in  European  markets  are  de- 
sirable for  American  merchants  than  are  ad- 
vantageous to  the  Europeans.  Should  we  be 
tempted  in  future  to  insist  upon  economic  con- 
cessions or  individual  privileges  which  European 
nations  regard  as  inequitable  or  unnecessary,  we 
may  insensibly  be  led,  as  in  1812,  to  a  point  where 
war  will  seem  to  be  our  natural  recourse.  While 
the  diplomatic  utterances  of  President  Wilson 
have  been  heartily  approved  by  a  large  consti- 
tuency in  America,  they  have  excited  opposi- 
tion and  distrust  abroad.  In  fact  they  seem 
quite  clearly  to  have  cost  us  our  national  pres- 
tige, not,  to  be  sure,  a  prestige  we  actually  pos- 
sessed, but  one  none  the  less  desired.  Our  dip- 
lomats have  somehow  failed  to  render  our  ideals 
and  policies  intelligible  to  Europeans.  Indeed  it 
is  not  enough  that  what  we  do  and  say  shall  be 
just,  legal,  equitable;  it  must  seem  so  to  others. 
The  international  prestige  of  the  United  States 
depends  not  upon  our  own  conviction  of  honor- 

49 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

able  intentions,  of  consistent  action,  of  high 
ideals,  but  upon  the  credence  other  nations  re- 
pose in  our  high  standards  of  honor  and  in  our 
readiness  to  act  justly  and  equitably. 

Our  diplomatic  policy,  the  trend  of  American 
public  opinion,  the  things  we  have  done  and 
those  we  have  omitted  to  do,  have  been  in  the 
last  year  of  a  nature  that  most  Europeans  have 
declared  themselves  nonplussed  to  explain.  They 
have  felt  us  scarcely  cognizant  of  the  limitations 
of  our  position,  nor  yet  sufficiently  informed 
upon  European  affairs  to  approximate  a  compre- 
hension of  the  gravity  of  European  issues  affected 
by  our  diplomatic  demands.  Where  we  have 
charged  them  with  inhumanity  and  illegal  con- 
duct, they  have  blamed  us  for  ignorance  and 
lack  of  charity.  Apparently  we  have  not  been 
willing  to  accept  European  ambitions  and  in- 
terests as  existing  facts,  to  estimate  their  scope, 
purpose,  and  justice  in  European  terms,  or  to 
realize  the  inevitability  with  which  all  economic 
phenomena  clash  by  the  fact  of  then*  existence. 
We  have  treated  the  ambitions  of  certain  nations 
as  unjustifiable,  have  denominated  then*  methods 
of  warfare  murder,  and  the  extension  of  their 
economic  interests  robbery.  The  necessities  of 
other  nations  we  have  been  seemingly  unable  to 
visualize,  nor  to  appreciate  their  necessary  re- 
action upon  our  own  interests. 

50 


NEUTRAL  RIGHTS  AND  PRESTIGE 

While  our  diplomatic  notes  were  couched  in 
language  customary  only  in  the  last  communica- 
tions forwarded  between  European  nations  about 
to  appeal  to  war,  our  Chief  Executive  made  no 
secret  of  the  unpreparedness  of  the  country  to 
execute  measures  of  coercion.  One  phrase  — 
"too  proud  to  fight"  —  produced  on  the  Euro- 
pean mind  most  unfortunate  impressions,  while 
the  laudation,  by  some,  of  our  unpreparedness 
as  a  public  virtue  was  supposed  in  Europe  clearly 
to  indicate  our  belief  that  European  armaments 
were  the  result  of  insanity  and  of  a  disregard  of 
the  Christian  and  humane  principles  on  which 
modern  society  is  believed  to  rest.  If  such  im- 
plications were  resented  as  unwarranted,  our 
policy  as  a  whole  was  unintelligible.  The  tenor 
of  our  diplomatic  notes  indicated  our  intention  to 
demand  the  utmost  extension  of  American  rights, 
without  the  slightest  ability  to  pay  the  price 
which  such  an  interference  with  European  na- 
tions would  necessitate,  and  without  any  ap- 
parent national  aim  of  the  first  importance  to 
be  achieved. 

Nor  has  it  seemed  to  European  statesmen  that 
the  United  States  has  itself  observed  those 
broad  tenets  of  humanity,  liberty,  and  honor 
which  it  erected  as  a  standard  of  conduct  for 
European  nations.  Such  precepts  were  appar- 
ently to  regulate  their  conduct  toward  us,  but 

51 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

we  seemed  to  base  our  own  conduct  toward 
them  upon  those  very  notions  of  international 
law  and  expediency  which  we  decried.  The  sen- 
sitiveness of  the  American  people  to  the  loss  of 
American  life  Europeans  find  it  difficult  to  credit 
on  the  score  of  the  sentiment  aroused  by  the 
Lusitania  incident;  for  they  know  that  we  our- 
selves know  that  many  times  that  number  of 
Americans  have  been  shamefully  done  to  death 
in  Mexico,  to  whose  sufferings  and  torture  the 
American  people  and  the  Administration  have 
been  apathetic.  Why  we  should  be  so  aroused 
over  the  death  by  drowning  of  a  comparatively 
few  women  and  children  when  American  women 
and  children  have  been  violated,  tortured,  and 
murdered  in  Mexico  without  remark,  the  Ger- 
mans cannot  grasp. 

With  our  protestations  that  high  ethical  mo- 
tives form  the  only  proper  basis  of  international 
action,  the  British  have  found  it  difficult  to 
align  our  demands  regarding  contraband  and 
the  blockade  of  Germany.  We  have  frankly 
alleged  the  loss  of  profit  and  the  sacrifice  of  in- 
dividual interests,  while  demanding  concessions 
of  national  import.  They  feel  that  we  have 
placed  the  profits  of  individuals  above  the  po- 
litical independence  and  safety  of  Great  Britain, 
and  claim  that  the  high  regard  for  ethical  con- 
ceptions which  we  profess  should  display  itself  in  a 

52 


NEUTRAL  RIGHTS  AND  PRESTIGE 

broad  and  magnanimous  appreciation  of  the  seri- 
ous crisis  in  which  the  British  nation  is  involved. 
In  regard  to  arbitration  the  Europeans  find 
our  national  attitude  incomprehensible.  The 
people  at  large  apparently  champion  arbitra- 
tion as  a  compulsory  method  for  the  settlement 
of  disputes  between  nations,  yet,  when  a  change 
of  circumstances  had  rendered  certain  treaties 
detrimental  to  American  interests,  large  sections 
of  the  country  have  been  hostile  to  the  idea  of 
submitting  the  issue  to  arbitration.  Only  with 
the  greatest  difficulty  was  Congress  induced  to 
rescind  its  action  in  contravention  of  our  treaties 
with  Great  Britain;  the  utmost  endeavors  of  the 
Federal  Government  and  of  other  agencies  have 
been  entirely  unable  to  prevent  the  annulling  of 
our  treaties  with  Japan  by  several  of  the  Western 
States.  The  present  Administration,  the  Euro- 
peans find,  has  itself  been  inconsistent  in  its 
policies.  While  securing  the  signature  of  treaties 
with  various  nations  for  compulsory  arbitration, 
the  United  States  has  persistently  refused  to  sub- 
mit to  an  international  tribunal  the  recent  con- 
troversies with  Great  Britain  and  Germany. 
Most  incomprehensible  was  this  attitude,  in  view 
of  the  fact  that  the  issues  in  question  were  pre- 
cisely that  type  of  quasi-legal  and  factual  prob- 
lem which  had  been  believed  peculiarly  suscep- 
tible of  compromise  and  adjustment. 

53 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE_  FUTURE 

With  the  Mexican  policy  of  the  Government 
has  clashed  radically  its  dealings  with  the  tiny 
republic  of  Hayti.  The  United  States  promptly 
suppressed  by  force  the  democratic  movements 
in  Hayti,  while  persistently  refusing  to  interfere 
with  anarchy  in  Mexico.  Many  Latin  Americans 
feel  that  our  attitude  toward  the  latter  was 
rather  the  result  of  our  inability  to  coerce  so 
large  a  state  than  of  any  love  for  democracy  or 
liberty.  Did  not  the  President's  own  policy  in 
Hayti  demonstrate  it?  Idealism  alleged  by  the 
advocates  of  Pan-Americanism;  the  creation  of  a 
reign  of  brotherly  love  between  all  the  American 
republics;  the  acceptance  by  the  United  States  of 
the  equality  of  the  sister  republics  in  the  south, 
are  not  consistent  with  recent  American  action 
in  the  case  of  the  Panama  Republic  and  nu- 
merous other  issues  not  commonly  remembered 
in  the  United  States,  but  fresh  to  mind  in  Latin 
America. 

In  Europe  and  Latin  America  there  is  a  feel- 
ing in  many  quarters  that  the  only  possible  ex- 
planation of  recent  American  diplomacy  is  to  be 
found  in  the  exigencies  of  party  politics.  They 
feel  themselves  compelled  to  choose  between 
such  disagreeable  alternatives  as  the  lamentable 
ignorance  of  American  statesmen  about  plain 
propositions  of  fact  and  law,  of  international 
diplomatic  usage  and  comity,  and  their  anima- 

54 


NEUTRAL  RIGHTS  AND  PRESTIGE 

tion  by  some  ulterior  purpose.  They  see  certain 
admitted  facts  —  the  importance  to  the  Demo- 
cratic Party  of  the  Irish  and  German  vote,  the 
strength  of  those  nationalities  in  the  pivotal 
State  of  New  York  and  in  other  doubtful  States, 
the  desire  to  conciliate  the  friends  of  the  Allies, 
whose  votes  are  also  essential  to  Democratic 
victory  in  1916.  Were  not  the  notes  to  Germany 
meant  to  be  read  by  the  friends  of  the  Allies  and 
the  notes  to  Great  Britain  by  the  Germans  and 
Irish? 

Did  not  the  immediate  publication  of  the 
more  important  communications  before  the 
European  Governments  could  possibly  have 
read  them  —  to  say  nothing  of  answering  them 
—  prove  the  intention  of  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment to  influence  the  opinion  of  its  own 
people  and  not  to  appeal  to  the  reason  and  equity 
of  the  European  Governments,  to  which  the 
notes  were  ostensibly  addressed?  If  meant  in 
good  faith,  why  did  not  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  wait  until  the  European  states- 
men could  at  least  have  an  opportunity  to  cor- 
rect misapprehensions  and  offer  explanations  or 
apologies?  Then  the  failure  of  the  United  States 
to  maintain  such  extraordinary  communications 
was  hard  to  explain  to  European  minds.  After 
we  had  stated  in  diplomatic  language  that  we 
should  go  to  war  unless  our  demands  were 

55 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

granted,  why,  when  our  demands  were  plainly 
refused,  did  we  simply  write  more  notes? 

Nor  did  the  issues  out  of  which  such  serious 
disagreements  grew  seem  to  the  Europeans  of 
sufficient  intrinsic  importance  to  risk  a  war  for 
their  favorable  settlement.  They  were  indeed 
those  duties  which  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment has  normally  performed  for  its  citizens  in 
time  of  peace  without  attracting  attention  or 
provoking  remark.  Practically  all  concern  in- 
dividual and  not  national  interests  and,  from 
any  accurate  point  of  view,  are  of  secondary  and 
not  of  primary  importance;  permissive  and  de- 
sirable rather  than  indispensable;  issues  for  whose 
advancement  it  can  never  become  expedient  to 
imperil  our  national  integrity  or  independence. 
In  part  they  concern  the  safety  of  Americans  on 
the  high  seas  or  domiciled  in  foreign  territory, 
in  part  rights  and  privileges  are  demanded  in 
commercial  transactions.  Access  to  an  accus- 
tomed market  is  sought,  or  the  right  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  the  high  prices  prevailing  in  the 
markets  of  belligerent  nations.  Nearly  all  in- 
volve the  degree  of  profit  likely  to  be  obtained  by 
American  citizens  prosecuting  some  particular 
business  rather  than  their  ability  to  continue 
to  do  business  at  all. 

Other  perplexing  issues  have  grown  out  of  the 
presence  in  this  country  of  citizens  of  the  bellig- 

56 


NEUTRAL  RIGHTS  AND  PRESTIGE 

erent  nations  who  have  attempted  in  various 
ways  to  further  the  interests  of  their  country. 
Charges  have  been  made  of  the  prosecution  of 
plots  by  aliens  whose  object  was  the  interference 
with  the  business  American  citizens  were  pur- 
suing with  European  Governments  or  citizens. 
It  seems  probable  that  certain  accidents  to  fac- 
tories producing  munitions  and  to  ships  carrying 
armament  were  the  result  of  an  intention  to 
cripple  the  ability  of  this  country  to  assist  cer- 
tain of  the  belligerent  nations.  In  particular  the 
rights  of  aliens  in  a  foreign  country  and  their 
amenability  to  its  territorial  jurisdiction  have 
been  insistently  raised.  There  are  also  in  this 
country  large  numbers  of  American  citizens  of 
foreign  extraction  whose  natural  sympathies  for 
the  land  of  their  birth  have  led  to  declarations 
and  actions  not  altogether  consistent  with  their 
legal  status  as  American  citizens. 

All  of  these  problems  are  recurrent  and  con- 
tinuing interests  which  the  National  Govern- 
ment must  always  be  ready  to  advance  and 
protect.  They  are  largely  the  result  of  the  in- 
fluence upon  the  commercial  world  of  the  tele- 
graph, the  railroad,  and  the  steamship,  whose 
advent  has  so  transformed  the  problems  of  trans- 
portation and  communication  as  to  extend  the 
commercial  world  to  the  confines  of  the  habitable 
globe.  There  is  no  port  in  the  world  to  which 

57 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

American  citizens  may  not  and  indeed  do  not 
penetrate  and  where  their  activities  and  pres- 
ence do  not  create  problems  for  the  National 
Government  to  solve.  While  it  has  always  been 
true  that  many  citizens  of  every  State  possessed 
interests  outside  its  borders,  there  has  never 
been  a  time  in  the  history  of  the  world  when  so 
large  a  proportion  of  the  population  of  any  na- 
tion had  so  varied  and  extensive  a  contact  with 
the  rest  of  the  globe  as  a  vast  majority  of  the 
citizens  of  all  highly  developed  nations  have 
at  present. 

Wherever  a  citizen  or  his  property  may  be, 
there  American  interests  requiring  protection  or 
advancement  are  to  be  found.  Some  citizens 
permanently  reside  in  foreign  countries  and  there 
acquire  property.  Others  residing  in  the  United 
States  establish  business  with  other  countries, 
and  their  property  rights  manifestly  will  differ 
from  natives  of  those  countries.  Business  trans- 
actions between  foreigners  and  American  citi- 
zens resident  at  home  and  abroad  create  prob- 
lems of  access  to  other  markets,  of  commercial 
privileges,  all  complicated  by  legal  issues  of  the 
utmost  difficulty.  Crimes  committed  by  Ameri- 
can citizens  on  foreign  soil  must  be  in  some  way 
expiated  without  exposing  the  individual  to 
unnecessarily  harsh  punishment.  The  status  of 
American  citizens  as  travelers  is  also  not  without 

58 


NEUTRAL  RIGHTS  AND  PRESTIGE 

its  difficulties,  while  the  protection  of  life  and 
property  on  the  high  seas  furnishes  some  of  the 
most  difficult  problems  that  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment has  been  required  to  solve  for  many 
years. 

For  the  permanent  solution  of  these  issues  the 
establishment  of  broad  premises  of  international 
law  is  indispensable,  and  to  that  end  the  United 
States  has  persistently  advanced  contentions 
whose  breadth  and  significance  European  states- 
men have  by  no  means  been  sure  were  appre- 
ciated at  Washington.  In  particular  the  United 
States  has  assumed  the  existence  of  a  definite 
corpus  of  international  law,  to  which  all  nations 
had  consented,  by  which  all  were  bound,  and  the 
breach  of  which  constituted  a  crime.  That  a 
definite  body  of  theoretical  notions  has  been 
developed  by  textbook  writers  and  idealists, 
European  statesmen  are  quite  willing  to  admit; 
but  that  any  such  body  of  precepts  has  ever 
been  adopted  by  common  consent  and  consti- 
tuted a  law  of  superior  obligation,  they  flatly 
deny. 

International  law  to  them  does  not  deserve 
the  term  "law."  It  is  voluntary,  fluid,  inde- 
terminate, and,  while  definite  precepts  have  been 
elaborated  by  courts  of  admiralty  and  by  chan- 
celleries, they  are  extremely  precise  and  are  too 
few  in  number  and  too  scattering  in  application 

59 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

to  deserve  the  name  of  an  international  code. 
In  short  the  United  States  is  demanding  the  ac- 
ceptance by  Europe  of  a  different  notion  of  in- 
ternational law  than  has  been  customarily  ac- 
cepted by  European  nations.  Instead  of  a 
mere  series  of  understandings,  the  recognition 
of  which  was  in  large  measure  voluntary,  we 
have  insisted  upon  a  definite  law  of  superior 
obligation.  This  proposal  has  been  invariably 
rejected  in  Europe,  whenever  submitted,  as  in- 
expedient and  inconsistent  with  the  facts  of  the 
situation. 

Moreover,  the  extensions  and  alterations  de- 
manded by  the  United  States  in  international 
practice  are  wide  and  far-reaching,  and  of  such 
vital  import  to  all  nations  that  European  states- 
men hesitate  to  believe  that  the  deliberations  or 
even  agreements  of  two  or  three  nations  can 
successfully  establish  such  tenets  as  international 
practice.  In  our  demands  to  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria in  submarine  cases  the  United  States  prac- 
tically asserts  its  jurisdiction  over  American 
citizens  wherever  they  are,  and  proclaims  its 
duty  to  secure  for  them  such  privileges  and  rights 
as  they  enjoy  under  international  law.  We  have 
also  assumed  jurisdiction  over  German  citizens 
in  the  United  States  and  have  tried  them  in 
Federal  courts  for  offenses  created  by  American 
statutes.  The  true  issue  is  the  nature  of  in- 

60 


NEUTRAL  RIGHTS  AND  PRESTIGE 

ternational  private  law  and  the  definition  of  the 
rights  of  citizens  outside  the  territorial  juris- 
diction of  their  own  nation. 

The  legal  status  of  aliens  has  never  been 
satisfactorily  settled.  According  to  the  premises 
of  territorial  law,  the  alien  neither  has  nor  can 
acquire  any  status  without  renouncing  his  pre- 
vious allegiance.  At  the  same  tune  the  mutual 
advantages  to  the  citizens  of  all  nations  of  free- 
dom of  intercourse,  as  well  as  the  substantial 
identity  of  the  existing  commercial  and  criminal 
codes  in  most  of  the  larger  countries,  made  it 
possible  for  the  nations  to  yield  by  courtesy 
privileges  which  they  declined  to  confer  by  right. 
No  alien  received  in  any  country  quite  that  same 
opportunity  of  action  which  its  own  citizens 
possessed,  or  quite  the  same  rights  in  its  courts, 
or  treatment  in  criminal  matters;  he  was  never- 
theless accorded  by  courtesy  what  was  indis- 
pensable. Extraordinary  and  peculiar  instances 
were  dealt  with  by  diplomacy.  Commonly  in 
criminal  cases  the  State  waived  its  own  jurisdic- 
tion over  its  citizens  in  favor  of  the  courts  of  the 
country  in  which  the  crime  was  committed.  The 
spread  of  international  morality  and  of  the  credit 
system,  the  inexpediency,  obvious  to  both 
parties,  of  disputing  the  validity  of  debts  and 
contracts  difficult,  of  enforcement  by  the  fact 
of  the  different  allegiance  of  the  parties,  made  the 

61 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

actual  cases  requiring  adjustment  few.  Yet  the 
very  fact  that  what  was  received  was  admittedly 
a  mutual  courtesy  presumed  an  absence  of 
right. 

The  outbreak  of  the  present  war  resulted 
promptly  in  the  withdrawal  from  American 
citizens  of  most  of  these  personal  and  com- 
mercial privileges  which  they  had  normally 
enjoyed  in  Europe  as  a  result  of  international 
comity.  Where  the  interests  of  the  belligerent 
nations  coincided  with  those  of  our  citizens,  the 
latter  were  protected;  where  they  clashed,  the 
old  privileges  were  promptly  rescinded.  No 
explicit  action  of  the  foreign  governments  was 
necessary,  for  the  privileges  were  entirely  a 
matter  of  grace.  The  United  States  promptly 
denied  the  right  of  the  belligerent  nations  to 
deprive  American  citizens  of  those  privileges  of 
access  and  of  intercourse  which  they  had  usually 
had,  alleging  that  a  custom  granted  in  actual 
fact  for  so  many  decades  had  ceased  to  be  per- 
missive and  had  become  obligatory;  had  ceased 
to  be  a  courtesy  and  had  become  a  right;  had 
ceased  to  be  a  national  regulation  and  had  be- 
come by  virtue  of  the  generality  of  its  acceptance 
a  part  of  international  law.  None  of  the  bellig- 
erent nations  was  willing  to  recognize  this  prin- 
ciple; all  admitted  the  importance  of  some 
definition  of  the  status  of  aliens;  none  was  willing 

62 


NEUTRAL  RIGHTS  AND  PRESTIGE 

to  concede  to  aliens  as  a  matter  of  right  any 
such  privileges  as  aliens  had  normally  possessed 
as  a  matter  of  fact  during  the  last  century. 

Nowhere  in  the  international  situation  are 
there  issues  so  subtle  as  these;  none  whose  true 
seriousness  and  ramifications  are  so  difficult  to 
visualize.  When  we  remember  that  the  Pan- 
German  contention  about  the  vital  necessity 
for  markets  is  in  lowest  terms  merely  the  com- 
parative and  relative  privileges  of  German  and 
British  subjects  in  various  parts  of  the  world,  we 
cannot  fail  to  realize  to  what  broad  and  funda- 
mental propositions  a  determination  to  advance 
the  interests  of  American  citizens  in  Europe 
may  lead  us.  Nothing  less  than  the  national 
honor  and  national  independence  of  European 
nations  have  been  advisably  deemed  endangered 
by  claims  not  different  in  essence  from  those 
advanced  in  our  recent  diplomatic  notes.  These 
immediate  issues  are  by  no  means  small,  by  no 
means  necessarily  permissive  or  desirable  in  a 
limited  sense.  Outwardly  indeed  they  are  un- 
related to  the  graver  issues,  but  so  broad  and 
elastic  are  at  present  the  notions  of  national 
defense,  so  flexible  are  the  ideas  of  what  it  is 
desirable  and  essential  for  nations  to  obtain, 
that  several  European  countries  have  after  long 
deliberation  decided  that  interests  of  this  type 
are  indispensable  and  must  be  furthered  even 

63 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

at  the  risk  of  the  national  integrity  and  inde- 
pendence. It  is  at  least  an  open  question  whether 
they  will  be  willing  to  concede  to  us  voluntarily 
extensive  privileges  which  they  have  declined 
to  yield  to  each  other. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  ESSENTIAL  MEASURE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

NOT  in  the  fact  that  American  interests  are  in 
danger,  but  in  the  value  to  us  of  these  interests 
lies  the  essential  measure  of  preparedness.  Its 
true  content  will  be  determined,  therefore,  by 
policies  rather  than  by  armaments,  by  ends  rather 
than  by  means.  To  establish  in  definite  and  exact 
terms  the  true  importance  of  our  threatened  in- 
terests will  be  its  first  step.  It  is  necessary  that 
the  South  should  export  its  cotton,  but  that  in- 
terest is  obviously  of  an  entirely  different  nature 
from  the  value  to  us  of  the  Philippines.  To  de- 
termine the  relation  of  the  threatened  interests 
to  our  fundamental  interests  will  be  next  essen- 
tial. Then  we  must  envisage  our  ability  to  pro- 
tect or  advance  the  interests  threatened  by  the 
use  of  force.  Clearly  we  must  defend  the  Panama 
Canal  by  navies,  while  we  cannot  restore  to  life 
the  people  drowned  on  the  Lusitania  by  any 
such  means.  If  the  interests  in  danger  cannot 
be  protected  or  advanced  by  the  use  of  force, 
are  not  other  means  available?  If  force  is  to  be 

65 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

used,  the  value  of  what  we  attempt  to  preserve 
or  to  obtain  will  promptly  determine  the  amount 
of  force  necessary  for  its  achievement.  In  last 
analysis,  preparedness  means  the  deliberate  for- 
mulation of  an  American  foreign  policy,  embrac- 
ing on  the  one  hand  a  careful  definition  of  Amer- 
ican interests  and  extending  on  the  other  to  the 
ideals  and  aims  of  American  democracy,  whose 
furtherance  every  true  citizen  of  the  United 
States  should  have  at  heart. 

Like  the  history  of  international  relations  dur- 
ing the  nineteenth  century,  the  issue  of  prepared- 
ness reduces  itself  to  a  commentary  upon  the  word 
defense.  Here  lies  at  present  the  debate  between 
the  pacifists  and  the  militarists;  here  the  differ- 
ence in  most  diplomatic  disputes  between  na- 
tions. In  its  primary  meaning  defense  connotes 
simply  what  it  is  indispensable  for  us  to  retain, 
and  offense  that  which  it  is  desirable  for  us  to 
obtain.  If  in  defense  we  see  that  which  we  cannot 
get  along  without,  we  find  offense  concerned  with 
that  which  we  should  like  to  have.  The  one  is 
primarily  to  secure  our  existence,  the  other  to 
promote  our  happiness  and  prosperity.  Yet  it 
is  clear  that  the  word  offense  has  passed  from  the 
vocabulary  of  nations.  That  sort  of  unprovoked 
aggression  which  it  has  normally  denoted  in  the 
past  is  no  longer  contemplated  by  any  organized 
body  of  people  against  another.  Defense  there- 

66 


ESSENTIAL  MEASURE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

fore  no  longer  connotes  an  attack  on  what  is  lit- 
erally indispensable  to  national  existence,  for  it 
would  assume  the  existence  of  that  type  of  offen- 
sive action  which  has  been  eliminated.  Prepared- 
ness will  deal  with  neither  one  nor  the  other  of 
these  primary  meanings. 

We  have  left  to  discuss  only  those  things  which 
are  desirable,  but  which  so  clearly  involve  the 
happiness  and  prosperity  of  each  nation  as  fairly 
to  be  enumerated  among  the  things  indispensa- 
ble to  its  future  welfare.  These  are  to-day  con- 
noted by  the  word  defense;  indeed  when  defense 
and  offense  are  opposed  to  each  other  they  merely 
indicate  the  interests  of  the  speaker;  what  he 
wishes  is  defense,  what  others  wish  is  offense. 
The  term  defensive-offensive  has  been  coined  to 
describe  this  new  and  subtle  definition  of  defense, 
intended  to  justify  the  advancement  of  national 
interests  by  the  prosecution  of  a  new  policy  and 
by  the  attainment  of  material  wealth  or  terri- 
torial possessions  not  already  in  the  nation's 
hands.  Indeed  a  large  part  of  the  danger  with 
which  the  international  situation  is  fraught  lies  in 
the  subtlety  of  all  phases  of  international  relation- 
ship, in  the  resolute  exorcising  of  defense  and 
offense  in  the  cruder  senses  of  the  words,  in  the 
broadening  and  deepening  of  the  conception  of 
the  national  welfare,  and  consequently  of  what 
is  involved  in  its  advancement  and  preservation. 

67 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

Capable  of  representation  from  many  points  of 
view,  this  type  of  defense  is  invariably  easy  to 
explain  and  justify  to  an  enlightened  and  hu- 
mane people.  Against  this  type  of  aggression 
must  we  prepare.  Paradoxically  we  must  defend 
ourselves  by  aggression  against  the  defensive 
measures  of  others. 

The  issues  which  preparedness  involves  are 
above  all  comparative  and  relative.  The  value  to 
us  of  any  possession  or  policy  is  by  no  means  a 
definite  and  positive  thing,  capable  at  any  one 
moment  of  specific  and  clear  statement.  It  is  the 
ratio  between  our  interests  and  those  of  other 
nations  —  a  variable  and  not  a  fixed  quantity, 
constantly  changing  because  the  needs,  interests, 
and  policies  of  one  nation  or  the  other  are  con- 
stantly shifting.  We  are  dealing  with  organisms, 
with  societies  in  process  of  growth  and  develop- 
ment, whose  requirements  and  interests  will 
never  be  identical  at  different  times,  nor  bear 
the  same  relation  to  each  other.  If  we  may  give 
to  this  much  abused  term  a  new  primary  mean- 
ing, the  measure  of  defense  lies  in  the  ratio  be- 
tween the  value  we  set  upon  the  policy  or  pos- 
session or  interest  and  its  value  to '  the  ag- 
gressor. This  ratio  will  indicate  how  much  effort 
he  is  willing  to  make  to  obtain  it;  at  least  that 
amount  of  effort  we  must  be  prepared  to  make 
to  retain  it.  The  aggressor  therefore  will  decide 

68 


ESSENTIAL  MEASURE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

the  price  of  its  retention  and  the  conditions  of 
the  struggle. 

It  is  impossible  for  us  to  predetermine  the  re- 
quirements of  a  defense  of  American  interests 
without  a  rigid  scrutiny  of  American  ideals  in 
their  relation  to  European  and  Asiatic  national 
ambitions.  Not  what  we  are  able  to  pay,  but 
what  the  adversary  is  willing  to  give  will  be  the 
measure  of  defense.  To  discover  the  amount  we 
must  study  his  policies  and  needs  and  must  re- 
member that  what  he  believes  to  be  true  will  be, 
for  the  purpose  of  action,  the  same  thing  as  the 
truth.  Where  we  wish  to  retain  the  thing  threat- 
ened, we  shall  learn  only  after  a  study  of  our 
own  situation  its  value  as  established  by  the 
fundamental  postulates  of  American  policy.  If 
he  rates  it  more  highly  than  we,  we  shall  be 
foolish  to  attempt  its  retention;  it  is  not  worth 
so  much  to  us.  If  we  rate  it  more  highly  than 
he  does,  he  will  be  unlikely  to  attempt  to  take 
it  from  us.  In  the  true  sense  of  the  word,  a 
purely  defensive  issue  is  not  likely  to  arise  to- 
day because  neither  is  apt  to  pay  more  than 
he  feels  the  thing  is  worth,  either  to  get  it  or  to 
keep  it. 

The  measure  of  the  defensive-offensive,  or  of 
defense  in  its  commoner  meaning,  will  always  be 
the  ratio  between  the  value  we  set  upon  the 
thing  desired  and  its  value  to  its  present  posses- 

69 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

sor;  infallibly  we  shall  see  from  this  calculation 
how  much  effort  will  be  necessary  to  obtain  the 
object  we  have  in  mind  and  we  shall  learn  thereby 
the  cost  of  preparedness.  We  must  always  pay 
the  value  its  possessor  sets  upon  it  as  an  aggres- 
sor must  always  pay,  in  our  own  case,  the  value 
we  set  upon  it.  Below  this  the  cost  of  prepared- 
ness can  never  sink.  It  will  always  vary  between 
this  minimum  and  the  maximum  price  which  the 
aggressor  is  willing  to  give;  obviously  the  price 
will  vary  with  different  nations. 

Here  is  the  crux  of  preparedness:  it  is  impos- 
sible to  deal  with  a  problem  of  two  dimensions  in 
the  terms  of  one.  This  fallacy  is  prominent  in  the 
propaganda  of  pacifists  and  militarists.  Each 
is  inclined  to  assume  that  policies  and  possessions 
have  some  definite  value  which  we  can  ascertain 
and  which  can  therefore  be  provided  for  by  pru- 
dential calculations.  As  a  result,  these  enthusi- 
asts, many  of  whom  on  both  sides  are  honest  and 
public  spirited,  deal  with  preparedness  as  a  ques- 
tion of  guns,  men,  money  —  an  issue  of  economy 
or  extravagance.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  true  price 
of  defense  is  as  little  within  our  control  as  the 
motion  of  the  heavenly  bodies.  Until  we  have 
clearly  analyzed  American  conditions  and  needs, 
the  ambitions  and  policies  of  European  nations, 
the  aims  and  weaknesses  of  Asiatic  nations,  we 
shall  not  have  even  accumulated  the  material 

70 


ESSENTIAL  MEASURE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

which  can  alone  tell  us  the  cost  of  defense.  The 
evaluation  of  American  interests  in  the  light  of 
European  and  Asiatic  ambitions  demands  the 
formulation  of  a  definite  and  constructive  Amer- 
ican foreign  policy. 


71 


CHAPTER  VI 

FUNDAMENTAL   AMERICAN   INTERESTS 

IT  is  not  easy  to  determine  those  fundamental 
interests  for  the  defense  or  maintenance  of  which 
an  American  foreign  policy  is  needed  and  by  the 
decision  of  which  all  lesser  problems  of  policy  will 
be  governed.  Few  will  dispute  the  contention 
that  the  maintenance  of  our  independence  and 
the  defense  and  promotion  of  our  economic  wel- 
fare are  fundamental  interests.  Yet  apparently 
neither  needs  protection.  Our  territorial  integrity 
is  established  upon  a  basis  firmer  than  that  upon 
which  the  safety  of  any  European  community 
rests;  our  political  independence  threatens  no 
European  country,  nor  would  the  political  con- 
trol of  our  continent  advance  the  interests  of  any 
European  nation  or  promote  the  settlement  of 
European  quarrels.  Our  effect  upon  Europe  and 
Europe's  influence  upon  us  must  always  be  in- 
direct. No  primary  motive  exists  for  the  invasion 
of  this  country  by  European  nations  nor  for  our 
invasion  of  Europe.  It  must  always  be  question- 
able whether  the  extent  of  the  effort  will  not  be 
greater  than  the  value  of  the  policy  at  stake. 

72 


FUNDAMENTAL  AMERICAN  INTERESTS 

Our  economic  welfare  seems  to  many  more  thor- 
oughly assured  by  our  vast  natural  resources 
and  the  inventive  genius  of  the  American  people 
than  by  any  other  forces  and  factors  which  the 
world  contains.  A  numerous  constituency  has 
therefore  concluded  that  our  fundamental  inter- 
ests are  too  thoroughly  assured  to  make  neces- 
sary a  foreign  policy  or  to  require  preparedness. 
We  hold  already,  by  the  accident  of  geography 
and  the  bounty  of  nature,  all  that  we  are  rightly 
entitled  to  own. 

The  fallacy  seems  to  lie  in  the  attempt  to  for- 
mulate American  interests  in  the  terms  of  Euro- 
pean diplomacy,  to  argue  from  an  analogy  which 
does  not  exist.  In  European  policy  an  imperative 
note,  always  clear,  rises  from  the  very  present 
danger  to  the  territorial  integrity  and  political 
independence  of  even  the  greatest  powers.  By 
the  exigencies  and  contingencies  of  the  defense 
of  the  national  integrity  and  independence  all 
else  is  measured;  when  it  has  been  adequately 
provided  for,  all  is  assumed  to  have  been  done; 
when  it  is  threatened,  everything  is  thought  to 
be  in  danger.  In  fact  the  greater  in  Europe  has 
comprehended  the  less;  the  primary  interests, 
once  protected,  have  ipso  facto  promoted  most 
interests  merely  desirable.  No  such  clear  neces- 
sity, the  reality  of  which  experience  has  long 
verified,  exists  in  the  United  States  to  cut  the  es- 

73 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

sential  from  the  less  essential  and  the  unessential. 
Political  independence  and  economic  prosperity 
are  not  for  us  synonymous.  Our  safety  from  con- 
quest does  not  necessarily  include  our  freedom 
of  access  to  the  markets  of  other  nations,  nor  will 
our  international  status  necessarily  advance  the 
happiness  and  welfare  of  individuals.  In  essence 
our  fundamental  interests  are  the  same  as  those 
of  Europe,  but  the  fundamental  factors  from  the 
point  of  view  of  American  policy  will  be  those  im- 
plicit in  European  policies,  those  inherent  in 
European  ideals  and  ambitions,  rather  than 
those  which  the  European  nations  have  chosen 
explicitly  to  champion.  With  us  the  problem  of 
defense  will  be  more  difficult  because  more  subtle; 
less  easy  of  achievement  because  less  obvious; 
though  not  less  imperative  because  less  tangible. 
National  independence  is  fundamentally  the 
right  to  decide  for  ourselves  what  is  essential  to 
our  honor,  our  safety,  and  our  prosperity;  the 
right  for  ourselves  and  for  our  descendants  in 
years  to  come  to  determine  what  modifications 
a  change  in  conditions  may  make  essential  or  de- 
sirable. Any  particular  territory  we  may  do  with- 
out; any  specific  policy  we  may  sacrifice  at  need; 
any  single  commercial  privilege  we  can  dispense 
with;  any  notion  about  national  honor  may  prove 
on  examination  unworthy  of  a  great  people;  but 
the  right  to  decide  what  shall  be  preserved  or 

74 


FUNDAMENTAL  AMERICAN  INTERESTS 

advanced  we  can  neither  compromise,  delegate, 
nor  surrender.  The  right  to  choose  is  our  most 
precious  heritage  from  our  ancestors  and  the 
most  essential  privilege  we  can  bequeath  to  our 
posterity. 

It  means  the  right  to  define  humanity,  justice, 
equity  in  the  terms  of  American  ideals,  the  right 
to  decide  for  ourselves  what  is  consonant  with  the 
national  honor.  In  last  analysis,  we  can  never 
allow  other  nations  to  decide  for  us  what  conduct 
toward  American  citizens  conforms  to  our  ideals, 
nor  determine  what  constitute  proper  precautions 
for  the  safety  of  American  lives  and  the  protec- 
tion of  American  property.  We  declined  to  ac- 
cept the  German  statements  concerning  the  con- 
sonance with  international  law  of  their  conduct 
in  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania.  We  protested 
against  the  deed  as  an  infringement  of  those  rights 
of  American  citizens  which  the  United  States  can 
neither  compromise  nor  surrender.  We  meant 
that  we  could  not  allow  the  German  Govern- 
ment to  define  humanity  and  justice  for  the 
American  people.  In  American  hearts  must  be 
the  final  repository  of  American  ideals;  in  Amer- 
ican judgments  must  be  the  final  appeal  upon 
questions  of  conduct.  We  can  never  submit, 
without  loss  of  self-respect,  to  a  flagrant  and  open 
denial  by  any  nation  of  the  consonance  of  our 
expressed  ideals  with  justice  and  humanity. 

75 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

The  second  fundamental  interest  of  the  United 
States  lies  in  the  right  to  define  American  in- 
terests in  the  terms  of  American  life.  Never  can 
we  cede  to  others  the  right  to  decide  what  is 
consonant  with  the  welfare  of  the  individual  or 
of  the  state,  nor  countenance  an  attempt  of  an- 
other nation  or  its  citizens  to  define  for  us  the 
limits  of  prosperity  in  this  country.  The  con- 
ditions of  American  life  must  be  the  final  test, 
and  no  other  analysis  than  our  own  can  ever  be 
satisfactory  to  us  as  a  nation.  Nothing  more 
fundamental  than  these  two  postulates  can  exist 
in  the  life  of  any  nation,  because  in  the  right  to 
determine  the  national  ideals  and  the  conditions 
of  national  life  lies  a  fundamental  privilege 
deeper,  broader,  truer  than  the  territorial  in- 
tegrity and  political  independence  of  which  so 
much  has  been  said.  So  long  as  a  people  retains 
its  national  consciousness  it  can  never  accept 
upon  those  postulates  the  judgment  of  another 
nation  without  sacrificing  the  realities  of  inde- 
pendence, without  surrendering  the  attributes  of 
power. 

Before  such  broad  principles  can  be  applied  to 
the  solution  of  actual  problems  their  practical 
application  and  meaning  must  be  made  clear. 
The  right  to  define  humanity  and  justice  in 
terms  of  American  ideals  must  of  its  own  nature 
remain  indefinite;  to  limit  it  is  to  destroy  it.  It 

76 


FUNDAMENTAL  AMERICAN  INTERESTS 

is  precisely  its  limitation  which  we  cannot  ac- 
cept from  others  nor  decree  in  advance  ourselves. 
At  the  same  time  equity  and  justice  will  cause  us 
to  recognize  that  other  nations,  to  whom  the 
right  to  choose  is  as  precious  as  it  is  to  us,  will 
not  permit  us  to  exercise  their  prerogatives. 
Magnanimity  and  a  sense  of  honor  will  cause 
us  to  refrain  from  exacting  from  others  the  full- 
est acceptance  of  our  own  discretionary  judg- 
ments, as  equity  and  impartiality  will  induce  us 
constantly  to  yield  voluntarily  somewhat  of  our 
own  possible  rights  in  an  endeavor  to  secure  a 
working  compromise  with  others.  The  right  to 
choose  will  often  display  itself  in  the  right  to 
yield. 

The  economic  interests  of  the  nation  may  be 
divided  into  the  right  to  advance  in  all  just  ways 
our  economic  welfare  at  home;  to  extend  Ameri- 
can trade  to  all  parts  of  the  world;  to  insure  a  con- 
tinuity of  intercourse  with  all  countries;  to  pro- 
tect the  lives  and  property  of  American  citizens 
in  foreign  countries  and  on  the  high  seas.  The 
great  difficulty  lies  in  defining  such  words  as 
prosperity,  freedom  of  access,  protection  of 
American  interests,  fair  profit,  just  treatment. 
If  we  ourselves  claim  as  an  attribute  of  inde- 
pendence the  right  to  fix  the  meaning  of  such 
words,  we  must  not  forget  that  other  nations 
claim  for  themselves  a  similar  privilege;  if  we 

77 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

define  those  terms  in  the  light  of  American  in- 
terests, they  will  define  them  in  the  light  of  their 
own  economic  needs.  While  it  will  be  expedient 
from  time  to  time  to  compromise  and  adjust, 
we  can  never  recognize  as  a  nation  the  death  of 
American  citizens  as  just  or  endurable  except  as 
an  act  of  war  or  by  execution  for  crime  after  due 
trial  by  law.  While  circumstances  may  extort 
from  us  acquiescence  in  what  others  are  able  to 
impose  upon  us,  we  can  never  as  a  nation  admit 
the  right  of  another  nation  to  intervene  between 
us  and  the  rest  of  the  world.  Artificial  barriers, 
interference  with  the  commercial  activities  of  our 
citizens,  we  must  always  declare  in  theory  detri- 
mental and  hostile.  Any  and  all  we  may  endure; 
none  can  we  accept  as  just,  desirable,  or  right. 
We  must  retain  and  continually  proclaim  our 
retention  of  the  ultimate  right  to  decide  all  ques- 
tions in  the  terms  of  American  ideals  and  of 
American  life,  because  we  cannot  admit  that  our 
standards  of  justice,  humanity,  or  prosperity  are 
created  for  us  by  others,  or  view  such  an  eventu- 
ality, should  we  be  compelled  to  endure  it,  as 
anything  less  than  an  indignity  and  a  danger  of 
the  first  importance. 

Indeed  the  right  to  choose  between  policies, 
the  freedom  to  act  in  accordance  with  our  own 
highest  ideals  and  truest  interests,  is  our  most 
sacred  possession  and  the  only  conceivable  guar- 

78 


FUNDAMENTAL  AMERICAN  INTERESTS 

antee  of  our  national  future.  It  stands  for  our 
right  to  readjust  our  policies  to  changed  circum- 
stances, political  and  economic,  in  the  great 
organism  of  which  we  form  a  part.  Surely  no  one 
will  deny  that  the  overwhelming  fact  in  American 
life  to-day  is  the  influence  of  a  war  for  which  we 
are  not  responsible,  set  in  motion  by  factors  over 
which  we  exercised  no  control,  pursued  for  ob- 
jects possessing  for  us  no  primary  interest.  It  is 
transforming  the  United  States  and  altering  every 
factor  of  consequence  in  our  national  frame. 
The  arrival  of  such  crises  can  never  be  predicted; 
the  probability  of  their  recurrence  can  never  be 
told;  the  likelihood  that  this  is  the  last  is  slight. 
Indeed  we  cannot  predicate  a  permanence  of  in- 
ternational conditions  and  relationships,  and, 
until  a  definite  crystallization  of  the  world  takes 
place,  the  American  people  must  retain  in  their 
hands  the  power  constantly  to  revise  American 
policy  in  consonance  with  American  ideals  and 
interests  as  modified  and  influenced  by  the  shift- 
ing life  of  the  world  organism.1  American  foreign 

1  The  necessity  of  preserving  the  right  of  posterity  to  adjust 
American  policies  in  the  future  to  the  conditions  which  may  then 
exist  is  to  me  the  crux  of  the  situation.  It  is  the  treasure  which  is 
entrusted  to  us  to  preserve;  it  is  precisely  what  posterity  challenges 
us  to  defend,  the  interest  for  whose  stewardship  we  shall  one  day 
be  called  to  account.  It  is  vital  that  we  should  at  present  begin  to 
establish  systematically  the  broad  economic,  industrial  and  ad- 
ministrative foundations  which  will  in  the  future  make  possible  a 
degree  of  preparedness,  which  is  not  at  present  essential,  but  which 
may  be  then  imperative,  but  which  cannot  then  be  executed  unless 

79 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

policy  is  merely  the  expression  of  American  life  in 
its  relation  to  the  world  at  large. 

Should  we  conclude  that  because  American 
interests  are  less  tangible  than  the  primary  need 
for  defense  from  invasion  they  are  therefore  less 
imperative  than  European  policies  in  their  need 
for  protection  or  advancement,  we  shall  commit 
the  gravest  error  at  present  open  to  American 
patriots.  The  assumption  that  we  are  isolated 
from  Europe  in  any  sense,  that  our  safety  and 
prosperity  rest  primarily  upon  factors  existent 
in  America  and  are  protected  by  our  territorial 
integrity,  is  a  fallacy  of  the  most  dangerous 
type.  Domestic  prosperity  for  all  nations  is 
largely  dependent  to-day  upon  the  continuance 
of  their  foreign  trade,  upon  their  ability  to  ex- 
change their  own  manufactures  for  those  articles 
which  the  country  does  not  produce  itself  and 
does  not  expect  to  make.  In  America  our  pros- 
perity very  evidently  rests  not  so  much  upon 
what  we  make  ourselves  as  upon  what  other  na- 
tions buy  from  us.  The  normality  of  American 
business  is  not  at  all  a  result  of  economic  factors 
hi  the  United  States;  nor  are  prices  and  values 
in  this  country  the  result  of  demand  and  supply 
within  our  borders;  they  are  the  result  of  con- 

we  now  lay  its  foundations.  Preparedness  concerns  not  ourselves 
but  posterity,  affects  not  the  present  but  the  future;  and  must  be 
undertaken  to  meet  exigencies  which  no  one  now  foresees  as  prob- 
able. 

80 


FUNDAMENTAL  AMERICAN  INTERESTS 

ditions  in  the  international  market  which  no 
country  controls,  but  on  which  all  are  dependent. 

The  fundamental  economic  interests  of  the 
United  States  are  no  longer  distinguishable,  sep- 
arable, from  the  interests  of  other  nations,  no 
longer  capable  of  precise  enumeration  or  of  geo- 
graphical location.  Some  interests  we  share  with 
others  —  the  use  of  the  high  seas,  freedom  of 
access  to  the  markets  of  Europe,  the  common  ne- 
cessity for  the  protection  of  the  lives  and  prop- 
erty of  citizens  when  in  foreign  lands  or  on  the 
high  seas.  Many  of  our  interests  are  comple- 
mentary to  those  of  European  nations  and  are  so 
definitely  tangled  in  the  web  of  the  European 
economic  fabric  as  to  depend  for  their  very  exist- 
ence upon  the  healthy,  normal  life  of  which  they 
form  a  part. 

As  a  result  of  this  economic  complexity,  of  this 
interpenetration  of  the  economic  fabric  of  each 
nation  by  that  of  all  other  nations,  the  delimina- 
tion  of  the  property  and  interests  of  nations  and 
of  their  citizens  has  become  a  matter  of  extraor- 
dinary difficulty  and  complexity.  My  property 
and  thine  are  no  longer  easily  separated  by  the 
boundary  lines  of  countries,  by  obvious  geograph- 
ical location,  or  by  legal  titles  and  patents  of 
award.  Truth  is  that  the  citizens  of  many  nations 
are  all  vitally  interested  in  the  same  transaction 
and  their  interests  are  so  nearly  identical  as  to 

81 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

defy  definition  or  contradistinction.  Economic 
interdependence  has  created  interlocking  in- 
terests, indistinguishable  lines  of  ownership,  an 
inseparable  confusion  of  interests,  interests  in 
themselves  intangible,  consisting  of  equities, 
opportunities,  franchises,  the  good-will  of  busi- 
nesses, and  of  other  peculiar  developments  of 
the  modern  credit  system. 

Thus  the  problem  of  the  defense  of  American 
interests  has  broadened  to  the  confines  of  the 
globe  and  has  lost  all  sense  of  geographical  loca- 
tion hi  the  immensity  of  space;  we  have  been  de- 
prived of  definitely  tangible  interests  by  the 
blurring  and  fusing  of  economic  lines.  Yet  de- 
fense was  never  so  imperative  because  the  possi- 
bility of  infringement  has  been  increased.  So 
great  has  been  the  ethical  and  moral  growth  of  the 
Christian  world  that  those  interests  and  posses- 
sions which  are  easily  distinguished  are  not  likely 
to  be  assailed  by  individuals  or  nations.  The 
present  danger  lies  in  the  intangibility  of  our 
national  interests,  in  the  interpenetration  of  our 
national  fabric  by  that  of  other  nations,  in  the 
difficulty  of  telling  where  one  leaves  off  and  the 
other  begins.  Disputes  as  to  the  whereabouts  of 
my  interests  and  their  relation  to  thine  are  be- 
coming more  common,  more  subtle,  more  diffi- 
cult of  adjustment  than  ever  before.  Where 
interests  are  so  nearly  identical,  the  ethical  re- 

82 


FUNDAMENTAL  AMERICAN  INTERESTS 

straints  both  upon  individuals  and  upon  nations 
become  less  conclusive  in  their  operation.  The 
ability  to  challenge  ownership,  possession,  or 
privilege,  upon  plausible  grounds,  increases  the 
danger  of  aggression  and  changes  so  entirely  the 
whole  issue  that  it  can  scarcely  be  phrased  in 
the  terms  of  the  older  diplomacy. 

Our  economic  interests  of  this  subtle  type  have 
become  therefore,  from  the  point  of  view  of  Amer- 
ican policy,  fundamental  and  primary  interests. 
They  must  be  as  explicitly  provided  for  as  if  our 
territorial  integrity  and  political  independence 
had  still  to  be  assured.  Obviously  the  latter  will 
be  worthless  if  our  economic  prosperity  be  at  issue. 
Nor,  because  such  interests  are  identified  in  Eu- 
rope with  territorial  integrity  and  political  in- 
dependence and  are  advanced  implicitly  rather 
than  explicitly,  must  we  believe  them  already 
assured  in  this  country.  The  contrary  is  pecul- 
iarly true.  Precisely  because  our  territorial  in- 
tegrity and  political  independence  are  assured  by 
geographic,  strategic,  and  economic  factors  over 
which  we  exercise  no  control  it  is  essential  that 
we  realize  the  fundamental  character  of  the  right 
to  choose  and  the  right  to  define  American  inter- 
ests in  the  terms  of  American  life.  We  must 
consciously  base  our  foreign  policy  upon  those 
interests  because  the  factors  which  insure  our 
safety  and  freedom  are  powerless  to  act  in  positive 

83 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

and  affirmative  ways.  The  fundamental  postu- 
lates of  American  policy  must  be  positive  and  not 
negative,  for  the  interests  to  be  maintained  and 
advanced  cannot  be  preserved  by  the  continu- 
ance of  any  policy  we  have  hitherto  followed. 

Certainly  their  defense  will  involve  action 
which  would  have  to  be  denominated,  in  the 
language  of  the  older  diplomacy,  aggression  and 
offense,  and  which  can  still  be  interpreted  by  other 
nations,  hi  the  language  of  the  newer  diplomacy, 
as  the  defensive-offensive.  We  attempt  in  very 
fact  to  obtain  something  which  we  should  not 
have  if  we  did  not  make  effort  to  secure  it;  we 
receive  a  share  of  the  profits  of  international 
business,  which  we  shall  get  only  if  we  strive  for 
it,  and  which  other  nations  or  individuals  will 
get  if  we  do  not.  If  we  limit  American  interests 
to  what  we  alone  can  conceivably  use  or  to  those 
things  which  others  do  not  care  enough  about  to 
take  from  us,  we  shall  be  lost  to  all  true  regard 
for  our  own  deeper  interests  and  for  the  rights  of 
posterity. 

We  must  also  recognize  frankly  the  fact  that 
our  economic  interests  are  and  must  be  antago- 
nistic to  those  of  other  nations.  The  notion  that 
our  interests  cannot  clash  to  their  detriment 
with  those  of  other  nations  assumes  our  existence 
as  a  separate  entity,  a  delimination  of  our  na- 
tional interests  from  those  of  others  which  does 

84 


FUNDAMENTAL  AMERICAN  INTERESTS 

not  exist.  We  are  a  part  of  an  international 
fabric,  political,  economic,  ethical,  and  we  cannot 
dissociate  ourselves  from  it.  The  assumption  of 
nationality,  the  notion  of  independence,  the  very 
fact  of  territorial  integrity  assume  an  antagonism 
of  interests.  To  suppose  that  our  interests  can 
only  be  the  counterpart  of  those  of  other  nations 
is  to  decline  to  accept  a  premise  of  national  life 
which  all  European  nations  believe  to  be  funda- 
mental and  upon  which  they  constantly  and  con- 
sistently act.  They  believe  it  necessary  for  them 
to  defend  their  own  interests  by  extending  their 
economic  transactions  to  the  uttermost,  and, 
while  they  view  a  clash  detrimental  to  us  as  re- 
grettable, they  also  declare  it  unavoidable  and 
pursue  their  policies  accordingly.  We  must  de- 
fend ourselves,  our  interests,  our  national  life, 
under  those  conditions  which  prevail  in  the  world 
at  large,  however  much  we  may  deny  their  con- 
sonance with  the  highest  ideals  of  international- 
ism or  with  the  future  state  of  the  world  as  we 
believe  it  will  be.  We  must  accept  as  fundamental 
those  same  postulates  which  other  nations  will 
employ  in  their  relations  with  us. 


85 


CHAPTER  VII 

IMPERATIVE   NECESSITY   OF   FORCE 

THE  most  important  single  decision  underlying 
the  foreign  policy  of  a  great  people  will  be  the 
willingness  to  use  or  not  to  use  the  organized 
force  of  armies  and  navies  to  protect  or  advance 
what  diplomacy  and  arbitration  have  failed  to 
secure  or  further.  Once  determined,  such  a 
postulate  will  instantly  cleave  the  attainable 
from  the  desirable  and  furnish  a  test  by  which  all 
policies,  expedients,  and  exigencies  may  be  meas- 
ured and  compared.  So  much  has  of  recent  years 
been  written  and  said  upon  this  fundamental 
subject  that  we  must  state  at  some  length  the 
reasons  for  believing  force  a  necessary  prerequi- 
site of  national  independence.1 

It  is  idle  to  maintain  that  the  greatest  mani- 
festations of  force  in  the  world  are  military; 
the  only  truly  permanent  manifestations,  the 

1  The  limitations  of  space  have  been  particularly  trying  in  this 
important  chapter  and  have  made  impossible  the  statement  of 
qualifications,  the  elaboration  of  shades  of  meaning,  the  rebuttal  of 
opposing  views.  To  attempt  anything  more  than  a  brief  resume  of 
the  most  cogent  reasons  was  impossible.  At  the  same  time  I  feel 
that,  if  these  are  valid,  they  establish  the  contention;  if  they  will 
not  convince  the  reader,  a  multitude  of  allegations  will  be  unavailing. 

86 


IMPERATIVE  NECESSITY  OF  FORCE 

only  truly  irresistible,  are  moral.  Between  these 
ethical  and  spiritual  phenomena  and  that  of 
brute  force  lies  the  sphere  of  economic  phe- 
nomena, less  powerful  than  the  one,  more  potent 
than  the  other.  None  the  less,  when  we  talk 
after  the  manner  of  men,  we  shall  be  compelled 
to  admit  (the  existence  and  possible  use  of  the  or- 
ganized effort  of  great  communities,  represented 
by  armies  and  navies,  as  the  ultimate  sanction 
in  support  of  their  ambitions  or  in  the  protec- 
tion of  the  property  and  lives  of  citizens.  Al- 
ways a  means  and  never  an  end,  a  tool  ready  to 
the  hand,  when  great  bodies  of  men  conclude 
that  economic  and  moral  forces  are  unable  for 
any  reason  to  execute  their  will,  organized  force 
always  remains  a  possible  method  to  be  tried 
before  relinquishing  their  purpose. 

Undoubtedly  its  importance  lies  partly  in  its 
lack  of  reason,  in  its  ability  to  establish  the 
wrong,  the  selfish,  the  brutal  at  the  expense  of  the 
right,  the  altruistic,  and  the  merciful.  At  any 
one  moment  it  is  the  final  factor  because  other 
manifestations  of  force  have  proved  their  inabil- 
ity to  make  headway  against  it.  All  other  varie- 
ties than  armies  require  extraordinary  and  pecul- 
iar conditions  for  their  operation  and  above  all 
are  dependent  upon  the  element  of  time.  Rarely, 
if  ever,  do  they  work  in  a  hurry;  rarely,  if  ever, 
can  they  be  depended  upon  to  advance  the  un- 

87 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

reasonable  and  the  illogical.  They  obey  certain 
great  laws  of  their  own,  of  which  man  may  at 
times  take  advantage,  but  which  seem  to  be 
beyond  his  control.  Brute  force  is  the  only 
power  which  the  savage  and  the  civilized  man 
alike  have  at  their  disposal.  Hence  we  cannot 
escape  the  fact  that  the  organized  force  of  mil- 
lions of  men  is  an  ultimate  appeal  in  all  human 
relationships  by  refusing  to  admit  it.  Like  the 
sun  in  the  heavens,  it  does  exist,  and,  upon  it,  in 
last  analysis,  our  own  rights  as  a  nation  must 
also  rest. 

At  the  same  time  our  readiness  to  employ  it 
in  defense  depends  in  the  main  upon  the  disposi- 
tion of  other  nations  to  call  upon  it  to  advance 
their  own  interests  at  the  expense  of  ours.  Were 
there  any  guarantee  that  they  would  not  appeal 
to  it  to  extort  from  us  territory  which  we  cannot 
be  persuaded  by  argument  to  concede,  we  could 
then  declare  our  intention  of  abandoning  its 
use  against  them.  If  we  can  limit  our  ambitions 
and  desires  to  what  others  will  voluntarily 
yield  to  us,  we  may  ourselves  decline  to  appeal 
to  force.  If  we  possess  nothing  they  value,  force 
is  unnecessary;  if  we  can  afford  to  lose  certain 
things  they  value,  we  may  sacrifice  the  interest 
in  question  on  the  probability  that  its  cost  of 
maintenance  by  military  force  will  exceed  its 
worth.  So  long,  however,  as  any  reasonable 

88 


IMPERATIVE  NECESSITY  OF  FORCE 

possibility  exists  of  an  appeal  to  force  by  other 
nations  against  us,  we  must  ourselves  be  ready 
in  such  an  exigency  to  use  force  in  defense,  or 
they  will  promptly  discover  that  they  may  al- 
ways advance  their  interests  at  the  expense  of 
ours. 

The  indispensable  we  cannot  afford  to  lose, 
whatever  the  cost  of  maintenance,  and  to  defend 
it  we  must  be  ready  to  expend  that  ultimate  ef- 
fort which  the  community  possesses  in  its  own 
brute  force.  Naturally  we  shall  first  exhaust 
every  other  conceivable  means  of  attaining  it, 
but,  if  there  be  then  one  final  method  by  which 
we  may  still  contest  the  issue,  we  shall  lose  the 
indispensable  before  the  sacrifice  becomes  neces- 
sary if  we  decline  to  contemplate  the  use  of  the 
ultimate  sanction.  The  crux  of  the  issue  lies  not 
in  the  definition  of  force,  its  limitations  or  evils, 
but  in  the  definition  of  what  is  indispensable. 
Most  militarists  and  pacifists  choose  as  examples 
things  manifestly  not  indispensable,  which  are 
merely  desirable,  the  value  of  which  is  even 
open  to  discussion;  each  easily  disproves  the 
other's  contention.  The  difficulty  lies  not  so 
much  in  the  Tightness  or  wrongness  of  war  as  in 
the  failure  to  take  a  sufficiently  fundamental 
view  of  American  interests. 

The  definition  of  our  fundamental  interests  as 
the  right  to  define  humanity  and  justice  in  the 

89 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

terms  of  American  ideals  and  the  right  to  de- 
fine American  interests  in  the  terms  of  American 
life  makes  sufficiently  clear  their  fundamental 
nature,  their  indispensable  character.  The  right 
to  choose  is  in  fact  the  ability  to  act  in  the  future 
with  intelligence;  it  is  discretion  projected  in- 
definitely into  national  history.  It  is  indeed  un- 
limited and  illimitable,  indefinable  and  intangi- 
ble because  of  its  ability  to  deal  with  what  is 
not  now  seen,  with  what  is  now  believed  to  be 
incredible,  impossible.  We  preserve  our  ability 
to  act  wisely  upon  the  unknowable  when  it 
becomes  the  known,  upon  problems  of  the  future 
when  they  have  become  those  of  the  present, 
upon  new  problems  and  new  phases  of  old.  We 
cannot  concede  the  right  to  choose  because  we 
do  not  know  what  it  is.  We  cannot  surrender  it 
because  it  cannot  be  defined.  We  cannot  limit 
it  because  we  shall  thereby  destroy  it.  It  is  the 
infinity  of  discretion,  the  eternity  of  freedom,  the 
intangibility  of  sovereignty.  If  so  crass  a  thing 
as  brute  force  can  preserve  for  us  so  inestimable 
a  privilege,  we  shall  indeed  lack  a  conception  of 
relative  values  if  we  decline  to  make  those  ma- 
terial sacrifices  which  the  use  of  force  involves. 
However  great  they  may  seem  to  us  at  the 
moment,  their  significance  is  naught  when  com- 
pared with  the  infinite  worth  of  those  things 
whose  value  cannot  be  estimated. 

90 


IMPERATIVE  NECESSITY  OF  FORCE 

The  decision  to  use  force  as  an  ultimate  appeal 
and  sanction  involves  immediate  preparedness. 
While  the  strength  of  any  nation  is  indeed  its 
people  plus  its  physical  resources,  at  any  moment 
its  strength  is  merely  that  portion  of  its  potential 
might  which  it  is  capable  of  exerting,  that  part 
of  its  human  and  physical  resources  which  have 
been  organized.  What  nations  are  not  able  to 
use  at  the  time,  they  do  not  possess;  the  strength 
of  men  unorganized  is  as  non-existent  in  any 
particular  crisis  as  that  of  babes  unborn.  The 
failure  to  be  prepared  to  use  force  at  that  mo- 
ment when  force  becomes  necessary  —  a  moment 
which  in  the  nature  of  things  can  never  be  ade- 
quately foreseen  —  means  the  loss  of  that  which 
force  is  intended  to  preserve.  In  the  long  run 
spiritual  and  economic  forces  will  protect  and 
defend  far  more  ably  than  the  crude  instruments 
called  armies  and  navies;  brute  force  is  a  thing 
of  the  moment  and  must  be  used  at  the  time; 
it  can  never  be  effective  unless  ready.  It  is 
peculiarly  true  at  the  present  day  that  military 
and  naval  preparedness  cannot  be  extemporized. 
A  decision  to  use  force  as  an  ultimate  sanction 
of  our  fundamental  interests  spells  immediate 
preparedness. 

These,  then,  are  the  most  fundamental  postu- 
lates of  national  policy :  we  do  possess  that  which 
we  cannot  afford  to  lose  and  that  which  we  can- 

91 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

not  concede;  we  must  therefore  prepare  to  exert 
in  its  defense  our  whole  might  and  contem- 
plate an  appeal  to  organized  force. 

Such  a  decision  merely  ratifies  the  judgment  of 
countless  generations  of  statesmen  who  have 
seen  in  such  armed  force  the  only  possible 
sanction  for  national  safety  and  prosperity.  If 
it  is  true  that  we  no  longer  need  invoke  such 
measures  in  defense  of  many  objects  for  which 
our  ancestors  struggled,  it  is  because  we  enjoy 
the  fruit  of  their  efforts,  because  their  blood  was 
evidently  not  shed  in  vain.  The  modern  issue 
is,  however,  not  less  imperative  than  the  literal 
defense  of  one's  fireside. 

It  is  difficult  to  subscribe  to  the  contention 
that  abstention  from  war  is  the  normal  course, 
that  the  use  of  armed  force  is  abnormal,  and 
therefore  wrong,  because  it  interferes  arbitrarily 
with  the  working  of  normal  or  non-military 
factors.  The  argument  is  governed  by  a  purely 
arbitrary  definition  of  what  is  normal.  The 
favorable  elements  of  the  situation  are  usually 
identified  with  the  normal  and  declared  to  be  the 
outcome  of  natural  forces,  a  definition  which 
promptly  renders  all  that  disturbs  the  operation 
of  these  "natural"  forces  artificial  and  wrong 
and  includes  of  course  in  its  scope  all  forms  of 
violence  and  organized  force.  A  candid  view  of 
the  past  development  of  the  human  race  seems  to 

92 


IMPERATIVE  NECESSITY  OF  FORCE 

render  probable  the  idea  that  the  interference  of 
man  with  the  natural  forces  of  development  in 
an  attempt  to  alter  and  twist  the  course  of  evolu- 
tion has  been  the  normal  fact  of  progress.  The 
very  ability  of  man  to  interfere  with  and  to 
some  extent  mold  natural  forces  is  the  attribute 
which  distinguishes  him  from  the  animals. 
Those  who  have  studied  animal  psychology  lay 
stress  upon  the  importance  of  blind  impulses,  of 
subconscious  Teachings  toward  some  unknown 
goal,  which  seem  to  animate  some  of  the  higher 
classes  of  animals  and  some  of  the  lower  types  of 
man.  Are  we  not  taking  much  for  granted  in 
assuming  that  concerted  efforts  which  great 
bodies  of  men  are  willing  and  anxious  to  make  do 
not  help  in  the  evolution  of  the  race  because 
they  lead  to  a  temporary  sacrifice  of  the  ma- 
terial? Are  not  mental,  moral,  and  spiritual 
qualities  the  true  objects  of  evolution,  and  are 
we  not  taking  as  a  criterion  of  what  is  detrimen- 
tal to  the  future  of  the  race  a  peculiar  test, 
if  we  declare  that  to  be  contrary  to  our  best  in- 
terests in  the  future  which  demands  a  sacrifice 
of  wealth  and  life  at  the  moment? 

The  warfare  of  to-day  is  really  a  protest 
against  existing  conditions,  against  the  operation 
of  what  are  called  normal  and  natural  forces  on 
the  ground  that  they  are  inequitable  and  the 
result  of  factors  not  natural  at  all,  but  highly 

93 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

artificial,  not  normal,  but  iniquitous.  It  is  the 
result  of  a  decision  reached  by  great  bodies  of 
men  that  a  sharp  and  fundamental  readjustment 
of  economic  relationship  between  the  various 
nations  is  absolutely  essential,  one  cleaner  and 
deeper  than  they  have  been  able  to  make  with 
the  non-military  forces  whose  use  they  so  little 
comprehend.  The  object  they  have  in  view  is 
indeed  one  which  they  realize  can  be  obtained 
by  non-military  factors,  but  they  also  see  that 
the  element  of  time  required  for  the  operation  of 
the  latter  is  greater  than  they  care  to  contem- 
plate. To  declare  that  they  must  patiently  wait 
for  the  attainment  of  what  they  regard  as 
supremely  desirable  until  two  generations  or 
several  centuries  can  put  them  in  possession  of 
it  by  the  slow  work  of  economic  and  moral  forces 
is  to  compel  them  to  suffer  in  the  meantime  those 
evils  which  they  believe  to  be  intolerable.  They 
prefer  an  appeal  to  force,  an  acceptance  of  the 
danger  and  suffering  which  they  understand  and 
can  compute  to  the  continuance  into  the  future 
of  a  toll  of  life  and  suffering  which  they  therefore 
cannot  estimate. 

That  war  means  hunger,  nakedness,  death, 
mental  and  moral  suffering,  men  have  always 
known;  but  these  great  social  and  economic 
evils  from  which  the  human  race  still  suffers  also 
entail  poverty,  wretchedness,  loss  of  property, 

94 


IMPERATIVE  NECESSITY  OF  FORCE 

sacrifice  of  health,  hunger,  starvation,  death  to 
a  degree  which  no  one  can  foresee  imposed  upon 
a  number  of  people  impossible  of  calculation. 
Men  never  appeal  to  war  against  evils  less  than 
war;  they  appeal  always  to  war  against  evils 
which  are  to  their  thinking  greater  than  war, 
likely  to  demand  suffering  more  terrible  than  war. 
It  is  not  a  choice  between  a  peace  lovely,  desir- 
able, free  from  suffering  and  risk,  and  a  war 
frightful  beyond  all  imagination  in  its  perils  and 
dangers.  It  is  a  choice  between  alternatives, 
between  a  struggle  whose  cost  they  can  fairly 
approximate  and  a  future  whose  perils  seem  only 
too  probably  greater.  To  tell  men  that  they 
must  not  use  force  because  it  causes  suffering  is 
to  mock  them.  Do  they  not  already  suffer? 
How  much  worse  than  death  and  poverty  does 
war  entail?  Men  appeal  to  war  against  what  they 
believe  to  be  intolerable  and  which  they  cannot 
otherwise  prevent. 

The  agitation  against  war  will  be  futile  so 
long  as  a  definition  of  war  is  synonymous  with 
fighting.  There  are  many  ways  by  which  na- 
tions and  individuals  are  at  present  robbed  of 
their  lives  and  property,  slain  and  tortured, 
without  the  firing  of  a  shot  under  conditions 
which  we  sardonically  denominate  peace.  The 
starving  millions  in  factories,  the  crushed  oper- 
atives in  sweat-shops,  are  dying  a  living  death 

95 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

compared  to  which  death  on  the  battlefield  is 
merciful.  It  does  not  depend  upon  what  we 
mean  by  war;  it  depends  on  what  we  mean  by 
suffering,  whether  we  find  war  more  horrible 
than  peace.  The  definition  of  peace  must  be 
extended  to  include  an  equitable  adjustment 
satisfactory  to  all  nations  and  individuals  upon 
social  and  economic  issues,  national  as  well  as 
international,  before  it  will  comprehend  anything 
remotely  likely  to  determine  present  issues. 
To  ask  the  poor,  the  oppressed,  and  the  down- 
trodden to  limit  themselves  to  peaceful  methods 
is  to  deprive  them  of  their  only  weapon  against 
those  multifold  economic,  social,  and  political 
forces  which  seem  to  them  to  be  crushing  body 
and  soul,  blackening  the  future,  and  destroying 
hope.  Not  war,  but  inequality,  oppression  is  the 
evil.  While  it  persists,  the  appeal  to  force  will 
be  always  the  last  resort  of  the  despairing. 
There  is  something  in  the  make-up  of  the  "man 
plant"  as  it  grows  in  the  Western  world  which 
makes  it  impossible  for  him  to  accept  misfortune 
without  this  final  attempt  to  readjust  the  situa- 
tion. 

When  we  appeal  to  force  as  our  ultimate 
sanction,  we  assume  that  we  ought  to  obtain 
the  maximum  of  our  reasonable  desires;  if  we 
adopt  persuasion  or  arbitration  as  our  only 
method  of  procedure,  we  shall  at  once  definitely 

96 


IMPERATIVE  NECESSITY  OF  FORCE 

accept  something  less  than  the  maximum  as  the 
most  we  can  ever  achieve.  Arbitration  and  per- 
suasion compel  us  to  accept  invariably  what 
others  will  concede  after  due  argument  and  in- 
sistence. Not  what  we  wish,  but  what  they  will 
yield,  becomes  the  measure  of  American  in- 
terests. We  obligate  ourselves  in  very  fact  never 
to  obtain  more,  never  to  consider  desirable  or 
necessary  for  the  United  States  what  other 
nations  cannot  be  persuaded  by  argument  to 
concede  to  us.  Here  lies  the  fallibility  of  arbi- 
tration. It  can  never  insure  us  anything,  de- 
sirable or  indispensable,  for  it  depends  unques- 
tionably upon  the  reasonableness  of  other  people, 
upon  the  desire  of  other  nations  for  equity, 
upon  the  recognition  by  all  of  the  wrongfulness 
of  obtaining  what  some  are  not  willing  to  con- 
cede. 

Arbitration  rests  upon  a  view  of  international 
ethics  which  declares  possible  a  mutual  regard 
by  each  nation  of  the  other's  interests  and  a 
willingness  on  the  part  of  each  to  be  satisfied 
with  a  compromise  which  must  necessarily  as- 
sign to  each  only  a  part  of  what  it  demands. 
Even  if  we  ourselves  possess  beyond  a  perad- 
venture  these  moral  and  ethical  qualities,  it  is 
all  important  that  the  nation  with  which  dif- 
ferences appear  should  also  possess  them.  May 
we  safely  intrust  American  interests  to  the  moral 

97 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

sense  of  other  nations?  Can  we  claim  that  Eu- 
ropean statesmen  show  at  present  a  conspicuous 
willingness  to  defend  our  present  interests? 
Have  the  nations  forborne  to  promote  their  own 
ambitions  where  they  knew  them  to  be  inimical 
to  those  of  others?  Have  they  hesitated  to  em- 
ploy the  force  at  their  command  to  further  theii 
own  welfare  at  the  expense  of  peoples  unprotected 
and  entirely  innocent  of  offense?  If  we  abandon 
the  use  of  force,  or  fail  adequately  to  prepare  tc 
use  it  in  emergencies,  we  shall  sacrifice  the  in- 
dispensable before  its  loss  becomes  inevitable; 
we  shall  remove  our  right  to  adapt  American 
policies  in  the  future  to  American  needs  as  shown 
by  the  shifting  conditions  of  American  life  and 
the  ambitions  of  European  nations. 

The  peculiar  fatality  of  such  a  choice  lies  in 
the  sacrifice  of  all  opportunity  to  alter  the  deci- 
sion. Once  definitely  adopted,  a  policy  of  un- 
preparedness,  or  a  lack  of  adequate  prepared- 
ness, spells  an  inability  to  prepare  at  all,  the 
irrevocable  surrender  of  the  right  to  choose,  the 
perpetual  limitation  of  American  interests  by 
the  maximum  expression  of  European  and 
Asiatic  ambitions.  We  shall  retain  only  what 
other  nations  cannot  take  away  from  us,  what 
they  do  not  value,  what  they  will  voluntarily 
concede. 

A  readiness  to  dispense  with  force  must  pro- 
98 


IMPERATIVE  NECESSITY  OF  FORCE 

ceed  from  a  willingness  to  accept  existing  cir- 
cumstances as  entirely  satisfactory  and  their 
continuance  as  the  most  advantageous  solution 
for  American  interests.  Let  us  assume  that  so 
far  as  the  United  States  is  concerned  the  proposi- 
tion is  true.  It  is  impossible,  however,  to  settle 
a  problem  of  two  dimensions  in  the  terms  of 
one;  the  mere  fact  that  existing  conditions  are 
those  most  favorable  for  us  raises  the  probability 
that  they  are  less  favorable  for  others.  Indeed 
several  European  nations  of  the  first  rank  are 
profoundly  discontented  with  present  condi- 
tions and  regard  their  continuance  as  intolerable. 
Even  if  the  United  States  can  remain  content 
with  what  we  at  present  have,  the  defense  of 
this  interest  of  ours  means  the  perpetuation  of 
the  disabilities  of  others.  It  will  entail  a  decision 
on  our  part  to  sustain  an  economic  situation 
which  powerful  European  nations  are  entirely 
ready  to  use  force  to  destroy.  Can  it  be  doubted 
that  they  will  present  to  the  United  States  the 
issue  of  sacrificing  the  present  situation  or  of 
fighting  in  its  defense?  The  challenger  and  not 
the  defendant  is  always,  in  international  affairs, 
the  one  to  choose  the  weapons.  If  they  appeal 
to  force  and  we  are  not  ready  or  willing  to  use 
force,  we  shall  lose.  The  mere  fact,  therefore, 
that  we  are  ourselves  contented  is  not  sufficient 
to  preserve  the  peace;  we  forget  the  significant 

99 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

truth  that  our  contentment  is  precisely  what 
others  wish  to  disturb. 

The  success  of  a  certain  type  of  pacifism  in  the 
United  States  has  been  based  upon  the  sedulous 
sowing  of  the  idea  that  we  are  already  the 
wealthiest  nation  on  earth,  with  the  largest  nat- 
ural resources,  becoming  already,  by  the  opera- 
tion of  factors  growing  out  of  the  European 
war,  the  most  powerful  financial  nation.  As 
such  we  have  everything  to  gain  by  the  main- 
tenance of  the  status  quo  and  everything  to  lose 
by  risking  it  in  war.  We  have  too  much  to  risk; 
we  already  have  so  much  that  we  can  scarcely 
add  to  our  possessions;  economic  factors  are 
already  so  clearly  operating  in  our  favor  that 
any  attempt  to  interfere  with  them  would  be 
detrimental,  if  not  disastrous. 

There  is  every  reason  to  suppose  that  this 
picture  of  American  conditions  is  fallacious  and 
false.  It  is  not  true  that  the  fundamental 
economic  forces  of  international  trade  are  work- 
ing in  our  favor,  that  the  fundamental  economic 
conditions  in  the  United  States  are  at  present 
likely  to  continue  to  produce  that  sort  of  result 
most  satisfactory  to  American  citizens.  The 
contrary  seems  to  be  true.  Peace  in  the  sense  of 
an  absence  of  warfare  means  the  indefinite  con- 
tinuation of  disabilities  which  individuals  and 
nations  now  at  an  economic  disadvantage  suffer. 

100 


IMPERATIVE  NECESSITY  OF  FORCE 

Among  these  is  the  United  States,  and  our  dis- 
advantages will  become  more  serious  in  propor- 
tion as  other  nations  interfere  by  artificial  meas- 
ures with  international  trade,  or  attempt  by 
military  force  and  political  pressure  to  manipu- 
late economic  factors  to  their  own  benefit  and 
to  our  detriment.  Our  past  growth  has  been  so 
abnormal  that  any  rapid  shift  to  such  economic 
conditions  as  have  been  normal  in  Europe  for 
the  last  generation  will  mean  for  this  country 
sharp  suffering,  hunger,  nakedness,  poverty, 
loss  of  life.  Those  same  economic  disabilities 
which  have  certified  the  need  for  the  use  of 
force  to  European  nations  are  and  will  be 
operative  in  this  country.  Unless  we,  of  differ- 
ent mental  make-up,  face  the  prospect  of  their 
indefinite  continuance  with  greater  satisfaction 
than  European  nations  have  manifested,  we 
shall  conclude  as  they  have  that  an  attempt  to 
secure  by  force  a  more  rapid  readjustment  of 
economic  and  social  forces  may  some  day  be 
preferable  to  their  continuance. 


101 


CHAPTER  VHI 

IS  PROSPERITY   INDISPENSABLE? 

IT  will  not  be  necessary  to  indict  a  long  screed 
to  convince  Americans  that  they  are  deserving 
of  prosperity;  it  is  a  proposition  with  which  they 
already  sympathize.  Nor  is  the  value  of  pros- 
perity in  need  of  proof:  it  possesses  already  an 
indefinable  but  powerful  attraction.  Like  happi- 
ness, prosperity  is  difficult  for  most  people  to 
define  but  impossible  to  dispense  with.  Like 
goodness,  the  majority  prefer  to  obtain  it,  if  at 
all,  without  conscious  effort;  like  life,  the  aver- 
age American  assumes  it  to  be  a  sort  of  birth- 
right, an  inalienable,  imprescriptible  something 
guaranteed  by  the  Declaration  of  Independence 
and  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  Hitherto  it 
has  appeared  annually  in  more  abundant  meas- 
ure without  seeming  thought  or  effort  on  the 
part  of  the  majority  of  individuals.  It  has  be- 
come a  matter  of  course,  an  axiom,  a  truism. 
To  speak  of  its  loss  is  to  blaspheme,  to  rave,  to 
become  a  jingo,  to  join  the  ranks  of  the  yellow 
press.  Are  we  not  the  richest  country  on  earth? 
Are  we  not  becoming  its  financial  center?  Will 

102 


IS  PROSPERITY  INDISPENSABLE? 

not  the  bulk  of  the  world's  capital  be  in  our  hands 
at  the  end  of  the  war?  Do  not  the  Europeans 
see  and  tremble? 

The  charm  of  the  word  seems  to  lie  in  its  sug- 
gestion of  a  geometrical  progression  of  well-being 
into  an  indefinite  future.  It  is  withal  no  fixed 
quantity,  but  is  relative  to  our  future  needs, 
comparative  with  our  past  attainments.  Nor  do 
we  feel  prosperous  when  we  merely  continue  to 
possess  what  we  have  had,  however  much  that 
may  have  been,  however  disproportionate  a 
return  upon  the  actual  labor  and  capital  invested. 
Prosperity  is,  in  the  immortal  words  of  Oliver 
Twist,  more,  more.  Enough  is  not  prosperity 
when  we  are  accustomed  to  too  much.  To  the 
majority  of  Americans  it  means  an  increase  of 
profits  this  year  over  last,  an  increase  in  luxuries. 
By  hard  times  we  mean  the  necessity  for 
economy  and  retrenchment,  spending  less  than 
we  did  before,  the  possession  of  less  satisfac- 
tions. 

Prosperity  is  however  by  no  means  axiomatic, 
not  in  the  least  continuous,  in  no  sense  neces- 
sarily assured  by  the  mere  fact  that  we  are  here. 
Nor  will  simple  non-interference  with  the  oper- 
ations of  the  so-called  normal  economic  factors 
result  in  that  additional  increment  of  satisfac- 
tions each  year  which  the  American  public 
expects.  Indeed,  it  is  American  prosperity  rather 

103 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

than  our  national  integrity,  our  political  inde- 
pendence, or  the  right  to  choose,  which  is  in 
immediate  danger.  Our  past  rate  of  growth  has 
been  due  to  natural  forces  so  truly  abnormal 
that  the  result,  explainable  as  it  is  by  economic 
history  and  theory,  has  been  in  comparison  with 
European  development  in  the  same  centuries  as 
highly  artificial  as  roses  in  December  in  New 
England.  So  rapid  a  pace,  it  has  been  long  seen, 
can  scarcely  be  maintained  many  more  decades; 
inevitably  it  must  slacken. 

Many  powerful  economic  factors  in  this  coun- 
try and  in  Europe  are  already  tending  to  reduce 
it  more  and  more  nearly  to  that  degree  of  ad- 
vance which  has  been  common  in  the  highly 
developed  economic  centers  of  the  older  conti- 
nent. So  much  the  history  of  the  past  teaches  us 
is  inevitable,  but  it  also  shows  us  that  the  tran- 
sition in  the  case  of  new  and  undeveloped  coun- 
tries, growing  by  leaps  and  bounds  under  power- 
ful economic  stimuli,  to]  the  settled  pace  of  a 
highly  developed  economic  unit  often  has  resulted 
in  extreme  suffering  for  the  people  alive  during 
the  period  of  change.  Especially  has  this  been 
true  when  the  transition  has  been  short  and 
sharp.  Such  countries  derive  tremendous  benefit 
from  a  more  gradual  retardation  of  the  rate  of 
growth,  from  a  lengthening  of  the  period  of 
transition  by  a  conscious  adaptation  and  use  of 

104 


IS  PROSPERITY  INDISPENSABLE? 

economic  forces.  The  difficulties  of  readjust- 
ment may  thus  be  minimized  and  some  types  of 
suffering  entirely  obviated. 

An  approximation  of  the  recent  rate  of  profit 
obtainable  from  commercial  enterprise  in  the 
United  States  is  indispensable  if  we  are  to  con- 
tinue to  muddle  along  with  our  present  demo- 
cratic government.  Great  as  has  been  the  work 
of  democracy  in  America,  as  an  educator  and 
uplifter  of  the  ignorant  and  forlorn,  it  has  been 
only  a  very  moderate  success  as  a  system  of 
government.  Foreign  students  and  American 
critics  are  alike  agreed  upon  the  inefficiency  of 
our  national,  state,  and  local  governments. 
We  have  accomplished  wonders;  we  have  learned 
how  to  do  things  quickly,  how  to  accomplish 
what  was  necessary  in  a  minimum  of  time.  Yet 
such  work  as  has  been  performed  by  the  state 
and  nation  has  often  cost  a  maximum  of  expense 
for  a  minimum  of  result,  if  we  take  the  experience 
of  European  communities  in  similar  undertak- 
ings as  a  test  of  what  can  be  done.  While  graft 
and  corruption  of  the  ugliest  sort  have  existed, 
the  phenomenal  cost  of  government  in  America 
has  been  largely  the  result  of  inefficiency  and 
inexperience,  the  sort  of  thing  which  always 
happens  when  those  who  do  not  know  how  do 
as  well  as  they  can. 

In  Congress  the  traditional  methods  of  na- 
105 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

tional  finance,  if  followed  by  any  individual  in 
his  private  expenses  or  by  any  business  con- 
cern, would  result  in  immediate  bankruptcy. 
No  budget  is  made;  no  attention  is  paid  to  ad- 
ministrative requests  beyond  a  certain  courtesy; 
and  the  habit  has  become  firmly  fixed  of  spend- 
ing something  over  two  hundred  millions  of 
dollars  a  year  in  expenses  which  produce  results 
dissociated  from  administrative  needs.  The 
pension  list  is  larger,  now  that  most  of  the  old 
soldiers  are  dead,  than  it  was  in  1870.  Most  of 
the  millions  spent  upon  the  Army  and  Navy 
are  not  represented  by  anything  military  or 
naval.  Huge  sums  have  erected  buildings, 
dredged  harbors,  and  drained  rivers,  whose  sole 
result  was  to  transfer  money  from  the  community 
to  the  constituents  of  Congressmen.  Yet  we 
shall  be  wise  to  recognize  that  this  money  is  not 
entirely  wasted;  it  is  merely  transferred  from 
public  to  private  uses.  The  nation  still  possesses 
it  and  spends  it  in  the  majority  of  instances  for 
purposes  which  increase  prosperity. 

We  cannot  however  continue  such  lavish  ex- 
penditure in  state  and  nation  for  such  purposes 
unless  prosperity  continues,  in  the  sense  of  a 
constantly  increasing  surplus  upon  which  taxes 
can  be  levied.  The  whole  financial  system  of 
the  country,  and  in  the  main  all  private  expendi- 
ture as  well,  is  based  upon  the  fact  that  some- 

106 


IS  PROSPERITY  INDISPENSABLE? 

how  there  has  usually  been  more  to  spend;  that 
without  thought  or  care  on  the  part  of  officials 
it  somehow  appeared.  Consequently  they  no 
longer  estimate  expenditure  by  the  surplus 
available,  or  even  by  existing  or  probable  rev- 
enue. We  have  grown  so  accustomed  to  too 
much,  to  more  than  we  could  spend,  that  we  do 
not  know  how  to  get  along  with  just  enough. 
Rigid  economy  will  mean  the  destruction  of  a 
large  part  of  congressional  and  state  traditions 
and  compel  the  education  of  American  politicians 
in  entirely  new  methods  of  administration. 

We  cannot  learn  to  economize  rapidly;  we 
cannot  expect  to  educate  officials,  accustomed  to 
lax  methods  and  generous  expenditures,  but 
upon  whose  experience  and  knowledge  we  must 
continue  to  rely,  in  methods  of  economy  and 
efficiency  at  the  stroke  of  a  pen  or  by  the  passing 
of  statutes.  The  system  permeates  the  com- 
munity, ramifies  into  private  business,  reaches 
homes,  churches,  and  corporations,  and  can  be 
uprooted  only  by  a  firmness  of  conviction  in  the 
imperative  necessity  of  reform  which  the  public 
mind  has  yet  to  attain.  Only  prosperity  in  the 
sense  of  more  to  spend  each  year  can  allow  Amer- 
ican democracy  to  grapple  with  future  problems. 

We  have  grown  accustomed  in  this  country  to 
a  degree  of  luxury  long  unknown  in  Europe. 
Almost  from  the  first,  in  America,  fresh  meat  was 

107 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

on  the  table  even  of  the  poorest,  and,  for  a 
longer  period  than  most  people  now  alive  can 
remember,  families  in  very  modest  circumstances 
have  had  milk,  butter,  and  sugar  in  profusion, 
coffee,  tea,  and  tobacco  without  stint,  warm 
houses,  plenty  of  warm  clothing,  carpets  on  the 
floors,  occasional  visits  to  the  theater.  These 
are  now  to  us  the  necessities  of  life.  The  sedu- 
lous work  of  reformers  has  sown  the  belief  in  the 
community  at  large  that  these  comforts  are 
merely  the  living  wage  to  which  all  people  have 
a  right,  whether  they  earn  it  or  not  by  labor 
evaluated  at  present  rates.  The  minimum  wage 
means  in  last  analysis  an  attempt  to  provide 
people  with  what  they  do  not  provide  themselves; 
it  seeks  to  delude  the  community  into  the  idea 
that  it  actually  earns  more  than  it  produces.  If 
attempted,  it  will  mean  that  some  individuals 
will  earn  it  for  other  individuals  not  as  yet  suf- 
ficiently capable  to  be  worth  that  much  in  the 
business  world.  A  decrease  in  the  present  rate 
of  profit  will  make  such  an  extension  of  comforts 
impossible  and  will  reduce  those  now  enjoyed  by 
an  extremely  numerous  class.  Such  a  result  can 
scarcely  fail  to  be  serious.  Where  so  many  are 
beginning  to  regard  more  than  they  have  as 
their  necessary  right,  of  which  they  are  de- 
prived only  by  injustice  and  greed,  the  reduc- 
tion of  what  they  now  have  will  stimulate  the 

108 


IS  PROSPERITY  INDISPENSABLE? 

hostile  campaign  against  trusts,  railroads,  and 
all  quasi-public  corporations,  already  struggling 
to  perform  their  services  to  the  community  with- 
out going  into  bankruptcy. 

All  those  social  reforms  so  ardently  desired,  so 
indispensable  to  our  future  welfare,  depend  upon 
the  continuance  of  the  existing  rate  of  profit. 
Since  the  actual  redivision  of  the  present  wealth 
of  the  community  is  so  difficult  as  to  be  imprac- 
ticable, the  most  that  can  be  hoped  is  to  secure 
for  manual  workers  a  somewhat  larger  share  of 
the  gross  total.  A  different  division  of  future 
profits  is  probably  the  only  immediate  solution 
of  the  difficulties  of  shop  girls,  of  laborers  in 
sweatshops  and  mines,  of  railroad  men  on  long 
shifts.  This  will  be  only  a  palliative.  It  seems  al- 
most impossible  to  convince  the  majority  that 
because  they  receive  more  pay  they  are  not  there- 
fore better  off,  or  that  a  reduction  of  hours  with- 
out a  proportionate  reduction  in  wages  means 
higher  pay.  Either  the  increase  is  an  attempt  to 
readjust  the  wage  scale  to  a  level  of  prices  which 
has  already  risen,  or  the  laborer  promptly  pays 
out  in  higher  prices  the  increased  amount  that 
he  has  received.  Unless  the  community  actually 
produces  more,  there  will  not  be  more.  Only 
a  greater  efficiency  can  give  the  great  majority 
of  people  higher  wages.  It  is  the  greater  propor- 
tion and  not  the  gross  total  which  is  involved. 

109 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

Unless  the  present  rate  of  profit  continues,  any 
such  division  of  future  profits  is  problematical. 
Should  the  rate  of  profit  decrease,  it  will  be  im- 
possible. 

Our  future  depends  upon  educating  the  over- 
whelming majority  of  the  community,  until  it 
is  able  to  exercise  in  reality  that  discretion  in 
public  affairs  of  which  democratic  theory  as- 
sumes the  individual  possessed.  We  are  attempt- 
ing the  most  perilous  experiment  in  the  world's 
history  by  acting  as  if  the  vast  majority  of  men 
possess  a  degree  of  intelligence  and  information 
which  every  one  of  them  knows  neither  he  nor 
his  fellows  do  possess.  In  the  progress  of  educa- 
tion lies  the  hope  of  the  future.  By  it  we  must 
mean  something  more  than  a  smattering  in  the 
public  schools  before  the  yawning  mills  devour 
the  children  at  fourteen.  They  must  continue, 
if  possible,  through  college,  and,  while  few  uni- 
versity instructors  retain  illusions  as  to  the  at- 
tainments of  college  graduates,  the  latter  are  so 
superior  to  the  grammar  school  product  in  gen- 
eral poise  and  mentality  that  the  problem  of 
democracy  would  seem  almost  solved  if  the  vast 
majority  could  be  forced  through  college. 

So  much  is  dependent  on  a  continuity  of  real 
prosperity.  If  the  parents  can  support  the  chil- 
dren a  few  more  years  without  denying  them- 
selves more  comforts  than  they  are  willing  to 

110 


IS  PROSPERITY  INDISPENSABLE? 

sacrifice,  the  children  will  have  the  needed  lei- 
sure to  devote  to  the  uninterrupted  work  of  train- 
ing for  future  citizenship.  It  all  reeks  of  profits, 
surplus  over  ordinary  expenses,  increasing  sur- 
pluses. Compared  to  this  the  tampering  with 
governmental  machinery  which  occupies  the 
attention  of  so  many  well-meaning  men  and 
women  —  the  short  ballot,  new  constitutions, 
woman  suffrage,  and  the  like  —  are  expedients 
for  exchanging  the  worst  evils  for  others  of  lesser 
degree.  Our  worst  problems  can  only  be  solved 
by  making  the  unfit  fit,  the  selfish  unselfish,  and 
the  wicked  good.  For  that,  prosperity  is  indis- 
pensable. 

If  it  is  essential,  is  it  in  danger?  Upon  what 
conditions  does  the  maintenance  of  the  present 
rate  of  profit  in  the  United  States  depend?  Not 
upon  conditions  primarily  existent  in  America. 
In  earlier  centuries  American  conditions  were 
very  nearly  the  prime  factors  in  our  astounding 
development.  A  new  and  practically  undevel- 
oped country,  whose  natural  resources  were  ab- 
normally rich,  received  from  Europe  an  entirely 
abnormal  supply  of  capital,  which  was  promptly 
invested  in  American  enterprises.  It  obtained 
also  from  Europe  by  immigration  an  entirely 
abnormal  supply  of  labor,  and  thus  stimulated 
into  abnormal  activity  normal  economic  con- 
ditions. From  this  abnormality  resulted  the 

111 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

American  prosperity  with  which  we  are  familiar. 
So  rich  were  our  resources  that  the  crudest  ex- 
tensive labor  produced  huge  profits.  The  swell- 
ing population  provided  an  ever  expanding  home 
market  for  all  manufactured  goods  we  could 
produce.  Created,  to  be  sure,  by  methods  in 
which  force  did  play  a  part  and  due  to  a  series 
of  circumstances  in  which  force  was  always  a 
potential  element,  the  resultant  prosperity  was 
none  the  less  a  product  of  economic  factors.1 

Nor  was  this  new  and  highly  artificial  economic 
structure  in  danger  of  disturbance  from  the  only 
armed  force  which  could  reach  it.  The  free  play 
of  economic  factors  in  this  country  was  assured 
by  the  significant  interests  of  the  greater  Eu- 
ropean nations  in  American  prosperity.  Their 
capital  had  been  invested  here  by  reason  of  cer- 
tain political  relationships  ultimately  founded 
on  force.  In  the  main  it  was  British  capital 
which  we  utilized,  because  Great  Britain  con- 
trolled all  the  approaches  to  the  United  States, 
and  investments  were  safer  for  British  capitalists 
than  for  the  citizens  of  other  states.  The  only 
nation,  therefore,  able  to  disturb  this  economic 
structure  found  the  existing  circumstances  as 
profitable  as  they  could  possibly  be  and  possessed 
no  motive  for  interference.  Indeed,  so  far  as 

1  See  also  Chapters  II,  IX,  X,  and  for  a  detailed  discussion  of 
the  economics  of  expansion. 

112 


IS  PROSPERITY  INDISPENSABLE? 

force  was  an  element  in  the  situation,  it  was  ex- 
erted entirely  to  maintain  and  develop  our  com- 
mercial structure. 

The  very  success  of  the  process  now  threatens 
the  happiness  of  a  part  of  the  individuals  who 
depend  upon  it.  As  far  as  the  entity  is  concerned, 
the  community  at  large,  its  prosperity  will  wax 
and  grow,  more  slowly  perhaps,  and,  it  may  be, 
in  different  directions,  but  surely  and  steadily. 
It  is  the  individual  who  is  threatened,  and  not  all 
individuals;  chiefly  those  on  the  margin  of  sub- 
sistence. The  creation  of  varied  industry  in  the 
United  States  has  entirely  changed  our  relation- 
ship to  Europe,  while  the  expansion  of  the  eco- 
nomic world  by  the  operations  of  the  railroad,  the 
steamship,  and  the  telegraph  has  scattered  to  the 
ends  of  the  earth  the  elements  of  each  nation's 
prosperity. 

American  prosperity  is  literally  more  depend- 
ent upon  a  normality  of  economic  conditions  in 
Europe  than  upon  forces  operative  in  this  coun- 
try. The  international  market  is  so  thoroughly 
interdependent,  the  economic  fabric  of  the  more 
highly  developed  nations  is  so  largely  the  result 
of  interpenetration,  that  a  decided  interference 
with  the  normality  of  the  economic  conditions 
in  Europe  promptly  interferes  with  the  normal 
working  of  forces  in  America  and  puts  an  end  to 
American  prosperity.  So  far  as  American  pros- 

113 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

perity  is  dependent  upon  the  continuity  of  pros- 
perity in  Europe,  no  measures  will  be  necessary 
to  preserve  it:  the  Europeans  are  themselves  as 
anxious  to  maintain  normal  conditions  as  Ameri- 
cans ever  can  be.  It  will  scarcely  be  necessary 
for  the  United  States  to  contemplate  assisting 
European  governments  in  the  preservation  of 
order.  If  their  own  economic  welfare  will  not 
induce  them  to  avoid  war,  it  is  hardly  likely 
that  the  protection  of  our  interests  will  cause 
them  to  renounce  an  appeal  to  arms. 

Prosperity  does  not  result  from  the  gross  total 
of  business  transactions,  but  from  the  degree  of 
profit  obtained.  Nor  by  this  rate  of  profit  do 
we  imply  gross  profit.  It  is  the  marginal  profit 
and  the  degree  of  that  marginal  profit  upon  the 
last  amount  of  business  which  is  sufficiently 
profitable  to  be  performed  at  all.  The  mere  fact, 
therefore,  that  the  total  volume  of  business 
transactions  has  increased  does  not  spell  pros- 
perity. It  must  have  increased  at  such  a  rate 
that  the  smallest  profit  which  the  least  intelli- 
gent business  man  receives  still  remains  as  be- 
fore, or  exceeds  his  previous  profit.  Inasmuch  as 
the  normal  factors  of  international  trade  tend  to 
diminish  the  marginal  profit  in  America,  pros- 
perity can  be  maintained,  not  by  protecting  our 
access  to  normal  European  markets,  not  by  in- 
creasing our  output  for  our  own  normal  domestic 

114 


IS  PROSPERITY  INDISPENSABLE? 

demand,  but  by  the  continued  possession  of 
abnormal  markets  at  home  or  abroad.  Upon 
these  we  have  in  the  past  been  very  dependent, 
and  we  have  ourselves  furnished  American  busi- 
ness such  abnormal  profits  in  domestic  trade 
that  we  have  grown  to  rely  upon  a  percentage  of 
net  gain,  which  few  business  men  in  Europe  ex- 
pect. Due  in  the  past  to  the  extraordinary  wealth 
of  virgin  resources,  to  a  practical  monopoly  in 
some  cases  of  the  commodity  in  question,  our 
trade  at  present  rests  upon  war  markets  in  Eu- 
rope, South  America,  Asia,  and  Canada.  Ameri- 
can prosperity  is  not  threatened  by  forcible  in- 
terference or  conquest,  but  by  the  slackening  of 
the  rate  of  growth,  which  normally  follows  upon 
the  development  of  economic  factors  and  which 
can  be  prevented  only  by  the  continuation  to  a 
certain  degree  of  that  sort  of  abnormal  condi- 
tion which  is  tending  to  disappear.  For  the 
present  we  may  expect  to  maintain  something 
approximating  abnormal  conditions  in  America, 
which  will  retard  the  diminution  of  this  rate  of 
profit  and  postpone  the  completion  of  the  transi- 
tion. But,  a  generation  hence,  what  shall  we  use? 
What  opportunity  will  remain  open? 


115 


CHAPTER  IX 

CAN  ARMED  FORCE  PROTECT  PROSPERITY? 

IF  we  study  the  foreign  policies  of  nations  in  the 
past  we  shall  find  at  the  bottom  of  each  that 
word  of  magic  import  and  illimitable  hope  — 
prosperity.  The  past  generations  of  statesmen 
believed  that  armed  force  could  advance  and 
protect  prosperity,  and  to  that  end  formulated 
significant  national  policies.  When  the  long 
ships  of  the  Greeks  set  sail  for  Troy  they  were 
attempting  to  remove  an  artificial  obstacle  which 
stood  in  the  way  of  Greek  commerce  with  the 
Euxine  and  prevented  the  expansion  of  Greek 
trade.  Thus  the  Punic  wars  were  contests  for 
the  trade  supremacy  of  the  western  Mediter- 
ranean. Between  the  struggles  of  the  legendary 
past  and  the  present  day  are  centuries  strewn 
with  wars  waged  in  the  pursuit  of  prosperity. 
The  discoverers  and  colonists  of  the  sixteenth 
and  seventeenth  centuries  looked  for  it  in 
America  and  Asia;  the  Mercantilists  of  the  seven- 
teenth century,  the  Physiocrats  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  sought  by  a  policy  of  broader  applica- 
tion, in  which  military  and  naval  forces  played  a 

116 


ARMED  FORCE  -  PROSPERITY 

conspicuous  part,  to  stimulate  national  economic 
growth.  So  too  the  Continental  System  of  Na- 
poleon, the  laissez  faire  of  the  Manchester 
School,  the  radicalism  of  Marx,  La  Salle,  and 
Henry  George,  were  all  essays  in  prosperity  and 
speculations  about  the  road  thither.  To  see, 
therefore,  the  assurance  of  American  prosperity 
as  the  fundamental  motive  of  our  foreign  policy, 
as  the  promise  of  American  life,  is  to  adopt  a 
standard  already  stamped  with  approval  by 
Agamemnon,  Drake,  Colbert,  Napoleon,  and 
Disraeli. 

There  has  been  in  America  a  tendency  to 
suppose  the  Europeans  lacking  in  sanity  because 
of  their  willingness  to  undertake  so  colossal  a 
war,  and  to  believe  them  ignorant  of  economics 
and  history  because  they  openly  advocate  the 
use  of  armed  force  in  the  interests  of  prosperity. 
Many  have  congratulated  themselves  because 
the  United  States  has  not  yet  fallen  a  prey  to 
this  delusion.  How  great  is  the  probability  that 
we  Americans  are  wiser  than  so  many  genera- 
tions of  European  statesmen;  that  we  apprehend 
more  clearly  the  operation  of  economic  factors 
and  the  possible  effect  upon  them  of  armed 
force?  We  need  hardly  expect  the  Europeans 
to  award  us  any  such  superiority,  and  there  does 
seem,  indeed,  to  be  scant  reason  to  credit  it. 

Man  is  apparently  differentiated  from  the 
117 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

animals  precisely  by  his  ability  to  interfere  with 
the  working  of  normal  physical  and  economic 
factors.  He  has  not  been  content  with  what  the 
succession  of  days  would  bring  him;  he  has  con- 
stantly sought  by  effort  to  accelerate  the  pace 
of  his  development,  to  increase  the  sum  total  of 
his  worldly  goods,  to  obtain  from  this  acre  a 
larger  yield,  to  discover  new  methods  for  utiliz- 
ing natural  objects  hitherto  without  value. 
There  has  never  been  a  time  within  recorded  his- 
tory when  the  leading  minds  of  the  race  have  not 
believed  in  this  possibility  of  accelerating  the 
pace  of  development.  The  new  theories  of  ex- 
pansion, imperialism,  and  colonization  merely 
bring  new  postulates  and  new  ideas  of  conditions 
to  reaffirm  old  conclusions.  Behind  present 
European  policies  stand  subtle  and  far-reaching 
conceptions,  traceable  to  Darwinism  and  the 
Mendelian  law,  to  the  study  of  diplomatics  and 
index  numbers,  to  economic  history  and  socio- 
logical research.  Conscious  experimentation  with 
commercial  crises,  famines,  and  great  natural 
catastrophes  has  caused  men  to  hope  that  by 
forethought  and  cooperation  their  disruptive  in- 
fluence may  be  so  nearly  eliminated  that  such 
events  will  cease  even  temporarily  to  interfere 
with  normal  business  conditions.  The  analysis 
of  the  credit  structure  and  of  banking,  the  study 
of  such  phenomena  as  the  rise  of  prices,  have 

118 


ARMED  FORCE  -  PROSPERITY 

resulted  in  the  formulation  of  plans  of  action 
which  experience  has  proved  to  be  accurate  and 
beneficial. 

If  the  synthesis  reached  by  European  thinkers 
and  statesmen  is  accurate,  it  is  as  valid  in 
America  as  in  Europe.  The  modern  economic 
fabric  is  an  integer  and  the  new  economic  his- 
tory, sociology,  and  biology  are  universal  in 
their  scope.  The  very  tenet  of  the  interrelation 
and  the  interpenetration  of  the  economic  world 
renders  improbable  a  postulate  true  in  Europe 
and  not  in  America.  We  shall  arrogate  too  much 
to  ourselves  if  we  suppose  that  we  have  so  soon 
outstripped  those  teachers  to  whom  we  owe 
literally  all  our  own  knowledge  and  training. 
So  far  as  scholarship,  art,  and  industry  exist  in 
America,  they  are  provably  direct  importations 
from  Europe.  We  have  not  yet  freed  ourselves 
from  the  dominant  influence  of  European 
thought;  we  have  yet  to  produce  any  manifesta- 
tion of  intellectual  endeavor  which  is  not  con- 
fessedly European  in  character.  Only  the  igno- 
rant will  conclude  that  we  are  wiser  than  the 
Europeans  and  that  fallacies  visible  to  us  will 
not  also  be  clear  to  them.  Our  unwillingness  to 
accept  their  conclusions  does  not  demonstrate  of 
itself  our  superior  intelligence  and  information. 

It  is  easy  to  show  that  armed  force  cannot 
create  economic  forces  or  spiritual  and  ethical 

119 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

phenomena.  No  well-informed  European  stu- 
dents or  statesmen  have  ever  believed  that  crude 
invasion  —  the  seizure  of  houses  and  lands,  the 
confiscation  of  property,  and  the  expulsion  of 
the  inhabitants  —  added  to  the  conqueror's 
wealth.  For  many  generations  it  has  been  clear 
that  robbery  on  a  large  scale  was  as  futile  of 
permanent  results  as  on  a  small  scale.  Nor 
have  statesmen  believed  that  fundamental  eco- 
nomic disabilities  could  be  literally  removed 
by  the  edge  of  the  sword.  We  cannot  thus  pay 
our  debts  to  Europe,  nor  seize  the  capital  needed 
for  investment  in  other  lands,  nor  change  the 
general  character  of  our  economic  development. 
Direct  exchange  as  profitable  to  the  merchants 
of  other  countries  as  to  ours,  a  merchant  marine 
adequate  for  American  commerce,  we  cannot  es- 
tablish by  battles  or  by  legislation.  Force  never 
has  and  will  not  in  future  make  nations  rich  at 
a  stroke,  nor  create  economic  independence  in  a 
moment.  We  may  rob  others  of  their  prosperity, 
but  we  cannot  transfer  it  to  ourselves.  No 
student  or  statesman  of  consequence  has  ever 
believed  that  we  could.1 

1  I  am  aware  that  I  am  here  explicitly  taking  issue  with  Mr. 
Norman  AngelTs  position  in  The  Great  Illusion  and  other  books. 
This  seems  to  me  his  chief  fallacy:  most  of  his  contentions  are  true, 
but  have  never  been  denied  by  leading  statesmen,  who  still  declare 
despite  such  admissions  that  armed  force  is  capable  of  a  beneficial 
influence  more  extended  than  the  police  power  which  Mr.  Angell 
also  sanctions. 

120 


ARMED  FORCE  -  PROSPERITY 

The  feat  is  not  to-day  more  impossible;  its 
futility  is  simply  more  obvious.  Wealth  more 
clearly  than  ever  is  seen  to  exist  in  great  com- 
munities in  the  continuous  use  of  buildings  and 
resources,  in  the  continuous  cultivation  of  land, 
in  the  actual  operation  of  railroads,  factories, 
and  banks.  The  iron  rails,  the  bank  vaults,  the 
machinery  in  the  factories,  armies  can  seize; 
but  these  material  objects  avail  nothing  because 
wealth  is  not  inherent  in  them.  It  lies  in  their 
continuous  use.  The  intangible  cannot  be  stolen. 
Between  developed  countries  the  profits  of  trade 
consist  in  the  continuity  of  an  exchange  mutually 
profitable.  When  the  necessary  conditions  exist, 
force  is  apparently  unable  entirely  to  stop  then1 
operation;  when  the  profits  are  not  mutual,  no 
amount  of  force  can  make  the  exchange  continu- 
ous. As  for  the  credit  structure  upon  which  mod- 
ern business  so  vitally  depends,  it  is  the  result  and 
creation  of  confidence,  established  between  indi- 
viduals by  long  years  of  intercourse.  The  threat 
of  force  paralyzes  the  structure.  In  the  long  run, 
prosperity  must  proceed  from  the  operation  of 
economic  phenomena  which  force  is  incapable  of 
creating  or  transferring.1 

At  the  same  time  force  can  hasten  the  pace  at 

1  The  difference  between  effects  in  the  long  run  and  over  briefer 
periods  is  a  point  which  is  often  decisive  in  the  decisions  of  states- 
men, who  must  act  at  the  moment,  and  who  must  often  be  attempt- 
ing to  obviate  the  difficulties  created  by  economic  disabilities, 

121 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

which  economic  development  proceeds,  and,  con- 
versely, can  prevent  the  too  rapid  retardation 
of  the  rate  of  growth.  Conscious  thought  may 
utilize  force  so  as  to  bring  labor  and  capital 
together,  so  as  to  juxtapose  the  necessary 
economic  phenomena  for  trade  and  thus  develop 
trade  where  it  did  not  exist  before.  Only  the  ig- 
norant will  confuse  this  operation  with  the  crea- 
tion of  phenomena.  The  interference  with  the 
continuity  of  economic  operations  by  violence, 
whether  of  individuals  or  of  armies,  force  can 
always  obviate;  and  where  artificial  barriers  have 
been  erected  by  legislation  or  custom  in  the  way 
of  trade,  they  can  be  removed  by  political  and 
military  influence.  All  of  these  uses  of  force  are 
beneficial  and  profitable.  In  developed  coun- 
tries, the  part  played  by  organized  force  is 
hardly  realized,  because  the  advanced  conscious- 
ness of  the  public  mind  appreciates  so  keenly 
the  advantages  of  a  continuity  of  economic  oper- 
ations that  no  interference  by  violence  or  statute 
is  ordinarily  attempted  which  force  is  needed  to 
counteract.  Strikes  and  riots  do  occasionally 
occur,  but  ordinarily  the  work  of  the  police  is 
limited  to  the  punishment  of  minor  offenses 
against  the  criminal  code. 

which  only  time  can  transform.  It  must  always  be  remembered 
that  the  majority  of  the  postulates  of  economic  theory  concern 
effects  in  the  long  run  only,  while  most  political  policies  are  cal- 
culated to  produce  immediate  results. 

122 


ARMED  FORCE  -  PROSPERITY 

The  true  problem  of  a  country  like  the  United 
States,  which  has  attained  a  complex  economic 
development  but  remains  inferior  in  strength 
to  other  States,1  and  still  owes  a  considerable 
portion  of  the  capital  sum  upon  which  its  busi- 
ness is  founded,  is  of  such  a  nature  that  force 
can  assist  in  its  solution.  Indeed,  the  solution 
lies  in  the  acceleration  of  the  rate  of  growth, 
and  therefore  in  the  shortening  of  the  period 
of  economic  dependence  and  inferiority.  The 
advantages  of  independence  are  so  great  and  so 
truly  beneficial  to  all  citizens  that  any  legiti- 
mate effort  which  will  hasten  its  attainment  is 
justifiable.  At  the  same  time  only  from  the 
operation  of  normal  economic  factors  can  in- 
dependence result;  only  by  a  gradual  accumula- 
tion of  net  profits  can  the  debts  be  paid  and  a 
capital  sum  of  our  own  be  created.  Normally 
the  rate  of  growth  is  dependent  upon  the  propor- 
tion of  the  country's  business  which  produces  a 
rate  of  profit  greater  than  the  marginal  profit 
necessary  to  induce  men  to  conduct  their  busi- 
ness at  all.  The  true  gross  profits  are  the  residuum 
after  the  expenses  of  production  have  been  paid, 
which  must  always  include  that  minimum  busi- 
ness profit  which  is  really  the  promoter's  salary 
and  which  represents  the  least  amount  which  will 

1  This  aspect  of  the  subject  has  been  reserved  for  the  next 
chapter. 

123 


induce  him  to  conduct  business  at  all.  Ordinarily 
it  covers  his  personal  expenses.  Of  the  gross  prof- 
its a  considerable  proportion  is  used  to  discharge 
our  indebtedness  to  Europe  in  dividends  on 
stock,  interest  on  bonds,  and  payments  of  capi- 
tal sums.  What  remains  is  net  profit,  our  own 
profit,  the  possible  addition  to  our  own  capital 
fund.  Only  as  it  grows  can  we  become  inde- 
pendent, and  it  will  grow,  obviously,  in  propor- 
tion to  the  amount  of  business  in  the  country 
transacted  above  the  marginal  profit,  the  per- 
centage of  business  which  brings  in  abnormal 
profit,  and  which,  therefore,  results  in  a  greater 
net  profit.  This  is  what  we  mean  by  prosperity: 
the  creation  each  year  of  a  good  deal  more  than 
is  necessary  to  cause  us  to  do  business  at  all  and 
to  pay  our  debts;  the  ability  to  spend  each  year, 
either  for  our  own  purposes  or  in  the  develop- 
ment of  business,  a  much  larger  sum  than  the 
year  before. 

While  force  cannot  make  us  independent  at  a 
stroke,  it  can  hasten  the  operation  of  the  eco- 
nomic forces  which  will  gradually  perform  that 
feat.  Here  lay  the  real  object  of  mercantilism. 
Countries  were  to  become  self-sustaining,  which 
meant,  of  course,  independent;  the  colonial 
systems  were  intended  to  increase  the  propor- 
tion of  the  country's  business  which  produced 
abnormal  profit.  To  this  same  end  modern 

124 


ARMED  FORCE  -  PROSPERITY 

peaceful   penetration   and  Pan-Germanism  are 
directed. 

The  beneficial  influence  of  force  upon  economic 
development  has  been  in  recent  years  so  much 
in  controversy  that  a  somewhat  extended  treat- 
ment becomes  justifiable. 

There  exist  in  the  world  natural  highways 
along  which  the  world's  trade  flows,  in  the  main, 
because  the  geographical  structure  of  the  con- 
tinents and  oceans  dictates  the  lines  of  com- 
munication between  nations.  In  certain  dis- 
tricts, many  of  these  natural  roads  unite  and 
create  a  single  geographical  location,  which  is 
economically  more  valuable  to  its  inhabitants 
than  other  districts  would  be.  The  northern 
European  lines  of  communication  center  in 
Belgium  and  Holland;  the  trade  routes  by  sea 
all  unite  in  the  English  Channel;  New  York 
combines  a  splendid  harbor  with  access  to  the 
natural  highways  leading  north,  east,  and  west. 
Such  districts  as  these  are  always  richer,  more 
highly  developed  than  others,  and  business  is 
more  profitable  in  them  than  elsewhere.  These 
force  can  appropriate,  can  transfer  from  one 
political  allegiance  to  another,  and  the  addi- 
tion of  these  natural  entities  to  the  country's 
resources  will  be  a  source  of  profit,  although 
no  dollars  are  transferred  to  the  pockets  of  citi- 
zens in  the  conqueror  country. 

125 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

There  are  also  in  the  world  certain  districts 
whose  climate  provides  more  favorable  condi- 
tions for  the  growth  of  certain  staples  or  for  the 
manufacture  of  certain  commodities  than  other 
places  possess.  The  earth  also  contains  minerals, 
whose  location  is  fixed,  which  may  be  transferred 
to  the  conqueror  at  will  and  whose  ownership 
will  be  profitable.  The  French  have  felt  sorely 
the  loss  of  the  iron  mines  in  northern  France  and 
the  Germans  have  benefited  enormously  by  the 
seizure  of  the  great  oil  districts  in  Galicia.  There 
can  be  little  doubt  that  one  of  the  chief  purposes 
in  the  invasion  of  Belgium  by  Germany  was  to 
secure  the  use  during  the  war  of  the  French  iron 
mines,  of  the  Belgian  and  northern  French  indus- 
trial fabrics,  to  deprive  the  French  and  British 
of  these  resources  and  also  of  the  use  of  those 
great  roads  of  communication  which  center  in 
Belgium.  Here  are  advantages  which  armed  force 
did  transfer  from  one  nation  to  another. 

The  economics  of  nationalization  have  also 
been  proved  highly  essential  and  almost  entirely 
the  result  in  the  past  of  the  operation  of  armed 
force.  The  practical  non-existence  to-day  of 
artificial  barriers  hi  the  way  of  trade  conceals 
from  most  men  the  almost  innumerable  varieties 
of  such  difficulties  in  the  past.  Customs  barriers, 
toll  regulations,  differences  in  language,  in  corn- 
age,  in  weights  and  measures,  in  the  law  of  debt 

126 


ARMED  FORCE  -  PROSPERITY 

and  contract,  were  so  numerous  in  Europe  as 
practically  to  reduce  the  area  in  which  uniform 
conditions  existed  to  a  few  square  miles.  Grad- 
ually men  began  to  appreciate  the  very  decided 
commercial  advantages  which  result  from  an 
ability  to  trade  with  customers  at  a  distance 
under  uniform  conditions,  so  that  both  of  the 
contracting  parties  are  governed  by  the  same 
law,  make  their  agreement  in  the  same  language, 
in  the  same  units  of  money  and  measure.  Debts 
are  more  easily  collected,  contracts  more  com- 
monly honored,  disputes  and  disagreements  less 
usual  and  more  readily  adjusted.  Such  hin- 
drances are  purely  artificial  and  not  economic  in 
the  least,  and  therefore  their  removal  by  armed 
force  frees  trade  from  unnatural  restrictions  and 
results  in  mutual  profit  to  all  concerned  and  in 
the  rapid  increase  of  the  number  of  transactions, 
as  well  as  in  the  creation  of  a  much  greater  as- 
surance of  the  continuity  of  economic  processes. 
Economic  phenomena  force  cannot  create;  it  is 
able  to  assure  the  mutuality  of  benefit  which 
flows  from  a  uniformity  of  conditions  and  the 
continuity  of  economic  processes.  The  result 
invariably  spells  profit  and  prosperity. 

Obviously  armed  force  is  necessary  to  pro- 
tect the  continuity  of  the  normal  economic  proc- 
esses in  all  countries  from  artificial,  captious, 
or  aggressive  interference.  In  developed  coun- 

127 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

tries  this  duty  rarely  assumes  prominence  or 
requires  other  measures  than  those  habitual 
and  customary.  In  undeveloped  countries,  where 
order  is  not  preserved  by  the  native  authorities 
in  accordance  with  European  standards,  this 
police  duty  is  commonly  performed  by  some  one 
of  the  developed  countries,  primarily  in  its  own 
interests,  but  incidentally  with  beneficial  results 
to  the  trade  of  all  developed  countries.  Upon 
the  consistent  and  regular  performance  of  this 
police  work,  the  continuity  of  national  as  well 
as  international  trade  is  vitally  dependent,  and 
all  European  States  consider  most  important  the 
assurance  in  some  way  of  its  performance  in  all 
undeveloped  countries.  Other  things  equal,  the 
European  Government  which  undertakes  to 
keep  order  becomes  a  sort  of  trustee  for  all  other 
countries  and  expects  them  to  deal  with  the 
country  in  question  through  its  own  diplomatic 
machinery. 

It  is  possible  to  call  into  existence  economic 
conditions  in  undeveloped  countries  by  the  ex- 
portation from  Europe  of  machinery  and  skilled 
labor.  This  juxtaposition  of  labor  and  capital 
with  the  raw  materials,  already  in  existence  hi 
the  undeveloped  countries  but  not  utilized,  is  a 
sort  of  operation  which  armed  force  and  political 
interference  are  peculiarly  capable  of  perform- 
ing. Invariably  the  citizens  of  the  European 

128 


ARMED  FORCE  -  PROSPERITY 

nation  which  undertakes  this  penetration  demand 
from  their  own  Government  assurances  that 
order  in  the  European  sense  will  be  strictly 
observed  and  that  the  economic  factors  which 
they  thus  create  shall  be  assured  an  opportu- 
nity for  continuous  operation  for  a  sufficiently 
long  period  to  justify  the  investment.  Fre- 
quently such  guarantees  involve  the  establish- 
ment of  military  forces,  of  administrative  regula- 
tions, the  installing  of  European  officials,  before 
the  continuity  of  peace  in  the  European  sense 
can  be  predicated.  In  particular  the  European 
country  undertakes  to  protect  its  own  invest- 
ments from  political  or  military  interference  by 
some  other  nation,  intended,  of  course,  either  to 
disturb  the  peace,  or  to  result  in  the  repudiation 
of  the  debts  contracted,  or  in  a  refusal  longer  to 
countenance  the  ownership  of  the  concessions 
already  granted.  Once  completed,  however,  such 
conditions  are  extraordinarily  favorable  and 
establish  an  abnormally  lucrative  trade  with  the 
creditor  country  which  ordinary  competitive 
business  cannot  affect.  So  long  as  the  debtor 
nation  continues  to  pay  interest  on  the  capital 
investment,  or  so  long  as  the  citizens  of  the 
creditor  nation  resident  in  the  debtor  country  are 
able  to  export  the  product,  the  bulk  of  the  trade 
of  the  newer  country  must  flow  to  its  creditor.1 

1  A  fuller  statement  has  already  been  made  in  Chapter  II. 
129 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

Nor  will  the  profits  of  the  trade  accrue  solely 
to  the  capitalists  and  merchants  who  are  the 
direct  beneficiaries.  They  are  the  agents  by 
whose  hands  it  is  distributed  to  the  nation  at 
large.  They  will  be  more  acutely  aware  of  the 
existence  of  the  new  business  than  most  indi- 
viduals and  will  know  more  accurately  its  amount 
and  the  nature  of  the  factors  which  created  ,it. 
They  will  sense  before  others  the  appearance  of 
forces  hostile  to  it,  but  they  will  not  necessarily 
benefit  from  it  to  a  greater  degree  than  any 
capitalist  who  creates  new  business.  The  familiar 
example  of  the  miser  and  his  gold  shows  how  in- 
capable every  capitalist  is  of  retaining  even  a 
major  share  of  the  real  benefit.  So  long  as  he 
keeps  his  wealth  it  is  of  no  value  to  him.  To 
use  it,  to  enjoy  it,  he  must  spend  it,  which  means 
that  he  must  distribute  it,  create  to  that  extent 
a  new  market  for  the  products  of  people  who  have 
not  even  heard  of  the  colony.  Thus,  through 
the  channels  of  business,  the  profit  is  diffused 
throughout  the  nation,  increasing  its  produc- 
tion and  wellbeing  in  every  direction.  Corrup- 
tion and  undue  influence  may  enable  some  of  the 
capitalists  to  rob  others,  but  they  cannot  rob 
the  nation  of  the  same  sort  of  benefit  from  the 
trade  of  the  new  colony  which  it  receives  from 
the  extension  of  domestic  trade,  unless  they  hoard 
it  or  spend  it  in  foreign  lands.  Even  in  the  latter 

130 


ARMED  FORCE  -  PROSPERITY 

case,  a  conceivable  addition  to  the  nation's 
trade  must  result.  Normally,  therefore,  the  new 
economic  and  political  connection  benefits  the 
whole  nation. 

Such  a  relationship  is  also  capable  of  stimulat- 
ing new  economic  wants  in  the  native  population 
by  the  creation  of  new  social  habits  and  indi- 
vidual preferences.  The  Europeans  suggest  new 
methods  of  life  and  amusements  which  Eu- 
ropean products,  clothes,  food,  and  drink  are 
needed  to  satisfy.  Normally  the  tastes  and  pref- 
erences common  in  the  creditor  country  will  en- 
tirely govern  the  new  social  entity  composed  of 
immigrants  and  natives  and  will  at  once  result 
in  the  expenditure  for  such  luxuries  of  the  greater 
part  of  the  profit  created  in  the  new  country 
by  the  use  of  European  capital.  Thus  political 
influence  and  armed  force  create  another  ex- 
panding market  in  which  the  profits  are  ab- 
normal. 

The  difference  in  the  profits  between  staple 
goods  and  luxuries  is  common  knowledge, 
but  is  too  often  forgotten  in  international  re- 
lations. The  trade  in  staple  goods  is  governed 
almost  entirely  by  the  law  of  supply  and  demand 
in  the  international  market,  and  commonly 
yields  a  minimum  of  profit  approximating  the 
cost  of  production,  because  of  the  severity  of 
competition,  although  it  is  a  trade  in  which  the 

131 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE1  FUTURE 

mutuality  of  interests  is  so  great  that  its  con- 
tinuity and  the  great  number  of  transactions 
result  in  a  considerable  profit  whose  continuance 
is  thoroughly  well  established.  Luxuries,  on  the 
contrary,  possess  individual  and  preferential 
values  which  are  less  influenced  by  the  cost  of 
production.  Intrinsic  usefulness  and  the  cost 
of  production  have  little  to  do  with  the  sale  of 
automobiles  and  violins.  The  percentage  of  profit 
is  ordinarily  large,  and  in  localities  where  com- 
petition is  non-existent  the  exchange  value  may 
reach  any  amount  which  the  natives  are  willing 
to  give.  A  bolt  of  cotton  cloth  worth  at  whole- 
sale a  few  cents  a  yard  has  been  exchanged 
more  than  once  for  an  elephant's  tusk  or  rights 
in  a  gold  mine. 

Moreover,  this  sort  of  trade  in  a  new  country 
is  one  less  open  to  competition  than  in  developed 
countries,  because  social  preferences  differ  and 
the  particular  luxuries  of  European  countries 
do  not  find  a  ready  market  in  each  other's 
colonies.  If  the  creditor  country  can  practically 
exclude  by  diplomacy  or  force  other  social  in- 
fluences, and  thus  prevent  the  creation  of  new 
economic  wants  which  it  does  not  itself  satisfy, 
the  extent  of  profitable  trade  has  been  proved  by 
experience  to  be  almost  without  limit.  It  is  this 
opportunity  to  influence  economic  wants  and 
social  preferences  which  most  European  coun- 

132 


ARMED  FORCE  -  PROSPERITY 

tries  are  anxious  to  achieve  and  which  furnish 
them  very  real  excuse  for  political  and  military 
domination.  In  the  strict  sense,  of  course,  these 
economic  wants  are  not  created  by  force,  though 
it  should  be  clear  that  the  ability  to  exert  mili- 
tary force  is  the  effective  cause  of  their  exist- 
ence. 

Force  can,  therefore,  perform  many  operations 
which  will  protect  prosperity,  either  by  accel- 
erating the  pace  of  development  or  by  preventing 
its  retardation.  How  great  is  the  necessity  for 
such  an  employment  of  force  by  the  United 
States?  In  the  immediate  future  there  is  no 
particular  demand  other  than  is  required  to 
maintain  relations  already  in  existence.  The 
profits  of  business  in  America  are  still  abnormal; 
the  proportion  of  resources,  still  yielding  far 
more  than  the  ordinary  rate  of  return,  is  suf- 
ficiently great  to  furnish  us  adequate  opportu- 
nity at  home  for  some  years  to  come  for  the  in- 
vestment of  all  the  capital  that  we  can  ourselves 
accumulate.  It  is  the  future  which  challenges  our 
attention. 

At  the  present  rate  of  growth  abnormal 
profits  in  the  development  of  American  resources 
will  disappear  before  we  have  achieved  that  very 
real  economic  independence  which  is  the  goal 
of  American  effort,  and  will  also  disappear  before 
the  readjustment  of  American  business  to  the 

133 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

conditions  of  a  highly  developed  creditor  coun- 
try has  been  finally  accomplished.  We  do  not 
at  present  need  so  much  a  location  for  present 
capital  as  we  need  to  retain  a  location  in  which 
we  may  some  day  invest  capital  on  these  iterms 
and  obtain  from  it  abnormal  profits.  The  real 
danger  lies  in  the  determination  of  European 
nations  to  create  by  the  use  of  armed  force  ar- 
tificial conditions  to  their  own  advantage  in 
practically  all  the  undeveloped  countries  on  the 
globe. 

After  all,  the  issue  is  relative  and  comparative, 
and  the  prosperity  of  America  will  rest  in  the 
future  not  upon  the  volume  of  business  we  our- 
selves transact,  not  upon  the  gross  profit  we  obtain 
from  it,  but  upon  the  ratio  between  the  net  profit 
earned  in  this  country  and  in  other  countries. 
More  and  more  business  conditions  are  governed 
by  the  international  law  of  supply  and  demand; 
more  and  more  prosperity  in  the  United  States  is 
becoming  dependent  upon  economic  conditions 
in  the  rest  of  the  world.  If  by  the  use  of  armed 
force  the  European  nations  accelerate  their 
pace  of  development,  they  will  force  upon  us  the 
necessity  for  similar  measures.  At  anyone  mo- 
ment there  is  in  the  world  only  so  much  business 
and  so  much  profit.  If  they  receive  more,  we 
shall  have  less.  Not  what  we  decide,  but  what 
they  decide,  governs  the  situation.  If  we  do  not 

134 


ARMED  FORCE  -  PROSPERITY 

follow  their  example,  they  will  mold  conditions 
to  our  detriment;  will  set  in  motion  economic 
forces  which  will  reduce  our  rate  of  profit  and 
retard  American  development.  It  is  difficult  for 
most  people  to  remember  that  economic  phenom- 
ena once  created  cannot  be  destroyed  by  force, 
and  that  the  control  which  can  be  established  of 
the  trade  of  an  undeveloped  country  by  political 
influence  and  military  force  can  be  made  so 
complete  by  the  processes  of  economic  develop- 
ment that  even  invasion  cannot  change  the  sit- 
uation. An  opportunity  for  the  investment  of 
American  capital  at  present  in  undeveloped  coun- 
tries is  not  particularly  imperative.  It  is  essen- 
tial that  we  should  retain  an  opportunity  to 
invest  future  American  capital,  when  we  have 
gotten  it,  in  that  same  fashion  which  European 
countries  have  demonstrated  to  be  so  lucrative. 


135 


CHAPTER  X 

FUNDAMENTAL   ECONOMIC   DISABILITIES 

UNDERNEATH  any  true  and  consistent  concep- 
tion of  American  foreign  policy  must  lie  an  ac- 
curate analysis  of  our  economic  status  in  its 
relation  to  the  international  economic  fabric. 
It  has  been  customary  to  claim  that  the  United 
States  is  now  economically  independent.  In 
order  to  reveal  the  subtle  fallacies  involved  in 
this  statement,  in  order  to  show  that,  while  we 
are  no  longer  dependent  in  the  sense  of  1700  or 
of  1850,  we  are  still  by  no  means  an  independent 
economic  entity  in  the  European  sense,  a  brief 
resume  of  the  economic  relations  between  Amer- 
ica and  Europe  becomes  indispensable.1 

When  the  true  extent  of  the  discovery  of 
America  became  apparent  in  the  first  quarter  of 
the  sixteenth  century,  the  magnitude  of  the 
opportunities  for  exploitation  of  the  new  realm 
were  fully  appreciated  in  Europe.  The  control 
of  the  seas  by  Spain,  however,  prevented  coloni- 
zation by  other  European  powers,  who,  while 

1  A  discussion  of  the  economic  disabilities  which  prevent  the 
creation  of  an  American  merchant  marine  has  been  placed  for 
purpose  of  emphasis  in  Chapter  XV. 

136 


FUNDAMENTAL  ECONOMIC  DISABILITIES 

chafing  against  the  measures  adopted  to  exclude 
them  from  the  new  domain,  were  incapable  of 
attempting  more  than  pillage  and  interference. 
Spain  chose  to  exploit  Central  and  South 
America  and  left  the  northern  continent  com- 
paratively free  from  settlement  or  conquest. 
When  therefore  the  defeat  of  the  Spanish  Ar- 
mada in  1588  resulted  in  the  birth  of  a  new 
power  upon  the  sea,  the  legitimate  result  of  the 
victory  was  seen  in  England  to  be  an  opportunity 
to  develop  this  northern  continent. 

Moreover,  the  domination  of  the  seas,  main- 
tained because  of  European  conditions  and  result- 
ing from  battles  fought  in  Europe,  controlled  al- 
ways by  a  fleet  in  European  waters,  would  make 
aggressive  movements  in  the  New  World  rela- 
tively unnecessary.  In  the  main,  attempts  to 
interfere  with  the  new  colonies  could  be  pre- 
vented by  diplomacy  and  by  war  in  Europe. 
Actions  in  the  New  World  itself  would  ordina- 
rily be  inconclusive  of  more  than  possession,  for 
if  a  recognition  of  ownership  were  to  be  extorted 
from  European  nations,  it  must  be  obtained  by 
force  exerted  in  Europe.  The  extremely  moderate 
and  infrequent  use  of  force  in  America  must, 
therefore",  not  close  our  eyes  to  the  clear  fact  that 
British  naval  supremacy  has  been  for  three  cen- 
turies the  basis  of  the  relations  between  North 
America  and  Europe.  While  the  nature  of  the 

137 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

sea  power  itself  and  its  defensive  policies  have 
in  the  main  made  inexpedient  the  entire  exclu- 
sion of  other  European  nations,1  it  has  promptly 
intervened  whenever  they  attempted  action 
detrimental  to  American  interests.  We  know 
definitely  of  the  plans  of  Philip  IV,  of  Richelieu, 
of  Louis  XIV,  and  of  Napoleon  for  the  conquest 
of  North  America.  The  mere  fact  that  we  have 
not  been  conquered  has  been  due  to  the  strength 
of  Great  Britain  and  not  to  a  lack  of  motive  or 
desire  on  the  part  of  other  European  nations. 

Nor  must  we  forget  that  in  1823  and  in  1898 
Great  Britain  stood  between  the  Western 
Hemisphere  and  Europe  and  denied  other  na- 
tions access.  More  than  once  a  powerful  Euro- 
pean coalition  has  been  ready  in  the  nineteenth 
century  to  undertake  the  extension  of  political 
influence  in  South  and  Central  America  only 
to  find  its  plans  frustrated  by  Great  Britain's 
determined  refusal  to  permit  the  use  of  the  ocean 
highways  for  any  such  purpose.  We  shall  not 
disprove  the  significant  protection  of  the  sea 
power  by  ignoring  or  denying  it.  Because  we 
would  prefer  to  have  defended  ourselves,  let  us 
not  forget  the  fact  that  Great  Britain  made  it 
unnecessary.  It  will  also  be  well  to  remember 
that  a  power  repeatedly  able  to  defy  the  com- 

1  The  character  of  the  sea  power  and  its  relations  with  America 
have  been  treated  at  greater  length  in  Pan-Americanism,  Book  I. 

138 


FUNDAMENTAL  ECONOMIC  DISABILITIES 

bined  forces  of  great  European  nations  was 
amply  strong  enough  to  have  initiated  itself 
policies  detrimental  to  the  United  States 

This  country  is  indeed  a  peculiarly  clear  ex- 
ample of  the  use  of  force  for  the  establishment 
of  economic  relations  of  an  abnormal  character 
which  it  is  at  present  the  aim  of  European  na- 
tions to  establish  with  undeveloped  countries. 
The  supremacy  of  the  sea  provided  for  English 
capitalists  and  colonists  in  this  country  that 
definite  assurance  of  future  protection  which  is  to- 
day assumed  to  be  so  necessary.  By  this  immi- 
gration and  investment  of  capital,  thus  protected, 
were  created  new  social  entities,  whose  natural 
habits  and  normal  social  preferences  established 
an  economic  demand  which  the  mother  country 
only  could  supply.  The  Navigation  Acts  were  to 
tighten  those  bonds  by  compelling  the  trade  of 
other  nations  with  the  new  colonies  to  pass  first 
through  English  hands.  Legislative  and  adminis- 
trative measures  were  thus  from  the  first  de- 
signed to  develop  new  markets  for  the  trade  of 
the  mother  country  of  a  type  which  did  not  exist 
in  Europe  and  whose  trade  would  be  abnormally 
profitable  and  desirable.  Fundamentally,  Amer- 
ica is  the  result  of  the  potential  exercise  of  force 
by  the  sea  power. 

At  the  same  time  the  factors  set  in  operation 
were  entirely  economic  in  character;  the  abnor- 

139 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

mality  of  the  situation  lay  in  the  degree  to  which 
their  normal  growth  and  operation  were  hastened. 
Profit  can  result  only  from  the  application  of 
labor  to  capital,  but  the  virgin  resources  of  a 
new  continent  almost  unexampled  in  richness 
could  obviously  be  developed  as  fast  as  labor 
and  capital  could  be  applied.  The  sea  power  and 
all  other  applications  of  force  could  merely 
insure  the  juxtaposition  of  the  two  and  the  con- 
tinuity of  their  operations.  The  extraordinary 
rate  of  American  development  has  been  due  to 
the  extraordinary  supply  of  labor  and  capital. 
There  were  no  fundamental  obstacles  to  be  over- 
come. 

As  decades  passed,  this  abnormal  supply, 
instead  of  diminishing,  increased.  Each  year 
Europe  poured  in  constantly  larger  investments 
of  capital;  each  year  immigration  brought  us 
artificial  supplies  of  hands,  already  skilled  and 
diligent.  In  time  the  great  inventions  of  the  eight- 
eenth century  added  the  efficiency  of  machinery 
and  increased  the  rate  at  which  labor  developed 
the  existing  resources.  The  railroad  and  the 
telegraph  threw  down  the  great  barriers  which 
the  difficulties  of  overland  communication  had 
erected  in  the  path  of  American  progress,  while 
farm  machinery  and  new  devices  for  manufac- 
turing made  fewer  and  fewer  hands  able  to  per- 
form the  work  earlier  the  task  of  many.  From 

140 


FUNDAMENTAL  ECONOMIC  DISABILITIES 

the  tariff  came  further  artificial  stimulus  and 
assistance.  Students  are  agreed  that  significant 
industries  were  provided  with  their  initial  op- 
portunity by  the  tariff  and  were  thus  helped  over 
the  first  period  of  development.  If  there  is  a 
country  in  the  world  whose  growth  has  been 
abnormal,  it  is  the  United  States;  if  there  is  a 
country  in  the  world  whose  abnormal  growth 
has  been  due  to  the  protection  of  armed  force, '. 
it  is  the  United  States. 

The  thoroughness  of  the  work  of  the  first 
centuries  and  the  depth  of  the  influence  of 
the  sea  power  become  clear  when  we  realize 
that  the  severance  of  the  political  tie  with 
Great  Britain  made  no  fundamental  change  in 
the  social  habits  and  preferences  of  Americans. 
English  we  were  and  English  in  the  main  we  are 
still.  While  in  certain  localities  other  European 
traditions  predominate,  it  has  been  due  to  immi- 
gration from  that  country,  to  indirect  influence, 
and  never  to  the  exercise  of  political  authority 
or  of  military  or  naval  force.  French  armies  and 
navies  aided  us  in  achieving  political  independ- 
ence, but  the  great  influence  of  France  upon  our 
customs  and  laws  has  been  the  slow  work  of 
precept  and  example  operating  through  individ- 
uals. From  Germany  in  the  nineteenth  century 
came  strong  currents  of  philosophic,  musical, 
and  academic  stimuli,  but  [due  again  to 

141 


Germans  migrating  to  America  and  to  Americans 
traveling  abroad.  Sweden,  Norway,  Russia, 
Italy  have  similarly  added  to  the  complex  of 
traditions  from  which  an  American  fabric  is 
being  woven. .  'Yet  the  definite  trend  of  American 
development  is  still  unmistakably  Anglo-Saxon, 
our  social  habits  and  preferences  are  still  pre- 
ponderantly English,  and  the  closest  normal 
bond  is  still  that  with  Great  Britain. 

The  economic  dependence  of  America  upon 
Europe  was  dire  until  about  1830.  Civilized 
life  in  the  New  World  was  absolutely  dependent 
upon  the  importation  from  Europe  of  manu- 
factured goods.  While  as  the  decades  passed 
certain  industries  appeared  here  and  there,  at 
the  time  of  the  Revolution  America  had  no  indig- 
enous supply  of  manufactured  goods  adequate 
either  in  amount  or  in  quality.  George  Wash- 
ington wrote  in  anxious  inquiry  to  a  friend  in 
Philadelphia,  at  the  time  when  non-importation 
agreements  were  in  the  air,  to  learn  whether  or 
not  cloth  could  be  purchased  in  America  suitable 
for  his  clothes  and  querying  the  existence  of  a 
tailor  capable  of  rendering  his  appearance  pre- 
sentable. As  a  civilized  community,  indeed,  the 
colonists  had  been  entirely  dependent  upon 
manufactures  from  abroad  and  the  new  republic 
was  for  several  decades  not  more  capable  of 
supplying  its  most  immediate  needs. 

142 


FUNDAMENTAL  ECONOMIC  DISABILITIES 

Nothing  was  produced,  however,  in  America 
which  could  be  exchanged  in  Great  Britain  for 
the  manufactured  goods  desired.  Of  the  prin- 
cipal products  —  salt  fish  and  lumber  in  New 
England,  flour  in  the  Middle  States,  tobacco  and 
indigo  in  the  South  —  only  the  latter  were  sal- 
able abroad  and  the  planters  soon  discovered 
that  the  amounts  which  the  European  market 
could  absorb  of  both  in  any  one  year  were  limited. 
There  was  in  fact  no  adequate  medium  of  direct 
exchange  between  the  colonies  and  Europe,  be- 
cause the  commodities  produced  in  America  were 
also  raised  in  great  quantities  in  Europe  and 
ocean  freights  were  prohibitive.  No  other  means 
of  exchange  than  commodities  existed.  Some 
sort  of  coinage  was  attempted  and  foreign  coins 
did  circulate  to  some  extent,  but  so  disadvan- 
tageous was  the  economic  situation  that  no 
European  coins  remained  in  America  except 
those  too  debased  to  be  acceptable  in  London. 
Our  dependence  was  so  extreme  that  there  were 
utterly  no  redeeming  aspects  of  the  situation. 
Either  America  must  renounce  social  intercourse 
and  the  habits  of  civilization  or  buy  the  simplest 
necessities  in  a  European  market  which  declined 
to  accept  what  most  colonists  had  to  sell. 

The  first  solution  of  this  lack  of  a  medium  of 
direct  exchange  was  found  in  the  existence  of  the 
British  sugar  colonies  in  the  West  Indies,  where 

143 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

the  profits  in  the  raising  of  cane  were  so  enormous 
as  to  cause  a  disregard  of  the  necessities  for  sus- 
tenance. Consequently  the  food  products  and 
lumber  of  the  continental  colonies  found  a  market 
in  the  British  sugar  colonies,  whose  rum,  mo- 
lasses, and  sugar  had  a  ready  sale  in  Europe. 
From  the  proceeds  of  this  indirect  exchange  the 
colonial  merchants  bought  in  England  and  else- 
where the  goods  desired  in  America,  and  with 
the  profits  purchased  new  supplies  of  foodstuffs 
with  which  to  continue  this  triangular  traffic. 

Another  need  of  the  West  India  Islands  made 
possible  trade  with  Africa.  The  hard  work  on  the 
sugar  plantations  caused  an  abnormal  death  rate 
among  the  negro  slaves  and  created  a  flourishing 
market  for  new  supplies  of  negro  labor.  Indeed, 
the  colonial  merchants  established  an  extraor- 
dinarily profitable  business  in  the  exchange  of 
rum  for  negroes  and  African  produce.  Thus  in- 
vited, American  merchants  invested  in  ships; 
the  adventurous  life  attracted  very  able  men; 
over  the  trade,  moreover,  was  spread  the  segis 
of  the  British  Navigation  Acts,  and  behind  it 
stood  the  potential  might  of  the  British  navy. 
For  these  reasons  it  prospered  wonderfully. 

In  the  eighteenth  century,  however,  the  devel- 
opment of  the  continental  colonies  resulted  in 
the  production  of  an  amount  of  commodities  in 
excess  of  the  demand  for  staple  products  in  the 

144 


FUNDAMENTAL  ECONOMIC  DISABILITIES 

British  sugar  islands.  Moreover,  the  demand  in 
America  for  European  goods  had  become  greater 
than  could  be  purchased  with  the  exports  of  the 
British  sugar  islands  alone.  A  new  market  for 
colonial  goods  was  essential  if  the  rate  of  devel- 
opment in  America  was  to  continue  and  if  pros- 
perity as  Americans  were  beginning  to  under- 
stand it  was  not  to  be  destroyed.  A  smuggling 
trade  in  defiance  of  British  regulations,  as 
well  as  those  of  other  European  States,  was 
begun  with  the  sugar  colonies  of  the  Spanish, 
French,  and  Dutch  in  the  West  Indies.  It  too 
proved  lucrative,  but  interfering  obviously 
with  the  degree  of  profit  in  the  British  sugar 
islands,  became  the  subject  of  complaint  in 
England.  Legislative  and  administrative  meas- 
ures were  undertaken  by  the  British  Government 
to  suppress  it,  and  the  British  navy  proved  its 
efficiency  against  the  smugglers. 

The  result  was  a  widespread  demand  in 
America  for  an  extension  of  the  rights  of  trade, 
and  the  opinion  was  advisedly  expressed  by 
many  of  the  leaders  that  American  prosperity 
in  the  most  literal  sense  depended  upon  com- 
plete freedom  of  access  to  markets  regulated  by 
abnormal  economic  conditions.1  The  enactment 
by  Great  Britain  of  administrative  measures  in- 

1  These  propositions  about  American  history  have  been  de- 
veloped at  greater  length,  with  contemporary  citations,  in  Usher's 
Rise  of  the  American  People,  Chapters  VII  to  XVI. 

145 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

tended  to  enforce  strictly  the  exclusion  of  the 
colonies  from  foreign  sugar  islands  was  declared 
by  men  at  the  time  to  be  a  chief  cause  of  the 
American  Revolution.  It  seemed  to  the  colo- 
nists that  the  difficulty  lay  in  the  political  con- 
nection with  the  mother  country  which  obligated 
them  to  obey  such  legislation  as  Parliament 
passed.  Once  independent,  and  therefore  ab- 
solved from  British  regulations  and  legislation, 
they  fancied  that  trade  with  the  undeveloped 
markets  of  the  West  Indies  would  be  open  to 
them. 

The  success  of  the  Revolution,  to  the  aston- 
ishment of  the  patriots,  wrought  disaster  and 
not  prosperity.  They  had  apparently  been 
blind  to  the  fact  that  the  real  obstacle  in  the 
way  of  freedom  of  trade  was  the  British  navy, 
whose  operations  they  found  to  their  astonish- 
ment were  not  in  the  least  impeded  by  victories 
in  New  Jersey  and  Virginia,  nor  by  the  temporary 
presence  of  the  French  fleet  in  American  waters. 
American  merchants  had  now  no  privileges  in 
West  Indian  markets.  Nor  were  the  strained 
relations  with  Great  Britain  assisted  by  the  very 
general  repudiation  of  private  and  public  in- 
debtedness after  the  close  of  the  Revolution. 
Capital  no  longer  arrived  from  abroad;  the  de- 
velopment of  the  country  came  momentarily 
to  a  standstill,  and  the  first  severe  commercial 

146 


FUNDAMENTAL  ECONOMIC  DISABILITIES 

crisis  which  America  had  known  produced  so 
great  a  reaction  in  favor  of  strong  government 
and  honesty  that  the  Constitution  was  drafted 
and  adopted  by  the  moderates,  and  the  debt  of 
both  States  and  nation  refunded  by  Hamilton 
in  order  to  reestablish  the  credit  of  America 
and  thus  insure  for  the  new  republic  an  adequate 
supply  of  European  capital. 

The  success  of  these  measures  was  assisted  by 
the  prompt  discovery  of  a  new  medium  of  direct 
exchange  with  Europe.  The  outbreak  of  general 
European  war,  removing  from  the  fields  a  great 
number  of  men,  upon  whose  services  agriculture 
was  then  immeasurably  more  dependent  than 
it  is  to-day,  produced  a  war  market  for  American 
grain  at  such  prices  that  exportation  became  not 
only  possible  but  profitable.  The  chief  market 
was  in  France,  because  the  British  fleet  held 
open  for  Great  Britain  her  ordinary  sources  of 
supply,  among  which  the  United  States  was  not 
at  that  time  reckoned.  To  France  therefore 
American  merchants  attempted  to  ship  their 
produce,  and  with  this  trade  the  British  promptly 
interfered.  Having  control  of  the  sea,  they  did 
not  purpose  to  allow  their  own  chief  enemy  to 
obtain  the  wherewithal  to  oppose  them  so  long 
as  they  were  able  to  prevent  it.  Once  more  the 
United  States  attempted,  first  by  means  of  an 
embargo  and  then  by  actual  war  upon  Great 

147 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

Britain,  to  prevent  the  interference  of  the  British 
navy  with  our  access  to  abnormal  markets. 
Again  the  futility  of  our  attempt  became  only 
too  apparent.  Nothing  was  achieved  by  either 
embargo  or  war  but  further  difficulties  for  the 
United  States. 

In  1815  the  situation  was  worse  than  ever 
before.  The  market  for  American  produce  in 
Europe  had  disappeared  with  the  coming  of 
peace;  the  old  methods  of  exchange  through 
the  West  Indies  were  hopelessly  inadequate; 
the  home  market  was  flooded  with  cheap  Eu- 
ropean manufactured  goods;  but  as  access  to 
the  favorable  markets  in  which  to  sell  was  no 
longer  to  be  had,  it  was  impossible  for  American 
merchants  to  take  advantage  oi  e  favorable 
market  in  which  to  buy,  which  existed  at  their 
very  doors.  Moreover  the  new  American  in- 
dustries were  threatened  with  dissolution  be- 
cause of  their  inability  to  compete  with  the 
better  organized  European  structures.  Just  able 
to  make  things  at  all,  we  were  not  able  to  make 
them  efficiently  and  cheaply.  The  Government 
however  declined  resolutely  all  British  offers  of 
compromise  with  regard  to  the  West  Indies. 
Freedom  of  trade  or  nothing  we  would  have; 
the  fullest  extent  of  American  privileges  and 
theoretical  rights,  or  nothing  at  all. 

At  last,  about  1830,  the  cotton  culture  in  the 
148 


FUNDAMENTAL  ECONOMIC  DISABILITIES 

South  provided  the  United  States  with  a  product 
for  which  the  demand  in  Europe  was  sufficiently 
elastic  to  answer  our  needs  for  a  medium  of 
direct  exchange.  Apparently  the  European  de- 
mand was  inexhaustible  and  it  became  clear  that 
the  United  States  might  expand  its  trade  with 
Europe  as  fast  as  the  output  of  cotton  could  be 
increased.  Naturally  we  could  not  buy  in  Eu- 
rope more  than  we  could  pay  for,  but  we  could 
buy  always  the  equivalent  of  the  cotton  crop. 
So  essential  indeed  was  cotton  believed  to  be 
that  for  nearly  a  generation  Southern  statesmen 
were  able  to  obtain  in  the  national  councils  prac- 
tically all  they  desired  by  the  mere  threat  of 
withholding  the  supply,  and  in  1860  it  was  fully 
believed  in  the  South  that  the  imperative  neces- 
sity for  this  medium  of  direct  exchange  with 
Europe  would  prevent  the  North  from  crushing 
their  revolt.  By  economic  pressure  they  would 
bring  the  North  to  her  knees.  Their  calculations 
were  upset  by  unexpected  economic  conditions. 
The  crops  in  Europe  failed  in  those  crucial  years; 
the  connection  between  the  new  grain  fields 
in  the  Mississippi  and  Ohio  valleys  with  New 
York  furnished  by  the  new  railroads  proved 
adequate,  and  the  North  was  able  to  continue 
direct  exchange  with  Europe  by  means  of  ex- 
ports of  grain. 

Meanwhile  the  problem  of  domestic  exchange 
149 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

had  been  partially  solved  by  the  discovery  of 
gold  in  California.  Hitherto  gold  had  been  kept 
in  the  country  only  with  the  greatest  difficulty, 
because  the  balance  of  trade  against  us  was  so 
very  heavy  that  anything  possessing  exchange 
value  in  Europe  commonly  was  exported  at 
once.  Only  by  slow  accretions  could  an  adequate 
supply  of  gold  for  a  domestic  currency  have 
normally  been  accumulated,  and  already  Ameri- 
can financiers  had  begun  to  despair  of  ever 
achieving  such  a  supply  when  the  increased 
amounts  exported  from  California  set  their  minds 
at  rest.  At  last  the  United  States  had  attained  a 
firm  medium  of  domestic  exchange  of  its  own, 
dependent  upon  its  own  supply  of  gold,  and  less 
subject  than  before  to  the  influence  of  the 
European  markets. 

The  development  of  the  country  since  the  Civil 
War,  the  continued  influx  of  labor  and  capital, 
have  finally  ended  this  first  phase  of  economic 
subjection  to  Europe.  The  old  dependence  has 
vanished  never  to  return.  We  are  no  longer  in 
any  sense  dependent  upon  Europe  for  the  ele- 
ments of  civilization,  for  the  necessary  supplies 
of  those  manufactured  goods  imperative  in  the 
pursuance  of  educated  and  enlightened  social 
intercourse.  A  medium  of  direct  exchange  is 
assured  beyond  a  peradventure,  less,  however, 
by  the  development  of  the  industrial  fabric  in 

150 


FUNDAMENTAL  ECONOMIC  DISABILITIES 

America  than  by  a  significant  alteration  of  con- 
ditions in  Europe.  Once  the  railroad  and  steam- 
ship had  proved  the  possibility  of  rapid  and 
dependable  communication,  once  the  new  farm 
machinery  had  proved  that  American  farmers 
could  continue  to  raise  adequate  supplies  of 
cheap  corn,  the  production  of  food  staples  in 
Europe  was  to  a  large  extent  abandoned.  A 
permanent  market  now  exists,  because  the  Eu- 
ropean has  decided  to  depend  upon  America 
for  a  large  portion  of  his  staple  goods.  It  is 
not  so  much  that  we  have  changed  as  it  is  that 
Europe  has  entered  upon  a  new  phase  of  eco- 
nomic development.  Nevertheless  we  are  at  last 
an  integral  and  indispensable  part  of  the  mod- 
ern interdependent  international  economic  fabric. 
We  are  necessary  not  only  to  European  pros- 
perity as  in  the  early  centuries,  but  to  European 
existence.  We  perform  an  indispensable  part 
in  the  normal  interchange  of  goods  between 
nations.  Yet  it  is  upon  our  staple  goods  rather 
than  upon  our  manufactures  that  Europe  relies. 
While  the  old  dependence  has  gone  forever, 
a  different  type  is  still  existent.  The  interde- 
pendence of  the  international  fabric  tends  to 
create  the  idea  that  its  parts  are  of  equal  im- 
portance and  to  conceal  the  divergence  in  eco- 
nomic development  between  nations.  The  mere 
fact  that  the  United  States  is  of  consequence  in 

151 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

the  economic  world,  a  factor  no  longer  negligi- 
ble and  permissive,  must  not  hide  from  us  the 
equally  definite  fact  that  we  have  not  yet  ac- 
quired economic  equality  with  England  and 
France,  nor  that  degree  of  industrial  develop- 
ment attained  in  Germany.  The  present  com- 
munities arrange  themselves  in  certain  groups. 
When  we  compare  their  actual  development  we 
find  those  in  which  manufacturing  and  the  arts 
have  attained  elaborate  development;  we  find 
again  those  countries  where  agricultural  condi- 
tions still  predominate  and  the  more  complex 
phases  of  economic  life  are  as  yet  secondary  in 
importance;  and  we  find  also  countries  where 
no  complex  development  is  visible,  and  still 
others  where  it  seems  unattainable. 

Unquestionably  the  United  States  belongs  in 
the  first  group,  for  our  economic  development 
has  reached  that  complex  stage  characteristic  of 
the  most  advanced  nations  in  the  world.  Yet 
because  we  are  so  obviously  more  advanced 
than  South  America  and  the  Balkan  States,  so 
far  removed  from  conditions  in  China  and  Egypt 
where  manufacturing  is  as  yet  rudimentary, 
we  tend  to  lose  sight  of  the  difference  in  economic 
condition  between  us  and  other  States  also  in  the 
first  rank.  On  the  one  hand  stand  Great  Britain, 
France,  Belgium,  and  Holland,  the  creditor 
countries,  elaborately  developed  from  the  pro- 

152 


FUNDAMENTAL   ECONOMIC   DISABILITIES 

ceeds  of  their  own  industry.  On  the  other  we 
see  Germany,  Austria,  Italy,  Russia,  the  United 
States,  and  Japan,  in  which  approximately  the 
same  conditions  have  been  produced  by  means 
of  borrowed  capital  and  skill.  These  are  the 
debtor  countries,  who  still  owe  the  capital  in- 
vestments to  which  their  great  growth  is  really 
due.  While  our  factories  and  railroads  are  not 
less  real  than  those  of  France,  they  are  not  yet 
assets,  for  the  loans  which  produced  them  have 
not  yet  been  paid.  It  is  a  fallacy,  therefore,  to 
suppose  that  those  countries  are  creditor  coun- 
tries whose  imports  exceed  their  exports,  or 
whose  total  output  compares  favorably  with  that 
of  other  nations,  or  whose  populations  enjoy 
practically  the  same  economic  satisfactions  as 
those  of  the  most  highly  developed  countries. 
Those  only  are  creditor  countries  whose  total 
assets  are  greater  than  their  liabilities,  who  are 
owed  by  other  nations  and  their  citizens  more 
than  they  must  pay  to  other  nations  and  their 
citizens. 

The  United  States  is  still  a  debtor  country, 
because  we  owe  European  investors  greater 
sums  than  are  owed  to  us.  Once  our  imports  in- 
variably exceeded  our  exports  because,  like  most 
undeveloped  countries,  we  were  thus  receiving 
enormous  capital  investments  and  were  able  to 
repay  only  the  interest.  For  forty  years  and  more 

153 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

our  exports  have  exceeded  our  imports  because, 
like  all  undeveloped  countries  whose  industry 
has  finally  become  established,  we  are  paying 
our  debts  in  exports  over  and  above  the  normal 
exchange  of  commodities  which  the  advanced 
development  of  the  country  creates  with  other 
highly  developed  nations.  Exports  also  stand 
for  our  own  investments  outside  the  United 
States,  which  have  within  recent  years  reached 
considerable  figures. 

The  present  war  has  created  an  artificial  de- 
mand for  American  manufactures  in  Europe  far 
more  considerable  than  the  sum  total  of  com- 
modities they  are  at  present  able  to  exchange. 
Their  inability  to  cancel  in  the  normal  way 
their  purchases  *  has  enabled  us  to  buy  back 
our  own  securities  faster  than  normal  conditions 
would  ever  have  permitted.  At  the  same  time 
the  assumption  of  a  total  canceling  of  the 

1  It  seems  scarcely  necessary  to  add  that  Great  Britain  and 
Prance  borrowed  money  in  the  United  States  not  in  the  least 
because  they  supposed  us  a  creditor  country,  nor  because  they  needed 
our  supplies  of  capital  to  enable  them  to  finance  the  war.  They 
wished  to  purchase  goods  of  American  merchants  and  could  not 
remit  goods  themselves.  They  had  therefore  to  place  a  loan  in 
America  with  which  their  American  creditors  could  be  paid.  In 
reality,  it  was  a  deferred  payment:  American  bankers,  who  could 
wait  for  then-  money,  paid  American  business  men  who  could  not. 
The  whole  operation  proved  clearly  that  we  have  very  little  cap- 
ital which  is  not  imperatively  needed  in  American  business.  The 
large  bank  deposits  in  recent  months  do  not  indicate  surplus 
capital,  but  merely  the  amount  of  capital,  normally  used  in  Amer- 
ican business,  which  the  late  stringency  caused  men  to  withhold 
from  investment. 

154 


FUNDAMENTAL   ECONOMIC   DISABILITIES 

American  indebtedness  is  too  optimistic.  We 
cannot  in  fact  pay  off  our  indebtedness  faster 
than  we  can  produce  commodities  valuable  in 
Europe.  The  total  exports  of  the  country  will 
in  no  case  indicate  the  rate  at  which  our  in- 
debtedness is  being  paid,  because  vast  quanti- 
ties are  still  exported  in  the  normal  routine  of 
international  trade.  Only  our  increase  of  ex- 
ports over  the  normal  total  is  payment  of  our 
indebtedness.  That  we  should  be  able  to  manu- 
facture in  this  country  within  any  brief  period 
any  such  value  in  commodities,  over  and  above 
our  own  normal  output,  as  our  indebtedness  to 
Europe  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  represented 
seems  incredible,  even  though  the  Europeans  are 
comparatively  incapable  of  exchanging  commod- 
ities or  of  dispensing  with  our  exports.  Nor  can 
we  become  a  creditor  country  until  all  is  paid. 

Attempts  to  calculate  our  indebtedness  have 
been  made  with  increasing  frequency  within  the 
past  months.  Recent  computation  has  shown 
American  railroad  securities  alone  owned  in 
Europe  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  to  the  total  of 
two  and  one  half  billions  of  dollars.  The  British 
Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  stated  our  indebted- 
ness to  Great  Britain  in  1914  at  five  billions.  It 
seems  probable  that  we  owe  in  France  about 
half  as  much  as  in  Great  Britain,  and  very  con- 
siderable sums  in  Belgium,  Holland,  and  Ger- 

155 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

many.  The  difficulty  of  reaching  any  figures  even 
approximately  correct  lies  in  the  impossibility  of 
ascertaining  accurately  the  proportion  between 
the  funded  debt  of  corporations  and  the  unfunded 
obligations  of  individuals.  It  seems  probable 
from  recent  international  events  that  the  un- 
funded debt  of  the  United  States,  owed  by  its 
citizens  to  the  citizens  of  foreign  nations,  for  the 
most  part  in  short  time  loans  and  mortgages, 
reaches  a  total  much  nearer  the  equivalent  of 
our  funded  indebtedness  than  statistics  reveal. 
Probable  computation  shows  that  the  United 
States  has  in  the  last  year  purchased  its  own 
securities  abroad  at  favorable  figures  to  a  sum 
total  of  one  billion  and  a  half.  It  seems,  however, 
not  possible  for  us  to  continue  to  absorb  our  own 
securities  at  any  such  rate,  and,  even  should  we 
do  so  for  several  years,  we  should  still  be  in 
debt  to  Europe,  for  it  seems  hardly  credible  that 
our  debts  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  funded  and 
unfunded,  national  and  private,  were  not  in 
excess  of  ten  billions  of  dollars.  The  invest- 
ments of  the  United  States  in  other  countries 
are  probably  not  in  excess  of  two  billions  of  dol- 
lars, the  major  part  of  which  is  in  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico  and  Central  America. 

Even  should  our  actual  indebtedness  be  can- 
celed within  a  brief  period,  our  economic  fabric 
would  still  be  appreciably  less  varied  and  efficient 

156 


FUNDAMENTAL   ECONOMIC  DISABILITIES 

than  the  industrial  fabric  of  Great  Britain, 
France,  Belgium,  and  Germany,  although  the 
United  States  is  certainly  far  more  advanced  than 
Hungary,  Russia,  Italy,  or  the  smaller  European 
States.  So  far  as  staple  products  are  concerned 
and  the  cheaper  varieties  of  manufactured  goods, 
we  successfully  compete  with  any  nation  in  the 
world.  The  finer  and  more  elaborate  products 
of  European  industries,  which  constitute  a  large 
proportion  of  the  commodities  exchanged  be- 
tween nations,  we  are  not  yet  able  to  make  at 
all  in  competition  with  Europe.  Most  we  are 
physically  able  to  produce,  but  we  are  not  yet 
capable  of  that  same  degree  of  skillful  and  ef- 
ficient artisanship  necessary  to  produce  them  as 
cheaply.  In  fact,  American  industry,  like  Amer- 
ican agriculture,  has  been  extensive  in  the 
broadest  sense  of  the  word,  and  the  value  of  co- 
operation, of  intensive  work,  of  careful  planning, 
and  of  cautious  operation  have  not  been  ap- 
preciated. 

We  are  therefore  economically  inferior  to  the 
best  organized  European  States  and  are  not 
able  to  compete  with  them  on  equal  terms  in 
European  and  non-European  markets.  Where 
the  price  is  identical  the  quality  is  not;  where 
the  quality  is  the  same  the  American  price  is 
usually  higher.  Furthermore,  the  same  degree  of 
standardization  has  not  been  common  in  America 

157 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

as  in  British,  French,  and  German  industry,  and 
a  lack  of  uniformity  in  the  product  and  a  ten- 
dency to  deteriorate  the  quality  as  soon  as  an 
extensive  sale  is  assured  have  been  detrimental 
to  an  extension  of  our  business  interests  in  for- 
eign markets.  Inadequate  packing,  resulting  in 
the  arrival  of  damaged  goods  after  a  journey  of 
thousands  of  miles,  the  inaccurate  making  of 
bills  so  common  in  the  United  States  have  also 
cost  us  many  customers  located  at  a  distance. 
We  have  not  yet  learned  to  compete  in  quality, 
promptitude,  accuracy,  and  efficiency  with  the 
great  European  nations.  We  are  not  yet  their 
equals  in  economic  development. 

We  are  not  yet  able  to  undertake  direct  trade 
with  many  countries  because  our  economic  fabric 
is  not  yet  varied  enough  to  enable  us  to  utilize 
sufficiently  large  quantities  of  the  raw  products 
which  those  countries  must  export,  nor  to  ex- 
change sufficient  quantities  of  our  own  manufac- 
tured goods  of  the  desired  quality.  Direct  trade 
must  rest  upon  the  ability  of  each  to  obtain 
precisely  what  it  needs.  So  far  as  the  United 
States  is  concerned,  the  difficulty  is  less  in  our 
ability  to  produce  manufactured  goods  which 
would  be  salable  as  in  a  very  decided  inability 
to  use  an  equal  amount  of  that  country's  raw 
produce.  It  has  not  yet  dawned  upon  most  mer- 
chants in  this  country  that  if  we  sell  to  other 

158 


FUNDAMENTAL   ECONOMIC  DISABILITIES 

countries  we  must  buy  from  them.  The  mere 
fact  of  the  existence  of  a  market  in  some  foreign 
country  for  what  the  individual  has  to  sell,  will 
not  enable  him  to  sell  there  until  some  other  in- 
dividual in  the  United  States  is  anxious  to  buy 
there. 

We  are  not  yet  able  to  establish  with  most 
parts  of  the  world  a  direct  trade  as  profitable  to 
merchants  in  those  countries  as  it  is  to  us.  In 
the  main  we  still  pay  our  bills  by  an  indirect 
exchange  of  commodities  not  less  roundabout 
than  was  common  in  the  eighteenth  century. 
Our  bulky  produce  we  sell  in  Europe  and  buy 
with  it  non-European  produce  which  the  Eu- 
ropean nations  themselves  purchase  in  Asia, 
Africa,  and  South  America  with  their  own 
manufactured  goods.  The  financial  transaction 
is  performed  by  English,  French,  and  German 
banks  largely  because  of  the  indirect  exchange 
of  commodities.1 

We  do  not  yet  possess  supplies  of  American 
capital  in  sufficient  amount  for  the  development 
of  trade  on  a  large  scale  with  those  semi-devel- 
oped and  undeveloped  countries  where  invest- 
ments are  an  imperative  prerequisite  of  the 

1  The  complexity  and  simplicity  of  international  trade  are 
neither  of  them  exemplified  in  the  cases  of  individual  merchants, 
for  some  may  trade  indirectly  with  countries  with  which  the  bulk 
of  American  trade  is  direct,  while  others  may  trade  directly  with 
South  America  and  Asia,  despite  the  fact  that  the  great  bulk  of 
American  trade  to  both  is  indirect. 

159 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

establishment  of  direct  intercourse.  Large  sums 
have  been  invested  by  American  citizens  which 
did  not  represent  American  capital.  The  sum 
total  of  investments  outside  the  United  States 
in  any  one  year  must  be  counted  off  against  the 
sum  total  borrowed  in  other  countries.  So  com- 
plex to-day  is  international  finance  that  German 
enterprises  in  Asia  Minor  are  in  part  owned  in 
the  United  States,  while  some  American  mines  in 
Mexico  were  (till  recently)  operated  by  American 
capital  borrowed  in  London.  Until  the  supply  of 
capital  in  America,  resulting  from  the  profits  of 
our  transactions,  has  become  very  much  greater 
than  it  is  at  present,  no  invasion  of  the  foreign 
investment  field  can  take  place.  A  corporation 
was  recently  formed  for  the  development  of 
American  business  interests  in  foreign  countries 
with  a  capital  of  fifty  millions,  a  sum  which  the 
press  supposed  extraordinary.  Yet  British  and 
French  investors  have  not  infrequently  loaned  as 
large  an  aggregate  to  a  single  country  in  a  single 
year.  Some  notion  therefore  of  their  total  in- 
vestments in  South  America,  Africa,  and  Asia, 
on  which  their  trade  depends,  can  thus  be  ob- 
tained. Nor  can  we  develop  as  large  a  direct 
trade  with  Brazil,  for  instance,  until  our  own 
capital  investments  become,  not  merely  con- 
siderable in  actual  amount,  but  equal  to  the 
total  investments  of  other  countries. 

160 


FUNDAMENTAL  ECONOMIC  DISABILITIES 

One  fact  alone  demonstrates  the  inadequacy 
of  our  supply  of  capital  compared  to  that  in 
Europe  —  the  high  rate  of  return  which  can  be 
obtained  in  America  with  safety.  Like  every- 
thing else,  capital  is  fundamentally  governed  by 
the  law  of  supply  and  demand.  In  America  the 
demand  commonly  exceeds  the  domestic  and 
foreign  supply  and  capital  is  more  expensive 
than  in  the  European  money  markets,  where  the 
supply  invariably  exceeds  the  domestic  demand. 
It  is  not  advantageous  for  us,  nor  for  the  mer- 
chants of  undeveloped  countries,  to  loan  capital 
to  them  at  the  rates  for  which  it  is  easily  ob- 
tainable in  London  and  Paris.  If  there  were 
enough  capital  for  sale  in  America  to  enable  us 
to  make  in  undeveloped  countries  sufficiently 
large  investments  to  effect  fundamentally  their 
economic  conditions,  its  price  in  this  country 
would  be  much  lower  than  it  is  and  reliable 
investments  would  be  less  difficult  to  secure. 
Until  therefore  we  have  an  annual  surplus  of  our 
own  capital  open  to  foreign  investment  at  least 
considerable  enough  to  affect  the  international 
market,  we  shall  not  be  able  to  compete  with 
France  and  Great  Britain  on  equal  terms. 

The  day  is  probably  not  far  distant  when 
these  final  evidences  of  economic  dependence 
and  inferiority  will  disappear.  The  recent  ac- 
cumulations in  American  banks  within  a  brief 

161 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

period,  due  to  business  conservatism,  show  what 
considerable  sums  are  commonly  utilized  in 
American  business  and  how  vast  the  net  profits 
in  American  enterprises  are  becoming.  Our 
ability  to  absorb  over  a  billion  and  a  half  of 
securities  without  apparent  effect  upon  the 
American  market  is  a  hopeful  sign  of  coming 
independence.  Nevertheless  that  day  has  yet  to 
dawn.  A  fundamental  postulate  of  American 
foreign  policy  must  be  for  the  present  the  eco- 
nomic inferiority  of  the  United  States  when  com- 
pared with  the  most  highly  developed  European 
nations,  the  inability  of  the  United  States  to 
compete  with  them  on  equal  terms  in  the  markets 
of  undeveloped  countries.  Fortunately  until  we 
become  able  to  compete  in  fact,  our  need  for 
extensive  trade  in  such  quarters  is  slight. 


162 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE   PRICE   OF   ISOLATION 

To  many  thoughtful  people  the  eminently  de- 
sirable object  of  American  policy  is  the  discovery 
of  some  avenue  of  escape  from  the  maelstrom  of 
the  world  with  the  precious  talent  entrusted  to 
the  United  States  in  the  interests  of  civilization, 
to  bury  it  in  secret,  and  somehow  exclude  the 
rest  of  the  world  from  this  garden  between  the 
oceans.  Shall  we  not  follow  the  wise  counsel  of 
Washington  and  Jefferson?  Must  we  not  keep 
ourselves  from  the  infection  of  this  riot  of  crim- 
inal bloodshed  already  drenching  Europe  with 
the  young  manhood  of  the  future?  Is  it  not  a 
simple  matter  to  continue  the  isolation  which 
already  exists? 

The  scheme  of  preparedness  advocated  by 
many  societies,  like  the  notion  of  isolation 
sounded  in  the  President's  message  to  Congress 
of  December,  1915,  assumes  an  intention  of  pro- 
tecting our  isolation  of  Europe,  of  preventing  the 
disturbance  of  American  interests  and  ambi- 
tions by  European  interference.  By  isolation  we 
mean  the  right  of  the  United  States  to  develop 

163 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

in  its  own  way  without  being  influenced  or  dis- 
turbed by  European  entanglements  or  wars. 
Necessarily  it  involves  the  prevention  of  then* 
attempts  to  interfere  with  American  policies, 
however  indirectly;  our  ability  to  keep  them  on 
the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic,  however  strong 
may  be  their  desire  to  cross.  It  will  be  idle  for 
us  to  attempt  to  convince  the  Europeans  that 
isolation  does  not  claim  independence  of  Eu- 
rope and  an  ability  to  disregard  their  interests, 
policies,  and  ambitions. 

Indeed,  the  position  which  the  diplomatic 
notes  of  the  United  States  have  reiterated  during 
the  past  year  is  not  far  short  of  a  complete  in- 
dependence of  Europe.  We  have  already  at- 
tempted an  extension  of  rights  and  privileges 
which  only  an  unquestioned  independence  can 
establish.  At  a  time  when  we  possess  by  our  own 
confession  no  armed  force  adequate  to  compel  the 
recognition  of  American  rights  by  any  European 
nation,  when  we  are  dependent  upon  the  sea 
power  for  our  entire  access  to  the  world  and  for 
our  financial  relations  with  foreign  customers 
outside  the  large  European  centers,  we  none  the 
less  insist  upon  receiving  from  Great  Britain 
privileges  that  country  has  repeatedly  declined 
to  grant  to  the  most  considerable  armed  powers 
of  Europe.  The  denial  by  the  majority  of  Amer- 
ican citizens  of  the  righteousness  of  Germany's 

164 


THE  PRICE  OF  ISOLATION 

national  aspirations  is  vehement,  yet  we  have 
demanded  from  her  the  voluntary  recognition  of 
an  extension  of  American  rights,  the  acceptance 
of  which  by  her  will  entail  the  sacrifice  of  meth- 
ods of  warfare  which  a  majority  of  the  German 
people  believe  imperative  to  maintain  her  ter- 
ritorial integrity  and  actual  independence. 

This  is  the  traditional  policy  of  the  United 
States:  to  insist  upon  privileges  from  European 
powers  without  an  apparent  appreciation  of  the 
effort  requisite  to  secure  their  concession.1  At 
every  great  crisis  we  have  asked  from  Europe 
what  we  had  no  ability  to  extort  —  and  have 
invariably  failed  to  attain  our  end.  In  1775  we 
demanded  freedom  of  trade  with  the  West  Indies; 
we  won  the  Revolution  but  lost  all  rights  in  the 
Gulf.  In  1812  we  insisted  upon  freedom  of  ac- 
cess to  France,  upon  the  immunity  of  American 
ships  from  Great  Britain's  regulations,  and  after 
three  years  of  war  —  secured  nothing.  In  1823 
President  Monroe  was  understood  in  Europe  to 
defy  Great  Britain  to  extend  her  influence  in 
South  America;  the  Doctrine  was  futile,  for 
Great  Britain  practically  took  possession  of 

1  I  am  expressing  here  no  hasty  judgment  and  I  beg  the  reader 
to  accord  it  more  than  casual  attention.  The  well-known  facts 
of  American  history  and  diplomacy  are  the  proof  of  its  accuracy 
and  are  established  by  the  cumulative  work  of  three  generations 
of  historians.  Not  the  facts,  but  the  deduction  is  what  seems  to  us 
incredible.  It  does  seem  incredible,  but  I  ask  advisedly,  is  it  not 
true? 

165 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

South  America,  though  she  preferred  for  reasons 
of  her  own  to  establish  no  political  dominion.1 
We  insisted  upon  rights  extensive,  if  not  exclu- 
sive, in  the  Gulf  and  in  Central  America,  and 
in  1850  signed  the  Clay  ton-Bui  wer  Treaty  ex- 
plicitly renouncing  any  privilege  Great  Britain 
did  not  also  have.  More  recently,  despite  pro- 
tests whose  language  was  both  clear  and  de- 
termined, the  German  submarines  continue  to 
torpedo  passenger  ships  and  the  British  Govern- 
ment enforces  its  stringent  restrictions  upon 
neutral  trade.  It  is  high  time  that  the  American 
people  began  to  realize  that  such  diplomatic  tra- 
ditions can  be  maintained  only  by  the  most  literal 
independence  of  Europe,  can  be  initiated  with 
probability  of  success  only  when  the  United 
States  is  able  actually  to  extort  acceptance  from 
unwilling  nations. 

If  the  United  States,  under  present  economic 
conditions,  maintains  its  traditional  policy  of  no 
formal  alliance  with  European  nations  or  coali- 

1  It  has  been  usually  claimed  therefore  in  the  United  States 
that  Monroe  merely  forbade  an  extension  of  political  dominion, 
and  that  the  Doctrine  had  accomplished  all  that  was  expected. 
This  may  be  true,  but  it  will  not  alter  the  fact  that  Great  Britain's 
true  reason  for  refraining  from  conquest  was  the  colonial  policy 
adopted  after  the  American  Revolution,  the  cardinal  tenet  of  which 
was  the  inexpediency  of  retaining  a  control  to  which  the  inhabi- 
tants objected.  In  accordance  with  it,  Great  Britain  established 
that  sort  of  relation  with  South  America  which  the  natives  found 
most  agreeable,  and  which  included  a  full  recognition  of  their 
political  independence. 

166 


THE  PRICE  OF  ISOLATION   - 

tions,  and  reiterates  the  position  of  the  adminis- 
tration during  the  last  months,  it  will  be  under- 
stood in  Europe  to  imply  an  intention  to  disregard 
European  policies  and  ambitions.  Without 
doubt  the  attempt  to  obtain  a  recognition  of  the 
fullest  possible  extension  of  American  rights  and 
privileges  spells  aggression.  It  is  of  the  first  con- 
sequence for  us  to  visualize  the  meaning  of  inde- 
pendence of  Europe  and  to  remember  that  noth- 
ing less  can  maintain  our  traditional  policy  of 
isolation  or  our  recent  diplomatic  utterances. 

Necessarily  we  must  be  ready  to  perform  ade- 
quately for  ourselves  all  those  services  which 
various  European  nations  at  present  render.  A 
league  created  by  many  influential  citizens  ad- 
vocates economic  pressure  as  a  method  of  ad- 
vancing American  interests,  and  apparently  a 
large  section  of  public  opinion  believes  that  the 
United  States  can  in  that  way  coerce  Europe. 
There  seems  to  be  no  realization  of  the  truth  — 
Europe  can  with  the  greatest  ease  coerce  the 
United  States  by  economic  pressure.  In  reality 
America  is  economically  dependent  upon  Europe, 
can  remain  isolated  only  if  Europe  allows  it. 
European  ambitions  and  not  American  interests 
govern  the  international  situation,  and  so  long  as 
their  economic  fabric  is  so  much  stronger  and 
better  organized  than  ours,  they  may  coerce  us 
by  economic  methods  at  will. 

167      ' 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

Of  the  extent  and  imperative  value  of  the  serv- 
ices which  we  are  unable  to  perform  for  ourselves 
there  seems  to  be  only  too  general  ignorance. 
American  foreign  trade  is  carried,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  a  negligible  fraction,  entirely  by  foreign 
merchant  marines,1  upon  whose  continued  service 
our  whole  future  contact  with  the  rest  of  the  world 
absolutely  depends.  We  do  business  directly  only 
with  a  few  of  the  largest  European  countries  and 
are  dependent  upon  European  exchange  for  all 
trade  with  the  smaller  European  nations  and 
with  practically  the  rest  of  the  world.  Indeed, 
when  the  outbreak  of  the  war  for  the  time  being 
suspended  the  activities  of  London  and  Paris 
banking  houses  through  which  American  mer- 
chants commonly  dealt  with  South  America, 
Asia,  and  Africa,  the  United  States  was  unable  to 
take  advantage  of  the  tremendous  commercial 
opportunities  simply  because  its  merchants  could 
not  make  financial  arrangements  satisfactory  to 
their  possible  customers.  While  the  number  of 
short  time  loans  placed  by  the  United  States  in 
Europe  is  not  as  considerable  as  the  volume  of 
such  transactions  between  European  countries, 
the  connection  of  the  New  York  Exchange  with 
the  great  European  financial  centers  is  neverthe- 

1  The  heavy  registered  tonnage  of  American  merchant  shipping 
is  engaged  in  our  river,  lake,  and  coastwise  trade  and  must  not  be 
confused  with  the  few  ships  devoted  to  foreign  trade  exclusively. 

168 


THE  PRICE  OF  ISOLATION 

less  so  close  that  at  almost  any  time  the  current 
business  of  the  United  States  could  be  sadly 
crippled  by  a  concerted  movement  from  Europe 
for  the  calling  in  of  American  loans.  An  even 
more  extended  influence  could  be  exerted  by  the 
sale  of  American  securities  in  European  markets, 
compelling  the  United  States  to  suffer  the  serious 
consequences  of  a  financial  panic  because  of  its 
inability  to  liquidate  its  debts  on  demand. 

In  1911,  by  such  economic  pressure,  Great 
Britain  and  France  brought  Germany  to  her 
knees  and  were  even  able  to  prevent  her  from 
having  recourse  to  arms.  The  greater  strength 
of  the  European  financial  communities,  the  com- 
paratively greater  development  of  their  industrial 
fabric,  make  economic  expedients  possible  for 
them  which  are  impossible  for  us.  We  cannot  re- 
taliate, for  we  perform  for  them  no  services  upon 
which  they  depend,  nor  do  they  buy  in  this 
country  any  product,  except  cotton,  which  can- 
not be  obtained  in  sufficient  quantities  else- 
where after  a  brief  delay.  Enough  cotton  even 
is  always  on  hand  in  Europe  to  supply  the  fac- 
tories for  some  months.  Long  before  the  expira- 
tion of  any  such  period  the  United  States  would 
have  been  compelled,  as  a  weaker  economic 
country,  to  yield. 

The  impression  seems  to  prevail  still  in  many 
quarters  that  the  expedient  adopted  in  1808  of 

169 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

an  embargo  on  exportation  would  afford  the 
United  States  an  effective  method  of  putting  pres- 
sure upon  Europe,  or  of  meeting  such  an  attempt 
by  Europe  to  utilize  economic  weapons  against  us. 
The  lamentable  failure  of  the  Embargo  of  1808 
has  had  apparently  no  lessons.  The  truth  is  in- 
deed simple.  American  prosperity  is  entirely  de- 
pendent upon  marketing  our  staple  products, 
which  we  cannot  ourselves  consume  in  any  such 
quantities  as  we  produce;  only  the  European  mar- 
ket is  adequate,  and  upon  it  we  are  literally  and 
absolutely  dependent.  Does  not  the  result  upon 
the  South  of  an  inability  to  market  more  than  a 
portion  of  the  cotton  crop  during  the  last  year 
indicate  sufficiently  how  extensive  and  appalling 
a  commercial  disaster  would  fall  upon  this  coun- 
try if  we  ceased  for  a  few  weeks  to  export  all 
products  to  European  markets?  Whatever  the 
Europeans  might  suffer  —  and  suffer  they  cer- 
tainly would,  whether  we  put  pressure  upon 
them  or  they  put  pressure  upon  us  —  we  should 
suffer  first  and  most. 

From  the  possibility  of  economic  pressure 
nothing  can  deliver  us  now  or  hi  future  except 
the  achieving  of  economic  independence,  which 
is  attainable  only  by  slow  development.  Armies 
and  navies  cannot  create  it,  nor  can  they  ever 
obviate  entirely  the  disabilities  which  its  absence 
make  inevitable. 

170 


LTHE  PRICE  OF  ISOLATION 

The  magnitude  of  the  measures  necessary  to 
enable  us  to  perform  for  ourselves  those  economic 
services  which  the  Europeans  now  perform  for 
us  by  no  means  completes  the  prerequisites  of 
independence.  When  we  have  once  created  a 
merchant  fleet  adequate  in  size  to  carry  the 
whole  of  our  imports  and  exports,  a  navy  to  pro- 
tect this  fleet  in  transit  will  be  absolutely  essen- 
tial. We  must  then  possess  an  army  sufficiently 
large  to  repel  from  our  shores  any  invasion  which 
the  navy  was  unable  to  defeat  on  the  ocean. 
When  we  talk  of  obtaining  independence  of  the 
sea  power,1  the  price  to  be  paid  will  not  in  the 
least  be  one  which  we  may  predetermine,  but 
that  value  which  the  sea  power  itself  sets  upon 
its  control  of  the  ocean  highways.  Great  Britain's 
idea  of  the  importance  to  her  of  the  control  of 
the  sea,  Germany's  evaluation  of  the  usefulness 
of  the  control  of  the  ocean  highways  to  her  own 
development,  will  necessarily  indicate  the  price 
we  shall  be  compelled  to  pay  if  we  purpose  to  take 
from  either  power  enough  of  its  control  of  the  seas 
to  render  ourselves  independent  in  fact. 

The  right  to  advance  American  interests  to 
the  maximum  extent  in  times  of  crisis  also  in- 
volves our  ability  to  interfere  effectively  in 

1  Independence  of  all  the  world  except  Great  Britain  is  of  course 
not  independence  at  all  and  least  of  all  isolation.  This  is  so  obvious 
that  Europeans  marvel  at  the  frequency  with  which  the  idea  is 
expressed  and  the  value  which  it  seems  to  have  for  many  people. 

171 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

European  affairs,  for  which  we  must  pay  not 
merely  the  value  we  ourselves  set  upon  the 
American  rights  and  interests  threatened,  nor 
the  money  we  happen  to  have,  but  the  value 
which  European  nations  assign  to  then*  own  right 
to  decide  European  issues  for  themselves.  Nor 
will  this  need  for  independence  be  measured  by 
normal  conditions.  Normally  the  need  for  inde- 
pendence will  not  arise;  the  mutuality  of  trade 
between  Europe  and  the  United  States  will  se- 
cure for  us  access  to  all  markets  in  which  trade 
is  advantageous  both  to  the  Europeans  and  to  us. 
The  true  measure  of  adequacy  will  be  the  exi- 
gencies of  great  crises,  when  the  normal  opera- 
tion of  economic  factors  is  for  the  time  being 
suspended  by  the  pressure  of  other  interests. 
Even  in  the  times  when  European  States  are  in 
great  danger,  we  must  still  be  ready  to  compel 
them  to  respect  American  interests  by  the  force 
we  are  able  to  exert.  Naturally  this  will  require 
a  strength  on  sea  and  land  at  least  sufficient  to 
imperil  them  and  will  necessarily  make  us  suf- 
ficiently strong  to  interfere  conclusively  in  Euro- 
pean affairs.  Unless  we  are  at  least  able  to  hold 
the  balance  between  European  coalitions,  our 
strength  will  be  insufficient  to  imperil  either. 

In  such  an  eventuality,  the  United  States  will 
become  the  controlling  element  in  world  politics. 
Less  than  this  will  not  be  independence.  Less 

172 


THE  PRICE  OF  ISOLATION 

than  this  will  not  preserve  isolation.  So  much  the 
Europeans  will  not  concede  us  without  actual 
war.  This  is  no  matter  of  armament  which  we 
may  ourselves  build  at  will  without  let  or  hin- 
drance. They  will  never  countenance  the  creation 
in  America  of  sufficient  armament  and  economic 
power  to  render  us  independent  of  Europe  with- 
out forcing  the  issue  in  actual  warfare,  and  any 
such  elaborate  preparedness,  apparently  involv- 
ing independence  of  Europe,  will  be  promptly 
interpreted  as  aggression,  will  be  dealt  with  ac- 
cordingly, and  will  consequently  thrust  upon  us 
preparations  adequate  to  meet  such  armament 
as  the  European  nations  will  under  those  cir- 
cumstances undertake  in  their  own  defense. 

Nor  must  we  forget  the  physical  weakness  of 
our  strategic  position.  Much  skepticism  exists 
(outside  military  circles)  as  to  the  possibility  of 
an  efficient  military  invasion  of  this  country  by 
European  powers.  These  same  individuals  seem 
to  have  no  doubt  whatever  of  the  ability  of  the 
United  States  to  compel  recognition  by  European 
nations  of  propositions  which  they  decline  to 
accept.  Natural  factors  make  it  precisely  as 
difficult  for  us  to  invade  Europe  as  for  Europe 
to  invade  us.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  invasion 
of  the  United  States  by  Europe  is  physically 
simple;  if  we  possess  the  necessary  forces,  it  is 
physically  an  easy  enough  matter  to  land  them 

173 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

in  Europe.  The  true  issue  is  the  amount  of  neces- 
sary armament.  Because  of  our  military  weak- 
ness, very  moderate  forces  will  suffice  those  who 
invade  us;  because  of  their  strength,  coercion  of 
Europe  by  the  United  States  is  literally  impos- 
sible. It  is  beyond  sane  international  thinking. 

The  size  and  efficiency  of  armament  which 
independence  will  require  of  the  United  States  is 
to  be  dealt  with  in  no  figures  or  round  numbers, 
nor  is  it  to  be  comprehended  in  a  single  scheme 
whose  adequacy  can  be  ascertained  by  scientific 
computation  ten  years  in  advance.  All  arma- 
ment is  relative  and  comparative;  the  United 
States  must  arm  in  comparison  with  the  size  and 
efficiency  of  existing  and  probable  European 
armies  and  navies.  Independence  will  mean  not 
a  navy  but  the  maintenance  of  a  certain  ratio 
of  strength,  and  will  involve  therefore  an  expense 
which  we  cannot  in  the  least  predicate  in  ad- 
vance, because  it  will  be  determined  by  the  size 
and  efficiency  of  European  forces,  which  we 
cannot  beforehand  know.  In  any  case,  it  means 
ships  not  by  units,  but  by  squadrons;  armies  not 
by  corps,  but  by  divisions;  artillery  not  in  hun- 
dreds, but  in  profusion;  ammunition  without 
limit,  and  all  the  other  innumerable  things  in  like 
measure  which  the  experience  of  the  past  months 
has  shown  indispensable  in  warfare.  Behind  such 
armament  must  stand  trained  officers,  skilled 

174 


THE  PRICE  OF  ISOLATION 

administrators,  hospital  and  surgical  organiza- 
tions, and  the  vital  and  elaborate  industrial 
mobilization  essential  to  keep  such  an  army  and 
navy  in  action. 

Armies  and  navies,  moreover,  are  not  in  them- 
selves realities,  but  are  merely  the  hands  of  the 
nation,  no  stronger  than  the  economic  and  in- 
dustrial fabric  behind  them.  It  is  the  nation 
itself  to-day  which  must  fight.  It  is  the  nation 
itself  which  must  prepare.  The  military  and 
naval  prerequisites  of  independence  demand,  in 
fact,  a  complete  and  searching  transformation  of 
the  United  States  in  all  matters  administrative 
and  nidus  trial.  Our  present  economic  strength 
is  vast  but  potential.  Our  industrial  fabric  lacks 
efficient  correlation,  coordination,  and  all  those 
capital  qualities  which  the  experience  of  the  last 
year  has  shown  Great  Britain  and  France  to  be 
absolutely  essential  for  the  prosecution  of  mod- 
ern warfare. 

For  independence  a  degree  of  extended  effort 
is  necessary  which  could  not  by  any  probable 
computation  be  achieved  in  less  than  hah*  a 
century.  We  have  not  at  present  even  the  nucleus 
of  an  army  and  navy  of  such  size  and  quality. 
Any  such  number  of  factories  as  must  at  once 
undertake  the  manufacture  of  munitions,  even 
the  war  orders  have  not  created.  Yards  in  which 
to  build  simultaneously  so  many  ships  are  not  in 

175 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

existence.  Whence,  too,  are  to  come  the  skilled 
hands  and  fingers,  the  able  intellects  to  construct 
rapidly  such  intricate  organisms  as  modern  ar- 
tillery and  battleships?  Iron  and  steel,  wood  and 
leather  we  possess.  It  is  the  human  element  we 
lack,  the  sort  of  labor  needed  to  apply  to  our  cap- 
ital. Only  long  years  of  effort  can  possibly  pro- 
duce ships,  munitions,  soldiers,  sailors,  officers, 
administrators  in  any  such  numbers  as  inde- 
pendence presumes.  We  have  our  whole  domestic 
fabric  to  reconstruct,  our  finances  and  traditions 

i 

to  unlearn  and  outlive,  our  industrial  fabric  to 
tear  up  by  the  roots  and  correlate  upon  an  en- 
tirely new  scheme.  The  whole  object  of  the  na- 
tional life  must  be  changed  and  a  concerted, 
conscious  effort  toward  independence  become 
the  single  aim  of  national,  State,  and  private  en- 
deavor. Nothing  less  can  achieve  it.  Even  so 
great  an  effort  over  so  long  a  period  as  hah*  a 
century  may  still  fail  to  attain  it. 

Indeed,  isolation  spells  independence,  and 
independence  spells  Pan-Germanism.  We  must 
not  fail  to  see  that  such  an  object  is  indeed  iden- 
tical with  the  policies  and  ambitions  which  have 
been  so  roundly  condemned  in  the  United  States 
in  the  last  year.  The  aim  of  German  statecraft 
is  simply  independence  —  their  ability  to  ad- 
vance German  policies  without  necessarily  re- 
garding the  interests  of  other  nations,  the  right 

176 


THE  PRICE  OF  ISOLATION 

to  stand  aloof  if  they  desire  from  European  co- 
alitions, the  right  to  choose  peace  when  others 
thrust  war  upon  them,  to  be  beholden  to  no  man 
for  their  privileges,  to  hold  nothing  upon  suffer- 
ance. For  Germany  independence  is  at  least 
explainable.  She  is  located  between  other  power- 
ful nations  and  may  conceivably,  by  a  coalition 
of  her  neighbors,  be  conquered  and  thereby 
lose  her  territorial  integrity,  her  political  inde- 
pendence, and  that  greatest  of  all  attributes  of 
sovereignty  —  the  right  to  choose.  The  violence 
with  which  other  nations  have  denied  the  ade- 
quacy of  this  defensive  motive  for  German  pol- 
icies of  independence  will  give  an  adequate  idea 
of  their  attitude  toward  a  similar  program  of  in- 
dependence for  the  United  States.  If  Germany's 
policy  of  expanding  her  influence  to  protect  her 
independence  be  aggression,  American  independ- 
ence, in  the  sense  of  a  right  to  extort  recognition 
from  European  nations  of  American  interests  and 
policies,  will  certainly  be  interpreted  as  an  in- 
tention to  dominate  Europe  and  rule  the  world. 
Yet  on  no  other  terms  can  we  maintain  isolation. 


177 


CHAPTER  XII 

INEXPEDIENCY  OF  INDEPENDENCE 

So  extended  an  effort  as  the  attainment  of 
literal  independence  of  Europe  requires  is  not 
expedient  to  defend  either  American  democracy 
or  American  interests.  It  means  the  sacrifice 
of  the  substance  of  American  democracy  to  pre- 
serve its  shadow;  the  abrogation  of  the  present 
meaning  of  the  right  to  choose  in  an  attempt  to 
defend  it;  the  destruction  of  our  political  and 
social  organizations  in  an  effort  to  protect  them. 
In  the  broadest  sense  independence,  isolation, 
mean  militarism,  and  therefore  possess  pre- 
requisites definitely  contrary  to  the  non-military 
traditions  of  American  life.  While  we  have 
not  been  in  truth  a  peaceful  people,  nor  yet  a 
people  willing  to  forgive  offense,  we  have  been  as 
a  nation  a  people  averse  to  that  sort  of  disci- 
pline and  sacrifice  which  militarism  involves. 
If  one  thing  is  definite  and  clear  in  the  American 
public  mind  to-day,  it  is  a  determination  to 
sanction  nothing  of  the  sort.  In  the  broadest 
sense,  therefore,  independence,  the  unlimited 
exercise  of  the  right  to  choose,  is  inexpedient. 

178 


INEXPEDIENCY  OF  INDEPENDENCE 

Such  preparations  as  independence  demands 
also  mean  aggression  and  are  definitely  contrary 
to  our  oft-expressed  abhorrence  of  conquest,  or 
of  an  attempt  to  force  from  other  nations  that 
which  they  definitely  decline  to  surrender. 
Great  sections  of  the  community  in  America 
have  looked  favorably  upon  propaganda  for 
permanent  peace,  have  subscribed  to  the  sub- 
stitution of  arbitration  by  international  courts 
for  an  appeal  to  war.  That  the  great  majority 
no  longer  agree  with  pacifism  as  the  professional 
societies  advocate  it  is  fairly  obvious,  but  their 
leanings  toward  pacifism  will  prevent  a  decision 
in  favor  of  schemes  or  policies  essentially  ag- 
gressive in  nature.  Independence  the  American, 
people  have  already  condemned  unsparingly  and 
in  no  doubtful  voice.  It  involves  the  same 
type  and  variety  of  effort,  the  same  centraliza- 
tion and  definite  direction  by  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment, the  same  planning  and  preparing  for 
which  Pan-Germanism  stands.  The  latter  a 
majority  of  the  American  people  unhesitatingly 
reject  as  unworthy  of  a  great  nation,  and  such 
sections  of  the  community  as  do  approve  seem 
to  be  in  the  minority. 

The  inexpediency  of  independence  is  also  made 
clear  by  the  extent  of  the  transformation  of  in- 
dustry required  and  the  elaborate  reorganiza- 
tion of  our  administrative  fabric  which  would 

179 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

become  imperative.  Both  are  flatly  contrary  to 
all  American  administrative  and  legal  tradi- 
tions. Both  demand  the  correlation  by  a  single 
power  of  all  the  activities  of  the  nation.  Both 
mean  a  total  change  of  direction  in  the  ideals  and 
aims  of  American  life,  the  destruction  of  Amer- 
ican democracy  as  it  is  now  understood  by  those 
very  measures  invoked  in  its  defense.  Where  the 
individual  has  stood  all  but  supreme,  the  State 
is  to  take  his  place;  where  individualist  ideals 
have  reigned,  collectivist  policies  will  dominate. 
Such  defense  is  futile,  for  it  involves  interpreta- 
tions of  American  life,  ideals,  and  interests  con- 
trary to  the  present  notions  cherished  by  the 
public  mind. 

While  nothing  less  than  independence  can 
enable  us  to  extort  from  other  nations  a  recogni- 
tion of  the  greatest  possible  extension  of  American 
interests,  and  therefore  of  the  most  liberal  exer- 
cise of  discretion  involved  in  our  right  to  choose, 
it  will  never  be  expedient  to  exercise  the  right 
to  choose  in  entire  disregard  of  the  interests  and 
ambitions  of  others,  to  act  as  if  we  alone  inhabit 
the  globe,  or  as  if  our  interests  and  ideals  are 
alone  worthy  of  credence  or  advancement.  The 
American  mind  purposes  to  be  guided  by  ethical 
precepts,  to  be  satisfied  with  an  equitable  ad- 
justment of  American  interests  to  those  of  other 
nations,  of  American  ideals  to  the  policies  of 

180 


INEXPEDIENCY  OF  INDEPENDENCE 

other  nations,  and  will  not  expect  to  carry  the 
right  to  choose  to  that  ultimate  point  which 
theoretical  sovereignty  will  justify. 

Even  if  feasible,  independence  is  not  expedient 
because  it  clearly  involves  the  payment  of  a 
greater  price  than  the  value  of  the  objects  to  be 
attained.  American  interests  there  are  which  we 
must  protect  and  defend,  which  in  all  probability 
force  will  be  needed  to  maintain,  but  no  Ameri- 
can interests  at  present  in  danger  nor  any  prob- 
lems at  present  to  be  decided  by  the  right  to 
choose  are  as  valuable  to  us  as  the  European 
estimate  of  those  interests  which  we  must  neces- 
sarily assail.  Their  interests  are  national;  ours 
in  the  main  individual.  Theirs  involve  their  very 
safety,  independence,  and  integrity;  ours  merely 
a  rate  of  profit,  individual  privilege,  individual 
wealth.  To  threaten  Great  Britain's  control  of 
the  sea  is  to  British  thinking  to  endanger  her 
existence.  To  threaten  Germany  by  an  armed 
force  considerable  enough  to  compel  submission 
will  introduce  into  the  affairs  of  Europe  a  new 
power  sufficiently  strong  to  endanger  the  politi- 
cal independence  of  any  European  nation.  Such 
an  effort  would  alter  the  balance  of  power  in 
Europe,  on  the  sea,  and  in  Asia.  Our  real  danger 
of  losing  contact  with  the  rest  of  the  world,  of 
finding  it  necessary  to  exercise  the  right  to 
choose  to  that  ultimate  degree  which  independ- 

181 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

ence  of  Europe  assumes  is  at  present  too  slight 
to  justify  an  effort  of  such  magnitude. 

Nor  is  independence  of  Europe  indispensable. 
Our  territorial  integrity  and  our  political  inde- 
pendence are  assured  by  that  definite  lack  of  a 
strategic  position  so  related  to  Europe  as  to  in- 
fluence in  any  way  the  relations  of  one  European 
power  to  one  another.  The  primary  motive  for 
conquest  is  entirely  lacking,  and  even  should 
future  means  of  communication  become  as  much 
more  effective  than  present  means  as  they  are 
than  those  of  1800,  it  is  highly  improbable  that 
any  relation  can  be  established  between  North 
America  and  Europe  of  such  a  nature  as  to 
create  such  a  strategic  interest.  Moreover  the 
rivalry  of  European  States  protects  us.  So  long 
as  anything  resembling  the  present  balance  of 
power  continues  to  exist  no  European  nation 
can  undertake  the  conquest  of  the  United  States 
without  risking  the  loss  in  Europe  of  more  than 
can  possibly  be  won  in  America.  That  the  pres- 
ent war  will  sufficiently  alter  the  balance  of 
power  to  abolish  this  restraint  upon  European 
action  is  improbable. 

There  are,  therefore,  such  weighty  arguments 
against  the  expediency  of  independence  of  Eu- 
rope that  the  sole  probable  need  for  such  arma- 
ment must  be  deemed  too  unimportant  to  justify 
such  extended  action.  We  do  hold  in  the  Panama 

182 


INEXPEDIENCY  OF  INDEPENDENCE 

Canal,  in  the  Philippines,  and  other  extracon- 
tinental  possessions  aggressive  positions  which 
do  threaten  the  interests  of  European  and  Asi- 
atic nations.  We  have  espoused  in  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  and  in  the  Open  Door  policies  which 
are  contrary  to  the  ambitions  of  European, 
Asiatic,  and  South  American  nations.  They 
can  be  maintained,  if  they  should  be  challenged, 
only  by  force  great  enough  to  establish  inde- 
pendence. If  we  cannot  discover  some  other 
means  for  providing  this  force,  they  are  not  in 
themselves  of  sufficient  importance  to  make  in- 
dependence expedient.  We  shall  be  foolish  to 
save  pennies  by  an  expenditure  of  millions.  If  we 
cannot  maintain  these  possessions  in  simple  ways 
we  shall  do  well  to  renounce  them  altogether. 

The  inexpediency  of  independence  demon- 
strated by  such  weighty  arguments  is  perhaps 
fortunate  because,  desirable  [or  not,  independence 
is  for  the  present  unattainable. .  We  cannot  main- 
tain our  traditional  policy  of  isolation  because 
we  cannot  disprove  our  definitive  and  close  re- 
lationship to  Europe,  nor  maintain  by  any  exer- 
tion of  force  an  isolation  which  does  not  exist. 
We  cannot  sever  by  armies  the  economic  ties 
which  bind  us  to  the  European  fabric,  because  in 
all  probability  no  exertion  of  force  is  capable  of 
altering  such  factors.  We  cannot  be  independent 
of  Europe  in  theory  until  we  are  independent  in 

183 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

fact.  Until  we  can  stand  without  the  assistance 
of  Europe,  we  cannot  stand  upon  OUT  own  feet. 
No  nation  can  become  independent  in  an  inter- 
national sense  until  it  has  become  in  actual  fact 
a  creditor  nation.  The  foreign  investments  in  the 
United  States  do  exceed  the  investments  of 
American  citizens  in  other  countries.  Even  the 
very  favorable  balance  of  trade  between  the 
United  States  and  Europe  created  by  the  war, 
the  huge  loans  placed  in  this  country  by  Euro- 
pean governments,  cannot  repay  our  total  in- 
debtedness. 

Indeed,  armed  force  is  incapable  of  providing 
those  supplies  of  capital  which  will  create  sub- 
stantial independence.  Nor  is  force  more  capable 
of  establishing  those  financial  connections  upon 
which  adequate  exchange  facilities  depend.  Only 
long  established  personal  acquaintance  can  beget 
that  mutual  confidence  which  is  the  essential 
factor  in  profitable  financial  relationships.  Until 
we  can  dispense  with  the  services  of  European 
nations  and  their  citizens,  independence  will  be 
a  fiction  and  a  sham,  isolation  will  be  a  delusion 
and  a  snare.  Economic  independence  must  be  a 
reality  or  it  is  nonexistent.  If  it  exists,  force  is 
scarcely  able  to  strengthen  it  and  almost  unable 
to  injure  it.  Until  it  exists,  force  is  impotent  to 
substitute  something  for  it.  We  cannot  defend 
independence  until  we  attain  it. 

184 


INEXPEDIENCY  OF  INDEPENDENCE 

The  feasibility  of  any  such  extended  effort 
as  an  attempt  to  hasten  by  artificial  means  our 
economic  independence  of  Europe  seems  doubt- 
ful. Only  by  such  careful  and  elaborate  correla- 
tion of  industrial  and  administrative  forces  as 
the  German  Government  and  German  scientists 
have  undertaken  in  the  last  forty  years  can  the 
acquisition  of  economic  independence  be  ac- 
celerated. The  most  elaborate  transformation 
will  be  necessary  in  the  United  States,  because 
cooperation  and  correlation  of  that  character  are 
foreign  to  our  industrial  and  administrative 
traditions.  For  the  execution  of  the  moderate 
plans  of  preparedness  advocated  already,  eight 
or  ten  years  are  admittedly  necessary.  For  so 
sweeping  a  transformation  as  the  hastening  of 
independence  would  involve,  half  a  century  would 
probably  be  insufficient.  Even  in  the  crisis  of 
actual  war,  when  the  national  independence  is 
clearly  imperiled,  the  experience  of  Great  Britain 
has  shown  that  such  administrative  and  indus- 
trial correlation  cannot  be  improvised. 

Much  can  no  doubt  be  accomplished  entirely 
in  accordance  with  the  spirit  of  American  devel- 
opment and  ideals.  Our  present  practice  is  so 
far  short  of  the  theory  that  if  the  two  can  be 
made  to  coincide,  more  will  have  been  accom- 
plished by  preparedness  than  generations  of 
statesmen  have  performed.  If  inadequate  meth- 

185 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

i 
ods,  extravagant  finance,  inefficient  officers  can 

be  exorcised,  an  enormous  gain  in  efficiency  will 
at  once  result.  We  can  indeed  make  the  ma- 
chinery of  democracy  as  efficient  as  it  claims  to 
be.  Where  American  business  has  been  exten- 
sive, we  can  make  it  intensive;  where  it  has 
learned  to  accomplish  quickly  what  must  be 
done,  we  must  teach  it  to  accomplish  surely  and 
cheaply  what  ought  to  be  done.  More  than  this 
is  probably  not  within  the  grasp  of  the  present 
generation,  and  policies  demanding  a  more  con- 
siderable exercise  of  industrial  and  administra- 
tive capacity  cannot  be  deemed  expedient.  Un- 
less the  structure  itself  is  to  be  uprooted  in  the 
attempt  to  hasten  our  economic  independence, 
we  must  realize  that  the  process  will  be  slow 
and  that  our  national  policies  for  some  decades 
to  come  must  be  based  upon  such  effort  as  the 
existing  social,  industrial,  and  administrative 
fabric  is  actually  able  to  achieve.  Whatever  we 
attempt,  it  must  be  feasible. 

Without  a  readiness  and  an  ability  to  pay  the 
price  of  literal  independence  of  Europe,  the 
United  States  cannot  expect  to  enjoy  its  fruits. 
Neither  our  present  disarmament  nor  our  eco- 
nomic dependence  on  Europe,  nor  yet  our  in- 
ability in  the  near  future  to  prepare  elaborate 
armament  and  alter  our  status  to  that  of  com- 
plete independence,  affords  any  adequate  reason 

186 


INEXPEDIENCY  OF  INDEPENDENCE 

on  our  part  for  aggressive  action.  The  limita- 
tions of  security  are  neither  terrifying  nor  dan- 
gerous. They  merely  compel  us  to  accept  our 
own  economic  disabilities  and  define  expedient 
conduct  as  their  acceptance.  We  cannot,  by  con- 
scious action  nor  by  the  invoking  of  military 
force,  redress  the  fundamental  balance  between 
this  country  and  Europe.  Until  we  become  in- 
dependent in  very  fact,  the  greater  development 
and  strength  of  independent  creditor  nations 
must  always  place  in  their  hands  a  terrible  coer- 
cive power  against  us.  Yet  the  probability  of  its 
use  is  slight.  European  interests  and  ambitions 
make  the  economic  coercion  of  the  United  States 
inexpedient,  unless  we  ourselves  force  upon  them 
an  issue  sufficiently  important  to  justify  the  dis- 
turbance of  the  international  economic  fabric. 

The  limitations  of  security  will  not  cost  us 
access  to  the  world's  markets.  We  have  never 
been  able  to  assure  it  by  our  own  political,  mili- 
tary, or  naval  strength,  but  we  have  never  en- 
tirely lost  it  and  have  suffered  its  limitation 
only  for  brief  periods.  The  sea  power  cannot 
close  the  ocean  highways  to  us  without  denying 
other  European  nations  access  to  the  United 
States.  The  identity  of  their  interests  and  ours 
under  normal  conditions  will  protect  ours.  They 
will  secure  for  us  what  we  need  in  the  promotion 
of  their  own  interests.  Moreover  a  great  part  of 

187 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

our  present  trade  with  Europe  rests  upon  funda- 
mental economic  factors  in  international  supply 
and  demand.  They  buy  from  us  because  our 
commodities  are  cheaper  or  better;  we  buy  from 
them  for  similar  economic  reasons.  Before  the 
war  broke  out  the  great  bulk  of  American  for- 
eign trade,  being  between  developed  countries, 
could  be  interfered  with  by  force  only  at  the 
risk  of  damaging  the  aggressor  nearly  as  much 
as  ourselves.  It  will  scarcely  ever  be  expedient 
for  any  nation  hi  Europe  to  interfere  with  its 
own  trade  with  us.  The  normality  of  conditions 
hi  the  United  States  is  necessary  to  prosperity 
in  Europe,  not  as  necessary  as  is  the  normality 
of  European  conditions  to  us,  but  still  too  great 
to  be  disregarded  except  under  extraordinary 
provocation. 

It  is  in  the  future  and  not  in  the  present  that 
the  limitations  of  security  will  become  significant, 
not  in  the  cession  or  loss  of  something  we  actually 
possess  at  this  moment,  but  hi  our  inability  to 
obtain  hi  the  future  something  we  do  not  to-day 
very  ardently  desire  but  to  which  we  may  soon 
attach  a  vital  importance.  Here  lies  the  real 
limitation.  Nothing  short  of  independence  can 
enable  us  to  extort  in  the  future  abnormal  privi- 
leges in  the  most  profitable  markets  of  the  world. 
If  England  and  France  will  not  permit  Germany 
to  obtain  such  relations  save  at  the  point  of  the 

188 


INEXPEDIENCY  OF  INDEPENDENCE 

bayonet,  we  need  hardly  expect  to  receive  any- 
thing beyond  that  protection  and  recognition 
which  they  are  willing  to  extend  to  the  citizens 
of  all  nations.  If  Germany  and  Austria  are  com- 
pelled to  fight  for  such  rights,  it  is  hardly  likely 
that  they  will  yield  them,  once  obtained,  to 
American  diplomacy. 

Indeed,  a  nation  prepared  only  for  the  de- 
fensive in  the  most  literal  sense  must  learn  to  be 
content  with  a  part  only  of  what  it  may  con- 
sider desirable.  It  must  learn  to  regulate  and 
modify  its  own  ambitions  and  policies  by  a  care- 
ful consideration  of  the  ambitions  and  interests 
of  the  great  European  nations.  So  long  as  we 
are  obviously  unable  to  coerce  them,  we  cannot 
demand  with  assurance  a  degree  of  regard  which 
they  rarely  accord  to  each  other's  interests, 
even  when  supported  by  the  might  of  armies  and 
navies.  For  the  United  States  to  threaten  and 
insist  is  to  expose  the  country  to  ridicule  in 
Europe.  Surely  we  will  not  do  well  to  reiterate 
our  intention  to  proceed  to  extremities  when 
by  our  own  confession  we  are  not  in  the  least 
able  to  make  good  our  word.  We  must  therefore 
always  be  satisfied  with  less  than  we  might 
justly  demand.  Security  will  define  equity,  jus- 
tice, expediency  in  the  terms  of  European  in- 
terests. We  must  realize  that  our  inability  to 
achieve  independence  of  Europe  will  force  us  to 

189 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

remain  satisfied  in  the  immediate  future  with  a 
very  reasonable  compromise  between  European 
ambitions  and  American  interests  and  that  a 
settlement  eminently  satisfactory  to  them  will 
neither  threaten  nor  destroy  really  significant 
interests  of  our  own. 


190 


CHAPTER  XIII 

FOREIGN   ALLIANCE   IMPERATIVE 

IF  American  independence  of  Europe  is  at  pres- 
ent impossible,  American  interests  cannot  be  ad- 
vanced by  our  economic  strength  or  by  our  mil- 
itary and  naval  forces,  in  short,  by  any  means 
exclusively  our  own.  Nor  is  the  United  States  in 
a  position  to  resist  unaided  the  economic  pres- 
sure of  European  nations  or  able  itself  to  coerce 
Europe  by  economic  pressure:  we  cannot  dis- 
pense with  the  services  at  present  rendered  us 
by  the  merchant  marine  and  banking  facilities  of 
the  sea  power.  Under  such  circumstances  we 
must  ally  with  one  or  the  other  European  coali- 
tion, or  limit  American  interests  to  such  privi- 
leges as  the  European  nations  will  voluntarily 
concede.  Unfortunately  we  must  abandon  some- 
thing, sacrifice  something,  lose  something.  Our 
traditional  policy  of  isolation  must  be  balanced 
against  the  advancement  of  American  interests 
and  ideals.  Either  we  must  sacrifice  the  policy 
and  make  a  European  alliance  upon  such  terms 
as  we  can,  or  we  must  maintain  isolation  by  a 
sacrifice  of  what  it  was  meant  to  preserve. 
There  can  be  here  no  hesitation.  A  policy  of 
191 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

isolation,  based  upon  anachronism  and  an  anom- 
aly, is  a  living  international  falsehood,  a  denial 
of  the  plain  facts  of  international  relationship, 
a  policy  based  upon  an  obvious  blindness  to 
realities.  The  United  States  is  a  part  of  the  world. 
The  fact  may  be  ignored  but  not  changed;  we 
have  merely  the  right  to  decide  the  form  which 
our  recognition  of  this  relationship  shall  take. 

A  foreign  policy  the  United  States  must  have; 
relationship  to  European  nations  we  already 
possess;  and  we  can  no  more  disassociate  our- 
selves from  the  world  than  a  man  can  logically 
deny  his  own  existence  and  proceed  to  found  a 
philosophy  of  life  upon  the  negation.  Whatever 
our  relations  with  other  States  may  be,  they  form 
our  policy.  It  is  like  individual  conduct.  Every 
man  does  maintain  some  sort  of  relations  with 
other  people;  he  can  neither  rid  himself  of  their 
existence  nor  so  isolate  himself  from  them  that 
he  can  act  entirely  without  regard  to  their  in- 
terests. He  may  decline  to  accept  his  obligations, 
may  desire  to  act  contrary  to  the  general  habits 
of  a  moral  life,  and  refuse  to  observe  the  ordinary 
regulations  imposed  by  the  community  for  the 
guidance  of  political  and  social  conduct;  but  he 
will  do  so  at  his  own  risk.  His  denial  of  his  re- 
lations to  society,  his  obstinate  refusal  to  recog- 
nize his  obligations  and  the  limitations  of  his 
personal  strength,  creative  power,  or  intellec- 

192 


FOREIGN  ALLIANCE  IMPERATIVE 

tual  ability  entirely  frustrate  the  true  objects  he 
may  have  in  mind,  which  are  to  be  obtained 
by  cooperation  alone.  So  a  nation  which  stead- 
fastly declines  to  cooperate  with  other  nations, 
to  take  counsel  with  them  for  the  purpose  of  es- 
tablishing a  community  of  interests,  is  unwilling 
to  recognize  that  identity  of  interests  for  which 
modern  alliances  stand. 

As  the  individual  finds  the  methods  and  char- 
acter of  social  intercourse  dictated  by  conven- 
tion, so  a  nation  cannot  itself  determine  the  type 
of  international  relationships.  It  must  accept 
those  methods  agreeable  to  the  majority  and 
proved  expedient  by  the  experience  of  others. 
It  cannot  successfully  say,  we  will  not  cooperate 
with  you  in  this  fashion  or  in  that,  we  will  not 
take  counsel  with  you  in  the  usual  way;  you 
must  either  associate  with  us  in  this  way  or  we 
shall  stand  aloof  in  isolation.  The  truth  is  that 
theoretical  sovereignty  is  a  fiction :  no  European 
State  has  found  it  possible  to  employ  in  practice 
its  theoretical  discretion,  to  deal  with  other  States 
as  the  postulates  of  political  science  expressed  by 
the  formal  traditions  of  diplomacy  dictate. 
The  accepted  method  of  international  associ- 
ation has  been  for  three  centuries  that  of  alli- 
ances, based  in  former  generations  upon  written 
treaties,  but  contained  to-day  in  tacit  verbal 
understandings,  both  indefinite  and  intangible. 

193 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

The  allies  recognize  publicly  and  formally  the  con- 
sonance of  fundamental  interests,  tacitly  declare 
their  belief  that  the  other's  actions  will  always 
presumably  proceed  from  friendly  intentions, 
that  any  disagreements  may  be  explained  and 
easily  compromised.  It  is  a  pledge  to  arbitrate 
all  internal  differences.  It  is  a  guarantee  of  sup- 
port when  the  other's  interests  are  threatened 
by  some  other  power. 

It  has  not  been  found  expedient  for  the  states- 
men of  one  nation  to  discuss  and  consider  its 
problems  alone  and  act  in  accordance  with  their 
decision.  To  learn  unofficially  what  one's  allies 
think  best,  to  discover  what  one's  enemies  desire, 
to  consult  the  particular  adversary  as  to  his 
willingness  to  compromise  upon  this  or  that,  and 
then  finally  to  dispatch  the  official  document 
with  a  practical  certainty  that  it  will  settle  the 
difficulty,  —  such  has  been  European  practice. 
Theoretical  sovereignty  has  been  waived  by  com- 
mon consent,  the  paraphernalia  of  diplomacy 
pushed  to  one  side  and  international  decisions 
reached  by  private  and  even  casual  conversa- 
tions at  dinner  tables  and  in  drawing  rooms,  with- 
out the  exchange  even  of  letters.  Formal  diplo- 
matic correspondence  between  nations  has  been 
reserved  for  matters  of  routine  or  for  crises  so 
imminent  that  personal  conference  is  already 
impossible  and  war  practically  decided  upon. 

194 


FOREIGN  ALLIANCE  IMPERATIVE 

The  United  States  cannot  hope  to  obtain 
greater  privileges  than  the  greatest  powers  allied 
in  coalitions  controlling  half  the  territory  of  the 
globe  have  been  able  to  secure.  Indeed,  the 
European  States  have  found  it  necessary  to 
work  in  concert,  to  compromise,  to  renounce  in- 
terests and  rights,  to  reduce  their  demands  to 
the  minimum,  to  omit  much  that  was  desirable, 
to  be  satisfied  on  the  whole  with  the  essential. 
None  of  them  have  expected,  even  when  bound 
together  in  powerful  coalitions,  to  secure  from 
each  other  whatever  they  chose  to  demand.  As 
for  the  smaller  nations,  they  have  frequently  con- 
gratulated themselves  upon  obtaining  anything 
at  all,  and  it  is  widely  recognized  that  only  the 
divergent  interests  of  the  greater  powers  have 
secured  for  the  smaller  States  the  freedom  and 
privileges  they  have  enjoyed. 

Indeed,  should  we  decline  to  accept  the  custom- 
ary method  of  alliance  by  tacit  understanding, 
we  shall  subscribe  not  in  the  least  to  isolation,  but 
to  a  selfish  defiance  and  unethical  disregard  of 
the  equal  rights  of  other  nations  to  exist  in  the 
world.  If  we  adopt  the  policy  of  alliance,  we 
shall  vote  to  accept  the  inevitable,  to  recognize 
the  obvious,  to  subscribe  to  the  realities  of  inter- 
national conditions,  and  shall  pledge  ourselves 
merely  to  a  willingness  to  accord  the  interests 
and  policies  of  others  that  same  consideration 

195 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

which  we  hope  that  others  will  be  willing  to  ac- 
cord our  own. 

The  great  peril  which  the  Allies  allege  in  the 
present  situation  is  the  determination  of  Ger- 
many to  create  such  conditions  in  Europe  as 
will  enable  her  and  her  allies  to  extend  their  in- 
fluence and  position  without  the  consultation 
and  compromise  which  have  hitherto  been  es- 
sential during  the  nineteenth  century.  They 
mean  by  a  "place  in  the  sun"  their  freedom  from 
the  limitations  which  the  ambitions  and  interests 
of  other  nations  have  hitherto  placed  upon  them. 
They  wish  nothing  held  upon  sufferance.  They 
claim  that  anything  short  of  independence  is  not 
even  security.  Is  it  not  this  very  unwillingness 
of  Germany  to  reduce  her  demands  to  a  mini- 
mum, to  be  satisfied  with  the  essential,  to  com- 
promise upon  the  desirable,  to  disregard  in  the 
future  the  necessity  of  alliance  and  conference, 
which  lies  at  the  root  of  her  present  policy? 

Such  an  attempt  to  hold  ourselves  aloof  cannot 
command  the  respect  and  approval  of  the  great 
powers  of  Europe,  cannot  fail  to  arouse  their 
suspicions,  because  in  essence  isolation  stands  for 
that  very  unwillingness  to  accept  the  ambitions 
and  interests  of  others  which  seems  to  nearly  all 
the  European  nations  the  most  dangerous  ele- 
ment in  international  politics.  An  alliance  stands, 
not  for  the  creation  of  limitations,  but,  in  the 

196 


FOREIGN  ALLIANCE  IMPERATIVE 

present  international  code,  for  a  recognition  of 
those  disabilities  which  already  exist.  We  shall 
not  easily  assume  a  relation  to  the  nations  of  Eu- 
rope which  they  definitively  decline  to  allow  one 
European  nation  to  assume  toward  the  others. 
The  price  of  independence  has  been  indicated: 
armament  so  extensive  as  to  enable  us  single- 
handed  to  extort  from  any  European  nation  any 
concession  however  slight,  the  ability  to  threaten 
the  balance  of  power  in  Europe  and  in  the  world 
at  large.  Should  the  United  States  persistently 
decline  to  create  such  relationship  with  other 
strong  powers  in  the  world  as  is  normal  in  Europe, 
a  general  distrust  of  our  purposes  and  policies 
will  result  which  may  lead  to  a  concerted  move- 
ment to  compel  us  to  recognize  the  international 
code  and  adopt  a  definite  attitude  of  friendship 
to  one  coalition  or  the  other. 

Even  if  European  nations  were  willing  longer 
to  recognize  this  aloofness  which  we  fondly  sup- 
pose to  be  isolation,  it  is  inexpedient  for  the 
United  States  to  continue  it.  The  key  to  the 
international  situation  lies  in  European  policies. 
European  interests  and  ambitions  and  not  Amer- 
ican interests  and  ideals  are  the  all-important  fac- 
tors, by  reason  of  that  most  obvious  of  all  facts, 
that  they  are  many  and  organized,  while  we  are 
a  single  nation,  to  all  intents  and  purposes  dis- 
armed and  disorganized.  What  they  decide  is 

197 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

more  important  than  what  we  decide.  Moreover 
they  possess,  what  we  entirely  lack,  brute  force 
amply  sufficient  to  compel  us  to  recognize  any 
view  of  the  situation  they  deem  expedient. 

If  our  so-called  isolation  continues,  it  will  be 
because  they  feel  able  to  disregard  our  existence. 
This  it  is  not  expedient  for  us  to  permit.  It  is 
highly  important  for  us  to  secure  admission  to  that 
concert  of  six  in  which  the  significant  decisions 
are  reached;  it  is  most  desirable  for  us  to  know 
in  advance  what  they  will  decide  and  to  attempt 
to  modify  their  actions  and  policies  from  time  to 
time  in  our  interests.  Requests  may  receive  at- 
tention where  demands  have  been  ignored,  and 
interests  be  recognized,  if  urged  in  the  secret 
conclave  in  traditional  fashion,  which  have  been 
treated  with  scant  courtesy  when  presented  in 
formal  communications.  We  can  secure  the  ad- 
vancement of  American  interests  only  by  pre- 
senting them  for  consideration  as  a  vital  part  of 
the  general  problem  while  it  is  still  under  discus- 
sion and  the  solution  is  yet  to  be  found.  If  we 
wait  until  the  European  powers  have  agreed  upon 
a  compromise,  it  will  be  obvious  that  no  one  of 
them  will  disregard  its  obligation  to  the  others 
in  order  to  advance  our  interests. 

Yet  American  interests  are  in  fact  so  linked  to 
European  ambitions  and  policies  that  what  con- 
cerns one  affects  the  other.  This  is  not  theory 

198 


FOREIGN  ALLIANCE  IMPERATIVE 

but  fact.  The  railroad,  steamship,  and  telegraph 
have  destroyed  our  isolation,  have  extended  the 
interests  of  American  citizens  to  the  uttermost 
parts  of  the  earth,  and  have  created  for  them  new 
territorial  limits,  to  which  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  does  not  itself  control.  Our  geo- 
graphical isolation  protects  our  commerce  and 
citizens  not  at  all;  they  are  not  comprehended 
within  the  area  isolated.  The  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
offer  them  no  security;  both  erect  real  barriers 
between  us  and  them.  Coast  defenses  and  navies 
are  of  no  avail  in  their  protection,  for  the  very 
nature  of  individual  activities  at  present  removes 
both  the  citizen  and  his  goods  from  the  environs 
of  the  United  States.  Voluntarily  Americans 
have  placed  themselves  within  the  power  of  other 
countries,  within  their  territorial  limits.  They 
have  isolated  themselves  from  the  United  States, 
removed  themselves  from  its  jurisdiction,  located 
their  property  beyond  the  reach  of  our  courts  and 
beyond  the  guns  of  our  armies.  However  pre- 
pared we  may  be,  they  will  always  be  outside 
our  lines,  beyond  our  grasp,  at  the  mercy  of  other 
nations. 

Potentially  we  are  to-day  as  a  nation  the  ally 
or  the  enemy  of  every  nation  on  the  globe,  be- 
cause American  interests  and  lives  are  every- 
where potentially  in  danger.  The  old  tradition 
is  no  longer  true:  a  European  alliance  can  to-day 

199 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

subserve  American  interests.  Where  there  were 
in  1800  travelers  and  merchants  outside  the  ju- 
risdiction of  the  United  States,  the  very  prosper- 
ity of  the  country  to-day,  the  most  important 
interests  of  citizens  at  home  are  dependent  upon 
the  consideration  shown  in  other  parts  of  the 
world  to  American  citizens  and  their  interests. 
The  railroad  and  the  steamship  have  separated 
the  merchant  in  America  from  his  customers, 
have  caused  him  to  intrust  his  property  for 
transit  to  individuals  of  whom  he  knows  nothing, 
to  send  it  into  countries  of  whose  Government 
and  conditions  he  is  personally  unadvised.  Every 
man,  woman,  and  child  in  the  United  States  has 
a  vital  personal  interest  in  events  abroad. 

Indeed,  the  true  necessity  for  an  alliance  lies  ' 
in  the  identity  of  American  interests  with  those 
of  Europe.  In  many  cases  American  citizens  are 
concerned  in  the  same  transactions  with  Euro- 
peans; the  delimination  of  their  interests  from 
ours  has  become  impossible;  the  line  between  my 
property  and  thine  can  scarcely  be  drawn  be- 
cause the  property  truly  valuable  is  no  longer 
tangible,  but  consists  in  the  use  of  capital,  the 
security  for  loans,  the  promptness  of  transporta- 
tion, the  honoring  of  commercial  paper.  We 
must  sit  in  the  councils  of  Europe,  if  we  can,  be- 
cause the  interests  of  American  citizens  are  iden- 
tical with  those  of  Europeans;  because  we  are 

200 


FOREIGN  ALLIANCE  IMPERATIVE 

fundamentally  as  eager  for  the  continuance  of 
their  prosperity  as  they  should  be  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  ours;  because  they,  and  they  only, 
can  protect  American  citizens  resident  within 
their  own  boundaries  or  insure  the  safety  of 
American  property  in  transit  through  their  do- 
mains. 

If  we  do  secure  by  alliance  admission  to  the 
European  Concert,  we  must  realize  that  we  can 
attain  the  privilege  only  on  their  terms.  Poten- 
tially one  of  the  mightiest  nations  in  the  world, 
the  United  States  ranks  in  the  in ternational  scale 
among  the  weakest.  Rightly  or  wrongly,  nations 
are  graded  to-day  according  to  the  amount  of 
effective  force  which  they  can  exert  in  interna- 
tional affairs  —  a  force  compounded  of  two  neces- 
sary elements:  the  strategical  relation  of  the 
national  area  to  that  of  other  nations  and  the 
organized  military  and  economic  strength.  The 
strategic  value  of  Belgium,  plus  its  great  indus- 
trial importance,  has  given  that  nation  a  position 
of  far  more  significance  in  international  affairs 
than  that  of  the  United  States.  We  possess  in- 
deed neither  essential  of  international  status  and 
can  bring  to  a  European  alliance  neither  of  the 
normal  advantages  which  European  nations  are 
accustomed  to  expect.  Our  economic  strength  is 
great,  but  not  indispensable  to  them.  Of  itself 
it  can  never  make  us  an  international  factor  of 

201 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

vast  prominence.  China  is  larger  in  population, 
South  America  greater  in  area,  Russia  as  consid- 
erable in  resources.  We  produce  or  manufacture 
few  things  of  which  some  other  source  of  supply 
does  not  exist.  Even  the  balance  of  power  in 
Europe,  the  peculiar  alignment  of  the  coalitions, 
scarcely  makes  possible  for  the  United  States  an 
alliance  upon  terms  really  favorable  to  American 
interests. 

European  policies  must  become  world  policies 
before  the  United  States  becomes  a  desirable 
ally.  Indeed,  were  it  not  for  the  fact  that  the 
balance  of  power  is  different  in  Europe,  in  Asia, 
and  in  Africa,  sustained  in  each  by  factors  not 
operative  elsewhere,  the  international  status  of 
the  United  States  would  be  problematic  in  the 
extreme.  But  Great  Britain  and  Russia,  allies 
in  the  Baltic,  are  deadly  rivals  in  the  Medi- 
terranean, in  Persia,  and  in  India.  France  and 
Great  Britain,  allies  in  Europe,  are  rivals  in 
Africa  and  Asia.  Japan,  who  must  retain  Great 
Britain's  support  against  Russia  in  Manchuria, 
finds  the  sea  power  her  rival  in  the  Pacific  and  in 
China.  These  are  significant  relationships  for  the 
United  States,  the  factors  which  give  us  an  op- 
portunity to  join  and  to  influence  international 
councils. 

An  idea  has  received  support  in  distinguished 
circles  that  the  only  adequate  motive  for  the  for- 

202 


FOREIGN  ALLIANCE  IMPERATIVE 

mation  of  a  European  alliance  would  be  the  entry 
of  the  United  States  into  the  concert  of  powers 
for  the  preservation  and  advancement  of  the 
peace  of  the  world.  If  we  avow  an  intention  of 
leading  the  world,  of  striking  a  dominant  note 
in  international  policies,  of  educating  the  Euro- 
peans in  ideals,  if  we  expect  to  compromise  for 
them  their  interests,  to  secure  a  renunciation  of 
their  ambitions,  we  shall  find  an  alliance  indeed 
difficult  to  establish.  Such  a  notion  is  to  Euro- 
peans preposterous  and  impertinent.  It  assumes 
that  we  shall  exert  an  influence  in  European  af- 
fairs more  decisive  than  they  themselves;  that 
we  shall  hold  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Euro- 
pean Concert;  that  we  shall  formulate  for  them 
decisions  which  they  would  not  be  able  to  reach 
for  themselves  and  will  be  able  to  secure  their 
consent  to  propositions  which  of  their  own  volition 
they  would  reject.  The  United  States  must  ap- 
pear in  the  international  arena  in  some  more  mod- 
est aspect  than  that  of  leader,  mentor,  and  re- 
former if  we  are  to  receive  that  cordial  welcome 
upon  which  we  are  peculiarly  dependent.1 

1  In  this  connection  it  is  enlightening  to  reflect  upon  the  igno- 
rance of  the  common  people  in  Europe  as  to  the  location  of  the 
United  States  and  the  nationality  of  its  inhabitants.  One  of  my 
colleagues  returned  to  his  native  village  in  northern  France  with 
his  American  wife.  One  of  the  tradespeople  said  to  another:  "I 
saw  Monsieur  X's  American  wife  to-day  and  she  is  as  white  as  you 
or  I."  Recently  I  was  told  of  an  American  who  was  arrested  in 
southern  France  as  a  spy  and  declared  his  nationality.  "  How  then 

203 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

Even  if  we  adopt  an  extremely  moderate  ver- 
sion of  the  reconstruction  of  Europe  necessary  to 
satisfy  all  of  the  contending  parties,  it  cannot  be 
gainsaid  that  such  a  reorganization  is  beyond 
the  power  of  the  United  States  to  achieve.  The 
problems  they  have  not  been  themselves  able  to 
solve  in  four  hundred  years  of  diplomacy  and 
war  they  will  scarcely  expect  American  states- 
men to  settle  when  the  men  appointed  to  office 
are  of  the  caliber  common  in  the  last  generation. 
Some  Americans  have  acquired  reputations  for 
statesmanship  even  in  Europe,  but  the  European 
opinion  of  American  capacity  in  international 
politics  is  lower  than  any  American  likes  to 
contemplate. 

Upon  such  a  basis  intercourse  is  impossible. 
Our  assistance  in  affairs  of  mutual  interest  they 
will  be  glad  to  have;  our  approval  of  their  actions 
they  desire;  an  amicable  understanding  for  the 
establishment  of  mutual  aims  and  for  the  pro- 
tection of  identical  or  complementary  interests 

do  you  speak  English?"  asked  the  officer.  "They  speak  Spanish  in 
America  as  every  one  knows."  He  finally  agreed  that  probably 
there  were  parts  of  North  America  where  English  was  spoken,  but 
no  explanations  could  change  his  conviction  that  "American" 
meant  "South  American"  and  that  my  friend's  failure  to  declare 
his  nationality  accurately  was  not  very  suspicious.  Even  educated 
people  in  Germany  and  France  receive  most  of  their  conceptions 
about  America  from  Wild  West  moving  picture  films,  which  are 
very  popular,  while  "American  (i.  e.,  negro)  minstrels"  are  a  stock 
part  of  vaudeville  and  cafe  entertainments.  They  have  not  the 
same  curiosity  about  us  that  we  have  about  Europe. 

204 


FOREIGN  ALLIANCE  IMPERATIVE 

they  are  willing  to  make.  More  than  this  assumes 
an  international  consciousness  the  existence  of 
which  the  war  itself  and  the  very  problems  re- 
quiring settlement  only  too  clearly  demonstrate 
to  be  nonexistent.  Mutuality  of  interests,  cor- 
diality of  friendship,  are  the  very  possible  bases 
for  arrangements.  Our  moral  and  intellectual 
superiority  are  not  sufficiently  evident  to  them 
to  establish  so  broad  a  tenet  as  our  leadership  in 
the  world. 

We  can  only  be  accepted  as  a  member  of  the 
European  Concert  in  equal  standing  by  the 
willingness  to  admit  and  accept  those  common 
standards  of  conduct,  and  particularly  those 
decisions  in  regard  to  specific  problems  which 
are  already  agreeable  to  the  nations  of  Europe. 
In  the  protection  of  American  life  abroad  we 
must  deem  those  measures  satisfactory  which 
the  powers  have  found  expedient  in  their  rela- 
tions with  each  other.  Greater  privileges  than 
they  extend  to  each  other  we  shall  scarcely  ob- 
tain. Why,  too,  should  we  ask  more  than  equal- 
ity? The  amenability  of  aliens  to  foreign 
jurisdictions,  commercial  privileges,  freedom  of 
access,  the  law  of  property,  —  all  this  will  be 
regulated  for  us  by  such  common  principles  as 
the  European  Governments  agree  upon.  Certain 
amendments,  reasonably  implied  by  our  peculiar 
requirements,  we  may  confidently  expect  if  we 

205 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

show  that  same  equitable  regard  in  America  for 
the  rights  and  privileges  of  their  citizens. 

We  must  observe  faithfully  hi  the  future  those 
common  traditions  of  diplomatic  intercourse 
which  European  Governments  deem  necessary 
and  advisable.  Such  communications  as  we  hold 
with  foreign  Governments  must  be  secret,  must 
be  couched  in  a  terminology  commonly  under- 
stood in  Europe,  and  invariably  submitted  to 
the  European  Governments  before  given  to  the 
public  in  the  United  States.  Delays  we  must 
accept  without  repining;  secrecy  the  people  them- 
selves must  understand  to  be  the  essence  of  nego- 
tiation. We  must  at  least  permit  nothing  to  inter- 
fere with  the  impression  that  our  notes  are  really 
directed  to  those  Governments  for  whom  they 
are  ostensibly  intended,  if  we  are  not  to  incur  sus- 
picion of  negotiating  hi  bad  faith.  We  must 
at  least  extend  to  them  the  courtesy  of  sufficient 
time  to  read  the  communication,  prepare  and 
submit  a  satisfactory  answer  before  we  make 
public  the  cause  of  the  difficulty. 

Indeed,  the  European  diplomats  have  objected 
not  so  much  to  the  policy  of  President  Wilson, 
nor  to  the  contents  and  language  of  his  communi- 
cations, as  they  have  to  the  immediate  publica- 
tion of  the  documents  before  their  receipt  by  the 
foreign  Government.  Delicate  negotiations,  they 
claim,  cannot  be  conducted  in  such  fashion,  and 

206 


FOREIGN  ALLIANCE  IMPERATIVE 

if  reparation  and  apology  are  desired,  they  can 
be  best  obtained  by  quiet,  diplomatic  methods. 
No  nation  can  be  expected  so  to  sacrifice  its 
notion  of  right  conduct  as  publicly  to  confess  in 
as  palpable  a  manner  as  the  President  has  de- 
manded of  Germany  and  Austria  the  conscious 
commission  of  brutal  crimes,  ordered  by  the 
National  Government  itself  in  entire  contraven- 
tion with  the  most  rudimentary  ideas  of  human- 
ity and  civilization.  According  to  European 
standards,  such  diplomacy  is  neither  expedient 
nor  equitable.  It  deprives  Germany  and  Austria 
of  all  reasonable  possibility  of  satisfying  the  de- 
mands of  the  United  States  in  ways  to  which 
public  opinion  in  those  countries  will  subscribe. 
It  will  not  be  possible  in  future  for  the  United 
States  to  appeal  to  international  law  as  a  more 
definite  and  well  accepted  standard  than  the 
great  powers  of  Europe  believe  it  to  be.  Such 
principles  as  are  established  by  general  consent 
they  will  no  doubt  be  willing  to  observe,  but  they 
will  expect  us  in  our  own  dealings  with  them  to 
accept  the  European  standard  of  international 
conduct  and  will  not  expect  us  to  impose  upon 
them  standards  of  international  conduct  which 
we  ourselves  erect.  The  opinion  of  the  many  will 
in  this  case,  as  in  all  others,  outweigh  those  of  one. 
Something  of  the  American  doctrine  of  the  un- 
constitutionality  of  law  has  been  very  clear  in 

207 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

American  diplomatic  statements.  The  President 
has  unconsciously  looked  upon  the  corpus  of  in- 
ternational law  as  he  would  upon  our  own  defi- 
nite written  constitution  and  has  assumed  that 
all  acts  inconsistent  with  it  were  for  that  reason 
illegal.  Such  a  notion  is  not  familiar  to  Euro- 
peans, who  are  apt  to  regard  such  things  as  are 
not  definitely  settled  as  unlegal,  not  illegal.  It 
has  been  difficult,  therefore,  for  them  to  accept 
a  notion  of  disobedience  to  international  law 
really  founded  upon  a  concept  unfamiliar  to  their 
legal  code. 

Our  international  status  will  be  largely  con- 
ditional upon  the  united  sentiments  of  the 
American  public.  So  long  as  we  present  the  ap- 
pearance of  a  conglomeration  of  European  nation- 
alities rather  than  of  a  nationality  distinct  and 
separate,  the  Government's  hands  in  negotiations 
will  be  tied  by  the  European  consciousness  of  our 
inability  to  rely  upon  the  prompt  and  unques- 
tioning support  of  American  citizens.  The  Gov- 
ernment must  speak  with  one  tongue;  it  must 
represent  no  divided  allegiance;  in  some  way  the 
hyphenated  American  must  disappear.  Legally, 
double  allegiance  is  an  impossibility:  a  man  can- 
not be  at  the  same  time  an  American  citizen  and 
a  citizen  of  another  nation.  Spiritually,  he  is  also 
an  anomaly,  for  his  true  allegiance  and  his  tech- 
nical allegiance  are  not  the  same.  The  mere  fact 

208 


that  present  Americans  possess  a  certain  intel- 
lectual sympathy  with  the  country  of  their  birth, 
or  with  the  country  from  which  their  progenitors 
came,  is  in  America  of  little  consequence.  It  be- 
comes significant  the  moment  European  Gov- 
ernments rely  upon  action  from  American  citi- 
zens previously  of  that  nationality.  The  Federal 
Government  must  take  prompt  and,  if  necessary, 
strenuous  measures  to  assure  the  European  Gov- 
ernments of  their  failure  to  appreciate  the 
strength  of  American  patriotism.  We  shall  not 
expect  to  change  normal  habits  and  social  prefer- 
ences or  spiritual  sympathies  and  ideals,  but  we 
can  convince  all  European  nations  that  American 
citizens  cannot  be  relied  upon  to  support  policies 
of  foreign  States  unless  the  United  States  itself, 
as  a  nation,  decides  advisedly  to  advance  them. 
Somehow,  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
must  bring  into  the  European  mind  a  clear  con- 
sciousness of  this  fact.  There  must  never  be  in 
the  United  States  a  question  of  the  possibility 
even  of  a  public  challenge  of  the  right  of  the 
Government  to  every  citizen's  undivided  alle- 
giance. 

Something  approaching  permanence  of  diplo- 
matic tenure  will  be  a  necessary  prerequisite  of  a 
foreign  alliance  for  the  United  States.  It  is  in  the 
fundamental  character  of  American  administra- 
tion that  the  Europeans  will  find  their  true  ob- 

209 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

jections  to  an  alliance.  The  chief  officials  of  the 
Federal  Government  are  elected  or  appointed 
for  short  terms,  are  commonly  not  reflected  or 
reappointed,  and  are  usually  men  without  dip- 
lomatic experience  and  without  familiarity  with 
European  history  or  international  politics.  The 
diplomats  whom  we  have  sent  abroad  to  im- 
portant courts  have  at  times  lacked  a  knowledge 
of  even  the  rudiments  of  the  country's  language 
and  have  possessed  few  compensating  qualities 
of  intelligence  and  information.  Nor  has  the 
secrecy,  considered  in  Europe  so  vital  to  all  dip- 
lomatic discussions,  been  observed  in  America, 
even  by  high  officials  while  in  office.  The  Amer- 
ican people  have  been  so  often  taken  into  the 
confidence  of  the  Government  in  foreign  affairs, 
important  negotiations  have  been  so  often  pub- 
lished before  the  European  Government  itself 
had  read  the  communication  of  the  United  States, 
that  all  European  statesmen  naturally  hesitate 
to  reveal  to  Americans  those  truly  vital  consid- 
erations upon  which  European  policies  are 
founded.  Nor  will  they  view  with  favor  the  idea 
of  a  growing  constituency  of  men  who  return  to 
public  life  with  no  probability  of  holding  office 
again  and  at  the  same  time  furnished  with  in- 
formation about  European  secrets.  Diplomacy 
in  Europe  is  a  profession.  The  first  qualifications 
are  information,  linguistic  ability,  tact,  and  social 

210 


FOREIGN  ALLIANCE  IMPERATIVE 

capacity;  the  second  is  length  of  office.  The  se- 
crets of  the  world  cannot  be  trusted  to  too  many 
heads.  It  is  difficult  enough  to  keep  a  few  lips 
closed;  twelve  or  thirteen  new  pairs  of  lips  every 
four  years  would  be  inconceivably  more  difficult 
to  silence. 

The  advantages  of  a  foreign  alliance  are  tran- 
scendent in  importance.  What  we  cannot  do  for 
ourselves,  our  ally  or  allies  can  and  will  perform. 
The  cumulative  strategic,  economic,  military, 
and  naval  power  of  the  coalition  itself  will  stand 
behind  all  reasonable  and  equitable  demands  of 
the  United  States.  War  becomes  unnecessary. 
The  coalition  can  easily  obtain  for  us  from  its 
enemies  more  than  the  unaided  strength  of  the 
United  States  could  ever  extort,  even  were  pre- 
paredness carried  to  the  point  of  independence, 
while  from  the  coalition  itself  our  interests  will 
receive  all  due  and  proper  consideration  in  rec- 
ognition of  those  services  which  we  ourselves 
render.  The  limitations  imposed  upon  American 
demands  by  an  alliance  can  never  be  as  consid- 
erable as  those  which  an  attempted  isolation 
would  make  imperative.  The  privileges  and  pro- 
tection which  the  alliance  will  secure  for  us  be- 
yond a  peradventure  will  always  be  greater  than 
those  diplomacy  could  obtain  unaided.  If  be- 
tween us  and  our  own  allies  we  must  depend 
upon  diplomacy  and  arbitration,  and  mus^expect 

211 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

to  demand  less  than  the  maximum,  it  will  still  be 
true  that  against  the  enemies  of  the  coalition 
we  may  frequently  hope  by  means  of  concerted 
pressure  to  obtain  the  maximum.  If  we  stand 
alone,  we  shall  invariably  receive  the  minimum. 
Only  in  this  way  can  the  United  States  at  present 
advance  those  interests  which  European  powers 
will  not  voluntarily  advance  themselves.  If 
pressure  is  necessary  to  advance  and  protect 
what  we  feel  we  must  have,  and  we  ourselves  are 
incapable  of  exerting  that  pressure,  we  can  ob- 
tain what  we  desire  only  by  the  help  of  others 
and  we  can  obtain  that  aid  only  by  alliance. 


212 


CHAPTER  XIV 

ALLIANCE  WITH   GREAT  BRITAIN 

THERE  is  in  the  world  at  present  only  one  power 
whom  we  are  able  to  serve  in  our  present  condi- 
tion, only  one  power  who  is  likely  to  render  us 
at  present  the  services  we  really  need.  We  can 
afford  to  pay  the  necessary  price  for  an  alliance 
with  this  power.  We  can  strengthen  her  and 
she  can  in  turn  strengthen  us.  Nor  will  an  alli- 
ance in  any  way  interfere  with  the  security  of 
both  nations.  Her  position  does  not  threaten 
ours,  nor  does  ours  menace  hers.  It  is  also  su- 
premely fortunate  that  this  power,  with  whose 
interests  ours  so  nearly  coincide,  should  be  that 
nation  clearly  allied  to  us  in  language,  blood,  law, 
and  religion.  Institutions,  traditions,  and  ideals 
are  also  in  substantial  harmony:  their  habits 
of  thought  are  in  the  main  ours;  those  supreme 
ends  of  national  existence  for  which  they  struggle 
are  all  but  the  same  as  our  own.  Where  perma- 
nent and  fundamental  factors  of  association  and 
understanding,  where  the  national  acquaintance- 
ship between  two  great  peoples  already  exist  to 
so  considerable  a  degree,  it  is  almost  providential 

213 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

that  the  advantages  of  an  alliance  between  them 
could  be  so  nearly  mutual.  An  alliance  with 
Great  Britain  will  secure  for  us  the  services  of 
the  sea  power  necessary  to  our  continued  pros- 
perity, and  will  also  place  behind  American  in- 
terests the  formidable  influence  and  armed  force 
of  one  of  the  most  potent  nations  in  the  world. 
Such  terms  we  could  not  extort  from  the  sea 
power  by  any  conceivable  exhibition  of  force  or 
by  any  economic  pressure  now  within  our  power 
or  likely  to  be  in  the  next  twenty  years. 

An  alliance  with  Great  Britain  should  become 
in  the  future  a  cornerstone  of  our  foreign  policy, 
as  her  institutions  have  been  the  fundamental 
influence  in  the  shaping  of  the  conditions  of 
American  life.1  Indeed,  if  we  achieve  such  a 
national  bond,  we  shall  merely  recognize  openly 
conditions  and  forces  long  in  operation  to  the 
mutual  advantage  of  both  countries.  Our  polity 
has  from  the  first  been  largely  dependent  upon 
the  control  of  the  seas  by  Great  Britain.  It 
made  America  English  in  speech,  English  in  law, 
Protestant  in  religion,  and  implanted  here  those 

1  The  proof  of  the  truth  of  this  statement  lies  in  the  history  of 
the  United  States  and  must  be  confessed  by  anyone  who  will  read 
it  with  an  open  mind.  My  proposals  in  this  chapter  rest  however 
upon  the  solid  grounds  of  interests  and  not  upon  the  insecure 
foundation  of  sentiment  or  prejudice.  These  factors  are  merely 
contributory;  they  strengthen  a  case  which  rests  upon  other  bases. 
To  have  expressed  in  this  chapter  the  qualifications,  modifications, 
and  reservations  which  crowd  my  mind  would  have  made  it  oc- 
cupy a  quarter  of  the  book. 

214 


ALLIANCE  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN 

ideals  of  freedom  and  liberty  which  the  American 
people  cherish  to-day  as  their  proudest  posses- 
sions. We  shall  merely  make  explicit  an  under- 
standing long  desired  by  a  considerable  portion 
of  the  population  in  both  nations  and  make 
definite  as  policy  what  has  been  constantly  un- 
dertaken in  the  name  of  expediency.1  While  we 
shall  be  no  more  dependent  upon  the  sea  power 
than  before,  nor  more  limited  in  our  national 
policies  by  her  ambitions  and  interests  than  has 
always  been  true,  we  shall  enormously  add  to 
our  international  status  and  achieve  an  ability 

1  The  heritage  of  Anti-British  feeling  from  the  post-revolu- 
tionary epoch,  and  Pro-German  and  Pro-Home  Rule  sentiment, 
will  influence  many  to  reject  these  statements  and  the  general 
position  I  have  taken  in  this  chapter  without  adequate  examina- 
tion. Others  will  feel  that  Washington's  dictum  about  entangling 
alliances  is  weighty  precedent  against  this  position.  While  it  is 
easy  to  show  that  Jefferson  feared  England,  it  is  not  less  easy  to 
prove  that  Washington,  Hamilton,  Jay,  Franklin,  and  others  whose 
reputation  for  wisdom  is  to-day  superior  to  Jefferson's,  wished  for 
a  connection  with  England  as  close  as  could  be  obtained.  They 
saw  in  1789  that  the  Revolution  had  solved  some  problems  at  the 
expense  of  others,  and,  while  willing  to  sacrifice  everything  to  the 
maintenance  of  political  independence  of  England,  declared  that 
the  English  control  of  the  seas  forced  upon  us  an  alliance  upon  such 
terms  as  we  could  obtain.  The  Anti-Federalists  however  advocated 
so  strongly  a  French  alliance,  that  Washington,  in  order  to  pre- 
vent it,  declared  himself  in  favor  of  no  alliances  at  all.  If  we  would 
not  ally  with  England,  it  was  suicide  for  us  to  ally  with  any  other 
power.  It  did  not  seem  wise  to  devote  so  much  space  in  a  brief 
book  to  the  discussion  of  a  question  of  precedent,  which  is  after  all 
too  old  and  concerned  a  situation  too  different  from  ours  at  present 
to  claim  decisive  importance.  I  earnestly  beg  my  readers  to  con- 
sider carefully  this  issue  of  alliance  quite  apart  from  traditions 
and  emotional  sympathies  for  other  countries.  This  is  too  serious 
an  issue  to  be  decided  upon  any  basis  except  the  clearest  reason, 
logic,  and  expediency. 

215 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

to  protect  and  advance  American  interests  which 
we  have  never  possessed  in  the  past.  Few  actual 
changes  will  be  necessary;  the  advantages  are 
certain;  the  moral  influence  of  such  an  alliance 
is  incalculable,  not  only  in  American  affairs  but 
in  world  politics. 

We  shall  at  once  achieve  all  the  more  imme- 
diate results  of  economic  independence  —  an 
adequate  merchant  marine,  satisfactory  exchange 
facilities,  the  necessary  supplies  of  capital  for 
the  development  of  American  industries.  We 
shall  at  once  attain  a  new  international  status. 
Some  position  we  have  undoubtedly  had  by 
reason  of  our  bare  existence,  but  international 
status  in  the  true  sense  of  the  word  we  have  never 
possessed,  because  our  relations  to  the  powers 
of  Europe  had  yet  to  be  defined,  established,  and 
accepted.  We  have  been  independent  in  fact; 
we  have  been  sovereign  in  theory.  Once  allied 
to  the  sea  power,  we  shall  become  in  all  proba- 
bility a  member  of  an  international  concert  of 
eight,  containing  the  six  great  European  nations, 
the  United  States,  and  Japan.  So  clear  and 
significant  an  international  status  we  have  never 
possessed.  Nor  can  we  by  any  conceivable  exer- 
cise of  our  own  military  or  economic  force  achieve 
it. 

Security  will  also  be  ours.  The  sea  power  in 
its  own  interests  will  guard  our  shores:  fleets 

216 


ALLIANCE  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN 

and  armies  able  to  reach  us  despite  her  will  so 
endanger  her  independence  that  nothing  short 
of  national  annihilation  can  lead  her  to  coun- 
tenance their  existence.  She  must  fall  before  we 
can  be  endangered,  once  a  definite  alliance  has 
made  the  interests  of  the  countries  one.  Great 
Britain's  assistance  —  and  an  alliance  with 
Great  Britain  will  certainly  mean  a  tacit  alliance 
with  her  European  allies  —  will  at  once  assure 
the  advancement  of  all  equitable  interpretations 
of  American  interests  and  privileges.  In  time  of 
peace  we  shall  enjoy  the  identical  advantages 
enjoyed  by  the  citizens  of  our  allies;  in  time  of 
war  we  shall  be  subjected  to  no  disabilities  det- 
rimental to  our  interests  from  which  they  do 
not  also  suffer  in  the  common  cause.  In  exchange 
for  the  one  we  shall  willingly  accept  the  other.  ; 
The  question  of  neutral  rights  will  no  longer 
exist  for  us.  We  shall  be  one  of  the  belligerents  in 
any  war  that  follows;  our  interests  will  become 
those  of  the  sea  power  and  such  restrictions  re-  , 
garding  contraband  and  freedom  of  access  as 
become  expedient  we  shall  naturally  expect  the 
sea  power  to  enforce  in  the  interests  of  all.  An 
alliance  will  carry  necessarily  the  acceptance  of 
the  sea  power's  interests,  ambitions,  and  safety 
as  essential  limitations  upon  the  extent  of 
American  interests  and  privileges  attainable  at 
any  one  moment.  She  cannot  be  expected  to 

217 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

yield  what  she  believes  to  be  indispensable  to 
her  security  merely  to  increase  the  profits  of 
private  citizens  in  the  United  States.  Nor  shall 
we,  on  our  part,  expect  her  to  demand  from  us 
similar  sacrifices.  We  have  already  declined  to 
sacrifice  our  national  interests  in  Mexico  to  pro- 
tect the  property  of  British  citizens.  Such  claims 
as  we  have  recently  advanced,  such  policies  as 
we  have  advocated  in  the  past  inconsistent  with 
this  position,  must  naturally  be  abandoned.  We 
must  display  that  degree  of  magnanimity,  that 
love  of  equity,  that  readiness  to  accept  her 
decision  as  to  what  is  indispensable  to  her 
safety  and  prosperity  as  we  shall  expect  her  to 
display  when  our  own  interests  are  involved. 

The  American  people  must  clearly  grasp  the 
fact  that  beneath  our  disputes  with  the  sea 
power  has  always  lain  discontent  with  our  own 
economic  disabilities  and  a  determination  to 
eliminate  them.  It  cannot  be  done  by  force,  and 
least  of  all  by  assaults  upon  the  sea  power.  We 
can  literally  afford  to  advance  all  worthy  in- 
terests of  Great  Britain,  and  she  can  agree  to 
promote  all  necessary  American  interests,  with- 
out either  nation  undertaking  to  fulfill  more  than 
is  consistent  with  the  safety  and  prosperity  of 
both. 

What  can  we  conceivably  under  present  cir- 
cumstances perform  for  Great  Britain  which  will 

218 


ALLIANCE  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN 

give  us  adequate  reason  for  crediting  her  fidelity 
to  an  alliance  in  which  the  advantages  are  at 
first  sight  overwhelmingly  in  our  favor?  It  will 
be  idle  for  us  to  enumerate  any  particular  serv- 
ices of  such  a  nature  as  those  which  the  United 
States  at  present  renders  to  Great  Britain  and  her 
allies.  There  is  no  promise  of  a  continuance  of 
such  conditions  as  now  persist,  nor  any  assur- 
ance of  a  recurrence  of  such  conditions  in  future 
crises,  and  naturally  no  possible  knowledge  of 
the  policy  of  future  statesmen  in  Great  Britain 
and  in  the  United  States.  Our  alliance  with  the 
sea  power  can  rest  only  upon  the  solid  ground 
of  the  sea  power's  strategic  weakness. 

It  is  the  island  position  of  Great  Britain  —  the 
slender  natural  resources,  the  small  area,  the 
thronging  population  —  which  creates  a  position 
strategically  strong  but  economically  vulner- 
able and  renders  an  alliance  with  the  United 
States  advantageous.  From  the  manifest  dif- 
ficulties which  this  position  involves  results  a 
belief  in  the  imperative  necessity  for  a  control  of 
the  ocean  highways.  Inevitably  British  policy 
becomes  contrary  to  the  interests  of  other  Eu- 
ropean nations,  for  it  assumes  that  the  defense 
of  Great  Britain  rests  upon  her  control  of  their 
communications.  A  coalition  against  her  is 
therefore  always  possible  in  Europe.  Yet  com- 
pelled by  her  island  position  thus  to  array  her- 

219 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

self  against  continental  Europe,  she  has  been 
driven  by  her  inability  to  feed  herself  and  to 
produce  the  supplies  of  raw  materials  which  her 
factories  need  to  retain  at  all  costs  the  friend- 
ship of  a  part  of  the  powers  on  the  continent. 
She  must  demand  from  others  the  ability  to  hold 
them  at  bay,  while  unable  to  make  her  defensive 
position  truly  invulnerable  by  literally  achiev- 
ing independence.  In  some  way  access  must  be 
maintained  to  the  food  supplies  of  the  Baltic, 
the  Black  Sea,  and  the  Mediterranean;  in  some 
way  markets  must  be  secured  in  Europe  for  the 
finished  manufactures  of  British  looms.  The 
fleet  must  isolate  the  British  Isles  from  Europe; 
diplomacy  must  maintain  contact.  A  coalition 
against  her  to  strip  her  of  her  control  of  the  sea 
in  the  general  interest  must  be  made  an  im- 
possibility. Isolation  without  separation,  con- 
tact without  danger,  are  precisely  what  she  must 
achieve. 

An  alliance  with  the  United  States  will  free 
Great  Britain  from  much  of  this  imperative 
necessity  for  interference  in  European  politics. 
Indeed,  the  growth  of  the  United  States  alone 
has  already  freed  the  sea  power  from  many  of 
its  greatest  difficulties.  Yet  until  formally  allied 
with  us,  she  can  never  be  sure  of  attaining  that 
invulnerability  which  the  conscious  develop- 
ment of  the  industrial  structure  of  both  nations 

220 


ALLIANCE  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN 

might  achieve,  should  it  be  directed  so  as  to 
make  the  one  complementary  to  the  other. 
Easily,  cheaply,  advantageously,  this  can  be  done. 
We  may  prepare  to  supply  Great  Britain  with 
everything  needed  in  peace  and  war,  while  she 
can  prepare  to  utilize  our  own  great  exports  of 
raw  materials  and  to  send  us  in  addition  only 
those  manufactured  goods  which  we  cannot  ad- 
vantageously make  ourselves. 

One  of  the  imperative  needs  for  the  United 
States  in  the  near  future  is  a  supply  of  capital 
adequate  for  the  development  of  American  re- 
sources. One  of  the  imperative  necessities  for 
Great  Britain  will  be  an  opportunity  for  the 
investment  of  capital  in  a  country  where  its  use 
will  not  contribute,  as  it  has  in  Germany,  to  the 
creation  of  a  hostile  economic  area  likely  in  the 
future  to  attempt  political  or  economic  measures 
detrimental  to  her  true  welfare.  All  of  the  great 
European  countries  demanding  capital  —  Ger- 
many, Austria,  Italy,  Russia  —  do  imperil  her  in- 
terests and  safety  by  their  location  and  ambitions. 
To  the  extent  she  aids  in  their  development 
or  promotes  their  prosperity,  she  is  creating 
forces  which  may  be  turned  against  her.  No 
great  civilized  country  offers  so  peculiar  a  com- 
bination of  safety  and  profit  in  the  investment 
of  capital  for  British  financiers  as  does  the 
United  States.  No  other  nation  can  Great  Britain 

221 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

see  growing  by  leaps  and  bounds  with  that  same 
complacency.  We  shall  thus  be  assured  of  a 
necessary  investment;  we  shall  assure  the  British 
of  the  safety  and  profitableness  of  the  transaction. 
Our  interests  are  not  identical,  but  the  advan- 
tages will  be  mutual. 

Now  should  Germany  win  a  military  victory 
on  the  continent  sufficient  to  extort  from  the 
allied  armies  terms  of  peace,  only  an  alliance 
with  the  United  States  can  permit  the  British  to 
continue  the  struggle.  Without  the  assistance  of 
land  power  the  sea  power  has  never  been  able 
to  defy  the  dominant  military  nation  in  Europe. 
Many  a  time  by  the  assiduous  use  of  its  own 
peculiar  advantages  it  has  prepared  a  victory 
for  its  allies;  invariably  their  defeat  has  forced 
upon  it  the  necessity  of  recognizing  temporarily 
the  dominant  military  power.  Even  if  the  Ger- 
mans should  be  compelled  by  the  inconclusive 
character  of  their  victory  to  agree  to  a  settle- 
ment by  no  means  extreme,  even  should  the 
British  retain  undisputed  control  of  the  sea, 
nothing  short  of  an  alliance  with  the  United 
States  and  the  willingness  of  this  country  to 
sustain  Great  Britain  against  the  European  vic- 
tors can  permit  the  sea  power  to  decline  to 
accept  the  result  of  the  conflict  on  shore.  For 
the  United  States,  therefore,  the  present  mo- 
ment is  a  more  favorable  time  to  make  over- 

222 


ALLIANCE  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN 

tures  to   Great   Britain   than  any  in  the  last 
century. 

For  the  United  States  the  true  necessity  is 
not  only  that  of  an  alliance  with  the  sea  power, 
but  of  an  alliance  with  Great  Britain  in  posses- 
sion of  the  sea  power.  While  unquestionably 
any  European  nation  which  may  succeed  in 
wresting  the  maritime  supremacy  from  Great 
Britain  will  be  in  large  measure  governed  in  her 
use  of  it  by  something  of  that  same  caution  and 
discretion  which  the  British  have  found  expedi- 
ent, there  is  no  nation  whose  fundamental  posi- 
tion itself  insures  for  the  United  States  so  great 
a  measure  of  safety  and  advantage.  To  speak  in 
such  a  connection  as  this  of  temporary  policies, 
of  the  character  of  statesmen  now  in  power,  of 
existing  economic  conditions,  is  to  base  our 
judgment  upon  the  sands  of  the  international 
fabric.  In  essence,  we  are  asking  whether  it  is 
wiser  for  the  United  States  to  exert  herself  to 
the  utmost  to  maintain  the  present  position  of 
Great  Britain,  or  passively  watch  Germany  se- 
cure control  of  the  seas,  if  she  can,  and  ally  with 
her  in  preference. 

It  should  be  obvious  that  the  island  position 
of  Great  Britain  does  create  more  imperative 
limitations  upon  her  use  of  her  naval  supremacy 
than  does  the  land  position  of  Germany.  The 
lack  of  natural  defenses  on  the  English  coasts  so 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

complicates  the  'defense  of  the  island  after  the 
invader  has  once  landed  that  defense  is  prob- 
lematical. For  Great  Britain,  therefore,  a  stand- 
ing army  is  inexpedient,  and  without  it  no 
schemes  of  aggression  or  conquest  involving  the 
destruction  of  the  political  domination  of  for- 
eign countries  can  be  undertaken.  For  Ger- 
many, on  the  other  hand,  the  existence  of  Russia 
and  the  absence  of  natural  defenses  make  im- 
perative a  standing  army  of  vast  size,  whose  very 
existence  makes  possible  the  aggressive  use  of  the 
sea  power.  While  a  policy  requiring  the  contin- 
ued absence  of  any  considerable  part  of  the  army 
from  German  soil  would  be  dangerous  and  there- 
fore inexpedient,  it  will  always  be  a  simple 
matter,  should  Germany  obtain  the  dominant 
position  on  the  continent,  to  spare  temporarily 
an  army  large  enough  to  undertake  the  invasion 
and  political  domination  of  any  minor  European, 
African,  or  South  American  country. 

For  Great  Britain  the  inexpediency  of  the 
action  is  greater  than  for  Germany,  because 
there  is  no  domestic  need  for  the  weapon  essen- 
tial to  the  execution  of  such  a  policy.  So  long 
as  the  navy  remains  all  powerful,  the  creation  of 
a  permanent  standing  army  will  be  an  aggressive 
act  too  unprovoked  for  British  public  opinion 
to  approve.  We  must  not  forget  that  the  public 
mind  in  all  European  countries  has  definitely 

224 


ALLIANCE  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN 

decided  that  conquest  and  aggression  in  the 
crude,  gross  sense  are  both  unethical  and  inex- 
pedient. Yet  the  defensive  needs  of  Germany 
provide  what  defensive  needs  make  impossible 
in  Great  Britain.  This  is  a  fundamental  con- 
sideration for  the  United  States  of  the  very  first 
importance,  for  it  tends  to  free  Germany  from 
the  same  necessity  for  caution  and  magnanimity 
which  Great  Britain  has  found  imperative. 
The  control  of  the  seas,  added  to  the  military 
domination  of  Europe,  would  make  the  defensive 
strength  of  Germany  so  enormous  that  she  need 
be  in  no  such  immediate  fear  of  a  coalition 
against  her  or  of  an  impending  attack  upon  her 
territorial  integrity  or  political  independence 
from  which  Great  Britain  has  never  been  able  to 
rid  herself.  Magnanimous  conduct,  expedient 
for  Germany,  is  imperative  for  Great  Britain, 
and  any  other  policy  at  once  endangers  the  exist- 
ence of  the  weapon  itself.  An  aggressive  use  of 
the  sea  power  is  considered  in  Great  Britain 
almost  beyond  the  pale  of  sanity. 

For  the  United  States  the  continuance  of  the 
control  of  the  sea  by  Great  Britain  is  also  desir- 
able because  no  other  European  State  possesses 
to  the  same  degree  an  interest  in  an  alliance  with 
us.  Certainly  no  other  State  would  find  an 
American  alliance  so  advantageous  and  there- 
fore be  willing  to  grant  us  as  advantageous 

225 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

terms;  certainly  the  interests  of  no  other  State 
so  clearly  assure  the  continuance  of  the  con- 
nection, and  if  we  are  to  depend  upon  the  alli- 
ance to  secure  for  us  the  results  of  independence, 
we  must  see  clearly  the  probability  of  its  contin- 
uance. Our  economic  structure  is  closely  com- 
plementary to  that  of  Great  Britain.  Definitely 
she  lacks  adequate  supplies  of  food  and  raw 
materials;  definitely  we  lack  certain  types  of 
manufactured  goods.  She  needs  precisely  what 
it  is  essential  for  us  to  sell;  she  makes  precisely 
what  it  has  been  necessary  for  us  to  buy.  While 
we  must  not  forget  the  fundamental  and  profit- 
able relations  between  the  United  States  and 
other  European  countries,  the  fundamental  ad- 
vantages in  trade  with  Great  Britain  are  more 
extensive. 

Her  important  supplies  must  reach  her  by 
sea;  this  alone  gives  the  United  States  a  strik- 
ing advantage.  For  Germany  communication 
with  us  in  times  of  crisis  will  always  be  perilous 
and  undependable  because  of  the  necessity 
of  ocean  transport  which  the  German  army, 
her  primary  defensive  force,  can  neither  estab- 
lish nor  protect.  The  same  peril  undoubtedly 
exists  in  the  case  of  Great  Britain,  but  the  con- 
dition indispensable  to  our  access  to  Europe  is 
also  indispensable  for  her  contact  with  any  part 
of  the  world.  She  therefore  maintains  as  her 

226 


ALLIANCE  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN 

primary  interest  the  control  of  the  ocean  which 
any  ally  of  ours  in  Europe  must  possess.  Ger- 
many could  only  regard  contact  with  us  as  of 
secondary  importance  and  would  sacrifice  no 
dispositions  of  primary  import  to  preserve  it. 

An  alliance  with  the  United  States  will  vitally 
strengthen  Great  Britain  in  warfare  with  con- 
tinental nations,  for  we  can  supply  her  what  in 
time  of  war  she  has  had  to  obtain  by  advancing 
the  interests  and  ambitions  of  other  European 
nations.  She  has  been  forced  to  sacrifice  second- 
ary interests  to  protect  her  integrity  and  inde- 
pendence. Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  finds 
herself,  once  the  English  fleet  is  beaten,  threat- 
ened from  the  east  and  not  from  the  west.  Our 
assistance  is  of  minor  consequence  and  in  no 
degree  whatever  indispensable.  What  we  have 
to  sell  she  also  produces;  what  she  herself  wishes 
to  sell  she  can  easily  dispose  of  to  her  own 
neighbors.  Sea-borne  commerce  is  perhaps  es- 
sential for  German  prosperity;  it  may  even  be 
significant  if  Germany  is  to  maintain  a  certain 
rate  of  growth;  but  it  can  never  be  at  any  one 
moment  indispensable  to  her  existence.  The 
experience  of  the  war  has  shown  the  possibility 
of  subsistence  for  Germans  from  German  re- 
sources alone,  and  a  dominant  Germany  can 
certainly  maintain  herself  in  prosperity  by  access 
to  the  markets  of  her  neighbors.  In  times  of 

227 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

crisis,  therefore,  an  alliance  with  the  United 
States  may  be  indispensable  to  Great  Britain; 
it  can  never  be  an  essential  element  in  German 
defense.  We  may  be  a  desirable  friend  for  Ger- 
many, but  an  alliance  can  never  assume  primary 
importance. 

At  the  same  time  until  Great  Britain  is 
beaten  at  sea  and  Germany  supreme  on  the 
continent  the  United  States  is  a  very  desirable 
ally  because  Great  Britain  and  France  are  thus 
deprived  of  an  economic  assistance  of  the  first 
importance.  As  the  present  war  has  shown, 
Germany  can  close  to  them  the  great  Baltic  and 
Black  Sea  grain  markets,  and  if  she  could  also 
by  alliance  prevent  access  to  the  American  sup- 
ply, they  would  find  the  problem  of  sustenance 
more  than  difficult  of  solution.  The  United 
States  navy,  too,  impotent  if  pitted  alone  against 
the  British  fleet,  would  make  a  respectable  aux- 
iliary squadron  for  the  German  navy  and  make 
good  much  of  its  present  inferiority  in  capital 
ships.  If  the  latter  could  use  American  harbors 
as  a  base  of  operations,  it  could  risk  a  dash  from 
the  North  Sea  into  the  open  ocean,  there  to 
attempt  the  outmaneuvering  of  the  British  as 
a  prelude  to  their  annihilation.  For  such  pur- 
poses an  alliance  with  Germany  would  have  no 
advantages  for  the  United  States.  There  is  no 
conceivable  gam  for  us  in  the  opening  of  the  seas 

228 


ALLIANCE  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN 

to  all  nations  on  the  same  terms  until  we  are 
able  to  take  advantage  of  the  opportunity  with 
a  merchant  marine  of  our  own. 

No  other  continental  nations  need  be  consid- 
ered as  possible  allies  of  the  United  States  be- 
cause none,  except  Great  Britain  and  Germany, 
are  in  any  position  to  control  the  sea.  Our  re- 
lationship to  all  other  nations  in  the  world  will 
thus  be  defined  by  an  alliance  with  one  or  the 
other  of  the  major  powers  on  the  sea.  It  is  only 
necessary  to  add  that  any  other  continental 
nation  than  Germany  which  may  become  power- 
ful on  the  sea  in  subsequent  years  will  hold  that 
same  fundamental  relationship  to  the  United 
States  which  Germany  now  has.  It  is  advanta- 
geous for  us  to  keep  the  control  of  the  sea  out  of 
the  hands  of  any  powerful  continental  nation. 

From  the  present  balance  of  power  in  Europe, 
from  the  difference  between  the  present  balance 
of  power  in  Europe,  in  Asia,  and  in  Africa,  flow 
precisely  those  circumstances  most  favorable 
to  the  United  States.  The  destruction  of  this 
delicate  balance  in  favor  of  either  coalition  will 
make  a  distinct  difference  to  American  interests, 
but  unquestionably  the  victory  of  the  Allies  will 
further  the  interests  of  those  powers  who  find 
the  position  of  the  United  States  most  essential 
to  them.  In  the  markets  of  undeveloped  coun- 
tries, the  victory  of  the  Allies  is  also  more  favor- 

229 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

able  for  the  United  States  than  a  victory  of  the 
Central  Empires.  Both,  to  be  sure,  will  be  freed 
from  those  fears  of  trouble  in  Europe  which  have 
tied  their  hands  for  a  generation  in  all  other 
countries;  neither  will  be  as  ready  to  countenance 
slight  encroachments  or  dissemble  its  real  am- 
bitions; both  will  extend  to  the  maximum  their 
operations  in  the  markets  they  at  present  control 
or  which  fall  into  their  hands.  They  will  absorb 
a  considerable  section  of  our  present  abnormal 
war  trade  and  limit  in  many  ways  our  possibili- 
ties for  future  expansion.  Neither  will  need  to 
use  force  against  us,  for  their  economic  superior- 
ity will  give  them  exactly  what  they  want,  once 
the  other  has  been  eliminated. 

But  the  Central  Empires  would  more  probably 
extend  their  operations  to  a  point  really  detri- 
mental to  us  and  would  be  less  certain  to  concede 
anything  to  us,  even  should  we  ally  with  them. 
After  all,  the  Allies  are  fighting  merely  to  main- 
tain what  they  have,  and  that  has  not  proved 
particularly  detrimental  to  us,  nor  is  it  likely  to. 
Germany  and  Austria  very  frankly  confess  their 
intention  to  obtain  what  they  do  not  now  pos- 
sess and  their  determination  to  take  it  by  force 
where  it  can  be  had.  In  South  America  they 
will  find  the  field  of  least  resistance,  because  in 
Africa  and  Asia  they  must  compete  with  the 
political  authority  of  Great  Britain,  France,  and 

230 


ALLIANCE  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN 

Russia,  and  whatever  domain  they  create,  they 
must  always  expect  to  maintain  and  administer. 
South  America  will  not  require  administration 
nor  protection  by  force  and  will  permit  the 
Germans  to  retain  at  home  the  maximum  popu- 
lation, which  is  to  their  thinking  a  matter  of 
prime  consideration.  That  the  Central  Empires 
can  so  decisively  win  in  Europe  as  to  obtain 
whatever  they  want,  that  Germany  can  take 
from  Great  Britain  the  literal  control  of  the 
seas,  seems  to  most  observers  incredible.  If  the 
Central  Powers  win  at  all,  it  will  be  a  qualified 
victory,  followed  by  a  settlement  in  the  nature 
of  a  distinct  compromise.  The  easiest  concession 
for  the  Allies  to  make  will  be  the  control  of 
Asia  Minor  by  Germany  and  Austria  and  a  free 
hand  for  both  in  South  America,  leaving  Great  ; 
Britain  and  France  still  supreme  in  Africa  and  ; 
Asia. 

No  political  dominion  will  be  conceded,  be- 
cause European  nations  possess  none  in  South 
America,1  nor  will  the  present  investments  of 
capital  be  interfered  with.  What  the  Germans 
wish  is  the  ability  to  create  under  the  most  favor- 
able conditions  a  future  market  by  an  untram- 
meled  opportunity  to  invest  their  own  capital 
and  to  create  social  preferences  and  habits  of 
life  which  German  goods  will  be  needed  to  satisfy. 

1  Except  Guiana. 
231 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

A  mere  gentleman's  agreement  between  the 
nations  most  concerned  will  be  amply  sufficient 
to  answer  all  their  purposes.  The  Germans  and 
Austrians  are  far  less  certain  than  the  British  to 
concede  us  any  privileges  of  value  at  present  and 
much  more  likely  to  undertake  elaborate  meas- 
ures of  development  which  will  exclude  us,  in 
common  with  all  other  countries,  from  the  lion's 
share  of  the  South  American  market  for  half  a 
century  to  come.  Before  that  time  privileges  of 
investment  there  may  be  indispensable  for  us. 

Should  Great  Britain  be  defeated  on  the  sea, 
the  probable  result  is  far  more  likely  to  be  an 
emulation  for  the  control  of  the  sea  by  various 
nations  than  the  retention  of  control  by  Ger- 
many alone  or  anything  resembling  internation- 
alization.1 Rivalry  will  place  the  United  States 
at  a  grave  disadvantage,  by  compelling  us  to 
compete,  as  a  condition  of  retaining  any  privi- 
leges at  all,  under  serious  economic  disabili- 
ties.2 Not  only  would  the  effort  be  infinitely 
more  costly  than  any  in  which  an  alliance  with 
the  present  sea  power  may  involve  us,  but 
alliances  would  become  matters  of  difficulty; 


1  I  trust  that  this  opinion  will  not  be  confused  with  my  specu- 
lations in  this  chapter  and  elsewhere  as  to  the  result  if  Germany 
should  obtain  the  supremacy  on  the  sea  Great  Britain  has.  The 
two  are  contradictory  because  they  proceeded  from  contradictory 
premises. 

1  These  will  be  discussed  in  Chapter  XV. 
232 


ALLIANCE  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN 

concessions  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to 
secure  them  would  be  in  all  probability  greater; 
the  advancement  of  American  interests  less  in 
degree  than  under  an  alliance  with  the  present 
sea  power. 

As  far  as  a  council  is  concerned  for  the  con- 
trol of  the  seas  by  a  general  agreement  of  the 
powers,  it  is  hardly  probable  that  the  machin- 
ery of  such  an  executive  body  would  do  more  than 
reflect  in  the  barest  and  most  direct  way  the 
political  alliances  and  conditions  prevailing  in 
the  world  at  large.  If  no  power  actually  domi- 
nated the  sea,  the  result  would  be  a  constant 
emulation  for  the  control  of  the  council  between 
those  possessed  of  any  possibility  of  winning  su- 
premacy. Other  nations  whose  conditions  fore- 
closed effective  competition  would  exert  no 
efficient  influence.  What  the  strong  agreed  upon 
would  be  executed  by  the  council  upon  the  weak. 
Whatever  the  strong  disagreed  upon  would  in 
all  probability  remain  in  abeyance.  It  is  difficult 
to  see  how  any  international  body  or  council 
can,  by  its  mere  creation,  alter  conditions  which 
actually  exist.  It  might  be  indeed  a  step  in 
advance,  and  might  be  seen  half  a  century  hence 
to  have  produced  results  invisible  to  contem- 
poraries, but  as  an  immediate  expedient  none 
of  these  schemes  promise  anything  of  advantage 
to  European  powers  and  certainly  nothing  to 

233 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

the  United  States.  If  in  them  the  various  pow- 
ers are  ranked,  as  at  present,  in  accordance  with 
the  physical  force  they  are  organized  to  exert, 
the  United  States  will  hold  a  position  of  inferior- 
ity until  our  potential  strength  is  definitely 
organized. 

For  the  United  States  it  is  vastly  more  ex- 
pedient to  deal  with  Great  Britain,  whose  posi- 
tion itself  imposes  definite  limitations  upon  her 
discretion.  It  is  easier  to  consult  and  arrange 
with  a  single  administration,  already  possessed 
of  power  to  execute  such  measures  as  it  may  deem 
expedient,  to  say  nothing  of  its  long  experience, 
tried  discretion,  and  proved  magnanimity  toward 
us.  Once  more  we  must  beware  of  supposing 
that  international  councils  and  courts  will  be 
more  advantageous  to  the  United  States  because 
she  will  be  able  to  dominate  them.  There  is 
absolutely  every  reason  to  believe  unfounded 
such  ideas  of  an  American  domination  of  Euro- 
pean diplomacy  in  this  or  any  other  guise. 


234 


CHAPTER  XV 

RENUNCIATION   OF   MARITIME   AMBITIONS 

WHEN  we  talk  of  the  creation  of  an  American 
merchant  marine,  we  are  not  discussing  our 
ability  to  construct  ships  or  to  navigate  them; 
the  resources  of  the  country  and  the  talent  of 
its  citizens  are  not  questioned.  We  are  con- 
cerned with  our  ability  to  establish  for  ourselves 
cheaply,  promptly,  and  efficiently  a  merchant 
marine  large  enough  to  make  certain  our  con- 
tact with  the  rest  of  the  world.  While  we  shall 
not  cease  to  employ  foreign  vessels,  we  must 
prepare  to  dispense  with  their  services.  Only 
a  merchant  marine  of  great  magnitude,  composed 
of  large  vessels  as  well  as  small,  of  fast  liners  and 
tramp  steamers,  can  supply  our  needs.  Ships 
are  not  enough;  many  ships  will  not  suffice.  We 
want  enough  ships,  and  how  many  that  will  be 
in  the  future  no  man  can  tell. 

Why  should  any  country  to-day  seek  to  per- 
form for  itself  any  service  which  another  cheaply, 
profitably,  and  efficiently  has  discharged  for 
half  a  century?  Does  not  the  division  of  labor, 
the  interdependence  of  the  economic  world,  the 

235 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

interpenetration  of  national  fabrics  make  all 
attempts  to  achieve  literal  independence  of  other 
nations  inexpedient  and  futile?  It  is  surely  no 
more  dangerous  for  us  to  depend  upon  other 
nations  for  the  transportation  of  our  crops  and 
commodities  than  for  us  to  rely  upon  them  to 
purchase  the  latter  when  landed  in  Europe.  Of 
neither  have  we  the  slightest  guarantee.  Amer- 
ican business  men  cheerfully  invest  capital  in 
some  enterprise  which  requires  dyestuffs  manu- 
factured in  Germany  without  reflecting  that 
nothing  whatever  obligates  the  Germans  to  oper- 
ate their  factories  except  an  expectation  of  profit. 
Yet  the  willingness  of  Europeans  to  buy  what 
we  export  and  to  export  to  us  in  turn  is  far  more 
essential  than  the  fact  or  method  of  transporta- 
tion. And  it  is  about  the  latter  only  that  we  are 
worried ! 

If  other  nations  cannot  get  along  without  our 
products,  they  will  be  as  interested  in  devising 
methods  of  transportation  for  them  as  we  can 
be.  If  they  are  not  willing  to  buy  our  products, 
no  facilities  for  transportation  will  create  a 
demand.  The  problem  of  distribution  does  not 
exist  until  a  demand  appears  located  at  a  dis- 
tance. Ships  and  railroads  are  purely  incidental 
factors  in  bringing  the  supply  to  the  demand.  It 
is  more  necessary  that  the  Europeans  should  eat 
than  that  American  farmers  should  make  a 

236 


MARITIME  AMBITIONS 

profit.  If  the  grain  is  certain  of  sale  on  arrival, 
its  physical  transfer  is  easy  to  arrange.  If  no 
market  exists,  all  the  shipping  facilities  in  the 
world  cannot  sell  our  produce.  In  truth,  what  is 
needed  is  cheaper,  more  efficient,  more  rapid 
transportation,  not  transportation  under  the 
American  flag.  If  we  insist  upon  performing 
what  we  do  not  do  well,  we  shall  hang  a  mill- 
stone round  our  necks.  Either  the  prices  of 
American  commodities  abroad  will  rise  to  pay  for 
our  experiment,  or,  as  is  more  probable,  we  shall 
lose  the  capital  in  return  for  a  demonstration  of 
the  truth  of  certain  economic  laws. 

No  nation  to-day  expects  to  be  self-sufficing. 
The  demand  for  an  American  merchant  marine 
simply  to  have  our  communication  with  the 
outside  world  under  the  protection  of  the  Amer- 
ican flag  is  based  upon  fallacies  of  economic 
theory  long  since  exploded.  Let  us  do  what  we 
do  better  than  others;  let  us  accept  from  others 
what  they  execute  more  cheaply  than  we  can. 
If  the  interpenetration  of  the  economic  world 
will  not  insure  access  to  the  world's  markets,  it 
will  prove  a  broken  reed  in  a  thousand  more 
significant  matters  for  which  we  already  exclu- 
sively depend  upon  it.  The  same  logic  which 
demonstrates  our  need  of  a  merchant  marine  in 
foreign  commerce  will  infallibly  prove  that  the 
whole  structure  of  the  business  world  is  a  fallacy 

237 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

of  the  first  magnitude.  If  we  may  safely  rely 
upon  a  mutuality  of  interests  in  greater  things, 
we  may  depend  upon  it  in  less  essential. 

We  need  not  own  the  ships  which  carry  our 
goods  in  order  to  assure  ourselves  with  practical 
certainty  of  their  services  under  all  circum- 
stances. Our  alliance  with  Great  Britain  will 
obtain  for  us  the  utmost  endeavor  of  the  sea 
power  itself  hi  the  maintenance  of  that  con- 
tact most  essential  to  American  interests.  So 
long  as  Great  Britain  remains  the  sea  power 
her  merchant  fleet  will  continue  large  enough  to 
perform  the  necessary  services  for  the  United 
States.  Moreover,  the  British  have  realized  with 
great  acumen  that  so  tremendous  a  fleet  can 
sustain  itself  only  in  the  service  of  other  nations 
and  only  by  performing  the  essential  offices  at  a 
more  moderate  cost  than  they  would  be  obliged 
to  pay  for  the  creation  and  maintenance  of  a 
merchant  marine  of  their  own. 

The  United  States  is  no  more  dependent  upon 
the  British  merchant  marine  for  its  contact  with 
the  rest  of  the  world  than  are  the  great  majority 
of  European  nations.  Russia  and  France,  to 
name  two  powerful  countries  only,  possess 
themselves  no  adequate  shipping  facilities.  They 
have  found  the  services  of  the  British  merchant 
fleets,  of  the  British  insurance  agencies  on  the 
whole  cheaper  than  any  similar  service  they  could 

238 


MARITIME  AMBITIONS 

have  rendered  themselves.  We  have  had  cer- 
tainly in  the  past  fifty  years  no  complaint  to 
make  against  extravagant  freight  rates,  against 
improper  and  careless  service,  against  delays  and 
dishonesty  due  to  the  British  "monopoly." 
Whatever  European  power  controls  the  sea  — 
and  it  will  be  sufficiently  evident  to  any  candid 
student  of  international  affairs  that  some  Eu- 
ropean power  or  coalition  will  continue  to  con- 
trol or  contest  the  supremacy  of  the  seas  in  the 
coming  generations  —  must,  as  the  price  of  its 
own  ascendency,  perform  these  same  services  for 
all  nations  thus  deprived  of  merchant  fleets. 
Even  in  the  gravest  crises,  some  sort  of  contact 
for  the  dependent  nations  the  sea  power  must 
provide. 

Great  Britain  has  also  understood  that  suprem- 
acy upon  the  seas  would  be  short-lived  should 
she  interfere  for  captious  reasons  with  the  normal 
interchange  of  commodities  between  nations.  So 
to  act  would  provide  the  motive  for  a  coalition 
of  all  other  nations  for  the  crushing  of  her  power 
upon  the  sea  and  their  own  deliverance  from 
unjust  domination.  Like  efficiency  and  economy, 
discretion  and  justice  are  the  necessary  props  of 
the  sea  power.  Only  when  its  interest  in  the 
closing  of  the  seas  coincides  with  the  interests  of 
other  powerful  nations  can  it  venture  to  make 
its  potential  supremacy  real.  Whether  or  not 

239 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

an  American  merchant  flag  flies,  access  to  Eu- 
ropean countries  will  continue  to  depend  upon 
the  generality  of  interest  in  its  continuance.  If 
all  desire  it,  the  sea  power  for  that  very  reason 
will  be  powerless  to  prevent  it.  If  enough  are 
interested  in  stopping  it,  they  will  be  strong 
enough  to  make  good  their  contention.  They 
will  not  otherwise  attempt  it.  In  either  case  we 
have  nothing  to  fear. 

To  suppose  that  the  present  lack  of  an  Ameri- 
can merchant  marine  is  due  to  the  failure  of  our 
merchants  and  capitalists  to  understand  the 
necessity  of  access  to  Europe,  or  to  the  greed  of 
Great  Britain  and  Germany,  is  to  minimize 
those  fundamental  economic  disabilities  under 
which  the  United  States  labors  in  the  maritime 
world.  If  past  economic  history  be  any  criterion 
of  truth,  these  are  precisely  those  economic  fac- 
tors which  force  is  unable  to  modify  and  is 
certainly  without  power  to  destroy. 

The  supply  of  capital  and  labor  for  an  in- 
ternational merchant  marine  is  controlled  by  a 
demand  and  supply  truly  international  in  scope, 
and  is  dependent  upon  the  ratio  between  the 
development  and  economic  status  of  the  various 
countries  bordering  the  sea.  Obviously  capital 
will  be  invested  in  a  merchant  marine  only  when 
the  return  will  be  normally  larger  than  capital 
produces  in  business  on  land.  The  risks  at  sea 

240 


MARITIME  AMBITIONS 

are  considerable,  maritime  insurance  is  always 
relatively  high,  and,  with  other  factors  not  pres- 
ent in  ordinary  business,  conspire  to  deplete  the 
gross  profits  at  a  rapid  rate.  The  sailors,  outside 
those  few  born  with  an  itch  for  the  sea,  are  re- 
cruited as  in  most  occupations  from  those  who 
find  other  available  employment  less  attractive. 
Naturally  they  come  from  nations  where  life  on 
shore  is  least  desirable. 

Until  about  1850  the  conditions  along  the 
Atlantic  coast  fostered  an  American  merchant 
marine.  The  coastwise  trade  with  the  West 
Indies,  the  triangular  trades  to  Europe  and  Africa 
were  enormously  more  profitable  than  agricul- 
ture or  rudimentary  manufacturing.  They  in- 
vited the  investment  of  such  capital  as  there 
was  and  enlisted  the  services  of  numbers  of  able 
and  adventurous  men.  The  forests  of  America, 
moreover,  provided  in  more  abundant  measure 
than  those  of  leading  European  States  the  ma- 
terials for  building  wooden  ships  and  gave  this 
country  a  very  real  economic  advantage  over 
England,  Germany,  and  France,  where  labor  was 
plentiful  but  where  the  raw  materials  for  ships 
were  expensive  because  brought  from  the  Baltic. 
For  a  time  the  Atlantic  coast  of  America  more 
nearly  combined  the  economic  advantages  of 
cheap  material  and  resident  labor  than  did  any 
country  in  Europe.  When  the  West  India  trade 

241 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

became  less  profitable  and  more  difficult,  a  vast 
market  in  Europe  for  American  grain  and  war 
freight  rates  gave  another  great  impulse  to  our 
merchant  marine. 

Then  came  a  change.  The  discovery  of  gold 
in  California,  the  enormous  profits  of  the  cotton 
culture  in  the  South,  the  Civil  War,  the  Pacific 
railroads,  the  Homestead  Acts,  all  tended  to 
multiply  attractions  in  America  at  a  time  when 
the  building  of  steamships  of  iron  gave  the  Eu- 
ropean nations  a  much  greater  proportionate 
advantage  in  the  manufacture  of  ships  than  we 
had  previously  possessed.  The  industrial  or- 
ganization of  the  United  States  was  not  complex 
enough  to  compete  with  European  metal  work 
and  American  capital  promptly  turned  to  the 
lucrative  opportunities  for  investment  in  Amer- 
ica which  were  then  multiplying  with  such 
rapidity. 

Promptly,  too,  the  steamship  transformed  the 
sailor's  life.  On  the  old  sailing  ship  a  certain 
spice  of  adventure  and  danger,  a  variety  of 
scene  which  contrasted  favorably  with  the 
monotonous  existence  in  one  spot  then  common 
on  shore,  attracted  a  fine  type  of  men.  The 
sailor  saw  many  ports  and  types  of  life,  possessed 
many  resources  for  amusement  which  the  lands- 
man did  not  at  that  time  have.  Many  and  many 
a  man  went  to  sea  because  life  on  the  old  clipper 

242 


MARITIME  AMBITIONS 

ships  was  more  interesting  than  the  life  of  the 
farmer  or  the  ordinary  mechanic.  But  the  ad- 
vent of  the  steamship  reduced  the  sailor  to  the 
rank  of  a  machinist,  coal  heaver,  painter,  or  day 
laborer,  forcing  him  to  execute  upon  the  ocean 
the  same  tasks  which  his  fellows  performed  on 
shore.  If  the  attractions  were  less,  and  the  work 
the  same,  the  discomforts  were  greater.  Cramped 
quarters,  poor  food,  exposure  without  the  spice 
of  danger  to  glorify  it,  an  immensely  laborious 
few  days  in  harbor,  followed  by  a  dull,  monoto- 
nous routine  at  sea,  create  a  sort  of  life  which 
has  natural  attractions  for  only  a  handful  of 
men  who  cannot  rid  themselves  of  the  liking  for 
a  sniff  of  the  salt  air  in  their  nostrils. 

Conversely,  life  on  shore  has  become  more 
interesting,  a  thousandfold  more  varied  than 
before  the  railroad,  the  modern  theater,  the  mov- 
ing picture  show,  and  the  department  store  began 
to  cater  at  small  expense  to  a  wide  range  of 
tastes  and  notions.  The  very  reasons  which 
brought  immigrants  to  the  United  States  in 
millions  kept  them  and  all  American  citizens  on 
shore.  The  demand  for  labor  has  regularly  ex- 
ceeded the  supply.  Free  land  might  also  be  had 
for  the  asking  upon  which  any  man  could  easily 
accumulate  a  competence  for  himself  and  his 
children.  The  superior  attractions  of  life  in 
America  on  land  stand  in  the  way  of  an  American 

243 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

merchant  marine.  This  is  the  true  barrier  and 
obstacle,  and  subsidies  and  navies  will  not 
remove  it.  To  millions  of  people  in  Europe  the 
ordinary  conditions  of  life  in  America  seem 
vastly  superior  to  their  own.  From  that  class 
comes  the  sailor.  The  Orientals,  also  accustomed 
to  conditions  at  home  truly  horrible  to  Ameri- 
cans, have  invaded  the  international  merchant 
marine.  With  them  American  citizens  will 
neither  live  nor  work.  The  sea  is  now  listed 
among  those  disagreeable  tasks  which  no  self- 
respecting  American  citizen  is  willing  to  perform. 
Those  same  economic  conditions  which  make 
life  attractive  in  the  United  States  create  a 
higher  wage  and  price  level  in  this  country  than 
abroad,  which  clashes  with  the  wage  level  at  sea, 
based  upon  the  international  demand  and  supply 
for  that  type  of  labor.  No  American  can  buy  for 
himself  the  necessities  of  life  at  home  with  the 
wages  paid  on  tramp  freighters  and  regulated  by 
the  necessities  of  life  in  European  and  Asiatic 
countries,  where  the  attractions  on  shore  are 
least  and  the  conditions  hardest.  We  cannot 
compel  this  merchant  marine,  by  any  methods  in 
our  control,  to  alter  conditions  of  life  which  are 
really  dependent  upon  the  fundamental  geo- 
graphical disabilities  of  other  countries  which 
neither  they  nor  we  may  create  or  modify.  To 
establish  an  American  merchant  marine  which 

344 


MARITIME  AMBITIONS 

will  attract  American  sailors  by  providing  con- 
ditions of  life  comparable  to  those  on  land  is  to 
set  up  an  industry  in  defiance  of  our  economic 
disabilities.  Not  only  will  the  cost  be  dispropor- 
tionate to  its  value,  but  so  long  as  such  con- 
ditions persist  the  industry  can  never  become 
profitable  or  normal.  It  is  idle  to  talk  of  tem- 
porary assistance,  because  the  disabilities  under 
which  we  at  present  labor  are  likely  to  persist 
for  a  good  many  decades  to  come. 

Another  almost  insuperable  fundamental  dif- 
ficulty has  lain  in  the  inability  to  secure  American 
capital  for  investment  in  an  American  merchant 
marine.  So  long  as  the  capital  invested  was  to 
be  found  in  the  forests  of  Maine  and  in  the  loins 
of  her  citizens,  a  merchant  marine  could  be 
created,  but  while  European  capital,  whose 
price  depends  upon  economic  conditions  over 
which  we  have  no  control,  commands  the  mer- 
chant marine  of  the  world,  we  cannot  hope  to 
compete.  Until  the  foreign  standard  of  living 
shall  be  raised,  or  the  American  standard  low- 
ered; until  the  foreign  price  of  capital  shall  be 
raised,  or  the  price  in  America  lowered,  per- 
manent economic  disabilities  will  remain  which 
cannot  be  altered.  American  legislation  com- 
pelling all  ships  which  ply  to  our  shores  to  regu- 
late their  wages  and  standards  of  living  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  American  scale  can  only  raise 

245 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

freight  rates  to  defray  the  additional  expense. 
The  profits  will  remain  the  same,  and  even 
should  American  seamen  enlist  in  large  numbers, 
there  can  be  no  true  merchant  marine  under  an 
American  flag  until  the  profits  can  be  so  in- 
creased that  American  capitalists  will  volun- 
tarily enter  the  field  in  sufficient  number  to 
create  a  merchant  fleet  of  real  size  and  capacity. 
If  we  wish  a  merchant  marine  of  our  own,  we 
must  create  it  in  accordance  with  such  economic 
conditions  as  prevail  in  the  international  ship- 
ping market. 

These  disabilities  do  not  apply  to  coastwise, 
lake,  and  river  shipping.  Being  within  our  terri- 
torial limits,  capital  and  labor  are  in  them  gov- 
erned by  economic  conditions  identical  with 
enterprises  on  shore.  In  fact,  foreign  capital 
and  labor  here  are  at  so  great  an  economic  dis- 
advantage that  they  are  foreclosed  competition, 
and  the  American  marine  for  this  sort  of  service 
has  always  been  prosperous  and  of  large  size. 
At  present  the  tonnage  in  our  coastwise,  lake, 
and  river  marine  aggregates  several  millions, 
and  a  phenomenally  large  tonnage  is  under  con- 
struction, chiefly  intended  to  replace  the  British 
and  German  tramp  freighters  which  ordinarily 
ply  between  the  Atlantic  and  the  Gulf  ports. 
This  flourishing  industry,  governed  by  American 
conditions  and  assured  of  permanence,  must  not 

246 


MARITIME  AMBITIONS 

be  confused  with  our  merchant  service  devoted 
exclusively  to  the  foreign  carrying  trade,  nor 
must  its  tonnage  under  construction  be  added 
to  our  present  tonnage  in  foreign  service. 

So  extraordinary  an  effort  as  the  development 
of  an  adequate  merchant  marine  will  involve 
can  never  be  expedient  for  the  United  States  so 
long  as  we  have  an  opportunity  of  alliance  with 
the  sea  power.  To  compete  with  Great  Britain 
for  the  ocean  freights  is  to  imperil  the  mainte- 
nance of  her  merchant  fleet,  to  reduce  its  rate  of 
profit,  and  therefore  to  deplete  the  strength  of 
the  very  power  which  we  are  enlisting  in  the 
support  of  our  own  interests.  An  attempt  to 
compete  with  the  British  fleet  by  means  of  an 
enterprise  stimulated  or  created  by  the  Gov- 
ernment will  incur  the  immediate  displeasure  of 
British  capitalists  and  investors  and  risk  at  once 
the  good  will  of  the  sea  power.  What  we  our- 
selves bring  is  under  ordinary  circumstances  so 
little  indispensable  that  our  alliance  with  her 
will  rest  upon  foundations  by  no  means  so  solid 
but  that  they  can  be  shaken.  Our  interests  in 
the  commercial  world  are  so  entirely  comple- 
mentary to  hers,  the  competition  between  the 
two  nations  is  so  slight,  that  any  attempt  to 
perform  such  a  service  for  ourselves  me^ly  in 
order  to  do  so  will  be  a  waste  of  money  and 
effort.  It  is  not  to  our  interest  to  sap  the  defen- 

247 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

sive  and  offensive  strength  of  the  sea  power  any 
more  than  it  would  be  wise  for  Kansas  to  attempt 
to  compete  with  Pennsylvania  in  the  iron  indus- 
try merely  to  have  foundries  of  her  own.  The 
present  sea  power  possesses  the  only  force  in 
the  world  which  we  have  any  probable  chance  of 
enlisting  permanently  in  our  service  and  we 
cannot  afford  to  alienate  her  good  will. 

In  Congress  and  in  the  country  at  large,  gov- 
ernment shipping  lines  to  South  America  have 
been  urged  to  increase  our  direct  trade  with  that 
continent.  Here  again  fundamental  economic 
obstacles  are  those  of  which  we  really  complain. 
Not  the  absence  of  American  ships,  but  our  in- 
ability to  utilize  ourselves  a  larger  proportion  of 
the  raw  products  exported  by  South  America 
stands  in  the  way  of  extending  our  direct  trade. 
To  be  sure,  a  certain  direct  trade  we  do  carry 
on,  but  the  amount  is  small.  Its  increase  in  any 
one  year  is  slight  because  the  normal  growth  of 
the  market  in  South  America,  controlled  by  the 
law  of  supply  and  demand,  increases  only  with 
the  slow  growth  of  their  own  net  profits.  The 
law  of  supply  and  demand  does  not  create  a  large 
direct  trade  between  the  United  States  and  South 
America  under  normal  conditions  and  the  in- 
stitution of  any  number  of  shipping  lines  cannot 
be  substituted  for  fundamental  economic  forces. 
Still  less  can  they  interfere  with  those  funda- 

248 


MARITIME  AMBITIONS 

mental  economic  conditions  which  do  establish 
direct  trade  between  South  America  and  Europe. 

Many  feel  that  the  proximity  of  the  United 
States  to  South  America  would  give  an  American 
merchant  marine  a  great  economic  advantage  in 
South  American  markets,  for  direct  transporta- 
tion over  a  shorter  distance  means  cheaper 
freights.  Such  geographical  proximity  is  a  fal- 
lacy. We  must  measure,  not  the  distance  be- 
tween the  tip  of  Florida  and  the  northern  coast 
of  Brazil,  but  the  distance  between  the  centers  of 
manufacture  and  distribution  in  the  United 
States  and  the  centers  of  trade  in  South  America. 
So  far  as  actual  mileage  is  concerned,  New  York, 
Boston,  and  Philadelphia  are  just  as  far  from 
Rio  de  Janeiro  and  Buenos  Ayres  as  are  the 
principal  European  ports.  A  direct  line  could 
not  result  in  cheaper  freights.  Indeed,  so  long  as 
American  capital  controls  it,  the  freights  must 
be  higher,  if  the  enterprise  is  to  pay  its  own  way. 

An  American  merchant  marine  is  not  the  true 
remedy  for  our  real  difficulties.  Contact  with 
Europe  would  not  have  been  much  simpler  or 
cheaper  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  even  had  we 
owned  a  truly  large  merchant  service.  Certainly 
nothing  could  have  been  achieved  by  so  very 
moderate  a  fleet  as  is  at  present  under  discus- 
sion. Shipping  experts  again  and  again  have 
pointed  out  that  the  difficulty  in  securing  f reight- 

249 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

ers  after  the  outbreak  of  the  war  was  not  due 
primarily  to  a  lack  of  ships.  While  the  German 
fleet  became  unavailable,  and  many  British 
ships  were  commandeered  for  government  serv- 
ice, the  amount  of  the  world's  foreign  trade  fell 
off  immensely,  the  rise  in  insurance  rates  put 
obstacles  in  the  way  of  commerce  entirely  out  of 
the  ordinary,  and  the  demand  for  cargoes  fell 
off  in  some  rough  proportion  to  the  limitation  of 
supply. 

The  real  difficulty  seems  to  have  lain  in  the 
lack  of  adequate  facilities  for  unloading  any 
such  number  of  ships  as  became  concentrated 
at  a  few  European  ports.  Docks  were  too  few, 
stevedores  enlisted,  the  vacancies  in  the  econ- 
omic fabric  made  it  difficult  to  provide  sub- 
stitutes for  such  disagreeable  tasks,  and  ships 
were  detained  in  European  harbors  waiting 
to  be  unloaded  for  periods  exceeding  the  time 
ordinarily  required  for  three  or  four  voyages. 
The  interchange  of  commerce  is  dependent,  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  upon  frequent  voyages  by  ships, 
not  upon  the  carriage  of  the  world's  commerce  by 
a  number  of  ships  whose  total  tonnage  is  that 
of  the  commerce  carried.  If  the  same  number  of 
ships  make  only  half  as  many  voyages,  the  facili- 
ties will  be  precisely  fifty  per  cent  short.  No 
number  of  ships  under  the  American  flag  would 
have  changed  these  conditions.  The  glut  of 

250 


MARITIME  AMBITIONS 

commerce  at  London,  Rotterdam,  Bordeaux, 
and  Vladivostock  would  simply  have  been  in- 
creased by  that  number  of  ships,  and  their 
failure  to  return  promptly  would  have  created 
precisely  the  same  problems. 

It  is  difficult  to  see  the  real  gain  for  the  United 
States  in  subsidizing  the  construction  of  a 
moderate  fleet  to  ply  to  Europe  or  South 
America.  It  would  not  render  us  independent  of 
European  fleets,  nor  give  us  such  facilities  as  an 
economic  or  military  crisis  in  Europe  would  make 
advisable.  It  could  not  increase  our  direct  trade 
with  South  America  or  Asia  and  would  obvi- 
ously not  increase  our  commerce  with  Europe. 
If  resolutely  founded  upon  the  law  of  supply  and 
demand  governing  the  international  marine,  the 
conditions  of  life  would  be  such  that  no  great 
number  of  American  sailors  would  enter  the 
service,  and  even  then  the  freight  rates  would 
not  provide  that  rate  of  return  which  American 
capital  expects.  Inasmuch  as  we  are  in  no  real 
danger  of  losing  the  services  of  the  sea  power, 
even  should  it  change  hands,  and  inasmuch  as 
the  creation  of  a  really  adequate  merchant 
marine  is  all  too  probably  an  effort  which  we 
are  unable  under  present  circumstances  to 
make,  it  is  hard  to  see  what  end  will  be  sub- 
served by  the  costly  experiment  of  creating  a 
moderate  fleet  under  such  a  decided  contra- 

251 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

vention  of  fundamental  law  of  supply  and  de- 
mand. There  has  been  a  great  controversy  as  to 
the  desires  of  American  seamen  and  capitalists 
for  governmental  assistance.  All  the  schemes  pro- 
posed have  aroused  widespread  opposition.  In- 
deed, the  merits  of  the  controversy  are  of  no 
consequence,  because  its  very  existence  points 
conclusively  to  a  lack  of  unanimity  in  American 
shipping  circles  as  to  the  desirability  of  creating 
a  merchant  marine  at  all. 


252 


CHAPTER  XVI 

ASIATIC   PROBLEMS 

SHALL  the  United  States  assert  that  right  to  inter- 
fere in  Asiatic  politics  implicit  in  her  position 
in  the  Philippines  and  Hawaii,  or  shall  she  accept 
Japan's  present  domination  of  the  Far  East  and 
thus  legitimatize  and  sanction  the  latter's  am- 
bitions? Both  alternatives  involve  losses,  the  one 
actual  and  present,  the  other  contingent  and 
future;  the  one  easy  to  measure,  the  other  im- 
possible to  estimate.  Shall  the  National  Govern- 
ment also  maintain  in  regard  to  the  privileges  of 
Japanese  the  position  of  existing  treaties,  which 
Federal  authority  is  incapable  of  executing,  or 
shall  it  rescind  them  and  formulate  others  con- 
sonant with  existing  legislation  in  the  western 
States?  Both  involve  a  certain  degree  of  national 
humiliation;  both  compel  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment to  recognize  its  lack  of  power  to  coerce  the 
States;  j both  compel  the  United  States  to  dis- 
honor solemn  international  engagements. 

A  sane  and  adequate  policy  can  be  formu- 
lated only  by  viewing  American  policies  and  in- 
terests in  their  relation  to  Asiatic  ambitions  and 

253 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

interests.  Above  all,  the  accomplished  facts  of 
the  situation  in  Asia  must  become  the  foundation 
of  American  policy,  whether  or  not  they  are  de- 
sirable or  justifiable. 

There  are  current  several  versions  of  Japanese 
policies  and  ambitions,  all  politely  and  consider- 
ately furnished  by  the  Japanese  themselves,  and 
all  therefore  sanctioned  by  authority.  They  are 
equally  credible  from  a  superficial  point  of  view 
because  they  emanate  to  precisely  the  same  de- 
gree from  men  in  a  position  to  know  the  truth. 
It  seems  not  to  have  occurred  however  to  a  nu- 
merous constituency  that  the  mere  fact  that  a 
witness  may  be  in  a  position  to  know  the  truth 
gives  no  guarantee  whatever  that  he  has  seen  fit 
to  include  it  in  his  testimony.  Much  less  does  it 
demonstrate  that  his  testimony  does  not  omit  or 
conceal  the  truth,  while  saying  nothing  contra- 
dictory. There  is  a  version  intended  to  be  read 
in  England,  another  for  use  in  Germany,  a  third 
obviously  meant  for  American  missionaries  and 
peace  advocates,  a  fourth  directed  at  American 
politicians,  diplomats,  and  army  officers,  and 
still  others  for  Chinese  and  Japanese  consump- 
tion. Fortunately  while  these  versions  are  at 
first  sight  contradictory,  they  differ  only  in  em- 
phasis and  phraseology,  and  if  read  in  the  light 
of  convictions  firmly  held  in  Australia,  China, 
Russia,  and  England,  provide  a  definite  and  con- 

254 


ASIATIC  PROBLEMS 

sistent  statement  which  entirely  accords  with  the 
logic  of  the  situation. 

The  basic  postulate  of  Japanese  policy  is  the 
domination  of  Asia  by  Asiatics.  The  mere  fact 
that  the  Japanese  identify  themselves  with 
those  Asiatics  for  whom  dominion  is  intended 
must  not  conceal  from  us  the  true  breadth  and 
significance  of  Japanese  policies.  They  see  popu- 
lous countries,  for  the  most  part  untrained  in 
European  methods  of  organized  warfare  and 
therefore  incapable  of  resisting  even  moderate 
measures  of  coercion  from  Europe,  upon  whose 
rich  resources  and  undeveloped  markets  the  Eu- 
ropean has  fixed  his  covetous  eye.  They  see  their 
backwardness  in  mechanical  and  industrial  de- 
velopment and  the  very  real  prosperity  to  be 
derived  from  their  development  in  European 
fashion.  They  see  a  determination  in  European 
nations  to  perform  these  valuable  services  only 
after  political  privileges  have  been  granted  to 
them,  which  practically  mortgage  the  independ- 
ence and  future  liberty  of  the  natives.  Already 
India  has  been  bought  and  sold;  Indo-China  and 
Burmah,  with  the  great  islands  of  the  sea,  have 
fallen  a  prey;  and  China,  the  most  populous  of 
all,  the  richest  in  natural  resources,  the  least  de- 
veloped, the  least  capable  of  resistance,  has  also 
been  marked  by  the  spoiler.  Special  privileges, 
extraterritorial  rights  have  been  wrung  from  the 

255 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

Chinese  and  little  secrecy  has  been  made  in 
Europe  of  the  intention  of  the  great  powers  to 
prevent  by  combined  action  the  loan  to  China  of 
the  necessary  capital,  raw  material,  and  engineer- 
ing skill,  except  in  exchange  for  political  and 
financial  concessions  so  extensive  and  elaborate 
that  the  Europeans  would  to  all  intents  and 
purposes  dominate  that  great  empire. 

Only  one  country  in  the  Orient  does  not  lie  at 
the  mercy  of  the  Europeans,  only  one  has  pos- 
sessed sufficient  genius  to  adapt  itself  to  western 
habits  and  methods,  to  develop  within  its  terri- 
tory an  industrial  organization  and  an  army  and 
navy  skilled  in  European  methods  without  in 
any  way  compromising  its  political  independence 
or  territorial  integrity.  That  nation  regards  itself 
as  of  necessity  the  trustee  of  the  liberty  of  all 
Asiatics,  the  only  State  capable  of  loosening  the 
greedy  clutch  upon  the  Asiatic  future  —  Japan. 
It  is  a  duty  the  Japanese  owe  all  orientals,  a 
trust  which  they  must  not  neglect.  It  involves 
necessarily  the  ending  of  the  domination  of  Asia 
by  Europe,  the  termination  of  special  privilege  in 
Asia  for  Europeans,  the  formulation  in  future  of 
Asiatic  policies  in  the  interest  of  Asiatic  needs  in- 
stead of  in  accordance  with  European  ambitions. 

The  Japanese,  educated  in  western  economic 
history  and  ambitions,  were  not  slow  to  discover 
the  European  tradition  that  in  the  profits  of  the 

256 


ASIATIC  PROBLEMS 

Far  Eastern  trade  lay  the  secret  of  the  commercial 
preponderance  of  European  nations  over  each 
other.  Upon  it  had  been  built  the  Italian  cities 
of  the  Middle  Ages,  Portugal  in  the  fifteenth  cen- 
tury, the  wealth  of  Holland,  the  riches  of  Eng- 
land. On  it  would  the  Germans  found  a  new  em- 
pire; from  it  the  United  States  would  suck  pros- 
perity. True  or  false,  Europeans  had  believed 
that  prosperity  lay  in  access  to  this  fabulous  trade 
of  the  Far  East  and  that  the  profits  of  develop- 
ing great  preferential  markets  in  Asia  would  spell 
the  dominion  of  Europe  for  that  fortunate  coun- 
try whose  diplomacy  and  military  force  could 
succeed  in  obtaining  them.  Why,  asked  the 
Japanese,  should  not  Asiatics  achieve  from  the 
same  trade  the  same  prosperity  and  physical 
strength  which  Europeans  were  certain  they  could 
derive?  Why  should  not  the  Asiatic  nations  them- 
selves receive  the  bulk  of  the  profits  from  their 
own  economic  growth? 

There  should  be  in  future  no  profits  for  Eu- 
ropean capitalists  beyond  the  normal  rate  of 
interest  assured  by  the  law  of  supply  and  de- 
mand. Abnormal  contracts  secured  by  political 
pressure,  concessions  or  mortgages  of  the  revenues 
of  oriental  countries  obtained  by  diplomacy, 
would  no  longer  be  countenanced.  Nor  should 
any  oriental  country  be  allowed  to  grant  Euro- 
pean nations  the  right  to  interfere  in  its  politics. 

257 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

That  this  would  involve  interference  with  the 
domestic  affairs  of  certain  Asiatic  countries,  the 
Japanese  realized;  that  it  would  spell  in  all  prob- 
ability action  against  various  European  nations 
which  they  would  term  aggression,  the  Japanese 
understood.  It  was  an  end  obviously  desirable, 
but  attainable  only  with  the  assistance  of  time 
and  favorable  circumstances. 

Then  opportunity  knocked  at  the  door.  The 
European  war  of  1914  assured  Japan  practically 
a  free  hand  for  a  brief  time.  Fortunately  her 
foresight  had  placed  her  in  a  position  to  control 
the  situation.  She  was  the  only  resident  power 
in  the  Pacific  with  a  large  navy,  with  a  great 
army,  with  a  modern  industrial  fabric  capable  of 
maintaining  and  supplying  both  in  action. 
Moreover,  this  new  industry,  created  to  be  sure 
at  a  cost  which  had  several  times  threatened  its 
stability,  was  able  to  render  the  Chinese  and 
other  orientals  the  most  essential  economic  serv- 
ices for  which  the  Europeans  had  expected 
such  extravagant  prices.  Independence  of  Eu- 
rope was  a  possibility;  the  Japanese  even  be- 
lieved it  was  an  actuality.  So  far  as  the  orien- 
tals themselves  were  concerned,  the  superiority 
of  the  Japanese  on  sea  and  land  was  over- 
whelming, while  the  European  war  removed  all 
fears  of  a  dispatch  to  the  Far  East  of  a  force 
adequate  to  interfere  with  Japanese  arrange- 

258- 


ASIATIC  PROBLEMS 

ments.  Everything  was  at  their  mercy.  They 
had  merely  to  decide  how  to  achieve  most  ex- 
peditiously  and  cheaply  those  aims  upon  which 
their  hearts  were  set.  A  treaty  with  Great  Britain 
promising  ostensibly  the  services  of  the  Japanese 
fleet  in  Great  Britain's  interest  permitted  them 
to  take  into  their  hands  the  actual  control  of  the 
Pacific. 

The  danger  point  of  the  situation  lay  in  China. 
Obviously  the  hatred  and  suspicion  of  the  Japan- 
ese in  China  made  a  voluntary  alliance  improb- 
able, though  it  was  doubtful  whether  an  alliance 
would  serve  the  purpose.  The  Japanese  were 
agreed  that  they  could  not  permit  the  Chinese  to 
exercise  their  own  sovereignty  if  it  were  to  result  in 
the  establishment  in  China  of  a  strong  economic 
entity  under  European  control.  However  con- 
siderable might  be  the  economic  development  of 
Japan,  however  successful  her  financial  opera- 
tions for  the  payment  of  her  enormous  debt 
owed  to  Europe,  she  could  never  expect  to  com- 
pete with  the  new  entity  which  European  genius 
and  capital  could  easily  develop  in  China.  The 
disparity  in  population,  in  area,  in  resources, 
were  so  overwhelming  that  Japan's  own  future 
could  scarcely  be  considered  secure  if  the  concert 
of  European  powers  was  allowed  to  have  its  way 
in  China.  Such  action  would  ultimately  transfer 
to  Asia  European  quarrels  and  rivalries,  invite 

259 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

warfare  in  Asia  between  the  various  European 
States  for  the  control  of  Asiatic  nations,  and  post- 
pone for  a  century  or  more  Asiatic  independence 
of  Europe.  The  outbreak  of  the  European  war 
gave  the  Japanese  the  opportunity  to  establish 
the  necessary  political  relations  with  China. 

The  defensive  character  of  this  policy  is  abun- 
dantly clear  to  the  Japanese,  who  protest  with 
clear  conscience  a  lack  of  aggressive  purposes. 
They  are  able  to  extend  to  Chinese  statesmen 
definite  pledges  that  the  domination  of  China  by 
Japan  in  the  vulgar  sense  is  not  their  object  and 
never  could  be  for  them  truly  expedient.  They 
point  out  that  the  disparity  in  size  and  resources 
of  the  two  countries  must  always  guarantee 
Chinese  independence,  must  make  Japanese  con- 
trol of  Chinese  policies  temporary.  Nor  does 
Japan  apparently  ask  for  herself  that  type  of  con- 
cession which  she  insists  that  the  Chinese  shall 
not  make  to  Europeans.  She  merely  demands 
that,  if  made  at  all,  they  shall  be  made  to  Japan 
herself.  All  existing  privileges  and  possessions  of 
Europeans  must  be  left  untouched  for  the  pres- 
ent, though  this  will  in  all  probability  not  be  dan- 
gerous. Although  these  strategic  points  furnish 
a  basis  for  aggressive  action,  so  long  as  no  aggres- 
sion is  undertaken,  the  continued  possession  by 
Europeans  will  not  be  vital.  Until  it  becomes 
evident  that  the  latter  are  about  to  undertake 

260 


ASIATIC  PROBLEMS 

active  measures,  it  can  never  be  expedient  for 
Japan  or  China  to  interfere  with  existing  ar- 
rangements. They  must  stand  upon  the  defen- 
sive and  pledge  peace  and  all  existing  rights  in 
return  for  peace  and  a  recognition  of  the  right- 
fulness  of  the  control  of  Asia  in  Asiatic  interests. 

The  Japanese  correctly  contend  that  this  pol- 
icy in  no  way  threatens  the  territorial  integrity, 
the  political  independence,  or  the  prosperity  of 
Europe  or  America.  With  legitimate  ambitions 
it  does  not  clash;  with  such  access  to  Asiatic  trade 
as  is  mutually  advantageous  it  will  not  interfere. 
It  does  assail  aggressive  possessions  and  policies 
to  which  none  of  these  foreign  nations  have  any 
true  right;  it  does  intend  to  make  impossible  of 
attainment  ambitions  they  have  undoubtedly 
cherished.  The  two  propositions  are  by  no  means 
contradictory.  The  defense  of  Asia  against  un- 
just oppression  is  certainly  not  an  attack  upon 
the  legitimate  ambitions  or  independence  of 
Europe  or  America.  It  is  even  easy  to  justify 
Japanese  expansion  as  a  truly  peaceable,  defen- 
sive movement  for  the  furtherance  of  what  might 
almost  be  called  an  altruistic  conception  of  the 
Asiatic  future,  if  we  will  judge  it  by  the  logic 
the  Europeans  apply  to  their  own  relations. 

Nevertheless,  any  attempt  to  interfere  with 
that  control  of  the  situation  which  the  Japanese 
actually  possess  will  precipitate  prompt  naval 

261 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

and  military  action.  Should  it  become  probable 
that  the  result  of  the  war  in  Europe  will  so 
strengthen  either  Russia,  Germany,  or  Great 
Britain  as  to  enable  them  to  defend  them- 
selves at  home  and  at  the  same  time  spare  the 
necessary  military  or  naval  forces  for  operations 
in  Asia,  the  Japanese  will  undoubtedly  gather 
into  their  hands  as  much  as  possible  before  such 
aggression  can  possibly  be  begun.  Similarly, 
should  the  United  States  undertake  the  creation 
of  sufficient  military  or  naval  forces  to  become 
dangerous,  Japan  will  promptly  seize  our  island 
colonies  and  thus  forestall  aggression.  Possession 
of  the  latter,  of  the  Dutch  colonies  in  the  Spice 
Islands  —  which  Germany  is  supposed  to  covet 
and  which  would  be  the  object  of  an  annexation 
of  Holland  —  the  occupation  of  Sumatra,  the 
Straits  Settlements,  and  the  fortification  of  the 
great  harbor  of  Singapore,  the  true  key  to  the 
Orient,  will  all  be  indispensable.  Military  oper- 
ations against  the  Russian  outposts  in  Mongolia 
and  Manchuria  will  also  be  imperative.  Further 
concessions  may  have  to  be  extorted  from  China 
in  order  to  insure  her  military  cooperation  and  a 
sufficient  control  of  Chinese  foreign  policy  to 
forestall  the  diplomatic  pressure  of  the  European 
Concert.  Should  Japan  so  act  before  the  close  of 
the  European  war,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  her 
position  could  be  successfully  assailed. 

262 


ASIATIC  PROBLEMS 

Here  then  is  the  real  issue  in  the  Far  East. 
Shall  the  United  States  tacitly  recognize  and 
sanction  this  situation  and  the  policy  which 
lies  behind  it?  To  take  no  action  will  mean  that 
the  only  power  in  the  world  at  present  capable 
of  interfering  will  allow  Japan  to  complete  un- 
disturbed the  military,  naval,  and  industrial 
preparations  necessary  to  render  this  new  posi- 
tion impregnable.  By  thus  sanctioning  the  ac- 
tion of  Japan  in  China  the  United  States  will 
definitely  abandon  interference  in  the  Far  East 
for  the  sake  of  abnormal  privileges  in  trade. 
The  alternative  for  us  lies  in  elaborate  military 
and  naval  preparations.  We  must  prepare  to 
hold  our  present  aggressive  positions  with  ad- 
equate force  or  renounce  those  ambitions  which 
constitute  the  sole  reason  for  holding  them. 

Unquestionably  the  United  States  was  and  is 
feared  in  Japan.  There  was  some  apprehension 
lest  we  champion  the  interests  of  China  and 
cause  her  to  undertake  a  campaign  of  resistance, 
which  would  indeed  be  futile  of  real  effect  but 
which  would  cause  the  Japanese  infinite  trouble. 
War  would  sow  a  spirit  of  resentment  in  China, 
which  would  imperil  the  future  cooperation  of 
the  two  countries  and  render  improbable  that 
cordial  understanding  which  the  Japanese  see  is 
essential.  An  assiduous  press  campaign  was 
waged  in  the  United  States  by  the  Japanese  au- 

263 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

thorities;  interviews  and  statements,  books  and 
messages  of  the  most  subtle  nature  were  arranged 
so  as  to  influence  all  shades  of  American  public 
opinion  in  favor  of  Japan  at  the  precise  moment 
when  the  negotiations  with  China  became  pub- 
lic. It  may  be  true,  of  course,  that  we  have  here 
a  mere  coincidence,  but  the  student  of  foreign 
affairs  soon  becomes  suspicious  of  such  happy 
coincidences,  the  results  of  which  are  so  ex- 
ceedingly beneficial  to  a  party  whose  interests 
are  obvious.  The  campaign  did  conceal  from 
the  American  public  the  vast  significance  of  the 
movement,  not  by  misstatements,  but  by  omis- 
sions and  carefully  placed  emphasis. 

For  the  United  States  an  alliance  with  the  sea 
power  in  the  hands  of  Great  Britain,  or  for  that 
matter  in  the  hands  of  any  other  European 
nation,  will  compel  us  to  countenance  and,  so- 
far  as  in  our  power  lies,  advance  those  ambitions 
and  policies  which  our  European  ally  deems  es- 
sential and  which  are  not  in  themselves  contrary 
to  American  interests.  Should  Great  Britain 
therefore  decide  at  the  close  of  the  war  to  con- 
test with  Japan  the  control  of  China,  access  to  the 
Far  East  through  the  Panama  Canal,  the  use  of 
Hawaii,  of  the  American  coaling  stations,  of  the 
Philippines  as  a  naval  base  will  become  liter- 
ally the  prerequisites  of  a  successful  campaign. 
Neither  our  own  fleet  or  army  will  be  necessary 

264 


ASIATIC  PROBLEMS 

factors  in  the  campaign,  though  our  assistance 
may  be  desirable.  If  diplomatic  rumor  has  any 
basis  in  fact,  the  occupation  of  the  Philippines 
and  of  the  Pacific  Islands  by  the  United  States 
was  due  solely  to  Great  Britain's  unwillingness 
to  allow  them  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  Germany 
and  to  the  impossibility  of  seizing  them  herself 
without  precipitating  a  European  crisis.  If  this 
be  true,  we  have  been  merely  trustees  and  can 
easily  discharge  our  obligations  by  relinquishing 
possession  to  the  sea  power.  Such  contingencies 
however  will  be  governed  by  European  policies 
and  ambitions  and  not  by  American  interests; 
they  are  not  matters  which  the  United  States  will 
decide  and  will  form  no  integral  part  of  an 
American  foreign  policy. 

American  interests  will  on  the  contrary  counsel 
as  expedient  the  renunciation  for  the  immediate 
future  of  all  ideas  of  aggressive  action  in  the 
Far  East  in  the  interests  of  abnormal  commercial 
privileges.  Even  should  we  successfully  obtain  a 
political  status  which  would  enable  us  to  invest 
capital  under  the  most  favorable  conditions,  and 
to  establish  by  political  and  diplomatic  influence 
social  preferences  and  economic  wants  which 
our  own  exports  would  be  needed  to  satisfy,  we 
are  not  now  able  to  utilize  such  an  opportunity. 
We  are  not  concerned  with  any  fancied  depend- 
ence of  the  United  States  on  other  countries. 

265 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

We  are  visualizing  the  economic  requirements  for 
the  development  of  the  almost  unlimited  re- 
sources of  three  hundred  millions  of  people: 
capital  without  limit,  manufactured  goods  almost 
beyond  computation,  exports  of  crude  material 
almost  larger  than  the  imagination  can  grasp. 
Any  supply  of  capital  adequate  to  develop  even 
a  segment  of  Chinese  resources  we  do  not  possess. 
At  present  we  cannot  consume  more  than  a  frac- 
tion of  Chinese  exports,  nor  provide  more  than 
a  very  small  part  of  the  machinery  and  supplies 
necessary  to  develop  the  country.  Whether  Eu- 
rope itself  is  economically  capable  of  developing 
China  at  the  utmost  speed  is  very  doubtful. 

Japanese  control  of  China  purposes  no  inter- 
ference with  present  trade  conditions  or  with 
the  present  access  of  European  and  American 
merchants.  They  see  with  clarity  the  impos- 
sibility of  utilizing  in  Japan  more  than  a  portion 
of  the  exports  of  China,  or  of  making  in  Japan 
more  than  a  part  of  what  the  Chinese  must  buy. 
Such  a  limitation  upon  Chinese  trade  as  a  mo- 
nopoly in  Japanese  hands  would  fatally  limit,  if 
not  destroy,  the  very  economic  growth  which 
they  wish  to  foster.  European  and  American 
capital  they  will  welcome  —  nay,  they  will 
invite  —  on  those  same  economic  terms  which 
prevail  in  Europe.  The  purchase  of  Chinese 
goods  by  foreign  merchants,  the  sale  of  foreign 

266 


ASIATIC  PROBLEMS 

commodities  to  China  will  be  stimulated  to  the 
maximum.  There  will  be  but  one  condition:  it 
must  involve  no  political  concession  or  extra- 
territorial privilege  not  already  in  existence. 

Beyond  any  doubt  the  Asiatics  would  prefer 
to  obtain  the  bulk  of  their  capital  from  the 
United  States.  It  might  almost  be  said  that  only 
our  economic  disabilities  prevent  us  from  ob- 
taining as  near  a  monopoly  of  the  Chinese  market 
as  it  is  possible  for  a  foreign  nation  to  secure. 
The  inefficiency  of  our  army  and  navy,  our  dis- 
tance from  Asia,  our  apparent  lack  of  as  impera- 
tive a  need  for  foreign  markets  as  European 
nations  possess,  make  political  concessions  less 
useful  to  us,  render  us  less  capable  of  enforcing 
them,  and  less  anxious  to  extort  them.  We  need 
therefore  have  no  fear  that  we  will  lose  any  trade 
we  now  have  of  real  value  to  us,  or  that  we  will 
sacrifice  any  opportunities  of  which  we  can  avail 
ourselves  in  the  immediate  future,  if  we  explicitly 
renounce  all  intention  of  securing  abnormal 
privileges  in  Asia.  If  we  promulgate  once  more 
the  doctrine  of  the  Open  Door  in  the  sense  of 
no  privileges  in  Asia  for  any  foreign  nation,  we 
shall  meet  with  a  most  enthusiastic  response 
from  the  orientals  and  will  adopt  as  our  policy 
that  notion  of  relationship  most  acceptable  in 
the  Far  East. 

While  we  thus  frankly  recognize  the  truth  of 
267 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

the  Japanese  contention  that  their  ambitions  are 
not  hostile  to  the  present  interests  or  position  of 
continental  United  States,  nor  to  its  true  fut- 
ure commercial  interests  in  Asia,  we  must  not 
forget  that  the  successful  assertion  of  Japanese 
ambitions  may  involve  the  loss  of  territories  we 
now  hold  and  of  certain  aspirations  which 
American  statesmen  have  cherished.  In  any 
case  we  shall  lose  our  Pacific  possessions,  even 
if  we  retain  them,  because  their  sole  value  lies 
in  the  base  they  furnish  for  the  advancement  of 
American  interests  in  Asia.  The  Japanese  will 
permit  us  to  retain  physical  possession  only  by 
renouncing  the  policies  which  physical  possession 
implies. 

But  we  can  easily  afford  to  sacrifice  the  Philip- 
pines, Hawaii,  and  the  coaling  stations.  They 
have  no  intrinsic  commercial  value  which  offsets 
the  expense  of  administration  and  the  mainte- 
nance of  order.  Indeed,  for  this  very  reason  the 
Japanese  will  prefer  to  leave  such  liabilities  in 
our  hands,  so  long  as  there  is  no  likelihood  of 
their  strategic  use.  Nor  will  all  of  them  together 
place  the  Japanese  in  a  position  to  conquer 
or  colonize  our  Pacific  coast.  The  great  width 
of  that  ocean,  the  stupendous  cost  of  so  extensive 
an  operation  as  even  a  temporary  invasion  would 
involve,  will  always  protect  us.  While  Japan  is 
physically  able  to  land  an  army  on  the  Pacific 

268 


ASIATIC  PROBLEMS 

coast  and  maintain  it  for  some  months,  she  will 
be  more  likely  to  seize  what  she  wants  and  give 
us  the  alternative  of  ceding  it  or  of  fighting  a 
war  for  it  in  the  Far  East.1  She  will  thus  transfer 
to  us  the  problem  of  conducting  operations  at 
long  range.  War  with  the  United  States,  though 
a  possible  method  of  furthering  present  ambi- 
tions, is  inexpedient  and  unnecessary  for  Japan. 

The  successful  Japanese  colonization  of  the 
Pacific  coast  of  the  United  States  is  without 
doubt  impossible.  The  ease  of  establishing  such 
a  colony,  while  we  are  disarmed,  does  not  conceal 
from  the  Japanese,  as  it  does  from  Americans, 
the  insuperable  difficulties  of  perpetuating  it. 
The  ultimate  effort  the  United  States  could  and 
would  make  to  defeat  such  an  attempt  would 
easily  be  ten  times  the  force  Japan  could  exert 
at  such  a  distance  to  maintain  it.  The  element 
of  time  would  be  in  our  favor;  we  should  operate 
from  our  base  of  supplies  and  draw  upon  a  popu- 
lation double  the  size  of  Japan's.  The  final  issue 
could  not  be  in  doubt  and  the  only  matter  for 
speculation  would  be  the  length  of  time  we  should 
require  for  adequate  preparations. 

Besides,   the  Japanese  would  be  lacking  in 

1  This  is  not  contradictory  with  the  opinion  already  expressed 
in  Chapter  III  that  the  Japanese  can  compel  us  to  cede  the  islands 
only  by  an  attack  on  continental  United  States.  That  seems  to  be 
true;  but  it  also  seems  probable  that  they  will  prefer  to  dispense 
with  titles  and  technicalities  and  rest  content  with  possession. 

269 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

sanity  to  establish  colonies  eight  thousand  miles 
away  when  admirable  opportunities  already 
exist  on  the  Asiatic  shores  across  from  Japan 
which  are  already  in  her  control.  In  Korea  and 
Manchuria  will  be  the  New  Japan,  and,  if  ad- 
ditional territory  is  eventually  needed,  Australia 
affords  suitable  natural  opportunities  and  its 
sparse  population  can  be  easily  conquered  by  a 
highly  organized  military  and  naval  nation 
nearly  ten  times  as  numerous.  For  exploitation 
of  the  European  type,  the  Spice  Islands,  Sumatra, 
Java,  Borneo,  and  the  Philippines  offer  excellent 
opportunities  which  can  be  developed  without 
extensive  colonization.  If  the  Japanese  retain 
any  remote  traces  of  sanity,  they  will  not  attempt 
to  colonize  the  western  coast  of  North  America 
in  preference  to  Asiatic  opportunities  of  such 
unexampled  richness.  The  mere  fact  that  the 
former  spells  a  long  war  with  a  great  people  while 
the  latter  may  be  had  for  the  taking,  will  alone 
decide  the  issue. 

A  minor  point,  but  one  worth  noting,  is  the 
inexpediency  of  any  attempt  by  the  United 
States  to  advance  its  interests  in  Asia  by  force. 
Waiving  the  fact  that  it  will  always  be  inexpe- 
dient to  attempt  the  forcible  creation  of  inter- 
ests which  cannot  be  established  by  force,  the 
United  States  is  unable  at  the  present  time  to 
put  in  the  field,  or  on  the  water,  sufficient  or- 

270 


ASIATIC  PROBLEMS 

ganized  force  to  hold  the  Philippines  and  Hawaii 
against  Japan.  The  latter  not  only  possesses  an 
extremely  efficient  army  and  navy  of  great  size, 
but  has  the  incalculable  advantage  of  being 
upon  the  field  of  action.  The  occupation  of  the 
Philippines  by  the  Japanese  would  be  an  opera- 
tion of  the  greatest  simplicity;  the  seizure  of 
Hawaii  might  even  be  effected  by  the  Japanese 
who  already  live  there.  To  retain  possession,  or 
to  regain  it  once  lost,  we  should  be  compelled 
to  exert  as  much  force  as  the  Japanese  can,  and 
inasmuch  as  we  should  be  driven  to  campaign 
from  a  great  distance,  we  should  be  compelled  to 
use  enormously  more  effort  in  gross  to  produce 
the  same  net  effect  in  the  Far  East.  We  must 
not  forget  that  the  present  preparedness  of  Ja- 
pan would  enable  her  to  consummate  with  the 
greatest  rapidity  all  fortification  of  our  present 
possessions  necessary  to  render  the  success  of 
an  assault  problematical  with  whatever  force 
we  arrived.  But  even  assuming  the  exercise  of 
such  force  possible,  it  would  still  be  inexpedient, 
because  it  would  certainly  cost  the  United  States 
a  sum  far  greater  than  the  total  profits  which 
might  conceivably  accrue  to  us  from  any  devel- 
opment of  the  Chinese  trade  of  which  our  pres- 
ent economic  fabric  is  capable. 

There  remains  the  question  of  Japanese  rights 
in  the  United  States,  the  admission  of  Japanese 

271 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

as  desirable  immigrants,  and  our  willingness  to 
grant  them  full  privileges  of  citizenship.  To 
decide  this  issue  by  theoretical  considerations  in 
defiance  of  the  prejudices  or  misconceptions  of 
any  large  section  of  our  own  population  would 
be  inexpedient.  Fundamental  reasons  also  exist 
for  accepting  as  sound  statesmanship  the  desire 
of  the  people  on  the  Pacific  coast  to  exclude  the 
oriental  from  the  United  States  and  to  prevent 
as  far  as  possible  the  acquisition  by  orientals 
already  here  of  the  full  privileges  of  citizenship. 
The  truth  seems  to  be  that  the  Japanese  and 
Chinese  do  not  amalgamate  with  our  own  popu- 
lation. It  would  be  a  work  of  supererogation  to 
speculate  upon  the  reason;  the  fact  itself  is  suf- 
ficiently clear.  The  admission  to  this  country, 
therefore,  of  a  large  number  of  Chinese  or 
Japanese  will  create  insoluble  social  and  political 
problems  of  the  utmost  gravity  for  a  democratic 
country.  Those  whose  political  or  social  equality 
we  find  ourselves  unable  to  accept,  we  wrong  by 
admitting  to  our  soil.  Let  us  therefore  exclude 
the  orientals  solely  because  we  cannot  assimilate 
them.  There  can  be  no  other  ground  half  as 
adequate.  We  must,  however,  expect  to  renounce 
all  those  privileges  and  rights  in  oriental  coun- 
tries which  we  might  have  obtained  by  the  ces- 
sion to  orientals  of  similar  rights  here.  Their 
trade  we  shall  secure  by  reason  of  fundamental 

272 


ASIATIC  PROBLEMS 

economic  forces  with  the  operation  of  which, 
when  mutually  beneficial,  neither  nation  wishes 
to  interfere.  Personal  privileges  we  cannot  ex- 
pect to  receive  which  we  do  not  accord  to  their 
citizens  in  this  country. 

There  is  no  probability  of  war  with  Japan 
unless  we  ourselves  create  it  by  an  attempt  to 
retain  aggressive  positions  whose  maintenance  is 
made  inexpedient  by  our  own  economic  status. 
Such  a  war  would  be,  as  the  Japanese  themselves 
declare,  contrary  to  the  best  interests  of  both 
nations.  If  we  are  wise  we  shall  accept  the 
limitations  which  our  economic  disabilities  im- 
pose upon  us,  which  Asiatic  interests  and  ambi- 
tions beyond  our  control  create,  and  formulate 
an  American  policy  in  the  Far  East  consistent 
with  both. 


273 


CHAPTER  XVII 

SOUTH  AMERICA  AND  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

THE  Monroe  Doctrine  is  our  most  dangerous 
possession,  our  best  known  and  oldest  tradition, 
one  of  the  few  notions  associated  with  our 
foreign  policy  which  survived  conception.1  The 
public  at  large  and  statesmen  for  nearly  a  cen- 
tury have  never  agreed  at  different  epochs  upon 
its  purpose,  nor  has  there  been  at  any  single 
epoch  an  overwhelming  majority  in  favor  of 
any  single  interpretation  of  its  intent.  Periodi- 
cally we  reiterate  its  significance  as  a  fundamental 
tenet  of  American  policy;  as  assiduously  we  ex- 
plain to  other  nations  that  it  does  not  possess 
the  only  connotation  which  seems  to  them  to 
correspond  with  the  facts  of  the  situation.  We 
seem  afraid  to  define  it,  afraid  to  use  it,  afraid  to 
discard  it.  Any  policy  is  a  source  of  extreme 

1  The  propositions  of  this  chapter  have  been  developed  at  some 
length  in  my  Pan-Americanism.  The  discussion  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  in  Henderson's  American  Diplomatic  Questions  I  have 
found  the  most  comprehensive  of  the  briefer  statements.  The  reader 
will  find  the  perusal  of  British,  French,  and  German  views  enlight- 
ening. The  brief  account  in  the  Cambridge  Modern  History  of  the 
European  diplomatic  tangle,  out  of  which  the  Doctrine  grew,  will 
do  much  to  orient  an  American's  conceptions  of  relativity. 

274 


SOUTH  AMERICA  -  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

danger,  a  fruitful  soil  in  which  disagreements 
may  develop  into  wars,  which  connotes  many 
meanings  to  the  American  people,  none  of  which 
seem  real  to  other  nations.  If  it  is  an  all  impor- 
tant postulate,  it  must  be  capable  of  definition; 
if  the  public  mind  is  unable  to  agree  upon  its 
purpose,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  not  a  policy 
at  all  and  its  maintenance  is  inexpedient.  Un- 
less a  definite,  consistent,  significant  meaning 
can  be  expressed  in  words  which  the  overwhelm- 
ing majority  of  American  people  will  approve 
and  which  the  words  will  connote  to  other 
nations,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  source  of 
grave  danger.  Apparently,  too,  another  expres- 
sion, equally  dangerous  because  of  its  multifold 
connotations,  is  growing  into  usage  —  Pan- 
Americanism. 

A  candid  and  unbiased  student  must  agree 
with  the  Latin  American  and  European  verdict 
upon  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  All  its  versions  but 
one  are  either  obsolete  or  fallacious,  and  the 
single  meaning  which  does  possess  significance 
threatens  aggressive  action  against  other  nations 
of  a  nature  which  is  not  at  present  expedient  or 
possible  for  the  United  States.  If  the  Doctrine  is 
harmless,  it  lacks  agreement  with  reality;  if  it 
is  aggressive,  it  is  beyond  the  power  of  the  United 
States  to  maintain. 

Its  oldest  meaning  assumed  that  South 
275 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

America1  was  threatened  with  political  domina- 
tion from  Europe  and  needed  the  protection  of 
the  United  States;  that  the  South  Americans  were 
anxious  for  us  to  protect  them  and  unable  to 
protect  themselves.  To-day  none  of  these  postu- 
lates are  true.  If  the  United  States  is  to  quarrel 
with  Great  Britain  or  other  European  nations  for 
the  purpose  of  protecting  South  America  from 
political  conquest  or  economic  aggression,  we 
shall  go  to  war  with  our  own  best  friends  hi  order 
to  perform  for  the  South  Americans  a  service 
which  they  neither  need  or  desire,  and  to  pre- 
vent the  extension  of  those  relations  between 
them  and  European  countries  most  beneficial  to 
them  and  to  the  Europeans. 

Any  meaning  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  which 
assumes  supervision  of  the  internal  administra- 
tion of  the  South  American  States  to  insure  the 
maintenance  of  order,  establish  firm  government 
and  democratic  institutions,  is  flatly  contrary  to 
the  primary  tenets  of  American  democracy. 

1  This  statement  is  not  entirely  accurate  because  Central 
America  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  were  in  all  probability  more  closely 
associated  with  Monroe's  original  message  than  South  America 
itself;  but  I  am  making  a  sharp  distinction  hi  this  chapter  between 
the  land  south  of  Panama  and  that  north  of  the  isthmus.  The 
latter,  which  I  contend  differs  in  condition,  must  be  treated  differ- 
ently in  policy.  Everything  said  in  this  chapter  refers,  except  when 
otherwise  stated,  to  South  America  proper.  My  contention  is  that 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  obsolete  and  fallacious  regarding  South 
America,  but  is  still  useful  for  Central  America  and  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico.  It  must  therefore  be  explicitly  restricted  to  the  latter. 

276 


SOUTH  AMERICA  -  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

We  may  perhaps  justly  interfere  in  the  affairs  of 
countries  less  developed  than  the  United  States, 
but  we  cannot  term  our  policy  democratic.  For 
we  ourselves  declare  that  the  most  precious  posses- 
sion of  any  people  is  their  right  to  frame  their  own 
institutions,  to  elect  themselves  those  who  will 
formulate  and  execute  such  statutes  as  they 
deem  wise  and  expedient.  If  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  confers  upon  us  a  right  to  super- 
vise internal  conditions  in  South  America,  it 
is  inconsistent  with  the  ideals  of  a  democratic 
nation:  it  alleges  a  right  for  us  which  we  deny 
to  others. 

Many  are  convinced  to-day  that  the  most  ex- 
pedient reading  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  denotes 
the  brotherhood  of  all  citizens  in  the  western 
Hemisphere  and  recognizes  their  common  herit- 
age of  democratic  ideals  and  their  identical  pur- 
poses in  the  establishment  of  free  governments. 
Such  an  interpretation  conflicts  diametrically 
with  one  of  the  oldest  and  most  definite  legal 
traditions  of  our  constitutional  law  —  the  denial 
to  the  Indian  as  an  Indian  of  citizenship  and  legal 
privileges.  It  also  is  contrary  to  one  of  the  best 
established  social  traditions  in  American  life  — 
the  denial  to  the  Indian  and  the  negro  of  social 
equality  and  the  privilege  of  intermarriage. 

Pan- Americanism,  in  the  sense  of  America  for 
the  Americans  and  the  exclusion  of  the  Europeans 

277 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

on  principle,  does  definitely  claim  the  existence 
between  the  two  continents  of  interests  closer 
than  those  which  either  possesses  with  Europe. 
If  this  be  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  if  this  be  Pan- 
Americanism,  it  is  founded  upon  a  fallacy  which 
any  textbook  or  encyclopedia  will  disprove. 
The  extension  of  American  trade  with  South 
America  beyond  its  present  limits  assumes  a 
mutuality  of  benefit  which  very  clearly  does  not 
and  will  not  for  many  years  exist.  Indeed,  any 
idea  of  special  interests,  privileges,  duties,  obliga- 
tions between  the  United  States  and  South 
American  countries  proper  which  neither  has 
with  Europe  are  contrary  to  the  true  interests  of 
South  America,  of  the  United  States,  and  of 
Europe.  The  truth  is  that  both  the  United  States 
and  South  America  possess  already  and  must 
continue  to  have  in  the  future  closer  contact 
with  Europe  than  with  each  other.  Any  foreign 
policy  of  the  United  States  which  countenances 
as  a  fundamental  tenet  a  postulate  diametrically 
contrary  to  these  facts  will  be  dangerous  and 
inexpedient  to  a  maximum  degree.  Any  effort 
spent  in  its  promulgation  or  preservation  will 
be  contrary  to  our  own  best  interests  and  those 
of  our  friends  and  will  be  literally  undertaken 
for  the  purpose  of  destroying  those  relations 
most  advantageous  to  us  and  to  those  whom  we- 
claim  to  protect. 

278 


SOUTH  AMERICA  -  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

If  such,  moreover,  be  the  meaning  of  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  it  is  not  possible  of  attainment.  It 
assumes  an  independence  of  Europe,  both  eco- 
nomic, political,  and  military,  which  does  not 
exist  and  which  by  all  reasonable  computation 
is  not  within  the  power  of  the  United  States  to 
achieve  within  the  next  generation.  Until  our 
navy  is  at  least  as  large  as  that  of  Great  Britain, 
all  talk  of  defending  South  America  from  Europe, 
or  of  excluding  the  Europeans  from  South 
America,  is  impertinent  and  dangerous,  because 
we  declare  the  intention  of  accomplishing  what 
every  one  knows  we  are  incapable  of  performing. 
Until  an  American  merchant  marine  adequate 
for  the  carrying  of  all  American  commerce  ac- 
tually exists,  until  banking  facilities  have  been 
provided  by  American  bankers  in  all  countries 
and  particularly  in  South  America,  any  defiance 
of  Europe,  or  the  exclusion  of  Europeans,  or 
indeed  any  limitation  of  European  influence  in 
South  America  will  be  impossible.  We  must  at 
least  be  ready  to  perform  for  the  South  Ameri- 
cans those  services  which  the  Europeans  now 
render.  Should  the  South  Americans  object  to 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the  United  States  is  at 
present  entirely  without  the  power  to  coerce 
them.  Not  only  is  it  true  that  the  larger  States 
are  quite  capable  of  defending  themselves 
against  European  invasion:  they  are  quite  as 

279 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

able    to    protect    themselves    against    pressure 
from  the  United  States. 

Preparedness  adequate  to  enable  us  to  ex- 
clude the  Europeans  by  force  means  armament 
adequate  for  the  conquest  of  South  America. 
They  are  well  aware  of  this  fact.  So  are  Euro- 
peans. Apparently,  too,  American  statesmen 
ignore  the  preponderant  commercial  interests  of 
European  nations  in  South  America,  the  enor- 
mous debts  which  the  South  Americans  have  in- 
curred and  whose  payment  they  have  promised. 
Obviously  European  investors  were  induced  to 
establish  such  extended  business  relations  only 
by  the  assurance  of  political  and  naval  protec- 
tion against  interference  with  the  safety  of  their 
capital  or  against  a  disturbance  of  normal  eco- 
nomic conditions.  The  South  American  Govern- 
ments in  the  larger  States  have  themselves  un- 
dertaken to  maintain  order,  and  the  European 
Governments  have  definitely  given  them  to  under- 
stand that  they  will  themselves  interfere  if  neces- 
sary in  the  interests  of  both.  Is  it  to  be  supposed 
that  they  will  not  redeem  these  pledges,  or  that  the 
South  American  Governments  will  hesitate  to  call 
for  assistance  should  the  United  States  attempt 
to  interfere  either  in  the  defense  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  or  by  the  promulgation  of  Pan-Ameri- 
canism? Are  we  not  mistaken  if  we  suppose  the 
United  States  able  to  overcome  such  resistance? 

280 


SOUTH  AMERICA  -  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

When  the  guarantee  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
by  all  the  American  republics  is  proposed  — 
assuming  that  a  definite  notion  of  the  Doctrine 
has  been  agreed  upon  —  it  can  have  no  other 
result  than  that  of  forming  a  defensive  alliance 
of  the  republics  against  Europe.  Like  all  other 
plans  for  the  modification  and  extension  of  the 
Doctrine,  it  lacks  reality  because,  as  has  been 
already  said,  the  connections  between  South 
America  and  Europe  are  already  so  intimate 
and  the  relations  so  entirely  cordial  that  any 
disturbance  of  either  would  be  as  detrimental 
to  the  South  Americans  as  to  the  Europeans. 
Such  a  defensive  alliance  is  unnecessary  for 
South  America.  It  is  only  for  the  United  States 
that  it  possesses  advantages.  For  us  to  secure 
from  them  assistance  in  the  extension  of  Ameri- 
can interests  at  the  cost  of  European  interests 
would  indeed  be  beneficial  —  to  us.  Shall  we 
not  nourish  a  delusion  if  we  suppose  that  they 
do  not  see  this? 

And  must  we  not  realize  that  their  apparent 
approbation  of  closer  union,  their  willingness  to 
cooperate  in  conferences,  congresses,  and  par- 
ticularly in  the  establishment  of  the  Pan-Amer- 
ican Union  is  susceptible  of  a  different  sort  of 
interpretation  from  an  idealistic  conception  of 
brotherhood?  No  European  diplomat  would 
hesitate  for  a  moment  to  conclude  that  these 

281 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

conferences  and  executive  bodies  are  extremely 
useful  to  the  South  Americans  because  of  the 
opportunity  which  they  furnish  them  to  become 
acquainted  with  one  another,  to  discuss  their 
own  common  interests,  and  compromise  their 
differences  and  disagreements.  An  executive 
body  meeting  in  secret  in  Washington  allows 
the  South  American  republics  to  establish  pre- 
cisely that  sort  of  concerted  action  and  agree- 
ment most  advantageous  for  them  in  their  op- 
position to  the  extension  of  American  influence 
in  South  America.  The  United  States  in  fact  is 
induced  to  sanction  a  regular  series  of  secret 
meetings,  which  it  would  otherwise  be  extremely 
difficult  to  hold  without  arousing  suspicion. 
When  American  members  attend,  indifferent 
business  can  always  be  discussed.  Indeed,  it 
will  be  a  simple  matter  to  form  alliances  against 
us  at  meetings  held  in  our  own  capital  city  for 
the  ostensible  purpose  of  promoting  friendship 
with  the  United  States.  Any  such  extension  of 
relations  as  the  American  people  fondly  assume 
is  being  discussed  are  so  contrary  to  the  inter- 
ests of  South  America  that  no  seasoned  observer 
in  Europe  would  for  a  moment  accept  any 
other  explanation  of  the  readiness  of  the  South 
Americans  to  cooperate. 

Other  proposals  for  the  extension  or  modifica- 
tion of  the  Doctrine  also  arouse  suspicion  in 

282 


SOUTH  AMERICA  -  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

other  nations.  Much  has  been  said  in  unofficial 
circles  of  an  extension  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
to  Europe  and  to  the  world.  If  a  guarantee  of 
the  independence  of  the  smaller  States  by  an 
agreement  of  the  larger  States  is  meant,  nothing 
but  the  familiar  doctrine  of  neutrality  is  involved, 
and  the  case  of  Belgium  has  already  proved  its 
futility.  The  only  other  alternative  would  be  a 
general  congress  of  nations  for  the  establish- 
ment of  international  peace,  commonly  denoted 
by  the  term,  the  United  States  of  Europe.  Of 
this  possibility  Europeans  are  skeptical.  But 
if  such  an  extension  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to 
Europe  means  a  guarantee  by  the  United  States 
alone  of  the  peace  of  Europe,  or  the  prevention 
of  aggression  and  war  in  Europe,  it  rests  upon 
premises  difficult  to  understand.  Of  a  similar 
nature  are  the  proposals  made  with  apparent 
seriousness  of  the  extension  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine by  the  United  States  over  Great  Britain, 
for  the  purpose  of  protecting  that  power  from 
invasion  by  Germany.  So  far  are  these  proposals 
removed  from  what  is  considered  in  London, 
Paris,  and  Berlin  to  be  sane  international  think- 
ing, that  they  arouse  fears  of  ulterior  purposes. 
In  the  light  of  European  premises  they  are  so 
extraordinary  in  their  perversity  and  ignorance 
that  they  would  be  classed  as  the  vagaries  of  an 
unsound  mind  were  it  not  that  the  quarters  from 

283 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

which  they  proceed  rouse  fears  of  subtly  aggressive 
policies.  Until  we  are  economically  independent 
of  Europe,  any  guarantee  of  European  peace  or 
of  the  independence  of  European  nations  by  any 
American  doctrine  is  impossible  of  achievement. 
At  the  same  time  it  is  idle  to  deny  that  there 
are  many  extensions  of  relationship  between  the 
United  States  and  South  American  nations  mu- 
tually advantageous  and  entirely  desirable.  The 
Pan-American  Union,  for  instance,  is  performing 
a  most  useful  work  in  the  dissemination  of  ac- 
curate information  about  commercial  opportuni- 
ties in  South  America  of  which  the  vast  majority 
of  American  merchants  are  entirely  ignorant. 
There  are  great  possibilities  for  the  increasing  of 
legitimate  trade  with  South  America,  based  upon 
fundamental  economic  forces  already  in  opera- 
tion. Arrangements  for  direct  transportation, 
for  direct  exchange  by  more  extended  banking 
facilities,  would  obviously  redound,  if  successful, 
to  the  advantage  of  all.  If  a  business  court  for 
the  hearing  of  commercial  cases  between  the 
citizens  of  the  various  republics  could  be  or- 
ganized; and  uniform  laws  regarding  contracts, 
bankruptcy,  and  process  for  the  collection  of 
debt  could  be  adopted,  serious  obstacles  in  the 
way  of  trade  would  be  removed  and  economic 
profit  would  result  for  the  citizens  of  all  coun- 
tries. Common  police  regulations  for  the  ap- 

284 


SOUTH  AMERICA  -  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

prehension  of  criminals  fleeing  from  justice  and 
for  the  keeping  of  the  peace  along  the  boundaries 
of  all  countries  would  be  clearly  advantageous, 
especially,  if  authority  on  both  sides  of  the  border, 
something  after  the  fashion  accorded  the  old 
English  and  Scotch  marches  officials,  could  be 
provided.  Yet  any  and  all  of  these  beneficial 
arrangements  would  be  even  more  profitable  and 
advantageous  if  they  could  be  established  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  European  nations. 
Indeed,  there  seem  to  be  no  connections  mutually 
advantageous  to  the  United  States  and  South 
America  which  would  not  be  equally  normal  and 
advantageous  between  the  United  States  and 
Europe  or  between  South  America  and  Europe. 
These  are  merely  those  provisions  for  interna- 
tional comity  and  equity  whose  expediency  has 
been  long  admitted. 

This  is  apparently  the  meaning  attached  by 
the  President  to  the  word  Pan- Americanism. 
It  is  unfortunate,  however,  that  the  term  em- 
ployed to  denote  relations  entirely  normal  be- 
tween all  civilized  countries  should  be  one  which 
bears  in  Europe  so  peculiar  a  connotation.  The 
prefix  "Pan"  there  invariably  denotes  a  closer 
bond  between  people  of  the  same  race,  intended 
to  provide  them  with  exclusive  privileges  and 
to  render  them  capable  of  defensive  action  in 
the  interests  of  their  own  organized  life  against 

285 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

other  countries  and  races.  Where  we  have  in 
mind  a  greater  friendship  between  existing  enti- 
ties, we  ought  not  to  employ  a  word  indicating 
to  the  European  mind  the  forcible  creation  of 
new  entities.  What  the  South  American  nations 
ask  of  the  United  States  is  a  recognition  of  their 
independence,  territorial  integrity,  political  sov- 
ereignty of  exactly  the  same  nature  which  the 
United  States  accords  Great  Britain  and  Ger- 
many. They  wish  to  hold  to  us  that  same  type 
of  relationship  which  European  powers  have. 
They  wish  to  become  in  the  strictest  sense  for- 
eign territory.  Either  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and 
Pan-Americanism  signify  the  direct  contrary  or 
they  have  no  meaning  at  all  which  justifies 
either  the  doctrine  or  the  name. 

In  fact,  our  relations  with  the  South  Ameri- 
can nations  must  be  governed  by  existing  con- 
ditions: first  and  foremost,  by  our  economic  de- 
pendence upon  the  sea  power  and  by  a  definite 
recognition  of  her  potential  domination  of  South 
America;  next,  by  the  inferiority  of  the  economic 
structure  of  the  United  States  as  compared  with 
European  nations;  lastly,  by  the  fallacies  of  Pan- 
Americanism.  Until  we  can  take  control  of  the 
approaches  to  South  America  in  fact,  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  is  an  unreality,  whether  it  stands  for 
defense  or  offense.  Our  alliance  with  the  sea 
power  will,  naturally,  inspire  us  to  renounce  all 

286 


SOUTH  AMERICA  -  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

policies  detrimental  to  its  interests  or  contrary 
to  its  policies.  Such  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is. 
In  1823  there  was  no  doubt  in  England  that  it 
was  addressed  to  England  and  not  to  Spain. 
Unquestionably  the  sea  power  will  be  glad  to 
share  with  us  its  trade  in  South  America,  partly 
because  its  interests  will  also  become  ours, 
partly  because  no  nation  can  monopolize  the 
trade  of  that  continent  without  literally  buying 
all  they  have  to  sell.  Clearly,  the  use  of  rubber, 
coffee,  timber,  and  hides  in  the  world  is  much 
more  considerable  than  in  any  single  country. 
There  is  no  immediate  danger  that  we  shall  lose 
in  South  America  any  commercial  advantages 
which  we  are  now  able  to  develop. 

Aside  from  justice  and  equity,  aside  from  an 
alliance  with  the  sea  power,  quite  apart  from 
the  impossibility  of  forcible  interference  by  the 
United  States  in  South  America,  there  is  no 
purpose  whatever  of  obtaining  abnormal  privi- 
leges, because  our  own  economic  fabric  is  not 
yet  able  to  take  advantage  of  more  opportunities 
than  we  already  have.  Supplies  of  capital  for 
investment  in  South  America  we  have;  a  supply 
adequate  to  South  American  needs  every  one 
knows  we  do  not  possess.  Direct  trade  with 
South  America  we  already  have;  a  direct  trade 
of  any  proportions  does  not  and  cannot  exist 
until  we  are  able  to  use  a  larger  proportion  of 

287 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

the  South  American  output.  Until  our  economic 
fabric  is  much  more  complex  than  it  is  at  pres- 
ent, we  cannot  think  of  extending  our  trade  rela- 
tions with  rapidity.  Nor  would  it  be  advan- 
tageous for  us  to  interfere  with  their  present 
trade.  The  great  bulk  of  their  exports  are 
hypothecated  to  the  creditor  countries,  and  for 
us  to  attempt  by  force  any  interference  with 
the  normal  payment  of  their  obligations  would 
promptly  disturb  the  credit  structure  of  the 
world,  upset  European  markets,  and  produce 
consequently  upon  the  United  States  itself  a 
reaction  more  costly  and  serious  to  American 
business  than  any  conceivable  profits  a  large 
direct  trade  with  South  America  could  yield. 
There  are  limitations  to  the  beneficial  influence 
of  force  in  economic  relations.  It  can  often  assist 
a  strong  creditor  nation  hi  extending  its  relations 
with  countries  inferior  in  strength.  It  can  never 
permit  an  undeveloped  or  inferior  economic  fabric 
to  contend  with  a  strong  creditor  State.  Artificial 
obstacles  force  may  remove,  but  economic  fac- 
tors it  can  at  most  merely  assist.  Our  economic 
fabric  is  not  yet  ready  for  such  assistance. 

We  must  accept,  therefore,  without  protest  or 
complaint  that  share  of  South  American  trade 
to  which  OUT  comparative  economic  develop- 
ment entitles  us,  realizing  that  it  will  grow  as 
we  grow  and  as  they  grow;  and  that  until  eco- 

288 


SOUTH  AMERICA  -  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

nomic  independence  is  a  fact  for  the  United 
States  beyond  all  argument,  we  cannot  hope  to 
create  different  relations.  If  other  nations  by 
the  undue  and  unjust  exploitation  of  their  own 
interests  interfere  with  the  normal  working  of 
economic  forces  to  our  detriment,  we  shall  ex- 
pect the  sea  power  to  interfere  in  our  behalf, 
but  if  the  sea  power  and  diplomacy  fail,  we  must 
accept  the  situation. 

With  South  American  nations  let  us  by  all 
means  cultivate  and  extend  friendly  relations 
wherever  possible;  any  degree  of  international 
cooperation,  mutually  advantageous  to  both  par- 
ties, let  us  by  all  means  sanction.  Arbitration 
treaties,  business  courts,  uniform  laws  on  certain 
subjects,  uniform  coinage,  weights  and  meas- 
ures—  such  we  may  readily  achieve;  but  let  us 
once  and  for  all  put  at  rest  their  fears  of  Amer- 
ican aggression.  If  we  cherish  no  schemes  of 
conquest,  no  sacrifice  will  be  involved;  we  shall 
merely  proclaim  officially  the  truth  when  we 
declare  by  statute  or  otherwise  that  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  in  all  its  meanings  is  obsolete  and  non- 
existent; that  Pan- Americanism  in  the  ordinary 
sense  of  the  word  is  untrue  and  fallacious;  that 
the  United  States  purposes  to  have  with  South 
American  nations  those  same  relations  of  amity 
and  friendship  which  it  has  with  European 
nations,  and  no  other. 

289 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

CENTRAL   AMERICA   AND   PANAMA 

IN  Central  America  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico 
the  strong  arm  of  the  United  States,  maintaining 
strict  order  by  means  of  an  efficient  resident 
army  and  an  adequate  and  powerful  navy  in 
West  Indian  waters!  The  Panama  Canal  we 
must  fortify  as  elaborately  as  military  science 
may  dictate.  Its  water  approaches  we  must 
guard  by  means  as  effective  as  the  best  naval 
experts  can  devise.  In  all,  the  cooperation  and 
approval  of  Great  Britain  is  certain.  Her  Atlantic 
fleet  will  maintain  our  access  by  sea  and  her 
strategic  naval  positions  will  be  at  our  disposal. 
Military  access  to  the  Canal  over  land  through 
Central  America  and  Mexico  we  must  have. 
The  foreign  relations  of  the  smaller  republics 
must  be  supervised  and  the  control  of  their  fi- 
nances, which  we  already  possess,  must  be  con- 
tinued. Yet  there  must  be  no  oppression,  no 
exploitation  in  the  vulgar  sense  of  the  word,  no 
unnecessary  interference  with  internal  adminis- 
tration or  with  local  policy.  As  liberal  a  share  of 
influence  in  their  own  affairs  as  they  are  able  to 

290 


CENTRAL  AMERICA  AND  PANAMA 

exercise  in  an  orderly  and  efficient  manner  they 
must  always  possess,  and  must  understand  that  it 
will  increase  automatically  as  the  intelligence 
and  capacity  of  the  people  themselves  grow, 
through  education  and  contact  with  the  outside 
world,  and  that  the  eventual  outcome  should  be 
the  admission  of  these  States  to  the  Union  upon 
equal  terms  with  the  thirteen  original  entities. 

A  closer  commercial  relationship  does  and 
ought  to  exist  between  Central  America,  the 
islands  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  the  United 
States  than  can  ever  normally  exist  between 
those  countries  and  Europe.  Their  commercial 
development  ought  to  be  in  American  hands 
whenever  skill  and  capital  are  required  which 
they  are  not  themselves  able  to  supply.  The 
commerce  of  the  Gulf  must  be  carried  in  Ameri- 
can bottoms,  manned  by  American  sailors  and 
officers.  Indeed,  our  interests  there  are  greater 
than  those  of  European  nations,  and  the  interests 
of  the  inhabitants  are  further  advanced  by  closer 
contact  with  the  United  States  than  they  can 
be  by  relations  with  European  nations.  The  ex- 
tension of  European  political,  military,  or  eco- 
nomic influence  neither  we  nor  they  can  coun- 
tenance. The  Monroe  Doctrine  must  be  re- 
stricted to  Central  America,  Panama,  and  the 
West  Indies.  But  it  must  not  nourish  in  igno- 
rant minds  the  belief  that  we  perform  in  our 

291 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

own   interest   services,   duties,  and  obligations 
which  we  shall  execute  in  theirs. 

The  justification  of  such  a  policy  upon  broad 
grounds  of  humanity,  liberty,  and  expediency  is 
less  difficult  than  idealists  will  suppose.  The 
situation  as  it  exists  at  the  present  moment  is 
purely  the  result  of  contact  between  a  numerous, 
aggressive,  highly  organized  people  and  relatively 
smaller,  uneducated,  and  semi-developed  com- 
munities. Geographical  proximity  establishes  a 
clash  of  fundamental  interests  which  neither 
idealism  nor  forbearance  can  prevent.  The 
Central  American  and  West  Indian  people  are 
in  the  main  Indians,  although  in  some  the  negro 
strain  predominates,  while  in  others  a  mixture 
of  white  blood  is  very  large.  Indians,  however, 
they  are  still,  even  though  many  of  them  have 
acquired  the  veneer  of  civilization.  The  result  of 
contact  between  the  white  man  and  the  Indian 
we  have  seen  only  too  clearly  in  the  history  of  the 
United  States.  The  Indian,  as  an  Indian,  does 
not  amalgamate.  The  individual  must  cease  to  be 
an  Indian,  must  adopt  our  habits  and  methods 
and  become  a  white  man,  or  he  ceases  to  exist. 
Three  centuries  have  proved  the  Indian  not  the 
equal  of  the  white  man  in  skill  or  ability,  in 
restraint  or  discipline.  Legislation  and  diplo- 
macy will  alike  be  futile  which  are  based  upon  the 
assumption  of  an  equality  which  does  not  exist. 

292 


CENTRAL  AMERICA  AND  PANAMA 

Intelligent  supervision  and  encouragement  can " 
produce  within  the  immediate  future,  as  they 
already  have  in  Oklahoma,  results  highly  ad- 
vantageous to  individual  Indians  as  well  as  to 
white  men.  The  stronger  and  better  organized 
community  will  gradually  absorb  these  Indian 
States,  and  the  most  we  can  hope  to  do  is  to 
soften  the  transition  for  the  individuals  alive  at 
any  one  time  and  to  develop  into  equality  as 
large  a  proportion  of  the  population  as  possible. 
Unless  the  expansion  of  the  United  States  to  its 
present  boundaries  was  a  crime  of  horrible  and 
unbelievable  magnitude,  such  a  policy  in  Central 
America  is  justifiable  and  humane.  It  is  literally 
that  policy  by  which  the  present  United  States 
has  been  created. 

Nor  is  it  inexpedient  for  the  present  Mexicans 
and  Central  Americans.  Unfortunately  the  al- 
ternative for  them  does  not  lie  between  sub- 
stantial political  and  economic  independence 
and  complete  domination  by  the  United  States. 
For  them  sovereignty  in  the  most  literal  sense 
is  impossible.  If  the  United  States  does  not 
keep  order  with  a  strong  hand  and  regulate  and 
dominate  their  political  and  financial  structure, 
the  great  European  nations  will  demand  the 
right.  So  beneficial  to  all  developed  countries  is 
the  exercise  of  force  to  protect  the  continuous 
and  uninterrupted  operation  of  economic  factors 

293 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

in  undeveloped  countries,  that  the  great  commer- 
cial nations  have  no  intention  of  permitting  any 
considerable  area  to  remain  unpoliced.  For  the 
people  of  the  country  such  a  forcible  observance 
of  the  proprieties  is  also  undoubtedly  beneficial, 
although  the  results  are  ordinarily  more  appar- 
ent in  the  second  generation  than  in  the  first. 
If  any  country  must  police  Central  America  and 
the  West  Indies,  the  United  States  is  so  situated 
as  to  do  it  at  a  minimum  cost  and  with  maxi- 
mum effect.  No  European  nation  can  undertake 
such  a  task  without  maintaining  military  and 
administrative  connections  at  a  great  distance 
and  at  a  disproportionate  expense  and  trouble. 
Moreover,  the  international  advantage  is  un- 
questioned of  placing  the  police  power  on  both 
sides  of  such  a  boundary  in  the  same  hands. 
One  great  difficulty  has  been  the  tendency  of 
American  criminals  to  take  refuge  in  Mexico 
and  Central  America  and  of  their  criminals  to 
infest  the  Texas  border.  Such  social  preferences 
and  new  economic  wants  as  may  be  created  can 
be  more  easily  satisfied  by  the  United  States 
than  by  European  countries,  and  will  gradually 
tend,  by  the  development  of  social  and  economic 
uniformity,  to  erase  the  very  line  which  at 
present  denotes  the  existence  of  the  problem. 

The  only  possible  permanent  solution  of  this 
difference  in  comparative  development  lies  in  the 

294 


CENTRAL  AMERICA  AND  PANAMA 

hope  that  penetration  by  the  United  States  may 
gradually  amalgamate  those  communities  with- 
out their  suffering  any  greater  loss  of  sovereignty, 
individuality,  and  liberty  than  the  older  States 
of  this  country  have  suffered  by  joining  the 
Union.  Yet  they  will  amalgamate  by  ceasing 
to  be  longer  Indian  communities.  Gradually 
white  men  will  migrate  thither  in  greater  and 
greater  numbers;  little  by  little  their  superior 
intelligence  and  energy  will  accumulate  in  their 
hands  a  larger  and  larger  control  of  the  economic 
and  political  fabric.  As  we  have  absorbed  sec- 
tion by  section  the  Red  Man's  heritage  in  the 
United  States,  so  will  we  bit  by  bit  take  from  him 
Mexico  and  Central  America.  The  handwriting 
is  on  the  wall  and  the  Central  Americans  have 
read  it.  But  nothing,  not  even  the  white  man's 
forbearance,  can  enable  men  still  in  middle  bar- 
barism, thousands  of  years  of  ethnical  develop- 
ment behind  the  Greeks  of  Homer,  to  withstand 
the  proximity  of  modern  civilization. 

There  seems  to  be  a  consensus  of  opinion  in 
the  United  States  that  the  restoration  of  order 
in  Mexico  by  means  of  such  economic  pressure 
as  was  tried  against  Huerta,  of  such  displays 
of  force  as  the  expedition  to  Vera  Cruz,  of  such 
guidance  and  direction  as  were  attempted  by  the 
special  envoys  sent  to  Carranza  and  Villa,  has 
been  proved  futile  and  inexpedient.  Neither 

295 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

peace  nor  democratic  government  as  we  under- 
stand it  has  as  yet  been  established  in  Mexico, 
and  the  probability  that  anything  resembling 
either  can  become  a  reality  within  a  brief  period 
is  not  great.  It  is  high  time  that  the  United 
States  made  preparations  to  police  Mexico  by  a 
United  States  army  of  such  undoubted  size  and 
efficiency  that  its  mere  presence  will  be  sufficient 
to  accomplish  the  necessary  ends.  No  demon- 
stration in  force  or  temporary  invasion  is  expe- 
dient. We  do  not  wish  to  fight  the  Mexicans; 
we  wish  to  prevent  the  Mexicans  from  fighting 
each  other,  and  apparently  we  shall  not  be 
able  to  achieve  our  purpose  until  we  are  so 
irresistibly  strong  that  resistance  will  become 
for  them  mere  slaughter.  If  this  be  the  situation, 
let  us  face  it  and  prepare  accordingly.  Certainly 
Great  Britain,  France,  and  Germany  will  not 
much  longer  tolerate  our  attempts  to  produce 
order  in  other  ways.  At  the  end  of  the  European 
war  vast  military  establishments  will  be  on 
foot,  and  it  will  be  a  simple  matter  to  utilize 
them  before  they  are  disbanded  for  the  perform- 
ance of  such  tasks  as  this. 

Coercion  by  the  United  States,  moreover,  will 
accord  with  the  known  facts  regarding  condi- 
tions in  these  countries.  Democratic  govern- 
ment as  we  understand  it,  government  in  which 
the  numerical  majority  actually  participate  with 


CENTRAL  AMERICA  AND  PANAMA 

some  faint  degree  of  intelligence,  is  literally 
impossible,  because  the  numerical  majority 
consists  of  Indians,  negroes,  and  halfbreeds  too 
ignorant  even  to  understand  what  participation 
means.  The  population  of  Mexico  is  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  fourteen  millions;  the  legal  electorate 
was,  some  years  ago,  about  eighty  thousand,  and 
was  intended  to  comprise  every  individual  in- 
telligent enough  to  be  able  to  vote.  Under  such 
circumstances  democratic  rule  by  the  numerical 
majority  becomes  an  impossibility.  However 
desirable,  it  cannot  be  achieved  for  some  gen- 
erations. The  United  States  wisely  suppressed 
the  recent  revolution  in  Hayti,  and  had  pre- 
viously interfered  in  the  affairs  of  San  Domingo, 
of  Cuba,  and  of  Porto  Rico.  The  literal  truth 
is  that  these  people  do  not  wish  to  carry  on  that 
type  of  government  which  we  call  democratic, 
or  to  maintain  that  sort  of  order  which  we  con- 
sider indispensable,  or  to  educate  themselves  or 
their  children  in  our  methods  of  economic  and 
social  life.  If  left  to  themselves  they  will  be 
a  century  hence  approximately  what  they  are 
now.  Individuals  here  and  there  will  separate 
themselves  from  the  mass,  migrate  to  the  United 
States  or  to  Europe,  and  display  perhaps  dis- 
tinguished ability.  They  will  not  do  it  upon 
that  soil  or  in  that  environment.  It  is  the  latter 
we  must  change.  Settled  long  before  the  United 

297 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

States,  these  countries  have  developed  so  slowly 
as  scarcely  to  have  progressed  at  all  and  present 
a  contrast  to  the  enlightened  and  progressive 
communities  in  South  America  which  is  indeed 
striking.  That  sort  of  tutelage  they  do  require, 
which  the  South  Americans  reject  with  scorn. 
From  the  economics  of  nationalization  we  may 
derive  still  further  support  for  such  a  policy. 
Between  the  United  States  and  this  district  we 
are  considering  there  is  natural  economic  affin- 
ity. Proximity  and  propinquity  are  realities  and 
not  assumptions.  Trade  naturally  flows  to  the 
United  States,  where  lies  the  natural  market  in 
which  to  sell  and  in  which  to  buy.  For  them  to 
seek  a  market  in  Europe  when  one  entirely 
adequate  exists  at  their  very  door  would  be 
folly.  Moreover,  the  United  States  is  already 
able  to  perform  all  the  services  which  they  re- 
quire. We  possess  sufficient  capital  of  our  own 
for  their  needs,  the  necessary  skilled  labor  and 
machinery,  the  sort  of  manufactured  articles 
which  they  are  accustomed  to  buy.  The  economic 
tie  is  already  a  reality,  for  the  fundamental 
economic  conditions  for  direct  trade  already 
exist.  About  seventy  per  cent  of  their  trade  is 
already  in  our  hands.  American  citizens  are 
the  largest  investors  of  capital  and  hold  the  most 
important  concessions  and  privileges.  The  experi- 
ence of  the  past  has  shown  that  the  extension  of 

298 


CENTRAL  AMERICA  AND  PANAMA 

political,  diplomatic,  and  economic  influence;  of 
a  uniformity  of  law,  of  coinage,  of  weights  and 
measures  over  areas  thus  closely  related  is  of 
mutual  benefit  to  the  citizens  of  all  the  countries 
affected.  It  will  be  almost  equally  advantageous 
to  the  citizens  of  European  countries.  As  fast 
as  we  develop  the  economic  resources  of  this 
area  we  shall  increase  the  normal  markets  there 
for  the  commodities  of  all  other  countries  and  the 
supply  of  raw  products  which  other  countries 
desire  to  buy.  So  far  as  we  regulate  and  render 
uniform  the  conditions  of  the  district,  we  make 
it  accessible  to  the  merchants  of  all  developed 
countries.  The  process,  indeed,  is  precisely  the 
same  as  that  which  proved  so  advantageous  in 
the  annexation  of  Texas,  in  the  development  of 
California  and  of  Oregon,  and  in  the  case  of  the 
Louisiana  Purchase.  The  extension  of  the  eco- 
nomic area  has  proved  in  the  vast  majority  of 
such  cases  justifiable  and  expedient. 

Nor  will  we  in  any  sense  adopt  an  aggressive 
policy  if  we  espouse  what  has  just  been  sketched.1 

1  In  Chapter  III  I  termed  the  defense  of  the  Canal  an  aggressive 
policy  and  apparently  now  contradict  myself.  The  reader  must 
remember  that  Chapter  III  assumes  that  the  United  States  stands 
alone  against  the  world  and  declines  alliance.  This  statement 
assumes  an  alliance  with  Great  Britain,  an  understanding  with  all 
European  States  upon  our  policy,  and  the  abandoning  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  as  far  as  South  America  is  concerned.  Such 
constructive  changes  in  other  policies  to  my  thinking  entirely  alter 
the  Central  American  problem  and  make  such  limited  action  as  I 
suggest  purely  defensive. 

299 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

It  is  in  the  strictest  sense  defensive,  because  it 
purposes  to  preserve  existing  American  interests 
and  present  American  property  rights  by  the 
continuance  of  that  policy  upon  which  the  whole 
development  of  the  United  States  rests  and  by 
which  all  of  the  greater  European  countries  have 
justified  their  national  expansion.  We  shall  re- 
deem the  tacit  promises  made  by  the  United 
States  to  American  citizens  in  the  last  decades 
on  the  strength  of  which  these  investments  were 
made  and  these  concessions  were  obtained. 
Whether  or  not  definite  instruments  in  writing 
were  signed,  it  was  understood  that  the  United 
States  guaranteed  its  citizens  that  same  unin- 
terrupted possession  of  their  opportunities,  that 
same  immunity  of  life  and  property,  and  that 
same  protection  from  the  unjust  political  op- 
pression by  the  native  governments  which 
European  citizens  were  then  accustomed  to 
receive  in  all  semideveloped  and  undeveloped 
States.  In  many  quarters,  both  here  and  abroad, 
there  is  a  feeling  that  the  national  honor  must 
be  thus  rehabilitated.  In  addition  we  have  made 
explicit  promises  to  Great  Britain,  to  France, 
and  to  Germany,  whose  citizens  and  their 
property  have  been  in  and  are  still  in  danger,  of 
protection  and  consideration  when  the  time  for 
a  readjustment  of  Mexican  finances  shall  appear. 
These  we  have  entirely  failed  to  fulfill  by  the 

300 


CENTRAL  AMERICA  AND  PANAMA 

exercise  of  economic  pressure  or  advice.  There 
is  left  for  us  only  an  appeal  to  armed  force  and  a 
determined  supervision  of  the  affairs  of  these  coun- 
tries in  the  interests  of  order  and  civilization. 

The  definite  maintenance  of  the  segis  of  the 
United  States  over  Central  America  and  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico  will  also  preserve  for  us  into  the 
remote  future  that  type  of  economic  opportunity 
for  which  the  great  nations  of  the  world  are  at 
present  vehemently  contending.  While  we  do 
not  at  present  require  a  greater  number  of  ab- 
normal opportunities  for  the  investment  of 
capital  than  the  American  business  at  home  and 
the  present  very  limited  penetration  of  Central 
America  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  afford,  in  time 
to  come  we  shall  require  that  sort  of  opportunity 
for  the  rapid  development  of  the  virgin  resources 
of  fertile  countries  which  Central  America  and 
the  Gulf  will  then  make  possible.  We  can  at 
present  successfully  reserve  this  area  in  the 
interest  of  our  future  prosperity,  with  benefit 
both  to  ourselves  and  to  the  inhabitants  of 
those  lands,  and  without  injustice  to  the  exist- 
ing or  future  interests  of  European  nations. 
Thus  shall  we  perform  those  duties  which  the 
present  demands;  thus  shall  we  answer  the 
challenge  of  the  future. 


301 


CHAPTER  XIX 

SCOPE   OF   PKEPAREDNESS 

OUR  economic  disabilities  and  our  present  lack 
of  administrative  and  industrial  correlation  dic- 
tate the  abandonment  of  the  Atlantic  to  Great 
Britain,  of  the  Pacific  to  Japan,  and  the  partial 
renunciation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  That 
force  which  we  cannot  at  present  exert  we  must 
supply  by  an  alliance  with  the  sea  power  in  the 
hands  of  Great  Britain  which  will  insure  us 
present  protection  against  the  aggressive  schemes 
of  all  other  European  States  and  the  force 
necessary  to  advance  and  protect  the  lives  and 
property  of  American  citizens  outside  the  United 
States.  What  the  sea  power  and  her  allies  will 
not  concede,  we  cannot  at  present  extort  from 
them;  what  they  are  unable  to  obtain  for  us 
from  others,  cannot  be  had.  There  remains  for 
us  to  perform  ourselves  the  task  of  policing 
Mexico,  Central  America,  and  the  Gulf  and  the 
defense  of  the  Panama  Canal  from  such  aggres- 
sion as  Great  Britain  is  unable,  because  of  the 
exigencies  of  the  situation,  to  defeat  in  Europe. 
We  must  always  be  able  to  hold  the  Canal  and 

302 


SCOPE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

its  approaches  both  in  the  Atlantic  and  in  the 
Pacific  until  Great  Britain  can  effectively  assist 
us.  But  precisely  those  great  crises  in  Europe 
which  threaten  Great  Britain's  independence 
will  contain  the  greatest  possibilities  of  peril  for 
the  United  States.  If  the  European  situation  is 
so  clearly  in  Great  Britain's  control  that  she 
may  dispatch  a  fleet  at  will,  other  European 
powers  are  unlikely  to  assail  us.  It  is  only  when 
Great  Britain  is  unable  to  spare  her  fleet  that 
we  shall  imperatively  need  ours. 

Yet  the  ultimate  meaning  of  preparedness 
lies  in  a  readiness  to  meet  the  incredible  and  the 
improbable.  If  we  limit  our  plans  to  dangers  at 
present  visible  and  tangible,  we  shall  accom- 
plish nothing  of  moment.  Only  to  that  extent  to 
which  we  lay  at  present  the  foundations  for  a 
greater  effort  than  is  now  expedient  shall  we 
envisage  the  true  requirements  of  the  situation. 
Not  in  what  we  see  lies  the  real  danger,  but  in 
our  unreadiness  to  make  an  effort  which  tran- 
scends the  limitations  of  present  knowledge. 
We  must  slowly  begin  to  lay  the  foundations  for 
armament  necessary  to  meet  the  incredible,  for 
while  we  may  not  need  now  to  complete  such 
measures,  unless  we  firmly  embed  the  founda- 
tion stones  of  economic  independence  to-day,  we 
shall  never  be  capable  of  the  effort  when  the  exi- 
gencies of  the  future  render  it  imperative.  We 

303 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

must  prepare  now  to  meet  the  unexpected,  be- 
cause when  danger  becomes  visible,  adequate 
preparedness  is  impossible.  Unless  we  compre- 
hend within  our  present  plans  the  loss  of  the 
supremacy  of  the  seas  by  Great  Britain,  a  sweep- 
ing German  victory  in  Europe,  the  total  de- 
struction of  the  balance  of  power,  the  aggression 
of  Russia,  an  entire  reversal  of  the  present  peace- 
ful policy  of  Japan,  we  shall  undertake  no  pre- 
paredness adequate  for  the  protection  of  that 
greatest  of  American  interests,  the  right  to 
choose.  At  all  costs,  we  must  not  disregard  the 
challenge  of  the  future. 

What  precise  measures  will  accomplish  our 
immediate  purposes?  How  much  more  must  we 
do  to  permit  in  the  future  an  extension  of  arma- 
ment adequate  for  needs  now  deemed  improb- 
able? The  issue  of  adequacy  is  not  one  for  lay- 
men, nor  for  members  of  Congress,  nor  yet  for 
secretaries  of  war  whose  experience  was  obtained 
in  the  study  of  law,  nor  for  secretaries  of  the 
navy  without  any  previous  acquaintance  with 
naval  affairs.  It  is  an  issue  to  be  decided  by 
experts  and  upon  which  their  opinion  only  is  of 
any  value.  Once  the  object  to  be  attained  is 
definitely  established,  the  forces  adequate  to 
achieve  it  can  be  determined  with  precision  by 
those  skilled  in  tactics  and  strategy.  The  elab- 
orate studies  of  military  and  naval  experts  need 

304 


SCOPE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

not  be  summarized  here.  There  seems  to  be  a 
general  agreement  that  an  army  of  between  a 
quarter  of  a  million  and  half  a  million  regular 
troops  is  the  least  which  will  accomplish  any- 
thing, and  that  a  fleet  about  double  the  size  of 
our  present  navy  will  be  needed  for  the  protec- 
tion of  the  Canal. 

Yet  there  seems  as  yet  to  be  too  little  realiza- 
tion of  the  difference  between  a  good  army  or 
navy  and  armament  adequate  for  the  defense  of 
American  interests,  present  and  future.  We 
need  not  good  ships,  but  enough  ships;  not  merely 
coast  defenses  strong  enough  to  defeat  all  fleets 
except  one  or  two,  but  defenses  adequate  against 
probable  aggressors.  Nor  can  we  set  some 
definite  future  date  for  the  completion  of  our 
plans,  limit  ourselves  to  so  many  troops  or  to  so 
many  ships,  or  to  the  expenditure  of  so  much 
money  annually  or  in  the  aggregate.  The  ad- 
versary will  not  appear  by  invitation  nor  ascer- 
tain in  advance  whether  his  arrival  will  be 
convenient.  How  much  effort  is  imperative  to 
defend  Panama  no  one  can  tell  until  our  attitude 
toward  Great  Britain  has  become  definite.  The 
defense  of  the  Canal  against  the  British  fleet, 
against  the  German  army,  or  the  Turkish  navy 
will  obviously  require  very  different  types  and 
amounts  of  preparedness.  To  protect  the  At- 
lantic coast  against  invasion  will  require  meas- 

305 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

ures  adequate  to  defeat  the  aggressor,  and  their 
extent  no  one  can  calculate  except  in  relation  to 
the  existing  and  future  strength  of  probable  ag- 
gressors. To  base  calculations  for  the  defense  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  upon  the  requirements  for 
defeating  any  nation  except  Great  Britain  will 
naturally  omit  from  our  calculations  the  effort 
needed  to  resist  the  only  power  we  are  at  all 
likely  to  meet.  Great  Britain  controls  South 
America,  and  it  is  her  clutch  which  the  Germans 
are  so  anxious  to  loose.  So  long  as  she  controls 
the  sea,  no  one  can  attack  South  America.  If 
we  ally  with  her,  our  preparations  to  save  Latin 
America  will  be  so  peculiar  as  to  rouse  in  her 
mind  prompt  suspicions  of  our  good  faith. 

The  conditions  of  the  struggle  for  which  we 
must  prepare  are  not  within  our  control.  Pre- 
paredness can  be  estimated  only  in  relation  to 
the  existing  and  future  armament  of  other  na- 
tions. We  cannot  deal  with  a  problem  of  two 
dimensions  in  the  terms  of  one.  The  scope  of 
preparedness  is  comparative  and  relative,  vari- 
able and  not  fixed,  progressive  and  not  static, 
shifting  as  international  values  and  policies  alter, 
as  the  armament  of  possible  aggressors  waxes  or 
wanes.  Exigencies  over  which  we  have  no  con- 
trol may  destroy  the  British  navy  or  the  Ger- 
man army,  or  may  double  the  size  and  ef- 
ficiency of  both.  Preparedness  for  the  future, 

306 


SCOPE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

therefore,  that  most  essential  preparedness  which 
we  can  undertake,  that  readiness  to  meet  the 
effort  whose  extent  cannot  now  be  calculated, 
must  envisage  the  possibility  of  a  far  more  ex- 
tensive effort  than  even  independence  of  Europe 
would  at  present  involve. 

Plans  at  present  more  than  adequate  upon 
paper  may  be  utterly  insufficient  by  the  time 
they  have  been  executed.  Even  supposing  that 
the  European  nations  and  Japan  undertake  no 
extension  of  their  armament  and  merely  execute 
present  plans  or  maintain  existing  forces,  their 
skill  and  efficiency  in  construction,  their  resource- 
fulness and  power  of  invention  are  so  much 
greater  than  ours  that  by  the  time  our  ships  are 
completed  and  our  artillery  manufactured  both 
may  be  practically  obsolete.  Four  years  is  the 
average  time  we  have  usually  required  for  the 
construction  of  a  battleship.  The  same  work  has 
been  performed  in  Great  Britain,  Germany,  and 
Japan  in  a  single  year,  and  is  normally  completed 
in  two  years.  Naval  architecture  and  improve- 
ments in  artillery  have  commonly  made  such 
strides  between  the  laying  of  the  keel  of  the 
American  battleship  and  the  commissioning  of 
the  vessel  that  European  ships  already  in  com- 
mission were  constructed  so  much  later  as  to 
outrange  and  outsail  the  new  American  vessel. 
The  notion  that  when  we  launch  a  battleship  it 

307 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

is  the  most  powerful  in  the  world  because  the 
most  recent  is  a  delusion  of  the  first  magnitude. 
Our  ships  still  under  construction  are  planned 
for  fourteen  inch  guns,  though  several  European 
battleships  armed  with  fifteen  inch  guns  have 
been  in  commission  for  months.  Nor  is  it  possi- 
ble to  place  heavier  guns  in  a  ship  intended  to 
carry  guns  of  smaller  caliber.  The  necessary 
shock  from  the  recoil  of  the  larger  guns  can  be 
absorbed  only  by  structural  changes  in  the  whole 
architecture  of  the  ship.  Coast  defense  weapons, 
too,  which  when  planned  were  more  than  ade- 
quate in  relation  to  the  armament  then  common 
upon  European  vessels,  are  now  entirely  inade- 
quate, because  the  equipment  of  European 
navies  has  since  been  completely  transformed. 

Any  preparedness  which  the  United  States  at 
present  undertakes  can  be  easily  obviated  by 
any  major  power  through  the  simple  expedient, 
already  often  employed,  of  increasing  its  own 
armament  as  fast  or  faster  than  ours.  The 
ability  of  the  European  nations  to  prepare  and 
the  probable  future  growth  of  their  armies  and 
navies  will  be  an  essential  element  in  American 
preparedness.  The  forces  needed  to  protect  the 
Panama  Canal  and  the  Gulf,  while  Great  Britain 
is  extending  efficient  assistance,  will  vary  en- 
tirely in  accordance  with  the  size  and  efficiency 
of  the  forces  directed  against  them,  and  cannot 

308 


SCOPE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

by  any  conceivable  method  be  computed  at 
present  for  the  year  1925.  We  have  no  means  of 
knowing  what  type  or  number  of  ships  European 
nations  will  build  in  the  next  ten  years.  Our 
arrangements  must  be  capable  therefore  of  rapid 
expansion  and  prompt  alteration  in  accordance 
with  future  changes  in  European  policies  and 
conditions.  This  is  indeed  the  very  essence  of 
preparedness,  its  true  scope,  its  real  purpose. 

This  comparative  and  relative  aspect  makes 
important  the  present  status  of  our  army  and 
navy.  If  we  assume  the  most  favorable  con- 
struction of  the  facts  and  accept  as  our  prem- 
ises all  that  the  most  ardent  defenders  of  both 

. 
allege,  we  shall  still  admit  that  we  have  in  the 

European  sense  neither  an  army  nor  a  navy.  At 
present  we  are  not  only  disarmed  but  disor- 
ganized. We  lack  even  an  efficient  army  and 
navy  in  miniature.  Some  first  class  battleships, 
a  few  good  officers,  a  few  trained  troops  we  do 
possess;  but  what  we  unquestionably  lack  is 
that  complex  and  highly  organized  machinery 
which  alone  can  make  these  ships  and  troops 
effective.  That  widely  ramifying  and  complex 
structure,  intended  in  European  navies  to  pro- 
tect and  supplement  the  battleship  squadrons, 
seems  to  be  nonexistent;  that  all-important 
section  of  the  modern  army,  the  artillery,  upon 
whose  adequacy  the  efficiency  of  the  army  itself 

309 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

depends,  seems  to  be  made  up  of  obsolete  ma- 
chinery and  is  practically  without  ammunition. 
Both  army  and  navy  lack  the  correlation  with 
our  industrial  fabric  needed  to  maintain  them  in 
the  field.  Indeed,  the  one  is  a  fair  coast  patrol 
and  the  other  a  rather  inadequate  police  force. 
Both  are  singularly  weak  in  personnel,  and  well- 
trained  and  experienced  officers  and  engineers, 
upon  whose  shoulders  the  direction  of  prepared- 
ness must  fall,  are  all  too  few. 

The  scope  of  present  measures  is  indicated  by 
the  extent  of  present  deficiencies.  Even  after 
we  have  limited  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  have  de- 
cided to  concede  whatever  Japan  may  demand 
in  the  Pacific,  and  practically  excluded  the  ele- 
ment of  danger  from  Europe  by  an  alliance  with 
the  sea  power,  the  effort  is  still  very  great,  be- 
cause of  the  deficiencies  of  our  present  organiza- 
tions. There  is  so  much  to  do  of  the  most  funda- 
mental nature  in  so  many  varied  directions 
that  years  must  elapse  before  an  army  and  navy 
of  real  value  can  appear  in  the  arena.  Yet  more 
than  can  be  performed  by  our  present  adminis- 
trative and  industrial  fabric  we  shall  be  unwise 
to  attempt.  Military  and  naval  machinery  is 
of  the  most  delicate  and  complex  description 
imaginable  and  requires  the  most  skillful  and 
dexterous  treatment  by  expert  brains  and  hands. 
The  number  of  men  at  present  capable  in  the 

310 


SCOPE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

United  States  of  such  designing  and  of  such  exe- 
cution are  few  and  we  must  limit  ourselves  to 
such  ships  or  munitions  as  they  can  make  well. 
The  European  war  contracts  will  gradually 
add  to  the  number  of  skilled  workers.  Indeed, 
preparedness  must  begin  at  the  bottom,  with 
factories,  foundries,  docks,  technical  schools, 
laboratories  —  with  the  essential  elements  of 
production.  We  must  also  begin  training  the 
future  personnel;  officers,  engineers,  gunners, 
navigators  are  not  to  be  developed  by  less  than 
several  years  of  strenuous  and  well-directed 
study.  This  the  British  and  Russians  have 
learned  to  their  cost.  And  the  personal  element 
is  far  more  essential  than  the  material,  because 
an  officer  at  present  occupying  a  subordinate 
position  may  by  the  fortunes  of  war  be  trans- 
formed on  the  battlefield  into  a  brigade  com- 
mander. Unless  his  education  has  compre- 
hended the  essentials  of  tactics  and  strategy  and 
has  made  him  a  potential  general,  the  entire 
army  may  be  imperiled  by  his  ignorance.  It  is 
this  type  of  preparedness,  too,  which  the  future 
imperatively  demands,  without  which  its  chal- 
lenge must  go  unanswered. 

Above  all,  the  correlation  of  the  army  and  the 
navy  with  each  other,  and  of  the  united  service 
with  our  administrative  and  industrial  fabrics, 
is  a  prerequisite  of  the  first  magnitude.  It  can- 

311 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

not  be  extemporized  or  improvised  after  the 
storm  breaks.  The  complicated  movements  of 
modern  warfare  can  only  be  executed  with  suc- 
cess by  a  widely  ramifying  organization,  working 
with  precision  and  dispatch.  Such  correlation 
and  cooperation  mean  elaborate  foresight  re- 
garding all  sorts  of  improbable  contingencies. 
At  present  in  the  United  States  all  these  pre- 
requisites of  modern  warfare  are  lacking.  The  or- 
ganizations of  the  army  and  navy,  such  as  they 
are,  are  separate  administrative  services,  are 
hostile  to  each  other,  and  fond  of  placing  ob- 
stacles in  each  other's  way.  They  must  cooperate 
as  one  service.  Modern  warfare  makes  im- 
perative the  harmonious  working  of  the  entire 
machinery  of  the  State  and  has  shown  that  ad- 
ministrative discord  will  have  only  too  fatal 
results  upon  the  battlefield. 

Particularly  serious  is  the  existing  jealousy 
in  both  army  and  navy  between  the  civilian 
administrators  and  the  professional  experts. 
The  former  have  commonly  overridden  [the 
advice  of  the  latter  and  Congress  has  repeatedly 
acted  in  contravention  to  the  suggestions  of 
both.  Indeed,  by  the  time  the  recommendations 
of  the  Army  and  Navy  Boards  have  reached  the 
stage  of  execution,  their  plans  are  frequently 
altered  beyond  recognition.  Preparedness,  what- 
ever its  extent,  makes  essential  the  drafting  and 

312 


SCOPE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

execution  of  all  measures  by  military  and  naval 
experts,  whose  decisions  must  be  accepted  with- 
out question  by  the  civil  and  legislative  authori- 
ties. If  the  plans  are  to  be  tampered  with  by 
secretaries  whose  knowledge  is  rudimentary 
and  by  congressmen  whose  purpose  is  political, 
and  executed  in  accordance  with  the  ignorant 
whims  of  administrative  officials  in  the  depart- 
ments, we  shall  achieve  something  fearfully 
and  wonderfully  made,  and  in  all  probability 
useless.  Modern  armament  is  as  definitely  tech- 
nical as  the  higher  mathematics  on  which  it 
rests,  and  can  be  constructed  only  by  experts. 
Unless  we  are  willing  to  place  the  experts  in 
control,  nothing  of  value  can  be  done.  They 
alone  can  determine  its  necessary  scope. 

Obviously  preparedness  spells  time.  What 
chance  is  there  that  we  can  wait  until  it  can 
become  a  reality,  that  the  issue  will  not  be  forced 
upon  us  before  we  are  ready  for  it?  It  is  entirely 
probable  that  we  shall  have  the  necessary  time, 
provided  we  lose  none  in  delays  and  unprofitable 
fumbling.  Our  alliance  with  the  sea  power,  our 
limitation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  our  willing- 
ness to  meet  Japan's  demands,  eliminate  the 
probability  of  assault  from  those  powers  who 
are  at  present  strong  enough  either  to  invade  the 
United  States  with  success  or  to  seize  those  pos- 
sessions we  have  determined  to  retain.  Aggres- 

313 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

sion  against  the  Panama  Canal  and  Gulf  of 
Mexico  is  for  the  present  improbable.  Both  have 
lain  at  the  mercy  of  Great  Britain  for  many 
years  and  her  lack  of  intention  to  seize  them  and 
her  willingness  to  leave  them  in  our  hands  is 
notorious. 

Whatever  the  result  of  the  European  war  on 
land,  it  seems  at  present  almost  certain  that  the 
British  and  German  navies  will  emerge  intact. 
The  Germans  cannot  afford  to  risk  their  navy 
in  battle.  If  they  win  upon  the  land  and  have 
been  defeated  at  sea,  they  will  have  already  lost 
the  very  opportunities  which  the  war  was 
fought  to  obtain.  When  they  become  dominant 
upon  the  continent,  they  must  possess  at  least 
sufficient  naval  strength  to  imperil  the  existence 
of  the  British  fleet;  otherwise  the  situation  of 
the  Napoleonic  regime  will  be  reproduced  and 
the  ability  of  the  sea  power  to  damage  German 
commerce  will  rob  the  victory  of  its  value.  Of 
course  if  the  Germans  are  defeated  on  land,  the 
United  States  will  have  nothing  to  fear,  unless 
the  victory  is  so  overwhelming  as  to  destroy  the 
German  navy  and  change  the  whole  policy  of 
Great  Britain.  This  is  unlikely. 

Whoever  wins  it  seems  probable  now  that  the 
present  war  must  continue  for  at  least  a  year  and 
perhaps  more,  and  be  followed  by  a  brief  period 
of  readjustment.  Although  it  may  become  ex- 

314 


SCOPE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

pedient  for  a  victorious  Great  Britain  to  grant 
Germany  in  the  settlement  a  free  hand  in  South 
America,  she  will  certainly  not  countenance,  as 
British  statesmen  have  more  than  once  affirmed 
with  vigor,  any  position  threatening  the  United 
States  or  the  Canal.  The  Germans,  if  victorious 
on  land,  may  attempt  to  increase  their  navy  once 
more  and  contest  with  Great  Britain  the  suprem- 
acy of  the  sea.  In  either  case  years  must  elapse: 
say  two  or  three  years  to  end  the  war,  four  or 
five  to  increase  the  German  fleet,  at  least  two  to 
defeat  the  British.  This  seems  to  be  the  calcula- 
tion of  the  Navy  Board.  For  several  years, 
whatever  happens  in  Europe,  nothing  is  likely 
to  be  attempted  against  the  United  States  which 
the  exigencies  of  the  European  situation  will  not 
defeat,  and  this  length  of  time  we  have  for  prepa- 
ration. All  this  depends  upon  the  assumption 
that  we  will  form  a  close  alliance  with  Great 
Britain,  cede  the  Pacific  to  Japan,  and  relieve 
the  apprehensions  of  South  America.  Unless 
we  do  all  three,  there  will  be  no  time  for 
adequate  preparedness. 

We  must  not  forget  that  the  defeat  of  the  Brit- 
ish navy  will  probably  not  destroy  it  nor  render 
the  Germans  supreme.  The  French  have  a  large 
navy,  and  the  Austrians  and  Italians  somewhat 
less  powerful  squadrons.  The  United  States  navy 
is  also  a  potential  force.  Coalitions  would  be 

315 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

formed  to  control  the  sea  and  would  be  too  busy 
with  one  another  to  permit  aggression  against  the 
United  States  until  the  issue  was  concluded, 
unless,  of  course,  the  seizure  of  the  Panama  Canal 
became  a  part  of  their  plans  for  domination. 
In  that  case  we  should  depend  upon  alliances 
with  the  coalition's  rivals  to  defeat  it. 

There  is  also  a  possibility  of  interference  from 
South  America,  to  protect  Central  America  from 
the  United  States.  The  most  radical  politicians 
in  that  continent  have  already  started  a  campaign 
for  that  purpose.  At  the  same  time  the  military 
effort  necessary  would  be  so  vast,  the  expense 
would  be  so  very  great,  because  of  the  distance 
which  such  troops  must  traverse,  that  its  possi- 
bility is  slight.  The  jealousies  of  the  South 
American  States  of  each  other  are  also  too  keen 
for  them  to  countenance  the  development  of 
such  armies.  Even  if  the  United  States  were 
worsted,  the  subsequent  aggressive  use  of  such 
forces  in  South  America  would  be  only  too 
possible,  and  the  small  States  are  already  ex- 
tremely suspicious  of  the  larger's  ambitions. 
We  may  for  practical  purposes  eliminate  danger 
from  South  America. 

As  intimated  already,  the  scope  of  prepared- 
ness should  contain  provision  for  the  defeat  of 
the  Allies  in  the  present  war.  Definite  grounds 
of  policy  seem  to  show  a  decided  advantage  for 

316 


SCOPE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

the  United  States  in  maintaining  Great  Britain's 
present  supremacy  on  the  sea.  If  we  depend 
upon  her  for  such  essential  services  as  our  con- 
tact with  the  rest  of  the  world  and  the  protec- 
tion of  American  lives  and  property  abroad,  we 
must  give  her  in  her  own  moments  of  peril  some 
gage  of  our  interest  in  her  welfare,  or  when  the 
skies  have  cleared  and  her  problems  are  solved 
she  will  be  mindful  of  our  passivity  in  her  time 
of  danger.  Our  relations  with  her  cannot  be  too 
cordial  if  they  are  to  establish  the  type  of  al- 
liance we  require.  Expediency  dictates  some- 
thing more  than  the  passive  attitude  which  the 
Government  has  hitherto  assumed.  Neutrality 
the  world  is  beginning  to  see  is  a  rather  trans- 
parent fiction  when  circumstances  make  im- 
possible the  equal  treatment  of  the  belligerents. 
Our  assistance  to  Great  Britain  and  France  has 
already  been  of  vital  consequence  and  may  prove 
in  the  end  to  have  been  a  decisive  element  in 
their  victory. 

At  the  same  time  the  progress  of  the  German 
armies  on  land,  the  difficulty  in  England  of  so 
organizing  industry  as  to  make  adequate  the 
supply  of  ammunition,  should  show  the  United 
States  that  this  is  the  moment  of  Great  Britain's 
gravest  need  and  the  time  when  those  whose 
welfare  is  in  large  measure  bound  up  with  hers 
should  extend  themselves  to  the  utmost.  If  the 

317 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

sea  power  is  to  remain  in  her  hands  it  is  high 
time  that  we  bestirred  ourselves;  if  it  is 
to  pass  from  her  it  is  high  time  we  did 
something  to  prepare  ourselves  for  that 
emergency.  In  particular  must  we  be  mind- 
ful of  the  probability  of  a  German  victory  on 
land  and  a  continuance  at  sea  of  the  present 
rivalry.  Without  the  active  assistance  of  some 
land  power  Great  Britain  must  accept  the  terms 
dictated  by  the  conqueror  of  her  Allies.  If  the 
United  States  should  openly  ally  with  her  and 
make  those  definite  and  clear  preparations  in 
the  next  year  or  two  to  supplement  Great  Brit- 
ain's own  industrial,  military,  and  naval  prepara- 
tions as  intelligent  foresight  can  easily  indicate, 
an  outcome  most  advantageous  to  us  and  to 
civilization  in  general  may  result.  Our  assistance 
may  turn  the  scale,  if  prompt  and  unstinted,  if 
directed  where  the  British  experts  indicate  it 
will  be  most  effective.  The  prestige  and  impor- 
tance of  the  United  States  in  the  next  generation 
would  then  be  something  with  which  to  conjure. 
Unless  we  act  at  once,  the  opportunity  is  lost. 

The  cost  of  preparedness  is  not  possible  of 
estimation  in  mere  dollars,  nor  yet  in  material 
or  lives.  We  are  undertaking  to  achieve  a  par- 
ticular end,  and  we  cannot  in  advance  know  the 
cost  until  we  know  how  much  effort  the  aggressor 
will  compel  us  to  exert.  If  European  figures  are 

318 


SCOPE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

any  criterion  of  what  armament  costs,  we  can 
complete  all  necessary  arrangements,  so  far  as 
Central  America  and  the  Gulf  are  concerned, 
with  approximately  our  present  budget.  The 
true  difficulty  is  that  of  obtaining  value  for  the 
materials  and  time  devoted  to  the  task.  This 
depends  upon  the  human  equation,  and  more 
nearly  than  any  other  one  thing  will  delimit  the 
scope  of  such  preparedness  as  we  actually 
achieve. 

Unquestionably  everything  will  cost  more  in 
this  country  than  in  Europe,  estimated  in 
money,  because  the  price  level  is  higher  and 
because  we  are  so  inexpert  in  this  particular 
operation,  so  genuinely  less  efficient  in  all  in- 
dustrial processes,  and  so  careless  in  adminis- 
tration. Vast  sums  of  money,  months  in  time, 
and  large  amounts  of  material  will  be  spent  in 
learning  how  to  do  things  well.  We  have  been 
accustomed  in  the  main  to  doing  things  just  well 
enough  barely  to  suffice  present  needs.  Scarcely 
anything  in  this  country  reaches  European 
standards  of  permanence  and  excellence.  No 
student  will  cavil  at  the  decision  reached  in  the 
past  to  do  quickly  the  best  we  could;  it  was 
more  essential  that  something  should  be  done 
at  that  time  than  that  a  great  deal  less  should 
have  been  done  well.  Now,  however,  we  are 
attempting  to  compete  with  Europe  in  the  most 

319 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

literal  sense,  and  the  quality  of  our  performance 
will  be  all  essential.  So  far  as  Mexico  is  con- 
cerned there  will  be  no  great]  difficulty  in  mak- 
ing efficient  our  army;  so  long  as  Great  Britain 
retains  control  of  the  sea  the  quality  of  our  navy 
will  not  be  of  real  moment.  It  is  the  future  into 
which  we  must  look,  whose  challenge  we  must 
answer.  A  preparedness  based  upon  Mexico  as 
an  aggressor  and  such  casual  work  as  falls  to  an 
auxiliary  fleet  will  ill  indicate  the  necessary  cost 
or  type  of  preparedness  to  insure  for  us  in  the 
future  the  safety  of  American  ideals  and  in- 
terests. Our  standard  must  not  be  less  rigid  than 
that  of  the  Europeans,  because  in  last  analysis, 
unless  we  are  prepared  for  an  assault  at  some 
future  time  from  Europe,  it  is  foolish  to  prepare 
at  all.  Here  the  cost  of  preparedness  will  make  it 
essential  for  the  United  States  to  expend  in  every 
direction  more  effort,  time,  material,  money 
than  the  European  nations  spend,  in  order  to 
pay  for  that  education  in  preparedness  which 
the  Europeans  have  been  achieving  for  about 
half  a  century.  Thus  the  cost  of  preparedness 
will  in  some  important  respects  indicate  its 
scope. 


320 


CHAPTER  XX 

DANGERS   OF   PREPAREDNESS 

THE  probability  that  preparedness  will  result  in 
militarism  seems  not  as  great  as  many  fear. 
Militarism  is  not  an  army.  It  is  a  state  of  mind, 
which  organizes  all  functions  of  State  in  accord- 
ance with  a  centralized,  well-knit  system  as 
despotic  as  that  of  an  army  and  in  which  the 
executive  authority  possesses  unlimited  discre- 
tion and  the  right  to  compel  obedience  by  force. 
The  United  States  Constitution,  the  division  of 
authority  between  the  Federal  Government  and 
the  States,  the  doctrine  of  the  unconstitution- 
ally of  law,  so  hamper  the  Federal  executive 
and  legislature  that  such  an  administrative  sys- 
tem is  out  of  the  question.  Nothing  short  of  the 
complete  revolution  of  the  constitutional  basis 
of  both  State  and  nation  could  permit  its  es- 
tablishment. Needless  to  say,  no  such  proba- 
bility exists. 

So  far  as  the  armament  makers  are  concerned, 
there  seems  to  be  no  inherent  danger  from  them. 
A  scandal  has  been  several  times  spread  that  they 
were  responsible  for  all  increases  of  armament 
in  Europe  and  for  this  war.  The  deduction  is 

321 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

plain:  preparedness  in  this  country  will  lead  the 
armament  makers  to  create  war  in  order  to 
increase  the  market  for  their  wares.  The  com- 
plexity of  European  politics,  the  well-known 
traditional,  racial,  and  political  explanations  of 
the  present  war,  ought  by  this  time  to  have  com- 
pletely demonstrated  the  armament  makers' 
inability  to  have  caused  such  a  cataclysm.  The 
mere  existence  of  a  tool  does  not  necessarily 
beget  its  abuse.  If  we  wish  to  fight  we  shall, 
whether  we  are  armed  or  not.  The  history  of 
the  United  States  is  a  record  of  wars  and  diplo- 
matic tangles  into  which  we  have  plunged  with- 
out regard  to  existing  armament  or  the  possi- 
bility of  success.  Preparedness  will  increase  the 
probability  of  our  achieving  something.  If  we 
do,  on  the  other  hand,  possess  that  discretion, 
peaceable  disposition,  and  love  of  equity  which 
the  idealists  claim,  the  mere  existence  of  an 
army  will  not  deprive  us  of  our  senses.  We  shall 
merely  have  a  tool  to  use  when  others  unjustly 
attack  us.  After  all  is  said,  we  come  back  to  the 
nation  itself.  Wars  result  not  from  armies  but 
from  belligerent  intentions  latent  in  great 
bodies  of  men.  If  we  possess  no  such  desires, 
preparedness  will  not  of  itself  create  them;  if 
they  are  latent  in  the  American  people  and 
merely  await  an  opportunity  for  expression,  pre- 
paredness is  precisely  what  we  need. 


DANGERS  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

We  have  rather  to  fear  that  a  certain  section 
of  the  people  will  not  wait  for  armament  to 
materialize,  but  will  assume  that  the  voting 
of  the  money  for  preparedness  has  already 
enabled  us  to  insist  upon  Europe's  acceptance  of 
the  positions  taken  in  our  recent  diplomatic 
notes.  We  must  not  expect  to  apply  the  new 
notion  of  offense  and  defense  to  the  actions  of 
Europeans  toward  us  while  we  regulate  our  rela- 
tions to  them  by  the  older  definitions  of  con- 
quest and  aggression.  If  we  insist  that  their 
defensive  policies  when  they  clash  with  American 
interests  become  aggressive,  we  must  not  expect 
them  to  admit  that  our  defensive  policies  remain 
defensive  when  they  clash  with  theirs.  We 
cannot  take  from  them  what  they  now  have 
without  causing  imputations  of  aggression,  nor 
can  we  retain  our  extracontinental  possessions 
and  expect  others  to  admit  that  our  actions  are 
on  a  par  with  the  defense  of  our  firesides. 

There  is  also  danger  that  the  formation  of 
policies  will  not  become  an  integral  part  of  pre- 
paredness; that  the  American  people  will  not 
continue  to  think  in  international  terms.  We 
may  quite  probably  create  an  army  and  navy 
before  we  have  attained  a  definite  national 
agreement  upon  the  ends  we  expect  to  achieve. 
After  the  first  decision  is  reached,  the  public  mind 
is  all  too  apt,  as  in  campaigns  for  political  re- 

323 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

form,  to  assume  a  policy  already  formulated. 
The  chief  purpose  of  preparedness,  on  the  con- 
trary, is  to  preserve  to  the  people  of  the  United 
States  a  right  to  act  hi  future  contingencies  which 
are  not  now  known;  to  evaluate  American 
interests  hi  accordance  with  conditions  of 
American  life  yet  to  appear.  Unless  the  people 
themselves  will  continue  to  watch  events,  will 
constantly  study  possible  complications  and 
exigencies,  preparedness  will  be  futile  to  achieve 
anything  more  than  immediate  needs.  Even 
though  the  effort  required  for  the  latter  may  seem 
considerable,  we  shall  hardly  need  to  dignify  it 
by  the  term  preparedness,  or  worry  about  a 
police  force  hi  Mexico  or  a  naval  patrol  in  the 
Gulf  imposing  militarism  on  the  United  States. 

A  more  real  danger  is  that  we  shall  limit  pre- 
paredness to  immediate  aims  and  omit  from 
consideration  those  intangible  future  needs 
which  form  the  only  true  justification  for  larger 
armament.  Indeed,  we  shall  foreclose  ourselves 
in  future  all  liberty  of  action,  or  the  use  of  real 
discretion,  if  we  fail  to  lay  the  foundations  of 
preparedness  upon  a  broad  and  enduring  basis. 
While  we  need  not  necessarily  erect  at  once  the 
superstructure  of  ships,  artillery,  and  men,  the 
administrative  and  industrial  fabric  capable  at 
need  of  producing  the  material  equipment,  must 
be  planned  and  in  the  main  executed  now,  for 

324 


DANGERS  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

when  the  exigencies  arise  the  extemporization 
of  preparedness  is  impossible. 

If  there  is  danger  that  we  shall  not  attempt 
enough,  there  is  also  danger  that  we  shall  at 
present  attempt  too  much.  We  cannot  with  our 
existing    administrative    and    industrial    fabric 
efficiently   create   more   than   a   comparatively 
limited  armament.   Men  in  any  desired  number 
we  may  enlist  and  drill,  but  the  total  we  can 
place  in  the  field  cannot  be  greater  than  the 
number  we  can  supply  with  artillery  and  un- 
limited  ammunition.     We   are  more  likely   to 
forget  or  discredit  the  extent  of  our  economic 
disabilities  than  we  are  to  develop  bellicose  in- 
tentions in  order  to  use  our  new  army.   It  is  also 
possible  that  we  shall  attempt  something  which 
armed  force  is  not  capable  of  accomplishing,  like 
an  extension   of  our  direct  trade  with  South 
America  or  China,  or  the  creation  of  an  ade- 
quate merchant  marine.   Again,  we  may  under- 
take something  unnecessary,  like  the  protection 
of  South  America  from  European  invasion.  Since 
enough  armament  to  defeat  the  Europeans  is 
enough  to  conquer  South  America,  they  will  not 
wait  for  us  to  complete  any  such  preparedness, 
and  the  Europeans  whose  vast  investments  we 
thus  threaten  will  promptly  foreclose  any  such 
possibilities   by   aggressive   action   against   the 
United  States.    We  are  advertising  our  weak- 

325 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

nesses  and  plans  so  liberally  that  the  whole  world 
is  in  our  confidence,  will  know  the  exact  progress 
of  preparedness  as  well  as  we,  and  will  therefore 
time  resistance  to  it  with  great  nicety. 

Other  objections  are  less  terrifying.  That  a 
country  fundamentally  as  wealthy  in  resources 
and  labor  will  be  in  the  long  run  impoverished 
by  financial  burdens  which  European  nations, 
less  favorably  placed,  have  carried  without  mani- 
fest distress,  seems  improbable.  Any  such  pre- 
paredness, present  or  future,  which  is  truly  ex- 
pedient, which  is  needed  to  advance  fundamental 
interests,  and  which  is  not  devoted  to  some  such 
chimerical  object  as  immediate  independence  of 
Europe,  the  subjugation  of  South  America,  or 
the  creation  of  a  merchant  marine,  we  can  easily 
afford.  Business  methods  in  Federal  adminis- 
tration, efficiency  in  the  Post  Office,  the  reduc- 
tion of  the  pension  fund,  the  abolition  of  the 
"pork  barrel"  will  pay  for  elaborate  preparedness 
twice  over.  If  artillery  and  uniforms,  battleships 
and  ammunition  are  uneconomic  because  they 
do  not  furnish  American  business  with  further 
capital,  they  are  not  more  uneconomic  than 
tobacco,  beer,  pleasure  vehicles  of  all  sorts, 
ladies'  hats,  and  a  thousand  varieties  of  un- 
necessary commodities  which  the  community 
annually  produces  to  the  value  of  hundreds  of 
millions  to  satisfy  its  vanity  and  to  amuse  itself. 

826 


DANGERS  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

If  the  mental  pleasure  of  the  one  justifies  its 
existence,  the  mental  satisfaction  of  being  pre- 
pared for  emergencies  will  justify  the  other. 
The  mere  fact  that  there  is  a  domestic  market  in 
which  luxuries  can  be  exchanged  for  necessities, 
while  battleships  possess  no  exchange  value 
between  individuals,  must  not  blind  us  to  the 
essential  identity  of  their  status  from  the  point 
of  view  of  national  economics. 

The  probable  loss  of  life  in  the  advancement  of 
American  interests  in  the  future  will  be  negligi- 
ble unless  the  United  States  persistently  de- 
clines to  ally  with  one  or  the  other  European 
coalition  and  seeks  to  maintain  a  fancied  isola- 
tion. Accurate  and  consistent  international 
thinking,  the  advancement  of  our  interests  by 
conference  and  alliance,  a  willingness  to  accept 
the  inevitable  limitations  created  by  our  eco- 
nomic inferiority,  a  readiness  to  recognize  the 
justifiability  of  European  ambitions  and  to  be 
satisfied  with  any  reasonable  compromise  be- 
tween them  and  American  interests,  will  make 
war  unnecessary  and  dispel  the  majority  of 
clouds  now  gathering  around  us.  Sane  thinking, 
expedient  policies,  and  an  equitable  regard  for 
the  equality  of  other  nations  will  render  our 
future  far  more  secure  than  any  outpouring  of 
blood  and  treasure.  But  each  failure  of  the 
nation  to  estimate  correctly  our  real  interna- 

327 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

tional  status,  each  inexpedient  policy  will  be 
paid  for,  with  usury,  in  money  and  lives. 

The  worst  calamity  which  can  at  present 
befall'  us  will  be  a  failure  to  consummate  the 
indispensable  foreign  alliance.  If  at  the  moment 
Great  Britain  is  our  natural  ally,  the  situation 
may  so  change  in  twenty  years  as  to  render  the 
continuance  of  the  connection  inexpedient  for 
both  nations.  But  ally  we  must  with  some  Eu- 
ropean major  power,  and  through  it  with  one 
of  the  great  coalitions.  Yet  the  practical  dif- 
ficulties of  consummating  such  an  alliance  are 
great.  If  we  can  ourselves  overcome  the  objec- 
tions all  Europeans  raise  to  the  lack  of  a  per- 
manent tenure  of  office  in  our  diplomatic  serv- 
ice, we  have  still  to  fear  lest  political  influence, 
popular  apathy  and  ignorance,  or  the  traditional 
prejudice  against  foreign  entanglements  may 
frustrate  the  negotiations.  Still  none  of  these 
obstacles  are  insuperable.  The  enthusiastic  and 
unanimous  support  of  the  nation's  leaders  in  all 
parties,  care  not  to  arouse  unnecessary  objec- 
tions and  prejudices,  will  probably  be  enough  to 
sway  American  public  opinion  in  favor  of  the 
connection. 

German  officials  and  historians  have  long  pre- 
dicted that  the  political  influence  of  the  German- 
Americans  and  of  the  Anti-British  elements  in 
our  population  will  always  be  strong  enough  to 

328 


DANGERS  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

prevent  the  official  support  by  the  United  States 
of  the  Triple  Entente.  It  must  be  acknowledged 
that  the  devious  methods  and  subterranean  pas- 
sages commonly  used  in  American  party  politics, 
as  well  as  the  ease  with  which  a  minority  of  the 
country  decides  the  personnel  of  the  leaders  and 
thus  directs  national  politics,1  lends  plausibility 
to  this  boast  from  Berlin.  The  solidarity  of  the 
German-Americans,  their  press  campaign,  the 
interference  with  the  munitions  plants  working 
for  the  Allies,  are  all  declared  in  the  German 
press  to  confirm  this  judgment.  Moreover,  they 
have  tools  ready  to  their  hand.  Large  bodies  of 
men,  not  yet  assimilated,  still  conscious  of  alien 
nationality,  and  speaking  foreign  tongues,  have 
been  provided  by  party  politics  with  the  suf- 
frage. As  they  have  been  readily  manipulated 
by  politicians  for  State  and  national  purposes 
which  they  did  not  comprehend,  they  can  no 
doubt  be  reached  more  easily  on  an  issue  of  this 
consequence.  Fighting  Germans  in  South  Amer- 
ica will  be  easy  compared  to  resisting  German 
influence  in  American  politics. 

The  European  entanglements  immediately 
dangerous  to  us  are  not  those  with  the  Euro- 
peans in  Europe,  but  those  with  the  Europeans 
whom  we  have  welcomed  to  America  and  to 

1  I  refer  to  the  decisive  influence  of  the  "  doubtful  "  States  in 
national  elections. 

329 


whom  we  have  extended  citizenship.  Unless  this 
influence  of  European  politics  and  ambitions  is 
firmly  and  consciously  met  by  all  true  Ameri- 
cans, standing  shoulder  to  shoulder,  not  because 
we  wish  to  ally  with  Great  Britain,  but  because 
we  will  not  receive  our  policies  from  Berlin  via 
German-American  influence  in  party  councils 
or  at  the  polls,  any  truly  national  policy  will  be 
impossible  of  formulation.  The  right  to  choose 
will  have  been  already  lost.  That  these  foreign 
sympathizers  will  commit  technical  treason  by 
openly  declining  to  accept  the  authority  of  the 
United  States  in  the  case  of  war  is  utterly  im- 
probable. They  will  not  thus  sacrifice  their 
property.  They  have  merely  to  utilize  their 
legal  rights  at  the  polls  in  the  interests  of  Eu- 
ropean nations  to  deal  the  land  of  their  adop- 
tion a  more  fatal  blow  than  invasion  could  inflict. 
Loyalty  is  easy  to  profess  so  long  as  nothing 
more  than  technical  disloyalty  is  disavowed. 
Between  breaking  the  letter  of  the  law  of  treason 
and  the  infringement  of  its  spirit  is  a  gap  as 
wide  as  the  Atlantic  Ocean. 

The  danger  is  also  great,  if  the  history  of 
American  democracy  affords  any  light  upon  the 
probable  action  of  American  politicians,  that 
preparedness  will  become  merely  a  stalking 
horse  for  the  political  parties.  It  is  a  popular 
appeal  and  works  upon  those  facile  emotions  of 

330 


DANGERS  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

the  great  public  which  campaign  oratory  can 
most  easily  stir.  The  Democrats  see  that,  if  the 
campaign  of  1916  is  fought  by  the  Republicans 
upon  the  issue  of  preparedness  and  the  Demo- 
crats now  in  power  undertake  in  meantime 
nothing  approaching  adequate  measures,  the 
Republicans  will  win  the  election  by  an  over- 
whelming majority.  The  Republicans  must  be 
foreclosed  any  such  admirable  opportunity;  the 
Democrats  must  make  preparedness  their  own 
by  doing  enough  to  spoil  it  as  campaign  material. 
Once  the  election  is  won,  they  may  then  drop 
it.  Commonly  American  campaign  promises 
have  never  been  fulfilled  and,  indeed,  the  con- 
tradictory statements  of  most  party  platforms  are 
impossible  of  execution.  The  mere  fact  that  the 
people  have  for  so  many  decades  paid  little  at- 
tention to  the  failure  to  execute  campaign  prom- 
ises is  a  very  real  danger  of  preparedness.  Noth- 
ing short  of  the  display  in  the  country  at  large 
of  a  very  definite,  serious  desire  for  prepared- 
ness and  a  persistent  reiteration  year  after  year 
that  it  be  made  effective  will  prevent  it  from 
sinking  into  one  of  those  stalking  horses  which 
emerge  regularly  from  the  political  barns  in 
campaign  years.  Let  us  not  say  that  this  is  im- 
possible. It  has  happened  before  in  matters  of 
as  grave  moment. 

Politicians  may  also  utilize  preparedness  as  a 
331 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

new  source  of  graft.  The  pension  fund  has  al- 
ready become  a  scandal  of  the  first  magnitude 
and  the  River  and  Harbor  Bill  is  tending  to 
outlive  its  usefulness,  because  appropriations 
cannot  be  sprinkled  over  as  large  an  area  as  is 
politically  advisable  and  at  the  same  time  de- 
velop natural  resources  sufficiently  important  to 
"cover"  the  appropriation  of  such  sums  of 
money.  Preparedness  will  be  a  large  and  soft 
plum  adapted  to  the  congressman's  every  need. 
The  erection  of  buildings,  providing  of  raw  ma- 
terials, the  appointing  of  supervisors,  the  em- 
ploying of  workmen,  and  the  like  will  be  rich 
soil  in  which  that  sort  of  political  jobbery  will 
sprout  which  has  gone  on  in  this  country  for 
so  many  years.1  The  danger  is  that  preparedness 
will  sink  to  the  level  of  the  River  and  Harbor 
Bill  and  achieve  no  good  purpose  whatever; 
that  Congress  will  not  undertake  it  in  real  ear- 
nest, but  merely  spend  the  money  in  nursing  the 
constituencies. 

Closely  related  to  this  very  definite  probability 
is  the  danger  that  every  vested  interest  will 

1  One  Congressman,  whose  voluble  denunciations  of  prepared- 
ness have  attracted  attention  in  the  press,  has  already  introduced 
a  bill  to  locate  an  armor  plate  factory  in  his  constituency.  We  have 
already  too  many  navy  yards  which  only  torpedo  destroyers  can 
enter  because  of  insufficient  water  and  too  many  coast  defenses, 
placed  where  they  will  do  the  maximum  political  service,  but  where 
the  configuration  of  the  coast  makes  impossible  an  assault  by  an 
enemy  fleet. 

332 


DANGERS  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

attempt  to  saddle  the  country  with  legislation 
in  its  favor  under  the  guise  of  preparedness. 
Already  the  campaign  is  beginning  in  the  in- 
terests of  the  high  protective  tariff,  based  upon 
the  two  specious  pleas  of  the  need  for  revenue, 
which  is  very  real,  and  the  need  for  the  protec- 
tion of  American  business  against  European 
competition  when  the  war  is  over,  which  is 
largely  imaginary.  The  latter,  of  course,  rests 
upon  all  the  familiar  fallacies,  so  often  exploded, 
and  which,  if  ever  true,  are  certainly  false  to-day, 
and  proposes  to  accomplish  those  same  illegiti- 
mate purposes  with  which  previous  tariffs  should 
have  made  the  public  familiar.  Ship  subsidies 
and  most  attempts  to  stimulate  a  merchant 
marine  belong  in  this  category.  Obviously  they 
will  mean  fat  profits  for  the  men  who  build  the 
ships  and  will  also  provide  those  who  operate 
them  in  the  interests  of  the  Government,  or 
the  politicians  who  control  the  departments  of 
the  Government  which  operate  them,  in  case  the 
Government  attempts  ownership,  with  a  ready 
excuse  beforehand  for  a  tremendous  deficit. 
Of  course  this  real  deficit  will  justify  as  much 
corruption  as  can  be  concealed. 

The  necessity  of  industrial  expansion  and  the 
correlation  of  our  economic  and  administrative 
structures  will  demand  factories  and  foundries, 
and,  in  all  probability  a  good  many  industries 

333 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

which  do  not  at  present  exist  in  America  on  a 
sufficient  scale.  Subsidies  will  again  become 
possible  and  political  influence  in  the  assignment 
of  contracts  and  the  choice  of  men  to  receive 
them  will  appear.  Where  so  extremely  plausible 
a  reason  has  been  provided  for  the  expenditure 
of  vast  sums  of  money  in  order  to  accomplish 
in  the  distant  future  results  not  really  compre- 
hensible to  the  ordinary  citizen,  and  which  de- 
pend upon  elaborate  measures  whose  apparent 
lack  of  association  with  the  purpose  itself  can 
be  so  readily  explained,  a  situation  has  been 
created  susceptible  of  infinite  abuse.  Such  cor- 
ruption will  be  almost  impossible  of  detection. 

A  more  subtle  danger  lies  in  the  probability 
that  we  shall  attempt  to  give  preparedness  the 
economic  basis  of  a  private  business  undertaken 
for  profit  and  thus  create  a  new  occupation  for 
American  citizens  which  will  be  pursued  for 
economic  reasons.  The  present  army  and  navy 
are  paid  (to  their  thinking  underpaid)  economic 
wages,  that  is  to  say,  the  equivalent,  with  the 
sustenance  the  Government  provides  and  other 
allowances  and  perquisites,  of  a  good  wage  or 
salary.  This  bonus  has  been  probably  neces- 
sary to  get  men  to  enlist  and  to  induce  the 
officers  to  undergo  the  necessary  training. 

In  Europe  men  have  not  been  and  are  not 
paid  during  their  periods  of  service  anything 

334 


DANGERS  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

more  than  a  small  allowance,  intended  to  cover 
the  expense  of  a  moderate  amount  of  smoking 
and  drinking.  So  far  as  possible  the  Govern- 
ments have  themselves  undertaken  the  purchase 
or  manufacture  of  needed  supplies  at  as  near  the 
cost  of  production  as  possible,  and  in  some  cases 
the  German  and  French  Governments  have  suc- 
ceeded in  reducing  the  cost  in  competition  with 
private  firms.  Certain  parts  of  the  English  serv- 
ice have  been  well  paid.  In  Russia  corruption 
in  the  purchase  of  supplies  has  been  extensive, 
and  in  France  has  been  not  unknown;  while  all 
the  foreign  Governments  have  been  forced  at 
times  to  pay  private  firms  a  fair  profit.  Yet  in 
no  country  has  the  total  expense  per  soldier 
exceeded  four  hundred  dollars  a  year. 

The  higher  wages  and  salaries,  the  bonuses 
paid  to  contractors,  the  extravagant  cost  of  all 
manufacture  undertaken  by  the  Government  it- 
self, have  resulted  in  an  average  annual  expendi- 
ture in  this  country  for  the  small  army  we  have 
of  thirteen  hundred  dollars  per  unit  —  an  ex- 
penditure three  times  as  great  as  the  most  costly 
European  service,  even  after  all  the  non-military 
expenses  in  the  army  budget  have  been  deducted. 
The  prime  difference  is  due  to  the  payment  of 
an  industrial  wage  and  to  the  failure  to  buy  or 
manufacture  at  cost.  On  this  basis  we  cannot 
hope  to  compete  with  European  nations;  so 

335 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

great  a  handicap  puts  us  out  of  the  race  before 
it  starts.  It  is  not  only  the  matter  of  expense. 
It  is  the  attitude  of  the  community  to  the  serv- 
ice as  a  sort  of  alternative  occupation  to  those 
of  civil  life  whose  rewards,  perquisites,  and 
salaries  are  to  be  compared  on  an  economic  basis. 
Until  the  national  service  is  dignified  by  a  recog- 
nition of  a  national  need,  it  will  not  attract  the 
type  of  men  we  must  have. 

In  the  end  we  cannot  fail  to  admit  the  possi- 
bility that  an  enormous  expenditure  of  effort, 
time,  and  material  will  be  too  ill-considered, 
too  much  influenced  by  political  and  local  con- 
siderations to  attain  adequately  the  end  in 
view.  The  fear  is  that  preparedness  will  not  be 
thoroughgoing.  Correlation  of  the  army  with  our 
administrative  and  industrial  fabrics  is  extraor- 
dinarily difficult,  though  upon  its  adequate  and 
prompt  establishment  preparedness  itself  de- 
pends. An  army  is  not  merely  soldiers,  nor  a 
navy  ships.  Both  are  organizations  which  are  of 
no  value  unless  complete  and  efficient.  The  prob- 
ability is  that  the  experts  will  have  a  hard  time 
with  the  politicians,  with  big  business,  with 
ignorant  but  well-meaning  civilians.  The  inertia 
and  incompetence  of  the  Government  depart- 
ments is  almost  incredible.  The  European  post 
offices  all  turn  over  a  surplus  of  many  millions 
annually  to  the  treasury.  In  the  United  States 

336 


DANGERS  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

alone  the  deficit  is  many  millions,  due  to  anti- 
quated methods  and  inefficiency.  The  amount  of 
useless  red  tape  at  Washington  is  beyond  belief. 
The  machinery  of  Congress  is  intended  to  kill 
legislation,  not  to  promote  it,  and  the  lack  of 
correlation  of  effort  between  the  Senate  and  the 
House  is  extraordinary.  These  are  the  lions  to 
be  met  and  conquered.  Hitherto  all  attempts  to 
destroy  them  have  been  unavailing. 

The  prerogatives  of  the  States  and  of  the  Sen- 
ate also  are  formidable  obstacles.  Throughout 
American  history  the  opposition  of  the  State 
Governments  to  every  increase  of  Federal  au- 
thority has  been  persistent  and  their  attempts 
to  block  the  wheels  have  at  times  almost  brought 
the  administration  to  a  standstill.  Such  an  ac- 
cession to  Federal  authority  as  preparedness  will 
mean  is  more  than  likely  to  raise  the  old  fear  of 
the  crushing  of  the  States  by  the  National  Gov- 
ernment which  Jefferson  and  others  entertained. 
The  jealousy  in  Congress  of  all  increases  of  execu- 
tive power  and  the  Senate's  jealousy  of  the  ex- 
ecutive control  of  foreign  policy  are  also  old  and 
extremely  insistent.  To  reform  the  administra- 
tive offices  in  Washington  and  put  experts  in 
control,  to  dispel  the  fears  of  the  States  of  Federal 
encroachment  and  secure  their  hearty  coopera- 
tion, to  disarm  legislative  jealousy  of  executive 
authority  and  prevent  the  well-meant  efforts  of 

337 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

the  Senate  from  frustrating  all  diplomatic  ends, 
is  a  task  of  such  complexity  and  difficulty  that 
the  student  is  appalled  by  the  opportunities  for 
disagreement  and  failure. 

Nor  can  the  necessary  industrial  preparation 
be  completed  without  the  assistance  of  the  trade 
unions,  of  the  great  banks,  and  of  the  great  cor- 
porations. The  three  have  never  had  anything 
approaching  harmonious  relations.  The  So- 
cialists, the  I.  W.  W.,  and  many  trade  unionists 
are  also  extremely  hostile  to  anything  approach- 
ing administrative  efficiency,  to  any  measures 
increasing  the  power  of  the  Government,  and  in 
particular  to  the  existence  of  an  army  and  a 
navy.  Most  of  them  dream  of  a  social  revolution 
which  shall  forcibly  readjust  the  present  ine- 
quality of  wealth  and  privilege.  It  will  be  possi- 
ble only  if  the  present  authorities  and  property 
owners  will  disarm.  The  Socialists  and  the 
I.  W.  W.  are  therefore  insistent  members  of  all 
peace  societies  and  preach  the  wickedness  of  war 
as  one  of  their  cardinal  tenets.  It  is  the  power  of 
the  State,  and,  in  particular,  its  armed  forces, 
they  fear.  In  the  United  States,  while  their 
own  organizations  are  not  as  powerful  as  in 
many  European  States,  the  lack  of  governmental 
centralization  and  the  weakness  of  the  army 
have  been  favorable  to  them  and  they  will  resist 
strenuously  any  attempt  at  change.  If  the  lead- 

338 


DANGERS  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

ers  can  continue  to  exert  any  such  influence  over 
the  men  as  they  have  at  times  possessed,  the 
correlation  of  the  industrial  fabric  with  the  mili- 
tary and  naval  will  be  difficult  in  the  extreme. 
The  most  skillful  workers  are  in  the  majority  of 
instances  the  best  organized,  and  upon  them  we 
are  most  dependent.  Something  like  a  solution 
of  social  problems,  a  lessening  of  the  hostility 
between  labor  and  capital,  will  be  an  important 
and  perhaps  essential  part  of  preparedness. 
These  are  real  dangers,  of  that  type  which 
American  institutions  and  American  social  con- 
ditions have  proved  exist.  Beside  them  the 
bogies  of  the  pacifists  and  the  alarms  of  the 
jingo  sink  into  insignificance. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

THE  American  nation  of  the  future  challenges 
the  American  people  now  alive  to  transmit  to  it 
unimpaired  its  heritage  of  freedom  and  pros- 
perity. It  defies  us  at  the  peril  of  its  grave  dis- 
pleasure to  neglect  its  interests ;  to  decide  national 
issues  with  reference  to  our  own  present  welfare 
in  order  to  increase  our  present  material  wealth. 
It  demands  from  us  of  the  present  its  rights  and 
privileges.  By  each  coming  generation  shall  we 
be  called  to  an  account  for  our  stewardship,  and 
the  accuracy  of  our  reckoning,  its  adequacy,  its 
altruism  will  be  challenged.  A  thousand  thou- 
sand millions  will  hereafter  pass  judgment  upon 
us.  Inevitably  we  must  appear  at  the  bar  of 
posterity  and  answer  the  challenge  of  the  future. 
Shall  we  reply  that  we  wrapped  the  talent 
intrusted  to  us  in  a  napkin  and  buried  it  in  the 
ground,  for  fear  of  the  thieves  who  wished  to 
steal  it;  that  we  isolated  ourselves  from  the 
world  and  sought  in  seclusion  to  preserve  de- 
mocracy unspoiled  from  the  taint  of  war  and  am- 
bition? Or  shall  we  declare  that  we  invested  it 

340 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

with  wisdom  and  discretion,  and  point  to  the 
fruits  of  preparedness,  to  long  years  of  close  co- 
operation with  European  nations,  to  the  achieve- 
ment of  economic  independence  and  of  inter- 
national equality? 

In  a  democratic  nation  the  welfare  of  the 
majority  must  govern  its  decisions  and  dictate 
expedient  conduct.  In  their  interests  must  for- 
eign policy  be  formulated.  But  the  constituency 
for  whom  we  are  to  act  is  not  now  alive.  Neither 
we,  nor  our  children,  nor  our  children's  children, 
nor  yet  all  together  constitute  a  majority  of  the 
American  people.  The  majority  of  the  citizens 
of  the  United  States  have  yet  to  be  born.  For 
this  greater  constituency,  unable  to  speak  or 
act  for  itself,  are  we  perforce  trustees  and  stew- 
ards. Their  property  we  hold  in  our  possession; 
their  liberty  only  we  can  assure;  their  safety  only 
we  can  protect;  in  their  interest  as  well  as  in  ours 
must  we  act.  The  American  people  in  the  past 
wrested  from  nature  a  continent  and  erected  the 
physical  frame  of  a  great  national  structure. 
For  us  they  won  political  independence;  for 
us  they  established  democratic  government  and 
national  unity.  To  us  they  bequeathed  unsolved 
the  problem  of  international  status.  The  period 
of  [isolation  is  passed.  The  United  States  has 
ceased  to  be  a  child  among  nations,  has  attained 
manhood,  and  must  now  recognize  its  responsi- 

341 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

bilities  and  obligations  both  to  citizens  now  alive 
and  to  those  yet  to  be  born.  For  we  die  unto 
ourselves,  but  we  live  for  posterity. 

In  the  interests  of  the  future,  not  in  our  own, 
the  right  to  choose  must  be  preserved  inviolate. 
We  exist  not  for  to-day,  nor  for  a  morrow  limited 
by  mortal  vision,  but  for  a  future  whose  length 
no  man  can  know.  We  are  the  stewards  of  in- 
terests whose  value  we  cannot  estimate,  for  a 
posterity  whose  number  we  cannot  count.  Their 
right  to  act,  their  right  to  define  humanity  in 
terms  of  American  ideals,  their  right  to  evaluate 
American  interests  in  the  terms  of  American 
life,  we  may  neither  barter  nor  sacrifice.  It  is  their 
liberty,  their  freedom,  their  heritage,  not  ours. 
What  are  a  few  millions  to-day  compared  to  the 
inestimable  value  of  the  right  of  countless  gener- 
ations to  act  as  expediency  demands?  Are  Amer- 
ican citizens  now  alive  more  precious  than  those 
yet  to  be  born?  We  must  not  save  a  few  lives 
now  at  the  cost  of  no  one  can  tell  how  many  lives 
in  the  future.  Suppose  at  Bunker  Hill  they  had 
calculated  the  cost  after  the  fashion  of  the  mod- 
ern pacifist  and  had  decided  not  to  fight? 
Suppose  in  the  Continental  Congress  of  1776 
considerations  of  the  liberty  of  posterity  had 
not  outweighed  prudential  considerations  and 
the  apprehensions  of  the  men  there  present? 
Suppose  the  vision  of  the  future  in  Abraham 

342 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

Lincoln's  mind  had  been  less  distinct  and  his 
determination  not  to  live  for  the  moment  alone 
less  firm?  Consciously  they  chose  to  live  for  us 
and  not  for  themselves.  Shall  we  not  prove 
ourselves  worthy  of  such  progenitors  and,  even 
as  they,  live  not  unto  ourselves  but  for  posterity? 
Truth  to  tell,  our  own  problems  require  only 
the  most  modest  preparedness.  Numerous  possi- 
bilities of  peril  indeed  crowd  upon  us,  yet  the 
immediate  danger  of  war  lies  in  our  own  incredu- 
lity and  ignorance,  in  the  improbability  that  we 
can  ourselves  be  made  to  see  the  folly  of  kicking 
against  the  pricks,  of  attempting  to  obviate  our 
economic  disabilities  by  making  war  upon  Great 
Britain  or  Germany.  Losses  of  unimportant 
territory  and  of  the  property  of  private  indi- 
viduals, a  circumscribing  of  our  ability  to  trade 
in  undeveloped  markets,  an  inability  to  prevent 
occasional  loss'of  American  lives  in  foreign  coun- 
tries or  on  the  high  seas,  furnish  national  prob- 
lems but  not  national  danger.  They  are  per- 
plexing and  annoying  rather  than  imperative. 
They  are  our  own  immediate  problems,  which 
we  ourselves  may  justly  decide  in  accordance 
with  our  own  interests.  The  most  favorable  solu- 
tion possible  could  not  be  worth  to  us  the  mil- 
lions independence  of  Europe  would  cost  or  the 
risk  of  lives  in  war.  Our  own  lives  will  always  be 
more  valuable  to  us  than  our  own  property. 

343 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

Indeed,  it  is  not  the  dangers  threatening  us 
which  are  terrifying.  They  may  be  dispelled  by 
an  alliance  with  the  sea  power,  by  a  discreet 
acceptance  of  our  economic  limitations  and  a 
consequent  renunciation  of  ambitions  which 
give  others  cause  for  suspicion  and  umbrage. 
Nor  are  the  probable  dangers  we  shall  ourselves 
encounter  within  the  next  twenty  years  peri- 
lous. Apparently  we  have  nothing  worse  to 
fear  than  a  diminution  of  the  present  abnormal 
rate  of  progress,  the  worst  calamity  in  whose 
train  will  be  a  type  of  suffering  for  a  not  too 
numerous  body  of  individuals  with  which  the 
commercial  crises  of  1873  and  1893  made  us 
familiar.  Easily,  by  the  preservation  of  our  pres- 
ent political  influence  in  Central  America  and 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  we  may  provide  a  future 
opportunity  for  the  investment  of  capital  with 
the  expectation  of  abnormal  returns  which  will 
retard  the  rapidity  of  the  transition  and  thus 
relieve  of  distress  the  great  majority  of  those  who 
would  otherwise  have  suffered. 

Not  what  we  see,  but  the  value  of  what  we 
cannot  afford  to  lose  creates  apprehension. 
Under  no  circumstances  can  we  sacrifice  the  en- 
tire liberty  of  the  American  people  to  act  in  the 
future  as  expediency  and  discretion  may  direct. 
Nothing  but  elaborate  preparedness  can  insure 
the  right  to  choose  in  the  near  and  in  the  dis- 

344 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

tant  future.  Our  immediate  problems  require  no 
greater  exertion  from  us  because  we  are  protected 
by  powerful  factors  not  our  own.  We  have  been 
defended  by  the  aegis  of  the  British  fleet,  which 
has  cleared  the  ocean  of  those  who  might  have 
injured  us  and  has  maintained  the  supremacy  of 
a  nation  whose  strategic  position  made  inexpedi- 
ent an  extension  of  political  dominion  which 
an  army  was  needed  to  establish  or  defend.  The 
delicate  balance  of  power  between  the  Euro- 
pean coalitions  has  increased  the  circumspec- 
tion of  the  sea  power  and  has  prevented  the 
dispatch  from  Europe  of  even  very  moderate  mili- 
tary and  naval  expeditions,  for  fear  that  more 
might  be  lost  in  Europe  during  its  absence  than 
could  be  gained  elsewhere.  So,  too,  the  rivalry 
in  Asia  and  Africa  of  the  nations  who  found 
themselves  allies  in  Europe  has  intensified  the 
subtlety  of  international  relationships.  While 
Russia,  Austria,  Italy,  and  Spain  are  so  backward 
in  development,  while  Germany  continues  to  owe 
her  capital  indebtedness  for  her  economic  de- 
velopment, the  economic  inferiority  of  the  United 
States  to  Great  Britain  and  France  will  always 
be  less  of  a  disability  than  if  we  were  the  only 
debtor  nation  with  an  economic  fabric  inferior 
in  skill  and  efficiency.  So  long  as  all  European 
nations,  except  Germany,  are  nearly  as  depend- 
ent upon  the  British  merchant  marine  as  we  are, 

345 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

access  to  the  world's  markets  will  be  firmly  es- 
tablished by  the  mutuality  of  interest  in  its 
continuance.  There  are  too  many  nations  suffer- 
ing from  economic  disabilities  similar  in  charac- 
ter to  ours  to  allow  the  better  organized  States 
to  take  full  advantage  of  their  superiority. 
Discretion  fetters  their  actions  and  policies. 

None  of  these  factors  is  within  our  control 
or  is  ever  likely  to  be.  Nor  can  we  ourselves 
exert  any  direct  influence  upon  them:  they  are 
economic  forces  largely  beyond  human  control; 
they  are  political  friendships  and  antipathies 
which  exist  independent  of  us  and  our  strategic 
position.  Upon  the  European  future  depends 
ours;  what  European  nations  do  will  be  more 
important  for  our  posterity  than  what  we  at- 
tempt. 

One  thing  they  are  determined  upon:  the  over- 
throw and  reorganization  of  the  modern  world. 
The  balance  of  power  which  is  our  shield  and 
buckler  they  are  seeking  to  demolish;  the  Brit- 
ish supremacy  of  the  sea  on  which  our  polity  is 
built,  powerful  nations  intend  to  annihilate; 
the  difference  in  the  balance  of  power  in  Asia, 
Africa,  and  Europe,  all  are  bent  in  altering  in 
their  own  favor.  Nor  are  the  semideveloped 
nations  less  determined  on  erasing  at  the  earliest 
moment  that  difference  in  development  between 
them  and  the  more  highly  organized  States  which 

346 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

prevents  the  latter  from  utilizing  their  superior- 
ity to  the  fullest  extent.  Moreover,  all  are  ready 
to  use  armed  force  to  attain  their  ends.  For  the 
future  nothing  is  certain,  even  if  only  existing 
forces  and  personalities  operate.  Should  a  second 
Caesar  or  Napoleon,  another  Henry  VIII  or 
Bismarck,  shape  the  world  by  his  genius,  nothing 
could  save  the  United  States  from  becoming  his 
prey  save  a  preparedness  whose  extensive  and 
deep  foundations  we  must  now  lay,  if  posterity 
is  to  have  the  opportunity  of  erecting  upon  them 
the  superstructure  of  armament  which  may 
then  become  imperative. 

For  the  United  States  the  element  of  time  is 
all-important.  We  must  at  all  costs  postpone  the 
decision  or  the  trial  of  strength.  Until  economic 
independence  is  truly  ours,  we  cannot  contend 
with  Europe,  and  nothing  but  the  slow  opera- 
tion of  economic  forces  can  create  it.  By  con- 
scious planning  and  the  discreet  use  of  force 
we  may  remove  artificial  obstacles  and  even 
somewhat  hasten  the  pace  of  development.  But 
we  cannot  accelerate  it  sufficiently  to  attain  in- 
dependence and  economic  equality  in  the  im- 
mediate future  by  an  effort  less  considerable  than 
Germany  has  made  in  the  last  three  decades. 

Time  again  we  need  that  propinquity  may 
erase  from  our  present  population  the  memory  of 
a  difference  of  racial  origins  and  of  governmental 

347 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

traditions.  We  are  not  now  a  nation  in  the  sense 
that  France  is.  We  cannot  be  until  the  whole 
population  has  ceased  to  think  except  as  Ameri- 
cans, has  forgotten  to  feel  an  emotional  and 
spiritual  sympathy  for  any  flag  but  the  Stars 
and  Stripes.  Time,  too,  we  must  have,  while  we 
are  reforming  our  careless  and  extravagant  ad- 
ministration, developing  intensive  industry  and 
a  skill  and  economy  of  operations  as  great  as 
European  nations  will  have  attained  half  a 
century  hence.  To  equal  them  we  must  develop 
faster  than  they,  and  as  they  will  not  stand  still, 
we  shall  overtake  them  only  in  time.  While 
the  new  Europe  is  crystallizing  and  reforming, 
is  recovering  from  the  war,  is  formulating  new 
policies  and  ambitions,  we  shall  grow  toward 
that  greater  preparedness  which  is  administra- 
tive, industrial,  spiritual.  Through  preparedness 
we  shall  win  nationality,  freedom,  equality. 

Our  present  armies  and  navies  must  prepare 
to  fight,  not  for  dominion,  not  even  for  safety, 
but  for  time  —  time  in  which  to  overtake  the 
Europeans  in  development,  time  in  which  to 
equal  their  spiritual  unity.  Armament  alone 
can  protect  us  against  unfair  methods  to  exclude 
us  from  the  race;  it  alone  can  hold  open  for  us 
opportunities  while  the  greater  preparedness  is 
fitting  us  to  utilize  them.  For  ourselves  the 
benefit  of  armament  will  be  chiefly  indirect,  in 

348 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

its  reaction  upon  our  social,  administrative,  and 
industrial  structure.  The  greater  preparedness 
merely  calls  on  us  to  solve  the  problems  of 
American  life.  It  has  focused  them  for  us,  thrown 
the  more  essential  into  high  relief,  shaken  us  out 
of  our  complacency  and  narrowness,  dampened 
our  exuberant  belief  that  we  are  the  great- 
est and  richest  nation,  and,  by  baring  our  de- 
ficiencies, has  helped  to  create  a  sense  of  relative 
international  values.  Old  words  will  have  new 
content  —  liberty,  efficiency,  loyalty,  patriotism, 
nationality.  Material  issues  and  aims  are  yield- 
ing the  foreground  to  the  spiritual.  Yet  neither 
the  armies  in  Europe  nor  the  ships  in  the  Hud- 
son are  working  this  miracle.  It  is  introspection, 
thought,  reflection.  The  former  furnish  merely 
the  occasion  for  rousing  our  consciousness  from 
the  routine  of  making  money. 

The  greater  preparedness,  whose  counterfeit 
presentments  armies  and  navies  are,  will  bring 
new  notions  of  national  cooperation,  an  approach 
to  equity  in  industrial  and  social  relationships, 
a  more  real  equality  of  men  and  women,  of  new 
citizens  and  old.  A  new  spiritual  consciousness 
will  arise  of  the  splendor  of  a  national  entity 
comprising  those  long  dead,  those  now  alive,  and 
those  yet  to  be  born,  a  realization  of  the  fact  that 
Washington  and  Lincoln  comprehended  within 
their  visions  of  a  greater  United  States  not  us 

349 


THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  FUTURE 

alone  but  our  own  remote  posterity.  Thus  shall 
we  work  for  a  permanent  peace  between  nations. 
For  peace  is  no  mere  negation,  neither  the  ab- 
sence of  war  nor  the  exorcising  of  hate.  Peace 
is  happiness  and  the  positive  existence  of  love 
between  men.  It  is  the  presence  of  contentment, 
not  the  absence  of  suffering.  Above  all,  it  is 
equity  in  individual,  national,  and  international 
relations,  in  political,  economic,  and  social  con- 
ditions. 

Such  a  greater  preparedness  for  peace  we  may 
well  undertake  in  the  interests  of  posterity;  the 
road  through  preparedness  to  freedom  and  na- 
tionality we  may  well  tread.  Let  us  not  merely 
hope  to  live  uninjured.  Let  us  do  more  than  pray 
for  peace.  Let  us  do  all  within  our  potent  might 
to  preserve  to  our  remote  posterity  that  unfet- 
tered discretion,  that  illimitable  right  to  mold 
the  future  destinies  of  the  nation  in  accordance 
with  the  exigencies  of  the  moment,  upon  which 
the  freedom  and  prosperity  of  the  American 
people  yet  to  be  born  depend.  Let  us  raise  a 
standard  of  which  the  wise  in  the  distant  future 
will  approve  and  to  which  the  honest  for  untold 
generations  may  repair. 

THE   END 


CAMBRIDGE  .  MASSACHUSETTS 
U   .   S   .  A 


THE  LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 

Santa  Barbara 


THIS  BOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 
STAMPED  BELOW. 


Series  9482 


001  070  693 5 


